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                                           Abstract 
 
The aim of this thesis is to deal with the liability elements of the delict or tort of intentional 
infliction of mental harm, or, more precisely, to explore questions arising from the three 
essential elements of the Wilkinson v Downton tort reformulated in Rhodes v OPO. To 
tackle these issues, this thesis is divided into four main chapters (chapters 2 to 5), followed 
by chapter 6 which provides the conclusion.  
 
The conduct element of the Wilkinson/Rhodes tort, or the tort of intentional infliction of 
mental harm, will be investigated in chapter 2, which will be further divided into three 
parts. Part A provides the general introduction of conduct element, where the construction 
of conduct patterns of this tort through a combination of different types of conduct and 
various aggravating factors will be proposed. In Part B, the three archetypal conduct 
patterns of this tort will be dissected and then compared to other five recognised 
torts/delicts, to draw the boundaries and see the applicability of this tort beyond these 
recognised torts/delicts. In Part C, the role played by the requirement of ‘no justification 
or excuse’ in respect of the conduct element will be probed, and the potential justificatory 
grounds for conduct of this tort will then be explored. 
 
The mental element of the Wilkinson/Rhodes tort will be investigated in chapter 3. This 
thesis will argue that, in addition to ‘intention based upon purpose (ends or means)’, the 
mental element of this tort should also include ‘intention based upon knowledge (foresight 
with substantial certainty)’, whilst ‘recklessness’ should be excluded. Inferred or 
constructive foresight/intention should be accepted for these purposes, along with actual 
or subjective foresight/intention. Where the object of intention can be perceived as 
‘(severe) mental or emotional distress’, the notion of ‘foresight with substantial certainty’ 
may arguably be regarded as the most suitable interpretation of the equivocal term 
‘calculated’. 
   ii  
 
The consequence element of the Wilkinson/Rhodes tort will be investigated in chapter 4. 
After examining the traditional distinction between recognised psychiatric illness and 
mere emotional distress, the boundary of mental harm will be delineated as deviation from 
normal or trivial emotions. Arguably, this concept of mental harm can be differentiated 
from recognised psychiatric illness as well as from mere emotional distress. Whether or 
not recognised psychiatric illness, as the traditional threshold of compensable damage of 
this tort, can to some extent be lowered will then be explored. If it is warranted that this 
traditional threshold can be lowered to ‘mental harm’ or ‘severe/significant emotional 
distress’, the relevant criteria for finding ‘mental harm’ will be analysed with examples. 
 
Issues regarding secondary victims in the realm of intentional infliction of mental harm 
will be investigated in chapter 5. First of all, it will be argued that secondary victims, 
whose mental harm is inflicted intentionally rather than negligently, should be entitled to 
a claim based upon this tort. Thereafter the prerequisites of this sort of claim will be 
explored. It will be argued that the prerequisites suggested, particularly in regard to the 
mental element, can adequately ring-fence liability for secondary victims in this 
intentional field. The limiting factors as regards proximity, as employed in negligence 
cases, remain important considerations in respect of this tort, although they need not be 
adopted as categorical limitations. 
 
Based upon these analyses and arguments, in chapter 6 a reconstructed framework of the 
Wilkinson/Rhodes tort will be proposed, which can arguably furnish answers to the long-
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                                       Lay Summary  
 
The aim of this thesis is to deal with the liability elements of the delict or tort of intentional 
infliction of mental harm. The overall research question can be presented as: under what 
conditions should intentionally inflicted (stand-alone) mental harm be recoverable? 
Derived from this question, more specific issues include: 1) What qualifies as the conduct 
of this tort? Is there any ground that may justify the conduct of this tort? 2) What 
constitutes intention in regard to this tort? 3) What level of mental harm or emotional 
distress inflicted on the part of the victim can be taken as compensable? Must the victim 
be labeled by psychiatric experts as having developed a certain kind of (recognised) 
psychiatric illness? 4) If, through the wrongdoer’s intentional conduct, mental harm is 
inflicted on a victim intentionally but indirectly – i.e. the victim is not the direct target of 
the wrongdoer’s conduct, can the victim claim for compensation under this circumstance? 
In order to tackle these issues, this thesis is divided into four main chapters. A 
reconstructed framework of the tort of intentional infliction of mental harm will then be 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
  
The subject of this thesis is the tort of intentional infliction of mental harm. Its research 
question is: under what conditions should intentionally inflicted (stand-alone) mental 
harm be recoverable?1 Drawing upon an in-depth analysis of English, Scottish, and 
comparative material it provides answers to the enduring problems encountered in this 
area of liability and offers suggestions as to how this delict or tort may be taken 
forward into the twenty-first century. 
  
  
1.1 Background and questions 
  
A useful starting point in explaining the background to this thesis is the English case 
of Wilkinson v Downton.2 In that case the defendant, by way of a misguided practical 
joke, fabricated a story to the effect that the plaintiff’s husband had been severely 
injured in an accident and required immediate assistance to bring him home. The 
plaintiff believed the story, and suffered a ‘violent shock to her nervous system’ with 
‘serious and permanent physical consequences’.3 These facts were held to constitute a 
good cause of action in tort. The defendant had ‘wilfully done an act calculated to 
cause physical harm to the plaintiff…and ha[d] in fact thereby caused physical harm 
to her’, ‘there being no justification alleged for the act’.4 Over the years, however, this 
decision has engendered several controversies,5 among which three obvious questions 
                                                                                                                
1 For more detail on the research question presented here see the last part of section 1.1. 
2 Wilkinson v Downton [1897] 2 QB 57. 
3 ibid at 58 per Wright J. 
4 ibid at 58-59 per Wright J.  
5 ‘Wilkinson v Downton [1897] 2 QB 57 has long puzzled writers on the law of torts.’ See M Lunney, 
‘Practical Joking and Its Penalty: Wilkinson v Downton in Context’ (2002) 10 Tort L Rev 168 at 168; 
‘The enduring charm of this cause of action lies in the cryptic nature of the description of the tort in 
Wilkinson itself, which creates plenty of room for debate about exactly what the criteria for liability 
are.’ See D Réaume, ‘The Role of Intention in the Tort in Wilkinson v Downton’ in JW Neyers, E 
Chamberlain and SGA Pitel (eds), Emerging Issues in Tort Law (2007) 533 at 533. Relevant analyses 
of the tort of Wilkinson v Downton see also P Handford, ‘Wilkinson v Downton and Acts Calculated 
to Cause Physical Harm’ (1985) 16 UWAL Rev 31; PR Glazebrook, ‘Wilkinson v Downton: A 
Centenary Postscript’ (1997) 32 IJNS 46; C Slade, ‘Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: 
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arise. The first is how ‘wilfully’ and ‘calculated’ should be interpreted, and how they 
are related to ‘intention’. The second concerns the level of injury required in order for 
liability to arise in cases where the nervous shock or mental harm has not developed 
into physical harm. The third, which has received less attention, relates to the kind of 
justification that can be raised to justify the alleged conduct. 
 
After the decision in Wilkinson v Downton the dicta by Wright J were invoked as a 
basis for claims in a variety of different contexts, with varying degrees of success. The 
various circumstances include, for instance: threatening/terrifying others in order to 
reach an unlawful goal;6 harassment (committed before the passage of the Protection 
from Harassment Act 1997);7 insults;8 invading others’ physical privacy or personal 
integrity; 9  or ‘emotionally manipulating [a minor] and encouraging her to send 
indecent images of herself’ in concomitance with sexual abuse.10 In Rhodes v OPO, 
which is now the leading case, an injunction had been sought by his former wife, on 
the basis of the principles in Wilkinson v Downton, to prevent Rhodes from publishing 
a book disclosing his true life story, details of which had the potential to inflict mental 
harm upon his minor son. The injunction was refused at first instance but granted by 
the Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court, however, allowed Rhodes’ appeal and set 
aside the injunction. The reasoning of the Supreme Court will be discussed at far 
greater length later in this thesis, but for present purposes it is important to note that 
                                                                                                                
Reconsidering the Test for Liability’ (2008) 34 Advoc Q 322; E Reid, ‘Protection of Personality 
Rights in the Modern Scots Law of Delict’ in NR Whitty and R Zimmermann (eds), Rights of 
Personality in Scots Law: A Comparative Perspective (2009) 247 at 4.2.2; Ying Khai Liew, ‘The Rule 
in Wilkinson v Downton: Conduct, Intention, and Justifiability’ (2015) 78 MLR 349; CDL Hunt, 
‘Wilkinson v Downton Revisited’ (2015) 74 CLJ 392; A Gray, ‘Wilkinson v Downton: New Work for 
An Old Tort to Do?’ (2015) 23 Tort L Rev 127; R Mulheron, ‘The Rule in Wilkinson v Downton’ 
(online chapter) in R Mulheron, Principles of Tort Law (2016), available at 
www.cambridge.org/mulheron; P Handford, Tort Liability for Mental Harm (3rd edn, 2017) ch 30; P 
Roycroft, ‘Wilkinson v Downton After Rhodes and Its Future Viability in New Zealand’ (2017) 48 
VUWLR 107. 
6 See the contexts of Janvier v Sweeney. In this case, the Court of Appeal approved the reasoning in 
Wilkinson v Downton and held Janvier as a ‘much stronger case’ than Wilkinson. See Janvier v 
Sweeney [1919] 2 KB 316 at 324 per Bankes LJ; at 326 per Duke LJ. 
7 See Khorasandjian v Bush [1993] QB 727; Wong v Parkside Health NHS Trust [2001] EWCA Civ 
1721; [2003] 3 All ER 932. 
8 See Austen v University of Wolverhampton [2005] EWHC 1635 (QB). 
9 See Wainwright v Home Office [2003] UKHL 53; [2004] 2 AC 406; C v D, SBA [2006] EWHC 166 
(QB). 
10 See ABC v WH 2000 Ltd v William Whillock [2015] EWHC 2687 (QB), in particular at para 89 per 
Sir Robert Nelson. 
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the majority reformulated the prerequisites of the Wilkinson tort into a conduct element, 
a mental element, and a consequence element, as follows:  
 
‘We are inclined to the view…that the tort is sufficiently contained by the 
combination of a) the conduct element requiring words or conduct directed at 
the claimant for which there is no justification or excuse, b) the mental element 
requiring an intention to cause at least severe mental or emotional distress, and 
c) the consequence element requiring physical harm or recognised psychiatric 
illness.’11 
  
This reformulation can be taken as significant due to two reasons. Firstly, through this 
reformulation the Supreme Court explicitly approved of Wilkinson v Downton as 
presenting a valid cause of action, which had not been subsumed into the tort of 
negligence.12 Moreover, through this reformulation, some light has been shed on the 
puzzling liability criteria of this tort. For example, it is very helpful that the Supreme 
Court has now specified the object/target of the defendant’s intention as ‘at least severe 
mental or emotional distress’,13 rather than confining this to notions of physical harm 
or recognised psychiatric illness. It is also sensible that the Supreme Court excluded 
the notion of recklessness from the required mental element.14 Nevertheless, the three 
questions raised at the start of this chapter remain unresolved, or at least, not fully 
clarified. The important questions which remain after this reformulation can be stated 
as follows.  
 
                                                                                                                
11 Rhodes v OPO [2015] UKSC 32; [2016] AC 219 at para 88 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
12 Lord Hoffmann remarked in Wainwright v Home Office that there was no longer a need to ‘fashion 
a tort of intention’ since the facts of Wilkinson could comfortably be accommodated ‘in the law of 
nervous shock caused by negligence’ by the time of Janvier v Sweeney. See Wainwright v Home 
Office (n 9) at para 40 per Lord Hoffmann. However, in Rhodes v OPO, the Supreme Court 
considered Lord Hoffmann’s comments on Wright J’s judgment to have misinterpreted the decision. 
The notion of ‘imputed intention’ was not ‘devised by Wright J to get around a perceived stumbling 
block in the law of negligence’. Moreover, ‘negligence and intent are very different fault elements’, 
which should be differentiated in respect of the ‘bases (and possible extent) of liability for causing 
personal injury’. See Rhodes v OPO (n 11) at paras 62-63 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. Relevant 
analyses see Chapter 3, section 3.11. 
13 The analysis of ‘the object of intention’, see Chapter 3, section 3.22. 
14 Rhodes v OPO (n 11) at para 87 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. Relevant analyses see Chapter 3, 
section 3.661. 
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Following the order of the restated elements, first of all, what qualifies as the conduct 
of this tort seems to be open-ended. In addition, it is not self-evident what role the 
notion of justification/excuse plays in regard to the conduct element, or what kind of 
justification/excuse can be raised. Secondly, despite some clarification as regards the 
object of intention, it remains unclear how intention should be understood for these 
purposes, and how intention relates to the notion of ‘calculated’ found in Wilkinson. 
Thirdly, although the majority of the Supreme Court articulated the required 
consequence as ‘physical harm or recognised psychiatric illness’,15 Lord Neuberger 
argued that ‘it should be enough for the claimant to establish that he suffered 
significant distress as a result of the defendant’s statement’.16 What is the conceptual 
difference between recognised psychiatric illness, severe/significant emotional 
distress, and mere emotional distress? Is there any cogent ground for maintaining or 
lowering the threshold of recognised psychiatric illness? Can a more appropriate 
threshold of compensable damage be set for this tort? All of these questions in relation 
to the consequence element need to be answered. Fourthly, a further question arises 
from the term ‘directed at’ employed in the conduct element.17 Since the alleged 
wrongdoing must be ‘directed at’ the claimant, does that mean victims injured 
indirectly – i.e. the secondary victims – would have no claim on the basis of Wilkinson 
v Downton? Alternatively, given that the circumstances of Rhodes v OPO had no 
bearing on secondary/indirectly injured victims, and the absence of English or Scottish 
authority directly in point, does scope still remain for secondary victims to recover for 
their mental harm (inflicted by the wrongdoers’ intentional acts)? This question also 
requires investigation. 
 
The focus of this thesis will be upon the foregoing questions, which arise from the 
three essential elements of the Wilkinson tort reformulated in Rhodes v OPO. These 
questions remain underexplored in English and Scottish literature, yet answering them 
is crucial to the future application of the Wilkinson/Rhodes tort. The research presented 
in this thesis is therefore both timely and important in terms of its original contribution.  
                                                                                                                
15 ibid at para 88 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
16 ibid at para 119 per Lord Neuberger. 
17 Namely, ‘the conduct element requiring words or conduct directed at the claimant for which there is 
no justification or excuse’. See ibid at para 88 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
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The structure and main points of this thesis will be set forth in section 1.4. 
  
  
1.2  Methodology and Scope 
  
This thesis is founded upon a systematic and comprehensive investigation of existing 
case law in this area and relevant commentary. Through this critical analysis, the 
current law will be clarified, and feasible models will be constructed in regard to 
particular aspects of this tort, with a view to assisting its future application. Moreover, 
in order better to define the boundary and applicability of the Wilkinson tort, 
systematic comparisons will be made at various points with other related torts.  
 
In terms of case law pertinent to the Wilkinson tort, the existent decisions are 
predominantly English. However, as will be argued in section 1.3, the Wilkinson tort 
is also of relevance to Scots law. At the same time given that the English and Scottish 
authorities are relatively few, and indeed insufficient to provide comprehensive 
answers to all of the questions explored here, comparative references will also be 
included. The main comparative sources will be Canadian and Australian cases. The 
Wilkinson tort has continued to evolve in these two Commonwealth jurisdictions, and 
it is therefore helpful to consider developments there as an aid to understanding how 
the law may progress in this area. 
 
The scope of this thesis centres upon the questions arising from the three essential 
elements of the Wilkinson tort reformulated in Rhodes v OPO – i.e. issues regarding 
conduct and justification, issues regarding intention, issues regarding mental harm, 
and issues regarding secondary (indirectly injured) victims. In other words, other 
general issues which may be relevant to the Wilkinson tort – such as causation and 
remoteness; distinctions in English law between different categories of damages; 
vicarious liability; compensation for negligently caused psychiatric injury and its 
prerequisites – are not within the scope of this thesis, although some of these topics 
may be touched upon where necessary. 
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1.3 The applicability of the Wilkinson/Rhodes tort in Scots law 
 
Apart from cases from Canada and Australia, as mentioned above, the existing 
decisions in relation to the Wilkinson tort are mostly English. Whether or not the 
Wilkinson tort can be applied in Scotland is therefore not settled beyond all doubt. 
However, in the light of dicta in the Scots authorities, the Wilkinson tort appears to 
have been acknowledged in the Scots law of delict. First of all, Wilkinson v Downton 
was considered as a sound ‘ground of action’ by Lord Johnston in A v B’s Trustees.18 
Similarly, in Bourhill v Young, reference was made to Wilkinson (admittedly in obiter 
remarks by Lord Porter) in terms that indicated equal acceptance of its relevance on 
both sides of the border: 
 
‘In all three countries [England, Scotland and Ireland], no doubt, shock 
occasioned by deliberate action affords a valid ground of claim: see Wilkinson v. 
Downton and Janvier v. Sweeney…’.19 
 
In modern case law, the applicability of the Wilkinson tort is reflected in the Outer 
House decision in Robertson v The Scottish Ministers, a case regarding persistent 
harassment and bullying at workplace that caused ‘anxiety and distress, leading on to 
more serious psychiatric illness’.20 The pursuer raised her claim against her employers 
upon three different grounds. In relation to the second claim (vicarious liability for 
intentionally inflicted harm),21 notably, Lord Emslie considered the dicta provided in 
several Wilkinson authorities before he decided to allow this claim to go to proof.22  
 
                                                                                                                
18 ‘I am prepared to hold that that is as good a ground of action as that which was sustained in 
Wilkinson’s case.’ See A v B’s Trustees (1906) 13 SLT 830 at 832 per Lord Johnston. 
19  Bourhill v Young 1942 SC (HL) 78 at 100-101 per Lord Porter. 
20 Robertson v The Scottish Ministers [2007] CSOH 186 at para 1 per Lord Emslie. 
21 ibid at para 2 per Lord Emslie.  
22 ibid at paras 14-19 per Lord Emslie. 
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In addition to these judicial dicta, academic commentary also points to the acceptance 
of the Wilkinson tort in Scots law.23 Also, some light has been shed by the Scottish 
Law Commission’s 2017 Report on Defamation. In this report, whilst advising that ‘a 
defamatory statement should only be actionable where it is published to someone other 
than the person who is the subject of it’,24 the Scottish Law Commission argued that 
‘hurt feelings or damage to self-esteem’ caused by a statement communicated solely 
to its subject, e.g. through ‘[o]ffensive emailing and texting’, would better be tackled 
by the ‘law against harassment and by communications legislation’ as well as by the 
‘delict of intentional infliction of mental harm’.25 On the assumption that the Scottish 
Courts were prepared to accept the dicta provided in Rhodes, the Scottish Law 
Commission argued that the wrong of ‘intentional infliction of mental harm’ may have 
a role to play in this regard.26  
 
In brief, despite the intellectual framework of Scots law of delict being different from 
its English counterpart, there seem to be credible grounds for recognising the 
Wilkinson tort in Scots law as a basis of delictual liability. Accordingly, the lack of 
clarity and unresolved questions arising from Wilkinson v Downton or from the three 
essential elements reformulated in Rhodes v OPO also present problems for Scots law. 
For instance, Reid pointed out the uncertainty as to whether, in Scots law, ‘in the 
absence of actual or threatened physical aggression or any other wrong, there exists a 
right of action against a defender who has intentionally inflicted emotional distress 
with effects falling short of recognised physical or psychiatric harm’. 27  Since 
equivalent gaps also exist in Scotland, the analysis and reconstruction of the essential 
elements of the Wilkinson/Rhodes delict, which will be done in this thesis, should be 
of relevance and of use to Scots law. 
 
                                                                                                                
23 DM Walker, The Law of Delict in Scotland (2nd rev edn, 1981) 499-500, 669-671; K Mck Norrie, 
‘The Intentional Delicts’ in K Reid and R Zimmermann (eds), A History of Private Law in Scotland, 
vol 2 (2000) 477 at n 146; Reid (n 5) at section 4.2.2; Handford, Tort Liability for Mental Harm (n 5) 
para 30.70.  
24 Scottish Law Commission, Defamation (Scot Law Com No 248, 2017) para 2.4. 
25 ibid. 
26 See ibid para 2.7. Namely, ‘a person who intended to cause another person to suffer severe mental 
or emotional distress bore the risk of liability in law if the deliberately-inflicted distress caused the 
other person to suffer a recognised psychiatric illness’.  
27 Reid (n 5) at section 4.2.2. 
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Lastly, it should be noted that the actio iniuriarum28 – or affront-based delicts29 – will 
not be dealt with in this thesis, based on the following reasons. First of all, it seems to 
be unsettled whether the actio iniuriarum can be revitalised in modern Scots law and 
play a more active role in protecting rights of personality. Diverse views in regard to 
this controversial question have already been explored at length in academic 
commentaries.30 Secondly, there seems to be recognition of the authority of Wilkinson 
in the above-mentioned Scots case law, and indeed Scottish Law Commission Report 
on Defamation proceeded on the basis that the Scottish Courts were prepared to accept 
Wilkinson, and the reformulation in Rhodes, without reference to the actio iniuriarum. 
In a similar vein, Birks argued more than 20 years ago, that although ‘the common law 
does recognise the delict iniuria’, in order to further ‘remedial activity’, ‘an 
                                                                                                                
28 ‘Actio iniuriarum’ can be defined as ‘an action raised in response to an attack on one of the interests 
protected by, and prohibited under, the concept of iniuria, or injury’. And three quintessential 
characteristics in regard to ‘iniuria’ or ‘injury’ can be observed as ‘affront, intent and the distinction 
between real and verbal injuries’. See  K Mck Norrie, ‘The Actio Iniuriarum in Scots Law: Romantic 
Romanism or Tool for Today?’ in E Descheemaeker and H Scott (eds), Iniuria and the Common Law 
(2013) 49 at 51.  
29 According to Norrie, ‘many of the modern forms of liability traced to the actio iniuriarum may 
conveniently be referred to as the “affront-based delicts”’. See ibid at 52. According to Whitty, 
‘affront-based delicts’ can be perceived as those in regard to which ‘solatium is awarded for wounded 
feelings arising from infringement of an interest which consists of or includes a non-patrimonial 
interest in an aspect of personality’. See NR Whitty, ‘Overview of Rights of Personality in Scots Law’ 
in NR Whitty and R Zimmermann (eds), Rights of Personality in Scots Law: A Comparative 
Perspective (2009) 147 at 205. 
30 For instance, Whitty argued for modernising the actio iniuriarum – or the ‘delict of real and verbal 
injury’– as the ‘legal source of new causes of action for the infringement of personality rights’. See 
Whitty (n 29) at 243-246. In contrast, Reid argued that ‘it is questionable whether it [actio iniuriarum] 
offers a sustainable model for the modern development of personality right protection…Without the 
jurisprudence that has informed the modern development of the doctrine in South Africa, it is difficult 
to see how in Scotland the actio iniuriarum could now be revived and reformed…’. See Reid (n 5) at 
305. Whilst MacQueen pointed out the potential of the actio iniuriarum in protecting against 
‘intrusions upon individual privacy’, he also mentioned the likelihood that ‘the actio iniuriarum in 
Scotland…cannot yet be said to form a very solid platform of either principle or precedent for further 
development of the common law of Scotland relating to the protection of privacy…’. See HL 
MacQueen, ‘A Hitchhiker’s Guide to Personality Rights in Scots Law, Mainly with Regard to 
Privacy’ in NR Whitty and R Zimmermann (eds), Rights of Personality in Scots Law: A Comparative 
Perspective (2009) 549 at 564-565 (in particular the first sentence of section 12.6.1). Moreover, Hogg 
considered that either ‘a reinvigorated actio iniuriarum’ or ‘development of a nominate delict to 
prevent invasion of privacy’ can be a solution to the question as to ‘how protection will be afforded to 
the unauthorised exploitation of personal images’. See M Hogg, Obligations (2nd edn, 2006) 81-82. 
Cameron remarked that, despite being able to ‘serve as a model for future development more 
generally’, the (development of) actio iniuriarum is ‘regarded in some quarters with scepticism’. 
Notably, Cameron made this comment in his fourth edition book, rather than in the latest version (5th 
edn, 2019). See G Cameron, Delict (4th edn, 2011) 83. Although the actio iniuriarum is ‘certainly 
more than a romantic Romanism in Scots law’, Norrie commented, that ‘the law’s general resistance 
to regarding emotional hurt as a loss is sound, and the identification of the circumstances in which that 
redress is justified is and should be driven by other forces than the ghosts of the past’. See Norrie (n 
28) at 65.     
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independent tort of contemptuous harassment’, or even other torts, should also be 
recognised and developed.31  In a sense the task undertaken by this thesis can be 
deemed as taking forward the challenges set out by Birks. Although currently the tort 
of harassment has been established on the basis of the Protection from Harassment Act 




1.4 Structure and main points 
 
In order to explore questions arising from the three essential elements of the Wilkinson 
tort reformulated in Rhodes, this thesis is divided into four main chapters (chapters 2 
to 5), followed by chapter 6 which provides the conclusion. 
 
In chapter 2, the conduct element of the Wilkinson/Rhodes tort, or the tort of intentional 
infliction of mental harm, will be investigated. This chapter will be further divided into 
three parts. Part A provides the general introduction to the conduct element, in which 
the core research questions will be raised, and the conduct patterns of this tort will be 
constructed through a combination of different types of conduct and various 
aggravating factors. In Part B, the crucial ingredients of the three archetypal conduct 
patterns of this tort will be examined and then compared to five other recognised 
torts/delicts, in order to draw its boundaries and to ascertain the applicability of this 
tort in areas which these recognised torts/delicts do not reach. In Part C, the role played 
by the requirement of ‘no justification or excuse’ in respect of the conduct element 
will be probed, and the potential justificatory grounds for conduct of this tort will then 
be explored.  
 
Chapter 3 will analyse the mental element of the Wilkinson/Rhodes tort. Under the 
heads of ‘intention based upon purpose (ends or means)’, ‘intention based upon 
knowledge (foresight with substantial certainty)’, and ‘recklessness’, this chapter will 
                                                                                                                
31 P Birks, ‘Harassment and Hubris The Right to an Equality of Respect’ (1997) 32 IJNS 1 at 44. 
32 See Chapter 2, section 2.225 in regard to the boundary between the statutory tort of harassment and 
this tort/delict. 
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explore different interpretations of the term ‘calculated’ as employed in Wilkinson v 
Downton, as well as the foundations of intention. A more appropriate construction of 
‘calculated’ and intention will then be proposed. 
 
In chapter 4, the consequence element of the Wilkinson/Rhodes tort will be considered. 
Firstly, the traditional distinction between recognised psychiatric illness and mere 
emotional distress will be reviewed, and the boundary of mental harm will be 
delineated. The question whether or not recognised psychiatric illness, as the 
traditional threshold of compensable damage of this tort, can to some extent be 
lowered will then be explored, and the relevant criteria for fixing the lowered threshold 
(‘mental harm’ or ‘severe/significant emotional distress’) will be analysed with 
examples. 
 
In chapter 5, the first question to be examined is whether secondary victims whose 
mental harm is inflicted intentionally should be entitled to a claim based upon this tort. 
Thereafter the prerequisites of this category of claim will be scrutinised in sections 
concerning, respectively, the conduct element, the mental element, and the 
consequence element of this tort. A view will then be offered on the extent to which 
these suggested prerequisites can adequately ring-fence liability in regard to secondary 
victims in this intentional field.  
 
Chapter 6 will draw together the analysis of previous chapters, and on that basis it will 
propose a reconstruction of the framework of the Wilkinson/Rhodes tort. This 
reconstruction will suggest solutions to the fundamental questions identified at the 
beginning of this chapter. 
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Chapter 2 Conduct and Justification 
 
The conduct element of the Wilkinson/Rhodes tort, or the tort of intentional infliction 
of mental harm, is investigated in this chapter. The chapter will be divided into three 
parts. Part A provides the general introduction to the conduct element, and raises the 
core research questions regarding conduct patterns as well as justifications. Moreover, 
it will be suggested that the gravity of conduct – observed mainly in the form of 
aggravating factors – may be a requirement of the conduct element. The conduct 
patterns of this tort can be constructed through a combination of different types of 
conduct and various aggravating factors. In Part B, the three archetypal conduct 
patterns of this tort will be explored. The crucial ingredients of these patterns, 
including relevant aggravating factors, will be analysed and the corresponding case 
law of different jurisdictions will be reviewed. Furthermore, the three conduct patterns 
falling within this tort will be compared to those observed in five other established 
torts, in order to draw boundaries and to ascertain the scope for this tort. Part C will 
examine whether the requirement that there should be ‘no justification or excuse’ is an 
integral part of the conduct element. The potential justifications/justificatory grounds 







2.11 In general 
 
In the milestone Supreme Court case, Rhodes v OPO, the conduct element was 
acknowledged as the first of three essential pillars of the Wilkinson v Downton tort, 
which requires ‘words or conduct directed at the claimant for which there is no 
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justification or excuse’.1 Leaving this element as inclusive as possible, the Supreme 
Court did not fully investigate the patterns or the nature of conduct required. Likewise, 
the question as to the unjustifiability of a wrongdoing was said to ‘depend on the 
context’.2 Although the wrongdoing in respect of this tort could broadly be classified 
as ‘deceptive’, ‘threatening’, or ‘abusive’,3 its exact features have not been pinpointed 
with clarity. Accordingly, it is not easy to distinguish an actionable act from one which 
is not actionable. It may also be difficult to distinguish this tort from other recognised 
torts with which these ‘deceptive’, ‘threatening’, or ‘abusive’ characteristics are to an 
extent shared features. In order to delineate this tort more distinctly, it is important to 
examine further the conduct patterns related to the Wilkinson v Downton tort. As a 
result, the first question for this chapter is: what is the essential nature or pattern(s) of 
conduct of this tort that is the key to its actionability, and distinguishes it from other 
recognised torts? 
 
Following the first question, the qualification of the conduct element – namely, ‘for 
which there is no justification or excuse’ –, also requires some exploration. Does the 
Supreme Court intend ‘the absence of justification or excuse’ to be an integral part of 
the conduct element, or does the Supreme Court simply point out that certain 
justifications or excuses can be raised as a defence for committing the conduct of this 
tort? And, what kind of justification/justificatory grounds can potentially be raised to 
defeat the conduct element, or to justify otherwise wrongful conduct?  
 
In investigating the above questions, given that the existent Scottish and English cases 
are few in number, a number of Wilkinson descendent cases decided in Canada and 
Australia are also examined in order to shed light upon the nature and patterns of 
conduct which are of relevance. 
 
Before the case review, a brief introduction is needed for the conduct element required 
in different jurisdictions in relation to the Wilkinson tort, or the tort of intentional 
                                                                                                                
1 Rhodes v OPO [2015] UKSC 32; [2016] AC 219 at para 88 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
2 ibid at para 111 per Lord Neuberger. 
3 ibid at para 77 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
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infliction of mental harm. Different requirements may signify different kinds of 
conduct which are actionable under this head of tort. Prior to Rhodes, the original 
conduct requirement, as set out in Wilkinson v Downton, was ‘an act calculated to 
cause physical harm’ and ‘to infringe [the plaintiff’s] legal right to personal safety’ 
without justification for the alleged wrongdoing.4  Calculated to cause (physical) 
harm appears to be more related to the mental element of this tort,5 but infringing the 
plaintiff’s legal right to personal safety belongs with the analysis of conduct. The 
Supreme Court in Rhodes has now rephrased the conduct element as ‘words or conduct 
directed at the claimant for which there is no justification or excuse’,6 which discloses 
little more about this element. The requirements of this tort prior to Rhodes are 
principally explored in Australian case law. The original requirement of a wilful (or 
deliberate) act calculated to cause harm without justification is preserved – mainly 
interpreted as an act (reasonably) likely to cause harm without justification. No new 
ingredient has yet been added into the conduct element.7 By contrast in Canada the 
Wilkinson tort requires that the conduct on the part of the wrongdoer be flagrant, 
extreme, or outrageous. The requirement of flagrant, extreme, or outrageous indicates 
that the conduct/wrongdoing at issue must be sufficiently grave to be actionable. This 
is a point worthy of further exploration. 
 
 
2.12 Gravity as a requirement: patterns of conduct and aggravating factors 
 
In Canada, the requirement of flagrant, extreme, or outrageous conduct had been well 
                                                                                                                
4 Wilkinson v Downton [1897] 2 QB 57 at 58-59 per Wright J. 
5 Different interpretations as to the term ‘calculated’ will be analysed in Chapter 3.  
6 Rhodes v OPO (n 1) at para 88 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. The elements reformulated in 
Rhodes have been followed in ABC v WH 2000 Ltd v William Whillock [2015] EWHC 2687 (QB) at 
para 89 per Sir Robert Nelson. These elements have also been employed in a recent decision, see 
Brayshaw v Partners of Apsley Surgery & O’Brien [2018] EWHC 3286 (QB) at para 56 per Mr 
Justice Martin Spencer, although the claim based upon the tort of ‘intentional infliction of harm’ failed 
in the end. 
7 On the conduct element in Australia, see Clavel v Savage [2013] NSWSC 775 at para 36 per 
Rothman J; Dickens v New South Wales [2017] NSWSC 1173 at para 33 per Fagan J. On the 
Australian authorities as regards this cause of action, see Clavel v Savage at paras 11-36 per Rothman 
J; Dickens v New South Wales at paras 34-40 per Fagan J. See also Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Naidu 
[2007] NSWCA 377 at paras 66-83 per Spigelman CJ. 
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established since Rahemtulla v Vanfed Credit Union,8 and then followed by a line of 
authorities.9 This requirement is comparable to the conduct element employed in 
Restatement (Third) of Torts §46 in relation to ‘intentionally or recklessly caused 
emotional harm’.10 However, rather than transplanting foreign legal approaches into 
native soil, McLachlin J in Rahemtulla interpreted this flagrant, extreme, or outrageous 
element as an intrinsic character of the tort as derived from Wilkinson v Downton and 
Janvier v Sweeney. In other words, the wrongdoing found in both Wilkinson and 
Janvier is regarded as ‘in fact flagrant and extreme’.11 McLachlin J took a step further 
and assumed that ‘only flagrant and extreme conduct inflicting mental suffering is 
actionable’.12 This Canadian approach was noted in Rhodes v OPO, but not followed 
there.13 Nevertheless, the Canadian interpretation is noteworthy as, arguably, it has 
unveiled the nature of the Wilkinson tort, indicating that there is an important question 
of degree, a point explored further below. 
 
The English, Canadian and Australian case law reviewed below indicates that the 
recurring patterns of conduct of this tort can be classified under four heads: 1) playing 
on or interfering with the victims’ emotional bonds with their nearest and dearest 
(mostly) through false statements; 2) threatening or coercing victims into doing 
something; 3) insults or other abusive conduct; 4) inflicting mental harm through 
injury to a third party. The first three types roughly correspond to the archetypal 
characteristics of this tort mentioned in Rhodes – which are ‘deceptive’, ‘threatening’, 
or ‘abusive’.14 The fourth category relates to what might be termed secondary victims, 
                                                                                                                
8 Rahemtulla v Vanfed Credit Union [1984] 3 WWR 296 at paras 53-55 per McLachlin J. 
9 See Boucher v Wal-Mart Canada Corp 2014 ONCA 419 at para 50 per Laskin J A; Hudspeth v 
Whatcott 2017 ONSC 1708 at para 245 per Perell J; Champ’s Mushrooms v Guo 2018 BCSC 650 at 
para 90 per Mr Justice Harvey. Other authorities prior to Boucher which employed this criterion 
include: Pacific Press v C E P, Local 115-M 52 CLAS 427; Prinzo v Baycrest Centre for Geriatric 
Care [2002] OJ No 2712; CVC Services v IWA-Canada, Local 1-71 38 CCEL (2d) 141; Campbell v 
Wellfund Audio-Visual Ltd [1995] BCJ No 2048; Butler v Newfoundland (Workers’ Compensation 
Commission) [1998] NJ No 190; Bogden v Purolator Courier Ltd [1996] AJ No 289; Clark v Canada 
[1994] 3 FC 323. These cases will be analysed in the following case review. 
10 ‘An actor who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe 
emotional harm to another is subject to liability for that emotional harm and, if the emotional harm 
causes bodily harm, also for the bodily harm’. See Restatement (Third) of Torts §46 (2012). 
11 Rahemtulla v Vanfed Credit Union (n 8) at para 53 per McLachlin J. 
12 ibid at para 54 per McLachlin J. 
13 Rhodes v OPO (n 1) at para 88 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
14 ibid at para 77 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
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a category which was not mentioned in Rhodes, nor in other English cases. Yet in other 
jurisdictions it is a well-recognised type of this tort, which will be investigated 
independently in Chapter 5. This listing is not exhaustive, however. The potential 
modes of inflicting mental harm are many and varied, but the above are the most 
frequently observed. 
 
The Canadian emphasis upon the gravity of the conduct seems to be consonant with 
(most of the) actionable cases from different jurisdictions. When determining the 
gravity of conduct, the character of the conduct, as well as its capability to inflict 
mental harm/emotional distress, are taken into consideration. Admittedly, this 
determination is highly reliant on context, and an element of subjectivity is 
inevitable.15 Nevertheless, in the case law of the different jurisdictions reviewed, five 
factors are frequently observed, which could be taken as indicating or aggravating the 
gravity of the conduct at issue. These five factors are 1) the falsity of the statement, 2) 
unlawful motive, 3) exploiting the victims’ vulnerability, 4) abusing power or unequal 
status, and 5) the persistence of the wrongdoing. As will be analysed in 2.2, arguably, 
the first factor is particularly relevant to the first pattern of conduct. The second factor 
is more related to the intention/mental element than to the conduct element, thus it will 
be analysed in Chapter 3.16 The last aggravating factor regarding the persistence of 
conduct may be of less relevance in England and Scotland, since where recurrent 
conduct is involved, it is more likely in practice that a claimant/pursuer will pursue a 
remedy under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 instead of this tort.17 As a 
result, in the diagram presented below, the fifth aggravating factor will not be placed 
into consideration, and, when constructing conduct patterns, emphasis will be placed 
on the first, the third, and the fourth aggravating factors – namely falsity of the 




                                                                                                                
15 As pointed out by Lord Neuberger, ‘even with a test of outrageousness a subjective judgment will 
be involved to some extent, but that cannot be avoided’. See ibid at para 110 per Lord Neuberger. 
16 See Chapter 3, section 3.323. 
17 See the analyses in sections 2.225 and 2.2252. 
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2.13 Construction of conduct patterns – combining different patterns with aggravating 
factors 
 
Based upon the above analysis, the patterns of conduct and relevant aggravating 






Combining the patterns of conduct with the first, the third, and the fourth aggravating 
factors,18 the conduct patterns of this tort can be constructed as follows: 
 
A.   False Statement  
                                                                                                                
18 Despite being relevant to the gravity of conduct, the second factor is more related to the mental 
element than to the conduct element.	  
   17  
a.   In general: Playing on or interfering with the victims’ emotional bonds with 
their nearest and dearest (mostly) through false statements, which could 
significantly impact their mental well-being. 
b.   Abusing power or unequal status in conjunction with playing on or interfering 
with the victims’ emotional bonds (mostly) through false statements. 
 
B.   Threatening 
a.   In general: Threatening or coercing victims into doing something, which could 
significantly impact their mental well-being. 
b.   Exploiting the victims’ vulnerability in conjunction with threats or coercion. 
c.   Abusing power or unequal status in conjunction with threats or coercion. 
a)   In the context of employment: Abusing power and threatening employees 
with work-related negative consequences. 
b)   In other contexts: Abusing power and threatening the victims with negative 
consequences. 
 
C.   Insults or other abusive conduct 
a.   In general: Insults or other abusive conduct, which could significantly impugn 
the victims’ dignity and impact their mental well-being. 
b.   Exploiting the victims’ vulnerability in conjunction with insults or other 
abusive conduct. 
c.   Abusing power or unequal status in conjunction with insults or other abusive 
conduct. 
a)   In the context of employment. 
b)   In other contexts. 
 
D.   Inflicting mental harm through injury to a third party – cases involving 
‘secondary victims’. 
 
E.   Other conduct patterns. 
 
Although the first four conduct patterns are not exhaustive classifications, they 
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nonetheless shed light on the typical conduct patterns of this tort found to be actionable 
or recoverable. It should be noted that the deed done in Rhodes v OPO – i.e. publishing 
a book revealing the author’s traumatic childhood experiences – does not come close 
to any of these four patterns. It is theoretically possible that such conduct might 
constitute the conduct element as required in Rhodes v OPO. However, in this case the 
majority in the Supreme Court held that the publication at issue had not done so,19 
based upon two grounds. The first was that the disputed conduct must be directed 
towards/at the claimant.20 Arguably, wrongdoing can be taken as directed at someone 
when he or she is either an immediate subject (of the wrongdoing) at the scene, or at 
least a substantial target.21 In Rhodes, the disputed publication was considered to be 
directed towards ‘a wide audience’ instead of towards ‘the claimant in isolation’.22 
The second ground is that publishing one’s own true life history to the world is 
justifiable conduct.23 As analysed further in sections 2.31 and 2.312, it seems arguable 
that the Supreme Court treated the absence of justification or excuse as an integral part 
of the conduct element, rather than treating the presence of a justification or excuse as 
a defence.24 Accordingly, since there was ‘every justification for the publication’,25 
the conduct element was not satisfied. Furthermore, a third reason may simply be that 
publishing one’s own life history to the world is not grave or egregious enough. As 
analysed in section 2.12, the gravity of conduct or aggravating factors can arguably be 
taken as a requirement in respect of this tort, as they are observed in most of the 
actionable cases of different jurisdictions.  
 
In Part B (section 2.2), the first three patterns and relevant case law will be reviewed, 
whilst the fourth conduct pattern will be explored independently in Chapter 5. 
 
                                                                                                                
19 Rhodes v OPO (n 1) at paras 80 and 90 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
20 ibid at paras 74 and 88 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson.	  
21 Such as the plaintiff in Bielitski v Obadiak [1922] 65 DLR 627; the first plaintiff (Mr. Butler) in 
Butler v Newfoundland (Workers’ Compensation Commission) (n 9); or Mrs. Basham in Stevenson v 
Basham [1922] NZLR 225. For analysis of the ‘substantial target’ in this tort see Chapter 5, section 
5.412. 
22 Rhodes v OPO (n 1) at paras 74 and 75 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
23 ibid at paras 76 and 77 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
24 See sections 2.31 and 2.312. As to whether or not the Supreme Court’s approach is a warranted 
one, see the analysis in section 2.313. 
25 Rhodes v OPO (n 1) at para 76 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 




2.2 Patterns of Conduct 
 
2.21 False Statement 
 
2.211 In general: Playing on or interfering with victims’ emotional bonds with their 
nearest and dearest (mostly) through false statements, which could significantly 
impact their mental well-being 
 
The case of Wilkinson v Downton itself, can serve as the paradigm for this sort of 
conduct pattern. Analogous patterns of conduct can also be discerned in several cases 
from other jurisdictions. This pattern of conduct roughly corresponds to the ‘deceptive 
(statement)’ category suggested by Rhodes,26 as in all of the cases the wrongdoer 
perpetrated the wrongdoing by means of a fabricated story. However, to tell a lie or 
simply to trick others cannot of itself suffice to be tortious. The nature and the essential 
ingredients of this conduct pattern require to be further examined.  
 
In Wilkinson v Downton, deliberately to play a practical joke, the defendant falsely 
informed the plaintiff that her husband had been severely injured in an accident, lying 
somewhere ‘with both legs broken’.27 Through these (false) words the defendant 
successfully played upon the plaintiff’s emotional bonds with her husband, causing 
her extreme anxiety and impacting her mental well-being. Wright J held the conduct 
of the plaintiff as ‘calculated to cause physical harm’ and ‘to infringe her legal right to 
personal safety’.28  
 
In Bielitski v Obadiak, a Canadian case, the defendant misrepresented to another 
person that the son of the plaintiff ‘had hanged himself from a telephone pole’,29 ‘with 
                                                                                                                
26 ibid at para 77 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
27 Wilkinson v Downton (n 4) at 58 per Wright J. 
28 ibid at 58-59 per Wright J. 
29 Bielitski v Obadiak (n 21) at para 14 per Lamont JA. 
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the intention that it should reach the plaintiff’.30 This untrue story had been repeated 
by different people and finally reached the plaintiff, as a consequence causing her 
‘violent shock and mental anguish, which brought on physical illness and incapacitated 
her for some time’.31 
 
What are the crucial features of this conduct pattern? Such conduct plays on or 
interferes with the victims’ emotional bonds with their relatives through a false story 
about injury or death. If the recipient believes the story, serious anxiety about the 
relative’s death or injury is triggered, with significant consequences for his or her 
mental well-being. Four features should therefore be noted: gravity, falsity, belief, and 
right to personal safety. 
 
First of all, trivial lies or tricks do not qualify as wrongdoing of this kind. The contents 
of stories fabricated in the two cases above are sufficiently serious to evoke strong 
emotional reactions. Wright J in Wilkinson held the conduct in question to be 
‘calculated to cause physical harm’ and ‘to infringe her legal right to personal safety’.32 
Trivial lies or tricks would be unlikely to trigger a person’s emotional reaction in such 
a way as to ‘to infringe her legal right to personal safety’. Despite the reformulation 
by the Supreme Court in Rhodes, this still implies that conduct in this category should 
be of certain degree of gravity.33 In the Canadian case Rahemtulla v Vanfed Credit 
Union, reviewed below, McLachlin J regarded the wrongdoing in Wilkinson as ‘in fact 
flagrant and extreme’.34 
 
Secondly, the falsity of the defendant’s statement seems to be an important factor. 
                                                                                                                
30 ibid at para 20 per Lamont JA. 
31 ibid at para 14 per Lamont JA. 
32 Wilkinson v Downton (n 4) at 58-59 per Wright J. 
33 See Rhodes v OPO (n 1) at para 88 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. Although the majority made 
no explicit comment about ‘gravity’ in regard to the conduct element, they did require the mental 
element to be ‘an intention to cause at least severe mental or emotional distress’. As will be explored 
in Chapter 3, the concept of intention can include purpose (ends or means) and foresight with 
substantial certainty (that a particular consequence would be caused by the disputed conduct). If a 
wrongdoer can foresee as substantially certain that his/her conduct can bring about ‘severe mental or 
emotional distress’, this foresight implies that his/her conduct should be one which is capable of 
causing ‘severe mental or emotional distress’, rather than a trivial misdemeanour. 
34 Rahemtulla v Vanfed Credit Union (n 8) at para 53 per McLachlin J. 
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Arguably, the falsity of the statement is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition 
of this conduct pattern, but it is an aggravating factor that heightens the gravity of the 
wrongdoing. It is not a sufficient condition because, as mentioned above, simply 
telling a lie which is not too serious would not entail liability. What matters is whether 
the conduct or the uttered statement is grave enough to inflict severe emotional distress. 
On the other side of the coin, falsity is not a necessary condition of this conduct pattern 
either. Certainly, telling the truth is generally less reprehensible than telling lies. Yet, 
under exceptional circumstances, telling the truth may be taken as sufficiently 
egregious to constitute this conduct pattern. Let us suppose, for instance, adapting the 
facts of Wilkinson, the defendant had indeed witnessed the husband of the plaintiff 
being ‘smashed up in an accident’ and told her about what occurred in a callous and 
rude manner, deliberately trying to depict every searing detail of the accident or the 
severe injury resulted, on purpose to inflict severe emotional distress upon the plaintiff. 
Alternatively, A wanted to take revenge upon B, his ex-girlfriend, so he murdered her 
son. Then, on purpose to inflict severe emotional distress upon her, A phoned B and 
informed her of all the details as to how he did it as well as the suffering of her son 
before his death. In these examples, despite telling the truth, the conduct on the part of 
the wrongdoers is still capable of infringing the victims’ mental well-being 
significantly. Wrongdoing of this nature can be regarded as grave/egregious due to the 
presence of the wrongdoers’ unlawful motive/purpose.35 Since the motive/purpose of 
the wrongdoers is to exploit the truth and inflict mental harm, there appears to be no 
reason why their conduct should escape liability just because they were 
communicating the truth.36 
 
Thirdly, for the false (or even true) statement to impact significantly upon the victim’s 
mental well-being, the victim must believe in this story. Clearly this belief is not a part 
of the defendant’s conduct, but it is a crucial factor connecting the defendant’s conduct 
to the emotional reaction on the part of the victim (claimant). Arguably, this belief 
                                                                                                                
35 In the absence of any unlawful motive/purpose, simply communicating true and injurious news in a 
callous or rude manner may not be considered as egregious enough. As to the boundary between 
motive and (intention based upon) purpose, see Chapter 3, section 3.323. 
36 Whether or not ‘truth’ can constitute justification for conduct of this tort will be further examined 
in section 2.3233. 
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should be reasonable from the perspective of ordinary people,37 otherwise it would 
be difficult for the defendant to foresee the belief and the consequent emotional 
reaction. Although such belief is an indispensable element, the claimant should not be 
required to prove this since in most of the cases, it would be very difficult for the 
claimant to establish his or her subjective belief. However, in exceptional situations 
where the defendant can prove that the claimant did not actually believe in the disputed 
story, or that the claimant’s belief is unreasonable, this evidence of lack of belief may 
serve to rebut the causal link between the defendant’s conduct and mental harm 
allegedly suffered by the claimant.  
 
Fourthly, in Wilkinson v Downton, Wright J spoke to the notion of a ‘legal right to 
personal safety’ by holding that ‘[t]he defendant has…wilfully done an act calculated 
to cause physical harm to the plaintiff – that is to say, to infringe her legal right to 
personal safety’.38 Thus the ‘legal right to personal safety’ seems to be the interest 
protected by this tort.39 It has been argued that the legal right to personal safety 
corresponds also with the interest protected by ‘trespass to the person’ in English law,40 
namely: ‘a person’s elementary civil right to security of the person, and self-
determination in relation to his own body’.41 On the other hand, Lord Hoffmann stated 
categorically in Wainwright v Home Office, that ‘Wilkinson v Downton has nothing to 
do with trespass to the person’.42 Indeed, Mrs. Wilkinson had not been put in any 
immediate physical danger by the disputed false story. Therefore, it is not self-evident 
what the ‘legal right to personal safety’ actually means, or what the protected interest 
                                                                                                                
37 For instance, if a complained false statement is uttered in a heated dispute, as well as in a vague 
manner without provision of any definite circumstances, the belief in it may be taken as unreasonable. 
Parallel contexts see a Scottish slander case Christie v Robertson (1899) 1 F 1155. 
38 Wilkinson v Downton (n 4) at 58-59 per Wright J. 
39 It should be noted that, in Birks’ opinion, Wilkinson v Downton ‘actually turns on the right to 
physical integrity’. However, in his article, Birks raised a hypothetical scenario and argued that the 
law’s focus on ‘physical integrity’ should be shifted to ‘the right to an equality of respect’ (which 
constitutes the protected interest of the independent tort of ‘contemptuous harassment’ as proposed by 
him). See P Birks, ‘Harassment and Hubris The Right to an Equality of Respect’ (1997) 32 IJNS 1 at 
43-44. 
40 PR Glazebrook, ‘Wilkinson v Downton: A Centenary Postscript’ (1997) 32 IJNS 46 at 47-48. Also 
see M Lunney, ‘Practical Joking and Its Penalty: Wilkinson v Downton in Context’ (2002) 10 Tort L 
Rev 168 at 180. 
41 JF Clerk and AM Dugdale, Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (22nd edn, 2018) para 15-01. 
42 Wainwright v Home Office [2003] UKHL 53; [2004] 2 AC 406 at para 47 per Lord Hoffmann. 
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is for this tort. In Wong v Parkside Health NHS Trust, having mentioned, but not 
elucidated, the notion of the ‘legal right to personal safety’, Lady Justice Hale held 
that, in order for the requirements of the Wilkinson tort to be met, ‘[t]he defendant must 
have intended to violate the claimant’s interest in his freedom from such harm 
[physical harm or recognised psychiatric illness].’ 43  The protected interest as 
conceptualised in that case is therefore ‘freedom from physical harm or recognised 
psychiatric illness’. In Rhodes v OPO, the Wilkinson tort is described by the majority 
in the Supreme Court as the tort of ‘wilful infringement of the right to personal 
safety’.44 Nevertheless, the notion of ‘the right to personal safety’ was not clarified, 
nor was it expressly incorporated in the reformulation of the elements of this tort. 
Rather, the majority reworded the mental element as ‘an intention to cause at least 
severe mental or emotional distress’.45 In the light of these decisions, although the 
‘right to personal safety’ is still referred to in broad terms as the protected interest of 
this tort, the more specific focus has arguably been shifted to victims’ right to mental 
integrity, or the freedom from harm to mental well-being or mental health.  
 
 
2.212 Abusing power in conjunction with playing on or interfering with victims’ 
emotional bonds 
 
The impugned conduct in Boswell v Minister of Police,46 a South African case, is 
similar to that in the above-mentioned two cases. The only difference is that the 
defendant in the former abused his power or status while he played on the plaintiff’s 
emotional bonds. In this case, the defendants, who were members of the police force, 
visited the plaintiff, who cared for her nephew Ivan since the death of his mother, and 
informed her that ‘he had shot Ivan who had died as a result’ and asked her to ‘go to 
the police station to identify the body’,47 which turned out to be a lie.48 The defendant 
                                                                                                                
43 Wong v Parkside Health NHS Trust [2001] EWCA Civ 1721; [2003] 3 All ER 932 at para 12 per 
Lady Justice Hale. 
44 Rhodes v OPO (n 1) at paras 73, 77, and 81 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
45 ibid at para 88 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
46 Boswell v Minister of Police 1978 (3) SA 268 (E). 
47 ibid at 270 per Kannemeyer J. 
48 ibid at 271 per Kannemeyer J. 
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was found to be aware of the plaintiff’s ‘close ties of kinship with Ivan’,49 yet chose 
to exploit it and trick the plaintiff. 
 
The points analysed in the general part above – gravity, falsity, and belief are also 
crucial factors to be considered here. Yet the special character of this case is the abuse 
of power or status on the part of the defendant. Although communication of false 
information to inflict mental harm can be done by any ordinary person, the factor of 
abusing power/status can arguably heighten the gravity of the conduct at issue. As 
discussed, if a fabricated story (regarding the death or injury to one’s nearest and 
dearest) is to damage an individual’s mental well-being, that individual needs to have 
reasonable belief in the story. The position or authority enjoyed by the defendant 
would make his story/information more credible and, as a result, much more likely to 
injure. Therefore, if wrongdoing of this type is perpetrated by the defendant whilst 
abusing his power or position, that conduct should be taken as more egregious. In other 
words, the abuse of power or status is an aggravating factor for this conduct pattern.50 
 
 
2.213 The scope of this tort and the boundaries between this conduct pattern and other 
established torts  
 
Finally, the boundaries between this conduct pattern and other nominate torts/delicts 
need to be drawn. By clarifying overlaps and differences, we can obtain a clearer 
understanding of the potential use of this tort, and the role it can fulfil where other torts 
have reached their limits. False statements are the most commonly adopted means to 
inflict mental harm. Yet false statements are also a feature of several other torts, such 
as defamation, fraud or deceit. The boundary with defamation is considered further 
below, as more relevant in relation to the third category of conduct pattern,51 since 
injured reputation is very closely related to injured dignity, and their borderline is not 
                                                                                                                
49 ibid at 274 per Kannemeyer J. 
50 Notably, ‘whether the actor abused a position of authority over the other person’ is an important 
consideration in determining ‘whether an actor’s conduct is extreme and outrageous’. See Restatement 
(Third) of Torts §46 (2012) (n 10) Comment d. 
51 Namely, ‘insults or other abusive conduct, which could significantly impugn victims’ dignity and 
impact their mental well-being’. 
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always easy to identify. Comparably, the tort of deceit/fraud also requires the 
communication of fabricated stories or reports in order to trick the victims. As Buller 
J stated in Pasley v Freeman, a milestone case which had garnered the common law 
principles pertinent to dishonesty and produced the tort of deceit,52 ‘[e]very deceit 
comprehends a lie, but a deceit is more than a lie on account of the view with which it 
is practised, its being coupled with some dealing, and the injury which it is calculated 
to occasion, and does occasion, to another person’.53 Two centuries later in Bradford 
Third Equitable Benefit Building Society v Borders, Viscount Maugham synthesised 
the common law rules related to deceit into four requirements:54 1. ‘there must be a 
representation of fact’; 2. ‘the representation must be made with a knowledge that it is 
false’; 3. ‘it must be made with the intention that it should be acted upon by the 
plaintiff…in the manner which resulted in damage to him’; 4. ‘it must be proved that 
the plaintiff has acted upon the false statement and has sustained damage by so doing’. 
The last three requirements here help to shed light upon the boundary between the tort 
of deceit/fraud and the first pattern of conduct. 
 
First of all, since ‘[e]very deceit comprehends a lie, but a deceit is more than a lie…’,55 
it seems clear that falsity is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition of deceit/fraud. 
In contrast, for this conduct pattern, despite a false statement being a prevalently 
employed means to inflict mental harm, it is arguable that the falsity of the statement 
is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition of this conduct pattern.56 Furthermore, 
as can be extracted from the last two requirements, the false representation in a deceit 
case should be intended to be acted on, and then actually acted on, thereby resulting 
in the damage at issue.57 By contrast with this, the first conduct pattern does not 
require the plaintiff to act upon the false statement – namely to engage in any further 
                                                                                                                
52 S Deakin, A Johnston and B Markesinis, Markesinis and Deakin’s Tort Law (7th edn, 2013) 466. 
53 Pasley v Freeman [1775-1802] All ER Rep 31 at 35 per Buller J. 
54 Bradford Third Equitable Benefit Building Society v Borders [1941] 2 All ER 205 at 211 per 
Viscount Maugham. 
55 Pasley v Freeman (n 53) at 35 per Buller J. 
56 As analysed above, under exceptional circumstances, telling the truth can possibly constitute this 
conduct pattern. 
57 On the requirement of ‘being acted on’ of the tort of deceit, see also discussion in Peek v Gurney 
[1861-73] All ER Rep 116 at 128 per Lord Cairns; Barry v Croskey (1861) 70 ER 945 at 954-955 per 
Vice Chancellor, Sir W Page Wood. 
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action in reliance upon it. The first conduct pattern requires the belief on the part of 
the plaintiff in the story. As long as the plaintiff believes in the story, no further action 
is needed. The communication of fabricated report itself is capable of (emotionally) 
harming the plaintiff in a significant manner. In Wilkinson v Downton, Wright J 
apparently made this distinction. He accepted that the cost of transportation, incurred 
as a result of the plaintiff’s action in reliance on the false message, could be recovered 
on the basis of Pasley v Freeman, since ‘the statement was a misrepresentation 
intended to be acted on to the damage of the plaintiff’.58 Yet the mental harm and 
physical harm caused to the plaintiff cannot be compensated on the same footing,59 as 
‘there is no injuria of that kind’.60 
 
In short, where the mental harm (or even physical harm) at issue arises as a result of 
the victim’s believing in the false statement rather than his/her acting upon it, this tort 





2.221 In general: Threatening or coercing victims into doing something, which could 
significantly impact their mental well-being 
 
Besides playing upon the victim’s emotional bonds, there are other avenues through 
which mental well-being can be significantly harmed. The conduct pattern explored in 
this section centres upon threatening the victim (into doing something) with negative 
consequences. This corresponds to an extent with the example of ‘threatening’ speech 
mentioned in Rhodes,61 as the utterance or exhibition of a threat is a frequently-seen 
feature of this conduct pattern. The manner in which the threat is uttered, as well as 
the alleged negative consequences, must be sufficiently serious to harm the victim’s 
mental well-being. In addition to the mere fact of the conduct being threatening, 
                                                                                                                
58 Wilkinson v Downton (n 4) at 58 per Wright J. 
59 ibid at 58-59 per Wright J. 
60 ibid at 58 per Wright J. 
61 Rhodes v OPO (n 1) at para 77 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
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aggravating factors such as exploiting the victim’s vulnerability or abusing power or 
unequal status can frequently be observed in cases of this category. These ‘aggravated’ 
cases will be explored in their own sub-categories as follows. 
 
Janvier v Sweeney62 is a classic case where this pattern of conduct can be discerned. 
The plaintiff’s case was that she was overcome by fright and anxiety about her own 
fate when she was falsely accused and threatened, in an implied fashion, with an 
accusation of treason. In order to procure certain letters possessed by the plaintiff’s 
employer, one of the defendants pretended to be ‘a detective inspector from Scotland 
Yard’, deceitfully informing the plaintiff that ‘she was the woman they wanted as she 
had been corresponding with a German spy’, using threats to induce her to cooperate 
with them and commit a gross breach of duty.63 According to Duke LJ, this case was 
‘much stronger’ than Wilkinson, because in this case ‘there was an intention to terrify 
the plaintiff for the purpose of attaining an unlawful object’.64 
 
The fundamental nature of this conduct pattern is using a threat to coerce the victim 
into doing something. This is undoubtedly different from the first conduct pattern. 
However, the two conduct patterns still share some important features. First of all, if 
Janvier v Sweeney can be taken as an archetypal case of this category, the disputed 
conduct requires to be grave. As observed by McLachlin J, the conduct pattern of 
Janvier v Sweeney can be regarded as ‘flagrant and extreme’.65 Trivial threats which 
are incapable of significantly impacting the victim’s mental well-being may not attract 
liability. In other words, the threatened consequences and the manner in which the 
threat is uttered must be serious and frightening to a high degree. 
 
Secondly, falsity is not a necessary characteristic of this conduct pattern. Although the 
defendant in Janvier threatened the plaintiff on the basis of a fabricated story, in most 
of the cases of this category there is no false statement. As threats in general can be 
based upon true facts, a false statement is not an indispensable element of threatening 
                                                                                                                
62 Janvier v Sweeney [1919] 2 KB 316. 
63 ibid at 320-321 per Bankes LJ; also at 316-317. 
64 ibid at 326 per Duke LJ. 
65 Rahemtulla v Vanfed Credit Union (n 8) at para 53 per McLachlin J. 
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behaviour. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether the falsity of the statement can be taken 
as an aggravating factor in this conduct pattern. Arguably, threats based upon true facts 
may often be more intimidating. For instance, if everything uttered by the defendant 
in Janvier was true, and the plaintiff knew it to be so, the threat at issue might have 
been even more frightening, and capable of harming the plaintiff’s mental integrity in 
a significant manner.66  
 
Thirdly, if the plaintiff is to be intimidated and damaged emotionally, the plaintiff 
needs to have reasonable belief in the defendant’s story, as well as in the prospect that 
the defendant would carry out the threat. However, the plaintiff does not need to take 
positive action in compliance with the threat. In Janvier v Sweeney, the disputed threat 
on the part of the defendant had impacted the plaintiff’s mental well-being in a 
significant way, even incapacitated her, before she could do anything in response to 
the threat. 
 
Lastly, the defendant’s unlawful motive, or ‘purpose of attaining an unlawful object’67 
can be observed in Janvier, which would arguably aggravate the wrongdoing/conduct 
at issue. As this aggravating factor is intertwined with the notions of motive and 
intention based upon purpose (ends or means), it will be explored in Chapter 3.68 
 
 
2.222 Exploiting the victim’s vulnerability in conjunction with threats or coercion 
 
The three cases analysed in this part are all from Canada. A common characteristic in 
each case is that the defendant exploited or played on others’ vulnerability when the 
disputed conduct (threat) was committed. In Timmermans v Buelow, with the 
knowledge of the plaintiff’s previous psychiatric condition,69 his landlord Buelow, 
kept threatening the plaintiff that he would put the latter back into the hospital,70 in 
                                                                                                                
66 As to whether truth-based threatening can be justified, see the discussion in sections 2.3222 and 
2.3233. 
67 Janvier v Sweeney (n 62) at 326 per Duke LJ. 
68 See Chapter 3, section 3.323.	  
69 Timmermans v Buelow [1984] OJ No 2408 at paras 18 and 31 per Catzman J. 
70 ibid at para 15 per Catzman J. 
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order to ‘play on the plaintiff’s fears and to induce him to vacate the [rented] premises 
immediately’.71 The second case, Pacific Press v C E P, Local 115-M, is a case of a 
grievance filed by a trade union to the Labour Arbitration Board against an employer. 
Despite having knowledge of the poor health and vulnerable mental state of the 
employee, the employer’s staff repeatedly threatened her that unless she resumed work 
she would be disciplined,72 In addition, they denied her claim for disability benefits 
without reasonable grounds for doing so.73 This conduct was appraised as flagrant and 
extreme.74 In the third case, Boothman v R, the plaintiff was threatened with losing 
her job, and suffered deliberate assaults, harassment, and insults. In this case, the 
plaintiff’s supervisor perceived her emotional fragility and determined to exploit it75 
by constant threats and insults.76 This conduct was held to have generated ‘extreme 
emotional reactions’.77 
 
As can be discerned from these three cases, knowledge of the plaintiff’s vulnerability 
and exploitation of this vulnerability appear to be the shared features of the disputed 
conduct. Parallel to abusing power or status, in accordance with the commentary to the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts §46, having knowledge of (and exploiting) the victim’s 
vulnerability is also a crucial consideration when assessing ‘whether an actor’s 
conduct is extreme and outrageous’.78 This is without doubt an important aggravating 
factor, which does not merely heighten the gravity of the defendant’s conduct, but may 
even transform otherwise non-tortious into tortious conduct.79 In other words, the 
wrongdoer’s knowledge and exploitation of the victim’s vulnerability may render 
normally harmless conduct harmful (specifically to this victim). Also, this knowledge 
                                                                                                                
71 ibid at paras 18 and 30 per Catzman J. 
72 Pacific Press v C E P, Local 115-M (n 9) at paras 94-95 per Bruce. 
73 ibid at paras 96-97 per Bruce. 
74 ibid at para 98 per Bruce. 
75 Boothman v R [1993] 3 FC 381 at para 98 per Noël J. 
76 ibid at para 76 per Noël J. 
77 ibid. 
78 Restatement (Third) of Torts §46 (2012) (n 10) Comment d. 
79 Accepting the principle that ‘[c]onduct which would not cause nervous shock to a normal person 
should not be regarded as tortious’, Noël J held that ‘[w]hen a person knowingly exploits another’s 
emotional and mental vulnerability thereby causing a severe and lasting mental breakdown, it is no 
answer to state that a normal person would not have been so adversely affected.’ See Boothman v R (n 
75) at paras 101 and 106 per Noël J. 
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(of vulnerability) can play a role in determining the wrongdoer’s level of intention80 
– at least in the form of knowledge/foresight with substantial certainty that his or her 
conduct would cause mental harm to this specific victim.81 
 
The feature of heightening the gravity of the wrongdoer’s conduct can be observed in 
Boothman v R. The various forms of conduct in Boothman – including threatening the 
victim with loss of her job – should be sufficiently serious to impact employees’ 
mental well-being in a significant way, irrespective of whether the employees are of 
normal fortitude.82 In contrast, in Timmermans v Buelow, generating an atmosphere 
of ‘tension and confrontation’,83 threatening to ‘put the plaintiff’s stuff out on the 
street’ 84  and put the plaintiff ‘back in the hospital’ 85  might be unpleasant and 
annoying. Yet whether these deeds can significantly harm the mental well-being of 
people of normal fortitude is questionable. The knowledge and exploitation of the 
plaintiff’s specific vulnerability played a crucial role here to trigger liability, 
transforming the defendant’s deeds into tortious and actionable ones. This 
interpretation seems to be consistent with Catzman J’s conclusion, that ‘Buelow’s 
actions on October 1, 1981, given his prior knowledge of the plaintiff’s condition, 




2.223 Abusing power or unequal status in conjunction with threats or coercion 
 
The characteristic shared by cases of this category is that the defendant abused power 
                                                                                                                
80 ‘If I am aware that a person is vulnerable to a particular form of conduct and I persist in that form 
of conduct, the fact I do so demonstrates the intentional aspects of my acts.’ See Bogden v Purolator 
Courier Ltd (n 9) at para 81 per Ritter J. 
81 Regarding this form/level of intention, see Chapter 3, section 3.4. 
82 Notably, this issue had not been addressed in Boothman. Since Mr. Stalinski had exploited the 
mental fragility on the part of the plaintiff, there is no question as regards ‘whether the actions of Mr. 
Stalinski would have caused nervous shock to a normal person’. See Boothman v R (n 75) at para 106 
per Noël J. 
83 Timmermans v Buelow (n 69) at para 14 per Catzman J. 
84 ibid at para 12 per Catzman J. 
85 ibid at para 15 per Catzman J. 
86 ibid at para 31 per Catzman J. 
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or unequal status in committing the impugned conduct (threat). As many cases of this 
type have emerged in the context of employment, this category will be further split 




2.2231 In the context of employment: Abusing power and threatening victims with 
loss of employment or other work-related negative consequences 
 
In this sub-category, the defendant can issue threats or indulge in other injurious 
conduct mainly because he or she enjoyed a superior position of authority at work. In 
nearly all of the cases reviewed here, the defendant did not exercise his power or 
authority for a legitimate purpose or in an appropriate manner. Therefore, the conduct 
pattern of this sub-category can be seen as a combination of the abuse of power and 
threats. The threats may be varied in nature, but they must be germane to work-related 
conditions. For instance, the gist of the threat may be about disciplinary measures 
taken against the victim. In Pacific Press v C E P, Local 115-M, noted above, whilst 
threatening the employee with disciplinary procedures 87  and rejecting without 
reasonable ground her claim for disability benefits,88 the employer did not merely 
exploit her fragility but also abused the employer’s power or authority. Alternatively, 
the threat may be related to an unwanted transfer or termination of employment. In the 
Boothman v R, mentioned above, the plaintiff’s supervisor repeatedly uttered threats 
and insults against her, threatening that she could be dismissed.89 His conduct not only 
exploited her vulnerability but also abused his superior authority. 
 
Other patterns of abusive and threatening conduct include the following examples:  
•  phoning an injured and unwell employee persistently,90 fabricating information 
from her doctor and insinuating that she was malingering,91 and threatening 
                                                                                                                
87 Pacific Press v C E P, Local 115-M (n 9) at para 95 per Bruce. 
88 ibid at paras 96-97 per Bruce. 
89 Boothman v R (n 75) at para 76 per Noël J. 
90 Prinzo v Baycrest Centre for Geriatric Care (n 9) at para 6 per Weiler JA. 
91 ibid at para 8 per Weiler JA. 
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her that she would be disciplined for refusing to return to work92 (Prinzo v 
Baycrest Centre for Geriatric Care);93  
•   in addition to physical abuse and threats of physical harm,94 repeatedly insulting 
the employee in a serious manner,95 threatening him with ‘loss of his job’,96 
and stopping his salary,97 or a transfer from his current position98 (Nationwide 
News Pty Ltd v Naidu);99  
•  making an unfounded accusation (of theft) against the employee,100 threatening 
her with the loss of her job,101 and actually dismissing her thereafter102 (held 
by McLachlin J as ‘flagrant and outrageous’103 as well as reflecting an abuse 
of power104 in Rahemtulla v Vanfed Credit Union);105  
•   in order to achieve an unlawful goal, repeatedly threatening the employee that 
unless he cooperated and ‘reconsidered his position’,106 he would lose his 
job,107 warning him that the defendant had ‘black contacts in Hong Kong’,108 
and actually dismissing him without reasonable ground 109  (Campbell v 
Wellfund Audio-Visual Ltd);110 
                                                                                                                
92 ibid at para 11 per Weiler JA. 
93 These wrongdoings on the part of the defendant prior to the termination were held as ‘flagrant and 
outrageous’ by the court. See ibid at para 60 per Weiler JA. 
94 Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Naidu (n 7) at paras 118-119 per Beazley JA. 
95 ibid at paras 117 and 128 per Beazley JA. 
96 ibid at para 134 per Beazley JA. 
97 ibid at para 137 per Beazley JA. 
98 ibid at para 117 per Beazley JA. 
99 The wrongdoings on the part of the wrongdoer were held as parallel to the character of the 
Wilkinson tort and as a consequence recoverable. See ibid at paras 67 and 83 per Spigelman CJ. 
100 Rahemtulla v Vanfed Credit Union (n 8) at paras 3 and 4 per McLachlin J. 
101 ibid at para 4 per McLachlin J. 
102 ibid at paras 4-5 per McLachlin J. 
103 ibid at para 55 per McLachlin J. 
104 ‘While the financial institution has the right to dismiss a suspect employee without investigation, 
the proper conduct of its affairs does not require that it be given the right to make reckless and very 
possibly untruthful accusations as to the employee’s honesty which will foreseeably inflict shock and 
mental suffering.’ See ibid. 
105 This is a pivotal case in relation to the Wilkinson tort in Canadian case law. See D Réaume, ‘The 
Role of Intention in the Tort in Wilkinson v Downton’ in JW Neyers, E Chamberlain and SGA Pitel 
(eds), Emerging Issues in Tort Law (2007) 533 at 546-548. 
106 Campbell v Wellfund Audio-Visual Ltd (n 9) at para 32 per Clancy J. 
107 ibid at para 38 per Clancy J. 
108 ibid at para 36 per Clancy J. 
109 ibid at para 46 per Clancy J. 
110 The wrongdoings of the defendant were held by Clancy J as flagrant and extreme. See ibid at para 
104 per Clancy J. 
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•   in addition to a course of harassment,111 threatening the plaintiff with the loss 
of her job,112 as well as with criminal investigation and charges113 (Clark v 
Canada).114 
 
In short, the common characteristic of the above cases is that the wrongdoer threatened 
the plaintiff/employee with work-related negative consequences by exploiting his or 
her superior position, authority, or power: ‘[t]he combatants are not equals’. 115 
Namely, the wrongdoer’s control over the prospective well-being of the threatened 
employee, made the threatening conduct more harmful and egregious. In one Canadian 
arbitration case, it was held that the employer’s authority heightened the gravity of 
otherwise common behaviour such as yelling, screaming, or heated arguments, 
potentially converting them into extreme and outrageous conduct.116   
 
In addition, it can be observed in most of the Canadian or Australian cases reviewed 
in the employment context, the impugned ‘conduct’ encompassed multiple actions 
rather than a single act. A threatening conduct pattern commonly occurred alongside 
insulting behaviour. Although these foreign cases help to shed light on the conduct 
patterns of this tort, in England and Scotland wrongdoing that recurs and meets the 
requirement of ‘a course of conduct’117 can be dealt with on the basis of the Protection 
from Harassment Act 1997. Therefore the boundary between this conduct pattern (or 
even this tort) and the statutory tort of harassment requires to be clarified. The 




                                                                                                                
111 Clark v Canada (n 9) at paras 5-8 per Dubé J. 
112 ibid at para 17 per Dubé J. 
113 ibid at paras 26-27 per Dubé J. 
114 These multiple wrongdoings were held by Dubé J as ‘extreme’. See ibid at para 65 per Dubé J. 
115 Tyee Village Hotel v Hotel, Restaurant & Culinary Employees & Bartenders Union, Local 40 57 
CLAS 124 at para 34 per Albertini. 
116 ibid at paras 12, 13, 34, 43, and 44 per Albertini. It was held at para 34, that ‘Harper appears to 
simply not understand that a person in authority cannot engage in a heated argument with an 
employee with impunity…The combatants are not equals’. 
117 See Protection from Harassment Act 1997 s 8(1) and s 1(1).  
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2.2232 In other contexts: possessing superior power/authority and threatening people 
with negative consequences 
 
Possession of superior authority or power in combination with threatening acts can 
also be seen in contexts other than employment. For instance, public officers and in 
particular the police and those involved in law enforcement may be seen as enjoying 
a form of superior power/authority. Based on that authority the wrongdoer can utter a 
threat, or make a threat more egregious and harmful. In Murray v Prevost, a Canadian 
case, the defendant was then a police officer,118 who threatened the plaintiff that he 
would take her child away,119 and that he would ‘fuck up [her] driving record’.120 The 
court held that these threats were ‘actionable’ in consideration of ‘the position of the 
Defendant as a police officer’.121 In another Canadian case, Butler v Newfoundland 
(Workers’ Compensation Commission), the first plaintiff was an injured worker and 
the second plaintiff was his wife, who acted as the advocate for the worker throughout 
a claim process.122 In the course of that process, without any foundation, the C.E.O. 
of the compensation commission insulted the wife and condemned her for her 
continuous interference with medical appraisals, threatening the plaintiffs with 
‘negative impact on the decision making process’. 123  The defendant’s conduct 
through its C.E.O. was held as ‘flagrant and extreme’.124 Obviously the impugned 
conduct in this case was regarded as so egregious because the defendant possessed 
superior power and authority. Conversely, it is possible that in the absence of the 
imbalance of power or authority, the disputed conduct on the part of the defendant may 
not be regarded as so serious as to be actionable.  
 
 
                                                                                                                
118 Murray v Prevost 2006 CarswellOnt 7522 at para 2 per JM Young DJ. 
119 ibid at para 5 per JM Young DJ. 
120 ibid. 
121 ibid. (The numbers of paragraphs are lost in this decision after para 5). 
122 Butler v Newfoundland (Workers’ Compensation Commission) (n 9) at paras 1 and 89 per Russell 
J. 
123 ibid at para 77(6) per Russell J. 
124 ibid at paras 93 and 102 per Russell J. 
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2.224 The boundary between this conduct pattern and assault 
 
2.2241 The characteristics of assault 
 
The feature of threats in respect of this conduct pattern can possibly be compared with 
the characteristics (or a part of the characteristics) of assault. In English law, under the 
head of ‘trespass to the person’, the tort of assault is distinguished from the tort of 
battery.125 Goff LJ elucidated the distinction succinctly in Collins v Wilcock, that an 
assault is ‘an act which causes another person to apprehend the infliction of immediate, 
unlawful, force on his person’, whilst a battery is ‘the actual infliction of unlawful 
force on another person’.126 The infliction of unlawful force does not need to bring 
about any physical harm. It can be satisfied by any unwanted and ‘hostile’ touching,127 
any physical contact which goes ‘beyond generally acceptable standards of 
conduct’,128 or any touching which can be taken as ‘offensive/objectionable’.129 The 
substance of assault is ‘an act causing reasonable apprehension of a battery’.130 The 
reasonable apprehension can be generated by various forms of conduct, possibly even 
by silent phone calls, by analogy with the decision in R v Ireland.131 Despite its being 
a criminal case, the House of Lords’ interpretation of the elements of assault therein 
might equally be applied to tortious liability also.132 Lord Hope acknowledged that 
silent phone calls, despite conveying no words or gestures at all, are capable of 
precipitating ‘an apprehension of immediate and unlawful violence’.133 Lord Steyn 
also held that the apprehension of ‘the possibility of immediate personal violence’, 
resulting from the silent calls, could meet the requirement of assault.134 However, it 
seems that an apprehension unrelated to physical violence, force or contact cannot be 
                                                                                                                
125 See Clerk and Dugdale (n 41) Chapter 15. 
126 Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172 at 1177 per Goff LJ. 
127 Wilson v Pringle [1987] QB 237 at 252-253 per Croom-Johnson LJ. 
128 Collins v Wilcock (n 126) at 1178 per Goff LJ. 
129 See PR Glazebrook, ‘Assaults and Their Consequences’ (1986) 45(3) CLJ 379 at 380-381. 
130 Clerk and Dugdale (n 41) para 15-13. 
131 R v Ireland [1998] AC 147. 
132 E Reid, Personality, Confidentiality and Privacy in Scots Law (2010) para 2.16. 
133 R v Ireland (n 131) at 166 per Lord Hope of Craighead. 
134 ibid at 162 per Lord Steyn. 
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protected by the law of assault. Whether this gap can be filled by this tort will be 
discussed further below (in section 2.2242). 
 
In contrast, this demarcation between assault and battery has gradually retreated from 
the modern outlook of Scots law.135 The terminological usage of ‘assault’ in current 
Scots law incorporates both the infliction of physical injury/contact and the threat of 
it. In principle, a remedy based upon assault may be recognised in situations where 
physical injury or bodily contact is inflicted,136 or in cases where physical injury or 
bodily contact is threatened.137 The first kind of assault can be committed either by 
‘direct physical contact’ or ‘by causing an object to make such contact’, which must 
be ‘objectionable and offensive’ instead of being ‘trivial’.138 In the second category, 
an assault can be committed by the wrongdoer putting the victim in ‘immediate fear 
of hostile or objectionable physical contact’.139 As the original essence of assault in 
Scots law could be taken as ‘insult’ or ‘affront’ to others,140 a third sub-division of 
assault was suggested by Walker. Under this category, labelled by Walker as ‘indirect 
assault’, an act done deliberately to result in another person’s ‘being affronted’ – e.g. 
taking away his clothes, or being ‘put in a state of alarm’, or ‘physically hurt’, is 
‘doubtless equally an assault’. 141  However, after a thorough examination, Reid 
observed that there is little authority in the modern Scots cases to support this third 
category of assault as proposed by Walker, since ‘[t]here are no findings of assault on 
the basis of soiled towels or other affronts to dignity without the presence of some 
                                                                                                                
135 F McManus, E Russell and J Bisacre, Delict: A Comprehensive Guide to the Law in Scotland (2nd 
edn, 2011) para 13.3. Reid (n 132) para 2.04. With regard to the emergence and establishment of 
assault, see J Blackie, ‘Unity in Diversity: The History of Personality Rights in Scots Law’ in NR 
Whitty and R Zimmermann (eds), Rights of Personality in Scots Law: A Comparative Perspective 
(2009) 31 at 104-108. 
136 Downie v Chief Constable, Strathclyde Police 1998 SLT 8 at 8-9 per Lord Bonomy. 
137 Hyslop v Staig (1816) 1 Mur 15 at 22 per Lord Chief Commissioner. Also see Ewing v Earl of 
Mar (1851) 14 D 314. In this case, the assault charged is twofold, besides ‘spitting’ the defender also 
rode on horseback at the pursuer, so as to place the latter in danger. 
138 Reid (n 132) para 2.05. 
139 ibid para 2.15. Also see Hyslop v Staig (n 137) at 22 per Lord Chief Commissioner: ‘It is not 
necessary in law to constitute an assault, that the person be struck. It is sufficient that he has been put 
in dread or apparent danger of bodily harm.’  
140 G Cameron, Delict (5th edn, 2019) para 4-17; or page 83 in the fourth edition. Also see DM 
Walker, The Law of Delict in Scotland (2nd rev edn, 1981) 488-490. 
141 Walker (n 140) 492. 
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element of contact or threatened physical danger.’142 In other words, an insult or 
affront, without the pursuer being physically hurt, touched, or threatened, is unlikely 
to found a solid claim in the area of assault. Nevertheless, this type of insult may be 
remedied on the basis of this tort, as will be explored in section 2.23. 
 
 
2.2242 Comparison between assault and the second conduct pattern of this tort 
 
A comparison between assault and the second conduct pattern of the tort discussed 
here reveals the points at which the law of assault may draw back but this tort might 
still apply. It would appear that assault in English law, or the second category of assault 
in Scots law – namely causing apprehension of ‘immediate’ and ‘unlawful’ force143 
or ‘immediate fear of hostile or objectionable physical contact’,144 can be compared 
to the second conduct pattern discussed in this section. Where an assault is perpetrated 
by means of a threat or threatening conduct, what is the distinction between such an 
assault and the threatening conduct of this tort?  
 
From the above analysis of the features of assault, it is obvious that in regard to assault 
threats require to involve physical injury, force, or contact. In other words, the 
expected bad consequence – injury or contact – relates to the victim’s physical 
integrity, and the apprehended injury, force, or contact must be hostile, offensive, or 
objectionable. In contrast, the negative consequences threatened in respect of the 
second conduct pattern (of the tort discussed here) can be of all sorts including but 
certainly not restricted to physical injury, force, or contact. They do not require to be 
immediate or imminent, yet they need to be sufficiently serious and gratuitous to 
invade the victim’s mental integrity or mental well-being. 
 
In the cases reviewed above, the threat of assault can be seen in Boothman v R and in 
Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Naidu. In Boothman v R, in addition to threats as to work-
                                                                                                                
142 Reid (n 132) para 2.20.	   	  
143 Collins v Wilcock (n 126) at 1177 per Goff LJ. 
144 Reid (n 132) para 2.15. 
   38  
related consequences, the plaintiff’s supervisor had made several threats such as ‘he 
wanted to shove his fist down plaintiff’s throat’, ‘he would break her fingers’, ‘he 
would rip off her lips’, and ‘he would break her arm and that he would bash her head 
in’.145  Whilst uttering these threats, he would occasionally display a hammer or 
brandish a screwdriver in the presence of the plaintiff.146 These threats were without 
doubt targeted at the plaintiff’s physical integrity. In a parallel manner, apart from 
threats concerning work-related consequences, in Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Naidu 
one of the defendant’s senior officers repeatedly made threats to the plaintiff regarding 
what he would do to him. He had ‘punched a hole in a wall’ and said ‘this is what I’m 
going to do to you’,147 once in a while intimidating him with ‘[kicking] chairs and 
[throwing] things’, warning him that if he dared to leave he ‘would never be able to 
walk’.148 Such threats are also of a physical character and capable of constituting 
assault. In contrast with these examples, other threats discussed above under this 
second category are non-physical, such as the threat to put the victim out of work, as 
occurred in Rahemtulla v Vanfed Credit Union,149 in Campbell v Wellfund Audio-
Visual Ltd,150  and also in Boothman v R151  and in Nationwide News Pty Ltd v 
Naidu.152 Threats of a non-physical nature also include the horrifying consequences 
of being charged with treason following from the threats made in Janvier v Sweeney;153 
the threat to send the victim back to hospital in Timmermans v Buelow;154 or threats 
to deprive the victims of their sole financial support as in Butler v Newfoundland 
(Workers’ Compensation Commission).155  
 
In sum, a boundary can possibly be drawn between the threat of assault and the threat 
of this second conduct pattern. Where the threatened consequences involve no physical 
                                                                                                                
145 Boothman v R (n 75) at para 74 per Noël J. 
146 ibid at para 75 per Noël J. 
147 Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Naidu (n 7) at para 119 per Beazley JA. 
148 ibid at para 123 per Beazley JA. 
149 Rahemtulla v Vanfed Credit Union (n 8) at para 4 per McLachlin J. 
150 Campbell v Wellfund Audio-Visual Ltd (n 9) at para 38 per Clancy J. 
151 Boothman v R (n 75) at para 76 per Noël J. 
152 Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Naidu (n 7) at para 134 per Beazley JA. 
153 Janvier v Sweeney (n 62) at 320-321 per Bankes LJ; also at 316-317. 
154 Timmermans v Buelow (n 69) at para 15 per Catzman J. 
155 Butler v Newfoundland (Workers’ Compensation Commission) (n 9) at paras 77(6) and 91 per 
Russell J. 
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injury, force, or contact, the law of assault would reach its limits. Yet the tort under 
discussion here may nonetheless provide a remedy. 
 
 
2.225 The boundary between this conduct pattern and harassment 
 
As discussed above this second conduct pattern typically involves multiple actions 
rather than a single act – especially in the context of employment. Also, this conduct 
pattern of threats is often intermingled with other conduct patterns. The variety of 
conduct is reminiscent of the statutory tort of harassment. Admittedly most of the 
decisions under review are from Canada or Australia. In Canada, tortious liability in 
respect of harassment is contentious, 156  or at least the situation is divided and 
unsettled.157 In Australia, the tort of harassment is similarly uncertain, as noted by the 
Australian Law Reform Commission. 158  As a result, in these two jurisdictions, 
wrongdoing in the form of harassment can be dealt with by reference to the Wilkinson 
tort. In contrast, in England and Scotland, pursuant to the Protection from Harassment 
Act 1997, ‘a course of conduct’ inflicting alarm, anxiety or distress constitutes 
actionable harassment. Hence as long as multiple actions are involved the 
requirements for statutory harassment are likely to be met. But are multiple actions of 
this conduct pattern (or this tort) fully covered by the 1997 Act? In order to answer 





                                                                                                                
156 See Campbell v Wellfund Audio-Visual Ltd (n 9) at para 93 per Clancy J. In this case, Clancy J 
stated that ‘I was provided with no authority that establishes harassment as a cause of action in 
Canada’. 
157 Mainland Sawmills Ltd v IWA-Canada, Local 1-3567 Society 2006 BCSC 1195 at paras 13-14 per 
J S Prowse J. As J S Prowse J pointed out, ‘The case law is divided’. However, even some cases ‘have 
assumed that the tort of harassment exists’, they ‘do not set out the basis for that assumption, nor do 
they set out the elements of the tort’. 
158 Australian Law Reform Commission, Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era (ALRC No 
123, 2014) para 15.12. In terms of civil remedies, ‘Australian courts have not recognised a common 
law cause of action for harassment’. 
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2.2251 The requirements and nature of harassment 
 
The Protection from Harassment Act 1997 addresses courses of conduct that inflict 
alarm, anxiety and emotional distress. In accordance with section 1(1) of the Act, 
which applies in England and Wales: ‘(1) A person must not pursue a course of conduct 
– (a) which amounts to harassment of another, and (b) which he knows or ought to 
know amounts to harassment of the other.’159 In regard to Scotland, with a slightly 
different wording, section 8(1) provides that ‘Every individual has a right to be free 
from harassment and, accordingly, a person must not pursue a course of conduct which 
amounts to harassment of another and (a) is intended to amount to harassment of that 
person; or (b) occurs in circumstances where it would appear to a reasonable person 
that it would amount to harassment of that person.’160 ‘Conduct’ encompasses speech 
and ‘harassment’ includes causing the person alarm or distress.161 A course of conduct 
must involve conduct on at least two occasions,162 save exceptions provided in section 
7(3)(b) for England and Wales 163  and section 8A(3)(b) for Scotland. 164 
Notwithstanding the foremost purpose of this Act being regarded as ‘prevention and 
protection rather than compensation’,165 in England/Wales and Scotland, the court 
may award damages which cover any ‘anxiety caused by the harassment’ and any 
‘financial loss resulting from the harassment’.166  To prevent the wrongdoer form 
pursuing any further conduct constituting harassment, the English/Welsh court can 
grant an injunction against the wrongdoer,167 whilst the Scottish court can grant an 
interdict or a non-harassment order.168 Besides civil remedies, harassment in England 
                                                                                                                
159 Protection from Harassment Act 1997 s 1(1). 
160 ibid s 8(1).  
161 ibid s 7(2), (4) in relation to England and Wales; s 8(3) in regard to Scotland. 
162 ibid s 7(3)(a) in relation to England and Wales; s 8(3) in regard to Scotland. 
163 ibid s 7(3)(b). In England and Wales, according to section 7(3)(b), ‘in the case of conduct in 
relation to two or more persons (see section 1(1A))’, a course of conduct must involve ‘conduct on at 
least one occasion in relation to each of those persons’. 
164 ibid s 8A(3)(b). In Scotland, where the disputed harassment constitutes ‘domestic abuse’, the 
required conduct ‘may involve behaviour on one or more than one occasion’. 
165 Majrowski v Guy’s and St Thomas’s NHS Trust [2007] 1 AC 224 at paras 65 and 67 per Baroness 
Hale of Richmond. Please also see T Lawson-Cruttenden and N Addison, Blackstone’s Guide to the 
Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (1997) 30. 
166 Protection from Harassment Act 1997 s 3(2) in relation to England and Wales; s 8(5), (6) in regard 
to Scotland. 
167 ibid s 3(3), 3(6), 3A. 
168 ibid s 8(5)(b). 
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and Wales is also a criminal offence,169 whereas the commission of harassment in 
Scotland is not per se a crime, although the breach of a non-harassment order in 
Scotland would constitute a criminal offence.170 
 
It is suggested that the legislation of Protection from Harassment Act was originally 
aimed at putting an end to ‘stalking’ and ‘neighbours from hell’.171 This might have 
been the impetus for the legislation, but the 1997 Act is drafted in a sufficiently broad 
way to cover much else besides. The width of protection offered by this Act was 
exemplified in Majrowski v Guy’s and St Thomas’s NHS Trust, where Lord Nicholls 
submitted that ‘[t]he Act seeks to provide protection against stalkers, racial abusers, 
disruptive neighbours, bullying at work and so forth.’172 In this case, the House of 
Lords unanimously held that the employer could be vicariously liable for the harassing 
conduct perpetrated by their employees, as long as the requirement of ‘close 
connection’ (between the complained harassment and the employment) was met.173  
 
In an intended rather than inadvertent manner, the ‘definition of harassment’ seemed 
to be left ‘wide and open-ended’ in the 1997 Act.174 Despite the absence of an exact 
definition, Lord Nicholls in Majrowski proposed a standard for determining whether 
the disputed course of conduct can be considered as harassment – ‘oppressive and 
unacceptable (behaviour)’, 175  whereas Lady Hale embraced similar terms of 
‘offensive and unacceptable behaviour’. 176  Harassment is, however, to be 
                                                                                                                
169 ibid s 2. 
170 ibid s 9. 
171 K Patten, ‘Defining Harassment’ (2010) 160 NLJ 331 at 331. Also see P Giliker, ‘The Ongoing 
March of Vicarious Liability’ (2006) 65 CLJ 489 at 490; C Bryden, ‘Unreasonable Conduct’ (2010) 
160 NLJ 198 at 199; Veakins v Kier Islington Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 1288 at para 17 per Lord Justice 
Maurice Kay. 
172 Majrowski v Guy’s and St Thomas’s NHS Trust (n 165) at para 18 per Lord Nicholls. 
173 ibid at para 30 per Lord Nicholls. As regards the ‘close connection’ test in respect of vicarious 
liability, see Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd [2002] 1 AC 215. Analyses pertinent to vicarious liability in the 
area of harassment, see Reid (n 132) para 4.06. Also see NA Moreham, ‘Harassment by Publication’ 
in NA Moreham and others (eds), Tugendhat and Christie: The Law of Privacy and the Media (3rd 
edn, 2016) 269 at paras 6.25 and 6.26.     
174 Majrowski v Guy’s and St Thomas’s NHS Trust (n 165) at para 66 per Baroness Hale of Richmond. 
Also see Patten (n 171) at 331.  
175 Majrowski v Guy’s and St Thomas’s NHS Trust (n 165) at para 30 per Lord Nicholls. 
176 ibid at para 66 per Baroness Hale of Richmond. 
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distinguished from ‘ordinary banter and badinage of life’, 177  or conduct that is 
‘unattractive’, ‘regrettable’, even ‘unreasonable’.178 In other words, the ‘gravity of the 
misconduct’ is required to cross the dividing line and satisfy the proposed standard.179 
 
 
2.2252 The demarcation between harassment and this conduct pattern 
 
Where the disputed wrongdoing, which (intentionally) inflicts alarm, distress, or even 
mental harm, occurs on only one occasion, in most cases it cannot be dealt with on the 
basis of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. Actionable harassment requires a 
course of conduct which involves conduct on at least two occasions,180 unless the 
wrongdoing at issue relates to multiple victims (harassed by the same wrongdoer) in 
England/Wales181 or amounts to ‘domestic abuse’ in Scotland.182 As a result, the tort 
under discussion here continues to have practical relevance where the wrongdoing has 
occurred on one occasion only.183  
 
However, where the alleged infliction of alarm, distress, or mental harm involves 
multiple deeds, the boundary between this conduct pattern (or this tort) and harassment 
becomes less clear, since the definition of harassment is left ‘wide and open-ended’.184 
The standard of ‘oppressive’, ‘offensive’, and ‘unacceptable’ behaviour as proposed 
in Majrowski can be construed by different courts in various ways. ‘Oppressive’ is 
perhaps more specific and implies gravity, but ‘offensive and unacceptable’ are very 
general terms used in depicting tortious conduct. As Lady Hale acknowledged in 
                                                                                                                
177 ibid. 
178 ibid at para 30 per Lord Nicholls. 
179 ibid. Regarding the ‘seriousness of the defendant’s conduct’, also see Moreham, ‘Harassment by 
Publication’ (n 173) at paras 6.21 and 6.22. 
180 Protection from Harassment Act 1997 s 7(3)(a) in relation to England and Wales; s 8(3) in regard 
to Scotland. 
181 ibid s 7(3)(b). Also see s 1(1A). 
182 ibid s 8A(3)(b).  
183 As Lord Neuberger remarked in Rhodes, that ‘Parliament has not legislated so as to cover, or to 
suggest disapproval of, claims in tort based on “one-off” distressing statements as in Wilkinson and 
Janvier’. See Rhodes v OPO (n 1) at para 109 per Lord Neuberger. 
184 Majrowski v Guy’s and St Thomas’s NHS Trust (n 165) at para 66 per Baroness Hale of Richmond. 
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Majrowski, that ‘[a]ll sorts of conduct may amount to harassment’. 185  This 
inclusiveness means that, in theory, the tort of harassment can extend to various kinds 
of wrongdoing as long as it is repeated. For example, if the impugned conduct 
occasioned ‘an apprehension of immediate and unlawful violence’,186 it should be 
taken as constituting an assault. On the other hand threats of unlawful and immediate 
force are likely to be offensive and unacceptable, and even oppressive, and therefore a 
campaign of such assaults could turn into harassment.187 Likewise, recurrent conduct 
of this pattern in the tort under discussion, which satisfies the standard of ‘oppressive’, 
‘offensive’, and ‘unacceptable’ behaviour, is also likely to come within the statutory 
concept of harassment. 
 
Moreover, the potential ambit of harassment is much wider than that of this tort also 
because intention is not a necessary requirement in the 1997 Act,188 nor is recognised 
psychiatric illness or physical harm (as a consequence developing from the inflicted 
anxiety or distress).189 Where such wrongdoing is recurrent, it is much easier to meet 
the requirements of the 1997 Act than those of this tort. 
 
In sum, in relation to recurrent wrongdoing, this tort is overshadowed by the Protection 
from Harassment Act 1997, retaining a significant role in cases where the alleged 







                                                                                                                
185 See ibid. 
186 R v Ireland (n 131) at 166 per Lord Hope of Craighead. 
187 This possibility is also reflected in Protection from Harassment Act 1997 s 4(1): ‘A person whose 
course of conduct causes another to fear, on at least two occasions, that violence will be used against 
him is guilty of an offence if he knows or ought to know that his course of conduct will cause the 
other so to fear on each of those occasions.’ 
188 See ibid ss 1(1) and 8(1). Also see Reid (n 132) para 4.03.  
189 Protection from Harassment Act 1997 ss 3(2) and 8(6). 
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2.23 Insults or other abusive conduct 
 
2.231 In general 
 
A further pattern of conduct can be discerned from the case law – insults or other 
abusive conduct, which can significantly impugn the victim’s fundamental dignity.190 
In Wainwright v Home Office, Lord Scott raised a question as to ‘whether the infliction 
of humiliation and distress by conduct calculated to humiliate and cause distress, is 
without more, tortious at common law’?191 His answer was straightforward – it is not, 
nor should it be.192 More than ten years later, in Rhodes v OPO, Lady Hale and Lord 
Toulson did not deny the possibility of insults or abusive words being actionable or 
recoverable under the head of Wilkinson v Downton, but left the question open as ‘it 
has not so far arisen and does not arise for consideration in this case’.193 However, in 
accordance with the requirements of the Wilkinson tort reformulated by them, there 
appears to be no sensible reason why insulting and abusive conduct should not be 
actionable, provided that it is unjustifiable, intended to cause severe emotional distress, 
and brings about recognised psychiatric illness (or physical harm) in consequence.194 
On the other hand, in acknowledging that insulting or offensive words could be 
actionable, 195  Lord Neuberger thought that this would probably occur under 
‘relatively limited and extreme’ circumstances.196 What constitutes an ‘unjustified’ or 
‘gratuitous’ insult requires to be examined.197 
 
In a sense Lord Neuberger’s thinking on this matter is compatible with the decisions 
in Austen v University of Wolverhampton198 and Giller v Procopets.199 In Austen v 
                                                                                                                
190 As the infringed interest is one’s dignity, self-esteem, or mental integrity rather than reputation or 
other kinds of recognised rights, the inflicted mental harm should still be perceived as stand-alone.	  
191 Wainwright v Home Office (n 42) at para 62 per Lord Scott of Foscote. 
192 ibid. 
193 Rhodes v OPO (n 1) at para 77 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
194 ibid at para 88 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
195 ibid at para 107 per Lord Neuberger. 
196 ibid at para 109 per Lord Neuberger. 
197 ibid at para 110 per Lord Neuberger. 
198 Austen v University of Wolverhampton [2005] EWHC 1635 (QB). 
199 Giller v Procopets [2008] VSCA 236. 
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University of Wolverhampton, 200  the claimant was described, in a confidential 
meeting between others at which he was not present, as a ‘sociopath’ and ‘A bull in a 
China shop type of person’,201 which was arguably insulting rather than defamatory. 
His initial claim for damages on the basis of defamation was accordingly struck out.202 
Over and above defamation, the claimant also claimed under the head of ‘intentional 
infliction of physical or emotional harm’.203 Mr. Justice Gray recognised the decision 
in Wilkinson v Downton as still binding upon him,204 and that ‘it is no bar to recovery 
that the statement was not made by the defendant directly to the claimant’.205 In his 
reasoning Mr. Justice Gray did not deny the likelihood that the alleged insults could 
be taken as a conduct pattern of this tort. However, the claim based upon the Wilkinson 
tort failed due to the claimant’s failure to prove the requisite aspects of intention and 
the exacerbation of existent psychiatric injury.206 Also, whether or not the insulting 
words at issue can be taken as grave enough is doubtful.  
 
Giller v Procopets, an Australian case, indicates that insulting and humiliating 
conduct, damaging to the victim’s dignity, can be regarded as potentially actionable. 
In this case, the parties used to be a couple.207 After an acrimonious separation, the 
defendant distributed several videotapes, in which previous sexual activities between 
them were recorded, to the plaintiff’s family as well as to others.208 The Victoria Court 
of Appeal held that recovery could be granted on the basis of breach of confidence, 
whilst striking out the claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and 
invasion of privacy.209 The claim based on intentional infliction of emotional distress 
failed primarily because three judges could not agree over the requisite harm element 
                                                                                                                
200 Austen v University of Wolverhampton (n 198). 
201 ibid at para 9 per Mr Justice Gray. 
202 ibid at para 2 per Mr Justice Gray. 
203 ibid. 
204 ibid at para 7 per Mr Justice Gray. 
205 ibid at para 10 per Mr Justice Gray. It should be noticed that, after the ruling of Rhodes, the 
disputed wrongdoing must be ‘directed at’ the claimant. See Rhodes v OPO (n 1) at para 88 per Lady 
Hale and Lord Toulson. However, this new requirement should not be seen as an attempt to exclude 
recovery for secondary victims. Relevant analyses see Chapter 5, section 5.2. 
206 Austen v University of Wolverhampton (n 198) at paras 11-16 per Mr Justice Gray. 
207 Giller v Procopets (n 199) at para 224 per Neave JA. 
208 ibid at paras 124-125 per Ashley JA. 
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in respect of the Wilkinson tort.210 However, none of them disagreed with the idea that 
the wrongdoing at issue was deliberate and insulting, and in principle capable of 
meeting the required conduct element of the Wilkinson tort. In particular, Maxwell P, 
dissenting, found that the insulting conduct not only had the potential to inflict serious 
emotional distress,211 but also was ‘extreme and outrageous’.212 In his opinion, the 
conduct should have been actionable, and the severe emotional distress suffered by 
Ms. Giller compensated on the basis of the Wilkinson tort. 
 
Following from these two decisions, it appears that insulting or abusive wrongdoing, 
standing on its own in the absence of other aggravating factors, has not been explicitly 
admitted as actionable. Although in principle it appears to have been accepted that 
conduct of this type might potentially be actionable, in neither case did the court allow 
the claim to proceed on the basis of the evidence before it. 
 
In the following subsections, the wrongdoing considered is of an insulting or abusive 
nature, yet it is closely associated with other aggravating factors or other types of 
conduct pattern. It is held to be actionable most likely because other considerations are 
also brought into the balance. 
 
 
2.232 Exploiting the victims’ vulnerability in conjunction with insults or other abusive 
conduct 
 
The wrongdoing of an insulting or abusive nature considered in this part is 
intermingled with the exploitation of the victims’ vulnerability. This either aggravates 
the seriousness of the conduct, or even forms an essential and inseparable aspect of its 
insulting or abusive character. In C v D, SBA and in ABC v WH 2000 Ltd v William 
Whillock, the exploitation of the victims’ vulnerability – their minority or fragile 
physical and mental state – exemplifies the latter. In other words, the exploitation of 
                                                                                                                
210 ibid at para 31 per Maxwell P; at paras 164-165 per Ashley JA; at paras 471-478 per Neave JA. 
211 ibid at para 36 per Maxwell P. 
212 ibid at paras 37-38 per Maxwell P. 
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fragility/minority was an essential and inseparable part of the gravity and actionability 
of the wrongdoing in question. Both cases also involved abuse of power or unequal 
status. 
 
In C v D, SBA, a case predating the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, various 
forms of wrongdoing had been inflicted upon the claimant – at that time a pupil at a 
junior day school.213 Apart from battery,214 two incidents were dealt with on the basis 
of Wilkinson v Downton. Firstly, the defendant, the headmaster of that school,215 
videoed the claimant when he was ‘taking a shower’ together with his classmates.216 
On the second occasion, when the claimant fainted, the defendant took the claimant to 
the infirmary, undressed him and stared at his genitals for several minutes.217 The 
judge emphasised that the second wrongdoing was committed ‘when C was especially 
vulnerable’, and constituted ‘a gross invasion of his personal integrity’,218 which 
should be recoverable on the footing of Wilkinson v Downton.219  
 
ABC v WH 2000 Ltd v William Whillock is another case where the exploitation of the 
victim’s vulnerability formed an essential part of the abusive conduct. In this case, the 
claimant alleged that whilst she was 16 years old, the defendant who was Vice 
Principal and Head of Boarding at her school220 attempted to develop a relationship 
with her, ‘encouraging her to send indecent images of herself to him’, and ultimately 
‘sexually assaulting her’. 221  Quite apart from the alleged sexual assaults, 222  Sir 
Robert Nelson pointed out that, in respect of the Wilkinson or the Rhodes claim, having 
been aware of the emotional vulnerability of the claimant,223 the defendant’s actions 
were capable of bringing about (mental) harm,224 as they placed the claimant in an 
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214 ibid at paras 84 and 87 per Mr Justice Field. 
215 ibid at para 2 per Mr Justice Field. 
216 ibid at paras 4, 10, and 97 per Mr Justice Field. 
217 ibid at paras 4, 12, and 98 per Mr Justice Field. 
218 ibid at para 98 per Mr Justice Field. 
219 ibid at para 100 per Mr Justice Field. 
220 ABC v WH 2000 Ltd v William Whillock (n 6) at para 3 per Sir Robert Nelson. 
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222 ibid at para 76 per Sir Robert Nelson. 
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even more vulnerable position, and rendered the preventable harm inescapable.225 In 
other words, this wrongdoing was found to be abusive, seriously damaging, and 
potentially actionable because the defendant’s knowledge (and exploitation) of the 
claimant’s emotional fragility and her minority were taken into consideration.226 
 
In two further cases, where the victims were not minors when they were wronged, the 
exploitation of their vulnerability can still be seen as aggravating the seriousness of 
the wrongdoing. In Boothman v R, as discussed in 2.222, in addition to threatening 
behaviour the supervisor exploited the plaintiff’s mental fragility by making 
‘derogatory comments about her abilities and her emotional and psychological 
health’. 227  This wrongdoing was held to have generated ‘extreme emotional 
reactions’228 and occasioned harm.229 Likewise, in another Canadian case, Bogden v 
Purolator Courier Ltd, apart from threatening the plaintiff with a disciplinary process 
or even with dismissal,230 the defendant frequently uttered derogatory and sarcastic 
remarks to the plaintiff.231  Taking into account the employer’s awareness of the 
plaintiff’s mental fragility,232 these insults, in conjunction with other threatening acts, 
were found to have had a cumulative effect and to have been extreme and 
outrageous.233 In both cases, the exploitation of the victims’ vulnerability was plainly 
an aggravating factor of the alleged wrongdoing. 
 
 
2.233 Abusing power or unequal status in conjunction with insults or other abusive 
conduct: 
 
The insults or abusive conduct analysed under this section are those perpetrated in 
concomitance with abuse of power or unequal status. The shared feature of all cases is 
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that the wrongdoer can insult or otherwise abuse the victims because the former enjoys 
a superior power, authority, or status. The other side of the coin is that the possession 
of superior power or status may also render the insulting or abusive conduct of the 
wrongdoer much more damaging. Although conduct of this type is more typically to 
be found in the employment context, unequal status and abuse of power can also be 
observed in other contexts, such as in schools, prisons, or comparable institutions. 
  
 
2.2331 In the context of employment: 
 
In cases arising in the context of employment, it is possible to discern not only the 
characteristics of abuse of power/status and insults, but also the pattern of threats with 
work-related negative consequences. As a result, the relative importance of the 
insulting conduct to the overall gravity of the wrongdoing is not easy to specify. 
However, the following case is exceptional as threatening words or conduct were not 
involved, but simply insulting conduct and the abuse of power. 
 
 
2.23311 Wrongdoing involving abuse of power and insulting/abusive conduct only 
  
In CVC Services v IWA-Canada, Local 1-71, a Canadian arbitration case, the grievor  
was dismissed by CVC Services, due to various complaints made against her, among 
which the pivotal one was directed at her promiscuity.234 This allegation was held to 
be unfounded and untrue,235 and the employer’s conduct was found to be ‘flagrant and 
extreme’.236 In this case, the loss of the grievor’s job was predicated on an allegation 
of such an insulting nature, capable of seriously damaging the grievor’s dignity and 
mental integrity. Depriving the grievor of her employment without a corroborated and 
legitimate basis can be taken as a form of abuse of power by the employer, which 
arguably constituted or heightened the gravity of the employer’s conduct. 
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2.23312 Wrongdoing involving abuse of power, insulting, and also threatening 
conduct 
 
As previously discussed, in the context of employment, most of the cases manifest 
three characteristics – abuse of power, insulting/abusive conduct, as well as 
threatening with work-related negative consequences. These characteristics overlap in 
the cases following the second conduct pattern which have already been explored, such 
as Prinzo v Baycrest Centre for Geriatric Care, Boothman v R, Nationwide News Pty 
Ltd v Naidu, Rahemtulla v Vanfed Credit Union and so on, and they will not be 
reiterated here. However, two further Canadian cases should also be considered. In 
these cases, the patterns of insulting/abusive conduct and abuse of power seem to be 
relatively more important, despite the presence of the feature of threatening conduct 
in addition. 
 
In these two cases, the wrongdoers abused their power and seriously insulted the 
victims, in order to force them to resign. In the first case, Boucher v Wal-Mart Canada 
Corp, the wrongdoer, Pinnock, was the respondent’s supervisor. Due to conflict 
between them, Pinnock commenced an ‘unrelenting and increasing torrent of abuse’ 
against the respondent,237 demeaning and humiliating her in private as well as in front 
of other employees for nearly six months, even stating that ‘her career was blowing 
away’.238 These multiple and continuous wrongdoings by Pinnock – mainly abusing 
power and insulting her – were held to be ‘flagrant and outrageous’,239 as well as 
serving the unlawful goal of forcing the respondent to leave her workplace. 240 
Likewise, in Smith v Alwarid, following some conflicts the defendant, who was the 
Deputy Minister of Education,241 removed authority from the plaintiff, uttering verbal 
attacks and demeaning him as a ‘fucking idiot and a typical bureaucrat’, treating him 
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in a very rude and unfair way.242 Eventually, the defendant stripped the plaintiff of his 
position, in contravention of the government policy.243 Such conduct was without 
doubt seriously insulting and capable of constituting abuse of power. As demonstrated 
here, the abuse of power or the presence of unlawful motive/purpose 244  almost 
certainly heightens the gravity of the insults at issue. 
 
 
2.2332 In other contexts: 
 
The characteristics of abuse of power/unequal status in conjunction with insulting/ 
abusive conduct can also be discerned in other contexts. For instance, the contexts of 
the above-analysed cases C v D, SBA and ABC v WH 2000 Ltd v William Whillock are 
related to schools. In addition to exploiting the vulnerability and minority of the 
victims, the wrongdoers in both cases could be considered as having abused their 
superior positions – as headmaster245 or vice principal and head of boarding at the 
school in question. 246  In both cases the wrongdoers would not have had the 
opportunity to exploit the vulnerability of children without being in a position of power, 





It can be seen from the above review that insulting or abusive conduct, standing on its 
own without aggravating factors or other types of conduct pattern, has not been 
explicitly admitted as actionable. In contrast, where the insulting or abusive conduct 
was committed in conjunction with aggravating factors – in particular the exploitation 
of the victims’ vulnerability, or the abuse of power or unequal status –, the wrongdoing 
at issue seemed to be evaluated by the courts in a different way. Where the victim’s 
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vulnerability has been exploited and the perpetrator has conducted himself or herself 
in an insulting/abusive manner, English and Canadian authorities find such conduct to 
be actionable or extreme, flagrant or outrageous.247 Likewise, the patterns of insulting 
behaviour in combination with abuse of power or unequal status have also been held 
by courts as actionable or extreme, flagrant and outrageous.248  
 
Other categories of conduct pattern are also seen combined with insulting or abusive 
behaviour. For instance, in the employment context, it is frequently seen that insults 
and threats are both involved, interwoven with each other as well as with other 
aggravating factors. In regard to lack of justification, it appears that the more 
aggravating factors and conduct patterns are involved in a case, the more likely it is 
that the wrongdoing in question would be found to be unjustifiable. 
 
In addition, the insulting or abusive conduct in some of the above cases is reminiscent 
of other torts. For instance, in Austen v University of Wolverhampton a claim for 
damages for defamation was struck out at an earlier stage,249 and in CVC Services v 
IWA-Canada, Local 1-71, a claim for damages for libel was the subject of separate 
proceedings.250 Moreover, the wrongdoing found in Giller v Procopets251 and C v D, 
SBA252 may have a bearing on invasion of privacy. As a result, the boundary between 
defamation and this tort (in particular this conduct pattern), as well as the boundary 
between invasion of privacy and this tort, require to be explored.  
 
 
2.235 The demarcation between this conduct pattern and defamation 
 
This section will attempt to draw the boundary between the conduct pattern of the tort 
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Courier Ltd in the above case review. 
248 See CVC Services v IWA-Canada, Local 1-71, Boucher v Wal-Mart Canada Corp, Smith v 
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under discussion here and that of defamation. The delict of ‘verbal injury’253 will not 
be investigated in this section. This is because the main drift of the law of verbal injury 
in the modern law has been towards providing protection to business interests and 
patrimonial loss; the ambit of verbal injury concerning personality interests has been 
considerably marginalised. Following the analysis in Steele v Scottish Daily Record 
and Sunday Mail Limited,254 the scope of verbal injury in regard to injured feelings 
seems to be substantially limited and even to ‘have no future role’.255 In its Report on 
Defamation, the Scottish Law Commission considered the ‘verbal injuries relating to 
individuals and feelings’ as ‘shrouded in obscurity’ and ‘no longer of practical utility’, 




2.2351 The boundary of defamation 
 
In England and Wales, much of the law of defamation has now been put on to a 
statutory footing by the Defamation Act 2013.257 Very little of the 2013 Act applies 
to Scotland,258 where the law of defamation remains mainly based on the common 
law.259 An examination of the elements of defamation law in each jurisdiction sheds 
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light on the demarcation between defamation and insult (under the head of the 
Wilkinson tort). 
 
In English law, the foremost requirement of defamation is that a ‘defamatory’ 
statement or imputation must be made. 260  The concept of ‘defamatory’ might 
encompass injury to ‘the reputation of another, by exposing him to hatred, contempt 
and ridicule’,261 ‘words which make a person be shunned or avoided’,262 conduct that 
is likely ‘to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society 
generally’,263 or ‘likely to affect a person adversely in the estimation of reasonable 
people generally’.264 After the decision in Thornton v Telegraph Media Group Ltd265 
and the passage of Defamation Act 2013,266 the qualification of seriousness has been 
attached to these dicta as regards (the consequences of) defamatory statements.267 
According to the Defamation Act 2013 s 1(1), ‘A statement is not defamatory unless 
its publication has caused or is likely to cause serious harm to the reputation of the 
claimant.’ 268  As this requirement is a bar rather than a definition, 269  and the 
Explanatory Notes to the Act do not state that previous dicta as regards ‘defamatory’ 
would be abandoned,270 the traditional tests provided in previous case law should 
remain applicable, but the defamatory imputation certainly has to meet the requirement 
of seriousness.271 
 
In Scots law, the reading of the term defamatory has been informed to a significant 
extent by English case law. Lord Atkin’s dictum regarding ‘to lower the plaintiff in 
                                                                                                                
260 A Mullis, R Parkes and C Gatley, Gatley on Libel and Slander (12th edn, 2013) 31 (or para 2.1); R 
Mulheron, Principles of Tort Law (2016) 769. 
261 Parmiter v Coupland 151 ER 340 at 342. 
262 Youssoupoff v MGM Pictures Ltd (1934) 50 TLR 581 at 587 per Slesser LJ. 
263 Sim v Stretch [1936] 2 All ER 1237 at 1240 per Lord Atkin. 
264 Skuse v Granada Television Ltd [1996] EMLR 278 at 286 per the Master of the Rolls. Also see 
Gillick v BBC [1996] EMLR 267 at 273-274 per Neill LJ. 
265 Thornton v Telegraph Media Group Ltd [2010] EWHC 1414 (QB). 
266 Defamation Act 2013. 
267 Mullis, Parkes and Gatley (n 260) 32-33; Clerk and Dugdale (n 41) paras 22-17 and 22-18. 
268 Defamation Act 2013 s 1(1). 
269 J Price and F McMahon (eds), Blackstone’s Guide to the Defamation Act 2013 (2013) para 2.42. 
270 Clerk and Dugdale (n 41) para 22-18. 
271 Price and McMahon (n 269) para 2.42. 
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the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally’272 continues to be 
adopted in modern practice in the same or parallel terms.273 On the basis of this 
dictum, the Scottish Law Commission observed in its Report as well as Discussion 
Paper on Defamation, that ‘defamatory’ may be defined as ‘damag[ing] the reputation 
of the pursuer in the eyes of the ordinary reader, viewer, or listener’,274 or ‘tend[ing] 
to make ordinary readers think the worse of the pursuer’. 275  As to whether the 
threshold of seriousness should be adopted in Scotland, after reviewing a line of 
English authorities including Jameel (Yousef) v Dow Jones & Co Inc,276 Thornton v 
Telegraph Media Group Ltd,277 and in particular Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd,278 
the Scottish Law Commission observed that ‘the issues of costs and complexity… 
associated with the section 1(1) test are not as significant as was initially feared’.279 
Putting different arguments into balance, the Scottish Law Commission recommended 
that a statutory threshold of ‘serious harm to the reputation’ should be introduced into 
the Scots law of defamation,280 which would not alter the definition of defamation in 
the common law sense. 281  It seems probable that, in the future, the threshold of 
‘serious harm to the reputation’ can be adopted in the Scots law of defamation, as it is 
in the English counterpart. 
 
A crucial element of defamation is publication. In English law, for a claim predicated 
upon defamation to survive, the defamatory remarks must be published to a third 
party,282 namely ‘making known the defamatory matter after it has been written to 
some person other than the person of whom it is written’.283 After the decision in 
                                                                                                                
272 Sim v Stretch (n 263) at 1240 per Lord Atkin. 
273 Scottish Law Commission (n 259) paras 2.7 and 2.8. 
274 Scottish Law Commission (n 256) para 1.2. 
275 Scottish Law Commission (n 259) para 2.8. 
276 Jameel (Yousef) v Dow Jones & Co Inc [2005] EWCA Civ 75. 
277 Thornton v Telegraph Media Group Ltd (n 265). 
278 Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd [2017] EWCA Civ 1334. Also see Lachaux v Independent Print 
Ltd [2015] EWHC 2242 (QB). In the former decision, the Court of Appeal (Lord Justice Davis, agreed 
by other members) unanimously upheld the decision of the trial court. As to the approaches regarding 
Defamation Act 2013 s 1(1) outlined by Lord Justice Davis, see para 82. 
279 Scottish Law Commission (n 256) para 2.10. 
280 ibid paras 2.12 and 2.14. 
281 ibid para 2.12. 
282 Mullis, Parkes and Gatley (n 260) para 6.1; Clerk and Dugdale (n 41) para 22-51. 
283 Pullman v Walter Hill & Co Ltd [1891] 1 QB 524 at 527 per Lord Esher. Also see Ibrahim v 
Swansea University [2012] EWHC 290 (QB) at paras 12 and 14 per Mr Justice Eady. 
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Jameel (Yousef) v Dow Jones & Co Inc and the coming into force of the Defamation 
Act 2013, the extent of publication becomes an important factor to be considered in 
determining whether the requirement of serious harm to reputation has been met. 
Circulation to limited numbers of people may no longer be recognised as sufficiently 
harmful.284 
 
In Scots law the position is slightly different. Publication, communication or 
circulation to a third party is not strictly required in Scots law.285 According to older 
authorities, it is possible to bring an action for defamation communicated to the 
pursuer alone.286  However, whether this position is sustainable today is open to 
question. In its Report on Defamation, the Scottish Law Commission observed this 
traditional rule as ‘antiquated’ and ‘being out of step with…other parts of the 
world’.287 It is recommended that communication to ‘someone other than the person 
who is the subject of it’ should be a requisite of actionable defamation.288  This 
approach would be more compatible with the proposed introduction of ‘threshold of 
serious harm to reputation’.289 Accordingly, publication or communication to a third 
party may become a requirement of the Scots law of defamation in the coming future. 
 
 
2.2352 Beyond defamation: the applicability of this tort (this conduct pattern) 
 
The prerequisites of defamation have been briefly introduced above. Thus the law of 
defamation does not provide a remedy where: 1) the imputation has not surmounted 
the threshold of ‘serious harm to the reputation’; or 2) the extent of publication is 
regarded as limited; or 3) the imputation is true. Where these requirements are not met, 
it may nevertheless be possible for the disputed statements to be treated as an insult, 
                                                                                                                
284 Mullis, Parkes and Gatley (n 260) para 6.1; Clerk and Dugdale (n 41) para 22-51. 
285 Cameron (n 140) para 4-01; Reid (n 132) para 10.35; K Mck Norrie, ‘The Scots Law of 
Defamation: Is There A Need for Reform?’ in NR Whitty and R Zimmermann (eds), Rights of 
Personality in Scots Law: A Comparative Perspective (2009) 433 at 438. 
286 Mackay v M’Cankie (1883) 10 R 537 at 539 per Lord President; Ramsay v MacLay & Co (1890) 
18 R 130 at 133 per Lord Justice-Clerk; Thomson v Kindell 1910 2 SLT 442 at 444 per Lord Dewar. 
287 Scottish Law Commission (n 256) para 2.4. 
288 ibid paras 2.4 and 2.8. 
289 ibid para 2.4. 
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since this conduct pattern has a different focus and characteristics. An insult is an 
attack upon one’s dignity, honour, or self-esteem which generates emotional distress 
and even mental harm,290 without necessarily having an impact on reputation or social 
standing. As explored in sections 2.231 and 2.234, the conduct pattern of insult may 
be actionable under the head of the Wilkinson tort, albeit in ‘relatively limited and 
extreme’ circumstances,291 such as being associated with aggravating factors or other 
types of conduct pattern. The potential applicability of insult (or the Wilkinson tort) in 
the above-listed three circumstances will be investigated as follows. 
 
 
2.23521 The imputation having not surmounted the threshold of seriousness required 
by the law of defamation: 
 
As analysed in 2.2351, serious harm to the reputation of the claimant is a requirement 
for any action of defamation to succeed.292 In respect of Scots law, though it is unclear 
at the present stage whether a parallel requirement will be implemented, the Scottish 
Law Commission has recommended that a statutory threshold of ‘serious harm to the 
reputation’ should be introduced into the Scots law of defamation.293 Pursuant to the 
Defamation Act 2013 s 1(1) in England, where this threshold of seriousness cannot be 
satisfied, the disputed imputation would not be actionable. Nevertheless, this tort may 
be relevant, specifically where the defendant’s conduct may be categorised as insulting. 
Of course this tort should not be used as a means to circumvent the raised threshold of 
defamation. However, defamation and insult are significantly different, so that the 
latter can be employed to protect against serious harm to dignity or mental integrity 
even when it does not also entail serious harm to reputation. For example, referring to 
a person as a rape victim or ridiculing him/her for his/her being raped may not inflict 
                                                                                                                
290 K Mck Norrie, ‘The Actio Iniuriarum in Scots Law: Romantic Romanism or Tool for Today?’ in E 
Descheemaeker and H Scott (eds), Iniuria and the Common Law (2013) 49 at 50-52. Also see E 
Descheemaeker and H Scott, ‘Iniuria and the Common Law’ in E Descheemaeker and H Scott (eds), 
Iniuria and the Common Law (2013) 1 at 1. 
291 Rhodes v OPO (n 1) at paras 107-109 per Lord Neuberger. 
292 Defamation Act 2013 s 1(1).  
293 Scottish Law Commission (n 256) paras 2.12 and 2.14. 
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serious harm to the victim’s reputation from the modern perspective,294 yet it may 
seriously damage his or her dignity or mental integrity, where the rape has occurred295 
or where the victim has some sort of emotional fragility. 296  Likewise, insulting 
someone as ‘no longer being a virgin’ can hardly in a serious manner affect other right-
thinking people’s attitudes towards him or her. Yet it is imaginable that this imputation 
might harm his or her dignity and mental integrity, especially when the person has a 
sensitive predisposition, or when the person is from a certain religious or ethnic 
background, where virginity is highly treasured.297 Under these circumstances, this 
tort can arguably provide some protection, particularly where the statement is not 
uttered in public (or to a third party).298 
 
Furthermore, as some commentators have pointed out, the serious harm threshold may 
mean that certain defamatory imputations previously regarded as actionable as 
‘exposing a person to ridicule’ and ‘causing others to shun and avoid one’ may no 
longer find a remedy.299 Again, the conduct pattern of insult or the Wilkinson tort may 
provide legal protection in these situations. What occurred in Uppal v Endemol UK 
Ltd300 may serve to illustrate this kind of possibility. In a competition TV programme, 
the claimant was insulted and ridiculed by other housemates. On the first occasion, 
one of the housemate referred to her as ‘a piece of shit’ and ‘stupid bastard’, insulting 
and ridiculing her through a vulgar rap.301 On the second broadcast episode, two 
                                                                                                                
294 See R Parkes, ‘Privacy, Defamation, and False Facts’ in NA Moreham and others (eds), Tugendhat 
and Christie: The Law of Privacy and the Media (3rd edn, 2016) 349 at para 8.04. Compare the ruling 
of Youssoupoff v MGM Pictures Ltd (n 262). In this case, a false suggestion of Princess Youssoupoff’s 
being raped in a film was held as constituting defamatory. 
295 This point will be further discussed in section 2.23523. 
296 Where the imputation of someone’s being raped is false, it is difficult to imagine that someone’s 
dignity or mental integrity would be seriously harmed by it, unless he or she has some kind of 
emotional fragility or sensitivity. 
297	   Certainly, the wrongdoer must have knowledge of these circumstances and exploit them.	  
298	   Admittedly, if these words (regarding rape or loss of virginity) are said in public or to a third 
party, they could also constitute disclosure/misuse of private information. 
299 Mullis, Parkes and Gatley (n 260) paras 2.10 and 2.15. Also see Price and McMahon (n 269) paras 
2.43 and 2.44. 
300 Uppal v Endemol UK Ltd 2014 EWHC 1063 (QB). 
301 ‘[Rapping] It’s your epilator, stick it up your arse, we don’t give a fuck because I’m going to 
fucking smash your face you little piece of shit’; ‘With who? I’ll give her a fun game, I’ll stick this 
[showing the hair brush] up her fucking minge, the stupid bastard, I’ll give her a fucking epilator 
[thrusting the hair brush towards his groin]. I’m gonna play loads of pranks on her because she’s a 
fucking piece of shit…’. See ibid at para 6 per Justice Dingemans. 
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housemates ridiculed the claimant’s eating manner as a form of Indian culture.302 
Accepting that the disputed statements must surmount the threshold of seriousness to 
be actionable as defamatory,303 Justice Dingemans found the description of ‘piece of 
shit’ as merely ‘vile abuse’,304 the rap as ridiculing,305 and the racial statements as 
‘offensive racial stereotyping’.306  Nonetheless, none of the words complained of 
could be counted as defamatory, 307  and the defamation claim was struck out 
accordingly.308 However, varying the above scenario slightly, let us assume that an 
insult is substantially directed at the victim, containing the words like ‘a piece of shit’, 
‘stupid bastard’, or something as vulgar as depicted in the complained rap, it seems 
arguable that such insulting invective might seriously harm the victim’s dignity and 
mental integrity. Provided that the mental and consequence elements have also been 
met, such behaviour may be sufficient to constitute the conduct element and the 
claimant would accordingly have a case on the basis of the Wilkinson or the Rhodes 
tort,309 in particular if any aggravating factor is involved.310 
 
 
2.23522 The extent of publication being limited: 
 
The second circumstance under which the conduct pattern of insult can provide legal 
protection beyond the reach of defamation is where the requirement of publication 
cannot be met. Essentially concerned with injury to dignity and mental well-being, 
insult (under the head of the Wilkinson tort) does not necessarily require publication. 
In Janvier v Sweeney, Bankes LJ explicitly pointed out that ‘[t]he distinction between 
actions of slander and actions of this kind is very clear. In slander it is necessary to 
prove publication, and so the words must have been uttered to some person other than 
                                                                                                                
302 ibid at para 9 per Justice Dingemans. 
303 ibid at para 21 per Justice Dingemans. 
304 ibid at para 24 per Justice Dingemans. 
305 ibid at para 26 per Justice Dingemans. 
306 ibid at para 27 per Justice Dingemans. 
307 ibid at paras 27-28 per Justice Dingemans. 
308 ibid at paras 29 and 32 per Justice Dingemans. 
309 The requisite elements of this tort see Rhodes v OPO (n 1) at para 88 per Lady Hale and Lord 
Toulson. 
310 As analysed, such as insulting in company with abusing power or unequal status; or insulting in 
connection with exploiting others’ vulnerabilities. 
   60  
the person complaining of the physical injury’.311 This demarcation is relatively clear-
cut in respect of English law. The Scots law position is slightly different since, as 
discussed above, communication to a third party is not an essential requirement in 
Scots law.312 In practice, however, it is thought unlikely that a claim for defamation 
would succeed in the modern law where the defamatory imputation had been seen or 
heard by the pursuer alone, and in any event, it is likely that any future reform of the 
law of defamation in Scotland would make publication a prerequisite.313 A similar 
gap thus arises in Scots law, which this tort might credibly address. 
 
As discussed above, the scale of publication now plays a more significant role.314 
Hence the distinction between defamation and insult in this regard becomes sharper. 
Where the disputed statements have not been published or only circulated on a limited 
scale, protection can nevertheless be accorded on the footing of insult (of the Wilkinson 
tort), as long as its prerequisites315 – in particular the statements must be factually or 
substantially directed at the victim316 – have been satisfied. 
 
Some comparable examples can be seen in the Canadian cases discussed earlier. In 
Canadian tort Law, publication to a third party is also a required element of 
defamation.317 In Rahemtulla v Vanfed Credit Union, for instance, the accusation of 
theft318 without investigation and evidence was arguably capable of ‘lower[ing] the 
plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally’. 319 
                                                                                                                
311 Janvier v Sweeney (n 62) at 323 per Bankes LJ. 
312 Cameron (n 140) para 4-01; Reid (n 132) para 10.35. 
313 Scottish Law Commission (n 256) paras 2.4 and 2.8. 
314 The extent of publication is an important factor to be considered in determining whether the raised 
threshold of serious harm to reputation has been met. See Mullis, Parkes and Gatley (n 260) paras 6.1-
6.2; Clerk and Dugdale (n 41) para 22-51. 
315 Rhodes v OPO (n 1) at para 88 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
316 For a claimant to succeed in a defamation case, it is not required that the communicated or 
published statement be directed at him or her. However, in respect of this tort, except for secondary 
victim cases, the wrongdoing (words or conduct) must be directed at the victim, factually or 
substantially. 
317 ‘There can be no cause of action in libel unless the writing complained of is published’. See 
Arnott v College of Physicians & Surgeons (Saskatchewan) [1954] SCR 538 at para 81 per Locke J; 
‘Publication takes place where the defamatory matter is brought by the defendant or his agent to the 
knowledge and understanding of some person other than the plaintiff’. See McNichol v Grandy [1931] 
SCR 696 at para 23 per Duff J. 
318 Rahemtulla v Vanfed Credit Union (n 8) at para 55 per McLachlin J. 
319 Sim v Stretch (n 263) at 1240 per Lord Atkin. This dictum is also accepted in Canadian law as the 
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However, the plaintiff originally brought an action for wrongful dismissal and 
defamation but chose not to pursue the action for defamation.320  Apart from the 
wrongful dismissal claim, the case was ultimately decided on the basis of the 
Wilkinson tort. Compensation was awarded in the light of the serious (humiliation and) 
mental distress.321 The reason may have been that the injurious remarks were mainly 
uttered to the victim herself rather than communicated to the public. Such instances 
reinforce the point that insult (under the head of the Wilkinson tort) has different 
characteristics and in the more egregious sorts of cases as depicted above can render 
protection where the law of defamation has reached its limits. 
 
 
2.23523 Truthful imputations 
 
a) In general 
 
In the law of defamation, truth is a complete defence.322 Regardless of how damaging 
or humiliating the impugned imputation might be, the law of defamation offers no 
recourse where the imputation is found to be true. In contrast, the truth or falsity of the 
disputed statement is not an absolute concern to insult or the Wilkinson tort. 
Admittedly, the gap pertinent to true statements/disclosure of true information has to 
a large extent been filled by the law of privacy.323 However, there is still scope for 
insult under the head of the Wilkinson tort to serve a function, since, as compared to 
the law of privacy (in particular the tort of misuse of private information), it provides 
                                                                                                                
construction of ‘defamatory’. 
320 Rahemtulla v Vanfed Credit Union (n 8) at para 8 per McLachlin J. 
321 ibid at paras 59-60 per McLachlin J. 
322 Parkes (n 294) at paras 8.11 and 8.28; Reid (n 132) para 11.02; J Gordley, Foundations of Private 
Law (2006) 245. Also see Defamation Act 2013 s 2(1), ‘It is a defence to an action for defamation for 
the defendant to show that the imputation conveyed by the statement complained of is substantially 
true’. 
323 Gordley (n 322) 233-236. In England, as there is no recognised tort of invasion of privacy, 
relevant causes of action are breach of confidence and misuse of private information. In Scotland, 
breach of confidence is also a well-recognised cause of action, yet the status of misuse of private 
information is not quite clear, as no contemporary case has been decided upon the basis of it. 
Nonetheless, it is cogently argued that ‘Scots law, like English law, must recognise misuse of private 
information as a delictual wrong’. See Reid (n 132) paras 14.51-14.52. The tort of misuse of private 
information will be introduced in the following section. 
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protection against different sorts of wrongdoing. For instance, uttering abusive, 
injurious, but true, statements might not be covered by the law of privacy where the 
uttered statements are neither confidential nor private. But even when the contents of 
the abusive statements relate to private information, a disclosure or misuse of private 
information would not necessarily occur. It is possible that the wrongdoer did not 
attempt to obtain or distribute the private information, but happened to witness the 
victim’s private affairs or hear about them from others, then insulted the victim on the 
basis of that information.  
 
For example, A happens to know that B had been raped or sexually abused in the past. 
On one occasion A insults or ridicules B (without the presence of other people) for his 
or her being raped/abused. As analysed above,324 this statement may not inflict serious 
harm to B’s reputation from the modern perspective.325 In addition, since there is no 
disclosure or misuse of this private information, B cannot resort to the tort of misuse 
of private information. However, it is arguable that this insult could seriously injure 
B’s dignity or mental integrity, and this would be all the more likely if B is in some 
way emotionally vulnerable. 
 
Notably, if a truth-based insult or attack relates to characteristics such as ‘age’, 
‘disability’, ‘gender reassignment’, ‘race’, ‘religion or belief’, ‘sex’, and ‘sexual 
orientation’, it may become a prohibited conduct – such as harassment – covered by 
the Equality Act 2010.326 Apart from these protected characteristics, an insult can be 
targeted at a person’s mental or intellectual status, or at the victim’s physical 
characteristics – such as size, shape, or stature. Instances of these sorts are perhaps 
rare. These kinds of insult, alluding to objective facts, require to be extreme, vile, or 
invective. Admittedly, as discussed in point c) below, such insults may only be 
considered as sufficiently grave to be actionable when an aggravating factor is 
involved. 
 
                                                                                                                
324 See section 2.23521. 
325 See Parkes (n 294) at para 8.04. 
326 Equality Act 2010 ss 4 and 26. 
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b) Distinction between factual and non-factual imputations 
 
It is important to distinguish between factual and non-factual imputations. Only factual 
imputations – insults based upon fact – can be found as true or false. The position is 
more complex when it comes to insults based on qualities such as beauty or ugliness. 
Comments on beauty or ugliness are arguably more value judgments or subjective 
appreciations rather than descriptions of fact. Clearly context is important. For 
instance, if a person’s face has actually been deformed as a result of his/her 
participation in active military service, insulting him/her for having a distorted face 
may be considered a description of fact. In ordinary circumstances, however, simply 
calling someone a beautiful or an ugly person is a subjective comment rather than an 
assertion of fact. Where the content of the statement cannot be regarded as capable of 
objective truth or falsity, no question of truth as a complete defence will arise. The law 
of defamation can function as usual and the core issue would simply be whether or not 
the impugned statement is defamatory.327 The reasoning in Berkoff v Burchill in a 
sense reflects this analysis. In this case, where the plaintiff was described as hideously 
ugly,328 Phillips LJ pointed out that ‘a statement that a person is ugly, or hideously 
ugly, is a statement of subjective appreciation of that individual’s features. To a degree 
both beauty and ugliness are in the eye of the beholder’.329 Since a statement about a 
person’s ugliness is not an allegation of fact, truth as a complete defence should not 
be a consideration in this case. Indeed, the analyses of the three Lord Justices revolved 
mostly around whether the statement can be found as defamatory, whether the plaintiff 
would be exposed to ridicule, be avoided or shunned by right-thinking people.330 
 
Likewise, this analysis might also be applied to other non-factual, metaphorical, or 
                                                                                                                
327 Certainly, dependent upon the contexts of the case, the defender might be able to raise other kinds 
of defence. 
328 The defendant referred to the plaintiff as a ‘notoriously hideous-looking’ person, and opined that 
the Creature in the film Frankenstein looks like the plaintiff, but ‘marginally better-looking’. See 
Berkoff v Burchill [1997] EMLR 139 at 141 per Neill LJ. 
329 ibid at 154 per Phillips LJ. 
330 ibid at 150-156. In the end both Neill LJ and Phillips LJ held that the disputed statement was 
capable of exposing the plaintiff to ridicule and this issue should be further considered by the jury. 
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figurative statements.331 Namely, if the imputation at issue is not susceptible to being 
proved true or false, the defence of truth cannot serve in the law of defamation. In 
consequence, the key issue is whether or not these figurative or metaphorical 
imputations are to be considered as defamatory and whether or not they have the 
potential to bring about serious harm to one’s reputation. As discussed above in 
2.23521, if the figurative or metaphorical imputations fail to cause sufficiently serious 
harm to a person’s reputation to be defamatory, the conduct pattern of insult (of this 
tort) may accord protection against (serious) harm to dignity or mental integrity under 
qualified circumstances.332 
 
c) Circumscribed protection against insulting but true statements 
 
As discussed above, the actionability of insulting statements or abusive conduct under 
the head of the Wilkinson tort is limited. In ordinary life insulting but true language is 
often uttered and heard. Although such conduct may be offensive, insulting or 
ridiculing a friend, colleague, or even a customer, for what they have done, or for their 
physical appearance or size should not be easily actionable, otherwise the courts might 
be inundated with trivial quarrels. Over and above the three Rhodes requirements,333 
aggravating factors should be required. For instance, insulting a person as 
psychopathic or deranged may be actionable under the head of the Wilkinson tort 
where that person has been humiliated and/or manipulated in such a way as 
intentionally to exploit his or her emotional fragility or psychiatric history.334  In 
addition, insulting a poorly-performing colleague in the workplace by accusing him or 
her of being extremely stupid, or educationally subnormal, may also constitute an 
actionable wrongdoing of this kind where there has been an abuse of power or unequal 
status.335 In these limited circumstances, the Wilkinson or Rhodes tort can possibly 
offer a remedy against insulting, abusing, but true statements. 
 
                                                                                                                
331 Regarding examinations of ‘non-factual imputations by use of figurative or satirical language’ in 
Scots verbal injury cases, see Reid (n 132) paras 8.29-8.32. 
332 See discussions in 2.23521. 
333 Rhodes v OPO (n 1) at para 88 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
334 Adapted from the contexts of Boothman v R (n 75); Timmermans v Buelow (n 69). 
335 Adapted from the contexts of Smith v Alwarid (n 241); Boucher v Wal-Mart Canada Corp (n 9). 
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2.23524 Concluding observations 
 
The discussion above suggests that there are three situations in which the law of 
defamation offers no remedy but insult may be actionable under the head of this tort: 
1) where the (insulting) imputation has not surmounted the threshold of ‘serious harm’ 
to reputation; 2) where the extent of publication has been limited; and 3) where the 
(insulting) imputation was true. However, it should be acknowledged that, in most 
cases, the actionability of insult under the head of this tort may further depend on the 
presence of other aggravating factors. 
 
 
2.236 The boundary between this conduct pattern and invasion of privacy 
 
An attempt will now be made to demarcate the boundary between this conduct pattern 
(in this tort) and invasion of privacy (in particular the tort of misuse of private 
information). Are there certain types of wrongdoing which lie beyond the reach of the 
existing law of privacy but for which a remedy may be found in this tort? 
 
 
2.2361 The emergence of the tort of misuse of private information 
 
Several of the cases reviewed above have a bearing upon the privacy issue. Though 
the protection of privacy may have different facets,336 most litigation hitherto has  
revolved around the dissemination of information.337 Claims in this regard used to be 
dealt with through two main routes338 – either under the head of breach of confidence, 
or by reference to the (now replaced) Data Protection Act 1998.339 In practice in the 
past breach of confidence played a much more crucial role than Data Protection Act 
                                                                                                                
336 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22; [2004] 2 AC 457 at para 12 per Lord Nicholls. 
337 NA Moreham, ‘The Nature of the Privacy Interest’ in NA Moreham and others (eds), Tugendhat 
and Christie: The Law of Privacy and the Media (3rd edn, 2016) 42 at para 2.11. 
338 J Rushbrooke and A Speker, ‘Breach of Confidence’ in NA Moreham and others (eds), Tugendhat 
and Christie: The Law of Privacy and the Media (3rd edn, 2016) 149 at para 4.01. 
339	   Data Protection Act 1998 has now been superseded by the Data Protection Act 2018.	  
   66  
1998.340 However, after the decision of the House of Lords in Campbell v MGN Ltd,341 
a new tort has grown out of and been differentiated from breach of confidence as an  
equitable wrong in England.342 This new tort – ‘misuse of private information’ – is ‘of 
most relevance in the majority of privacy cases involving the media’ at the present 
stage.343 
 
On the basis of Campbell v MGN Ltd, in terms of the essentials of the new tort of 
‘misuse of private information’, two main questions arise. The first question is whether 
or not the disclosed information is private, and in this connection reference may be 
made to Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.344 The touchstone 
by which this question can be answered is whether the person has a ‘reasonable 
expectation of privacy’345 with regard to the misused information.346 The question 
whether there was a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ can be considered as a 
‘threshold test’.347  Where this first test has been met, ‘the claimant’s interest in 
keeping the information private’ must then be balanced against ‘the countervailing 
interest of the recipient in publishing it’.348 The second question is whether the right 
to respect for private life should outweigh the right to freedom of expression?349 In 
this balancing exercise, the court must give effect to the principle of proportionality,350 
taking into account relevant factors such as ‘contribution to a debate of general 
                                                                                                                
340 Rushbrooke and Speker (n 338) at para 4.01. 
341 Campbell v MGN Ltd (n 336). 
342 Sir M Warby, A Garrick and C Strong, ‘Misuse of Private Information’ in NA Moreham and others 
(eds), Tugendhat and Christie: The Law of Privacy and the Media (3rd edn, 2016) 211 at para 5.09; 
Reid (n 132) para 14.41. 
343 Rushbrooke and Speker (n 338) at para 4.02. 
344 Warby, Garrick and Strong (n 342) at paras 5.14 and 5.15. 
345 Campbell v MGN Ltd (n 336) at para 21 per Lord Nicholls. Also see Reid (n 132) para 14.03. 
346 In a recent Supreme Court ruling the importance and relevancy of the ‘reasonable expectation of 
privacy’ test have been revisited and reaffirmed. See In the matter of an application by JR38 for 
Judicial Review [2015] UKSC 42; [2016] AC 1131 at paras 88, 93, 95 and 98 per Lord Toulson with 
whom Lord Hodge agrees; at paras 109-110 per Lord Clarke with whom Lord Hodge agrees. Also see 
Richard v BBC [2018] EWHC 1837 (Ch) at para 230 per Mr Justice Mann. 
347 Campbell v MGN Ltd (n 336) at para 137 per Baroness Hale. 
348 ibid. The two competing interests here are commonly recognised as the rights protected under 
Article 8 and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Article 8(1): ‘Everyone has 
the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.’ Article 10(1): 
‘Everyone has the right to freedom of expression…’. 
349 ibid at paras 112-124 per Lord Hope; at paras 134-140 per Baroness Hale. Also see Warby, 
Garrick and Strong (n 342) at paras 5.16-5.18. 
350 Campbell v MGN Ltd (n 336) at para 20 per Lord Nicholls; at para 140 per Baroness Hale. 
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interest’, the ‘content, form and consequences of the publication’ and so on.351 
 
 
2.2362 The boundary between infringement of privacy and insult (under the head of 
the Wilkinson tort) 
 
The tort of misuse of private information is now clearly established in English law, 
although the situation in Scots law is less settled, due to the scarcity of modern cases 
decided on the footing of misuse of private information.352 A comparison will now be 




2.23621 Insult in comparison to misuse of private information 
 
Insult (under the head of the Wilkinson tort) and the tort of misuse of private 
information can be regarded as sharing the following similarities: 
 
Firstly, like insult, misuse of private information centres upon safeguarding human 
dignity.353 An injury to reputation is not an essential element of misuse of private 
information, although the ‘protection of reputation’ is admitted as ‘part of the function 
of the law of privacy’.354 In other words, unlike defamation, compensation can be 
granted (for the injured dignity or mental integrity) in the absence of any (serious) 
harm to reputation. Secondly, as is the case with insult, publication or disclosure is not 
a required element of the tort of misuse of private information. The tort of misuse of 
private information may protect reputation but does not require reputation to have been 
damaged – the claimant’s good name in the estimation of (right-thinking) people. 
                                                                                                                
351 Other relevant factors see Richard v BBC (n 346) at para 276 per Mr Justice Mann. 
352 Reid (n 132) para 14.46. Cameron (n 140) para 4-14. See also X v BBC 2005 SLT 796. This is a 
case involving interim interdict in which the pursuer referred to misuse of private information in her 
pleadings and the court appeared to follow the reasoning recently applied in Campbell v MGN Ltd in 
granting interdict. 
353 Campbell v MGN Ltd (n 336) at paras 50-51 per Lord Hoffmann. 
354 Richard v BBC (n 346) at para 345 per Mr Justice Mann. 
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Publication or disclosure is thus less decisive. Thirdly, as with insult, the statement or 
the misused information at issue can be true or false. As shown in past actions based 
upon misuse of private information, this tort is mostly applied to disclosure of true 
information.355 However, as Lord Justice Longmore commented in McKennitt v Ash, 
truth or falsity is not a relevant concern of an action founded on misuse of private 
information.356 Fourthly, in the law of misuse of private information, a threshold of 
seriousness or non-triviality has been required in relation to the misused information 
or the effect of the misuse or disclosure.357 Likewise, an insult at a trivial level is not 
actionable but has a remedy only in ‘relatively limited and extreme’ conditions.358 
 
On the other hand, insult (under the head of the Wilkinson tort) and the tort of misuse 
of private information may differ in the following aspects: 
 
Firstly, as the title indicates, some misuse (of information) is required to trigger 
liability. Since in practice most actions concerning privacy arise out of the 
dissemination of information,359 it is usually not difficult for this requirement (of 
misuse) to be satisfied. As the term misuse primarily denotes wrong or improper use,360 
it is arguable that simply accessing or obtaining private information without further 
using it may not constitute misuse.361 In contrast, misuse (of information) is not a 
prerequisite of liability for insult (under the head of the Wilkinson tort). Insulting or 
abusive conduct need not involve misuse of information. Secondly, the misused 
                                                                                                                
355 J Hartshorne, ‘An Appropriate Remedy for the Publication of False Private Information’ (2012) 4 
JML 93 at 95; Warby, Garrick and Strong (n 342) at paras 5.30-5.32. 
356 McKennitt v Ash [2006] EWCA Civ 1714 at para 86 per Lord Justice Longmore. 
357 Warby, Garrick and Strong (n 342) at paras 5.154-5.157. Also see M v Secretary of State for Work 
and Pensions [2006] UKHL 11; [2006] 2 AC 91 at para 83 per Lord Walker; R (Gillan) v 
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2006] UKHL 12; [2006] 2 AC 307 at para 28 per Lord 
Bingham. 
358 Rhodes v OPO (n 1) at paras 107-109 per Lord Neuberger. 
359 See Moreham, ‘The Nature of the Privacy Interest’ (n 337) at para 2.11. 
360 As regards definitions of misuse, see the Oxford English Dictionary. 
361 What occurred in Beyts v Trump International Golf Club Scotland Ltd may be a good instance. 
The employee of the defender took a photo of the pursuer when she was urinating in the dunes, 
without further using the photo, and then deleting it. The pursuer brought a claim on the basis of the 
Data Protection Act 1998, without mentioning the tort of misuse of private information. A possible 
reason is that the defender may not be taken as misusing the private information. Regarding the 
contexts of this case, see Beyts v Trump International Golf Club Scotland Ltd [2017] SC EDIN 21 at 
para 12 per Sheriff Donald Corke. 
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information requires to be private, and, before striking a balance between competing 
interests, the core question to be answered is whether the claimant has a ‘reasonable 
expectation of privacy’ respecting the misused information.362 In contrast, insulting 
statements (or conduct) do not necessarily entail private information or interference 
with one’s expectation of privacy. An insult can be levelled in a variety of manners, 
which do not need to involve private information. Thirdly, as mentioned above, truth 
or falsity is not a crucial concern for either the tort of misuse of private information or 
insult (under the head of the Wilkinson tort). Nevertheless, a difference still exists. In 
respect of the former, most of the cases relate to the dissemination of true information, 
whilst cases of insult based upon true facts are much fewer, and they are unlikely to 
be actionable unless the insult at issue is accompanied by aggravating factors or other 
conduct patterns.363 
 
In sum, on the basis of the foregoing comparison, it seems arguable that insult (under 
the head of the Wilkinson tort) may provide legal protection beyond the reach of the 
tort of misuse of private information. It may apply where no private information is 
involved – e.g. where abusive statements unrelated to the victim’s private life are 
uttered. Moreover, even if private information is involved, insult (under the head of 
the Wilkinson tort) may apply where there is no misuse of that information. For 
instance, in the absence of any attempt to acquire or distribute the private information, 
the wrongdoer happens to witness or hear others’ private affairs. If the wrongdoer 
proceeds to insult the person concerned on the basis of that private information 
(without disclosing the information to any other third party), it seems that the victim 
could have a case only on the footing of the Wilkinson tort,364 although only under 
limited circumstances.365 
 
Where insulting or abusive conduct involves both of the elements of misuse and 
                                                                                                                
362 Campbell v MGN Ltd (n 336) at para 21 per Lord Nicholls. Also see Reid (n 132) para 14.03. 
363 See the analysis in 2.23523 (c). 
364 Notably, this wrongdoing may not be covered by the Data Protection Act 2018 either, since it 
does not meet the provided definition of ‘processing’ (of personal data). See Data Protection Act 2018 
s 3(4). 
365	   As analysed in section 2.23523 (a) and (c), this sort of insult may only be actionable when it is 
sufficiently serious or accompanied by aggravating factors. 
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private information, it seems more likely that a litigant would choose to proceed on 
the footing of misuse of private information. The above comparison indicates that the 
requirements of the tort of Wilkinson or Rhodes are more difficult to meet than those 
of the tort of misuse of private information, since there is no need to establish intention, 
nor is there any threshold as regards the harm caused. By contrast, the Wilkinson and 
Rhodes tort requires that the element of intention and the element of consequence 
(physical harm or recognised psychiatric illness) are both established. This marker of 
difference was reflected in the Australian case of Giller v Procopets, where the 
videotapes of private sexual activities between the two parties had been disclosed,366 
and recovery was granted on the footing of breach of confidence.367 The claim based 
on intentional infliction of emotional distress failed because the majority of the court 
did not regard the requisite harm element of the Wilkinson tort as having been met.368 
Thus the essential requirements of the Wilkinson tort may be less readily fulfilled than 
those of misuse of private information (or, as in Giller, breach of confidence). 
 
 
2.23642 Beyond misuse of private information – the applicability of this tort 
 
a)   Incomplete protection granted to physical privacy 
 
According to the European Court of Human Rights, the right protected under Article 
8 ‘covers the physical and psychological integrity of a person’. A person’s body is 
acknowledged as ‘the most intimate aspect of one’s private life’.369 Nevertheless, the 
legal protection given to physical privacy seems to be incomplete in England and in 
Scotland. Moreham commented that no particular protection is provided to physical 
privacy in terms of English law.370 Non-informational privacy or physical privacy is 
protected merely by ‘a piecemeal collection of common law actions and legislative 
                                                                                                                
366 Giller v Procopets (n 199) at paras 124-125 per Ashley JA. 
367 ibid at para 129 per Ashley JA. 
368 ibid at paras 164-165 per Ashley JA; at paras 471-478 per Neave JA. In this case, Ms. Giller 
merely suffered from emotional distress without developing any recognised psychiatric injury. 
369 YF v Turkey (2004) 39 EHRR 34 at para 33. 
370 Moreham, ‘The Nature of the Privacy Interest’ (n 337) at para 2.37. 
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measures’.371 This observation is based upon the examination of a variety of relevant 
legislation and common law torts, in regard to the potential protection they could offer, 
as well as their limits. In this connection, it should be noted that protection can be 
afforded against the processing of personal data ‘wholly or partly by automated means’ 
or against the processing, by other non-automated means, of personal data ‘which form 
part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing system’.372 Recital 15 to 
the GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation) also indicates that ‘the protection of 
natural persons should be technologically neutral and should not depend on the 
techniques used’. As long as ‘the personal data are contained or are intended to be 
contained in a filing system’, even ‘manual processing’ would be covered by this 
Regulation.373 In the light of the scope of current Data Protection legislation,374 as 
well as Moreham’s survey, it seems discernible that no protection would be rendered 
against an invasion of physical privacy, which is committed by a person who is not a 
public official375 under the following circumstances: 
 
*a one-off376 observing or listening to a person without collecting377 any personal 
data; or without using automated devices or intending to place personal data into a 
filing system;378 
*a one-off observing or listening to a person’s home without collecting any personal 
data; or without using automated devices or intending to place personal data into a 
filing system; 
*a one-off taking photos or recording activities or conversations in relation to a person 
or his/her home, without using automated devices or intending to place personal data 
                                                                                                                
371 NA Moreham, ‘Intrusion into Physical Privacy’ in NA Moreham and others (eds), Tugendhat and 
Christie: The Law of Privacy and the Media (3rd edn, 2016) 429 at para 10.03. 
372 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement 
of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L119 
Article 2(1); Data Protection Act 2018 ss 4 and 21. 
373 See Recital 15 to the GDPR. 
374 See Data Protection Act 2018. 
375 Where public authorities are involved in committing these wrongdoings, the Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act 2000 and the Human Rights Act 1998 would probably apply. 
376 Multiple or a course of conduct could be covered by the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. 
377 ‘Collection’ is also treated as a form of ‘processing’. See Data Protection Act 2018 s 3(4); GDPR 
Article 4(2). 
378 GDPR Article 2(1); Data Protection Act 2018 ss 4 and 21. 
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into a filing system. 
 
As for Scots law, it has been argued that the protection accorded to ‘territorial privacy’ 
and ‘privacy of the person’ is at best uncertain.379 In respect of ‘territorial privacy’, 
where the wrongdoer is not a public authority, the ‘remedies for infringement of the 
privacy of the home’ were left unclear after the decision in Martin v McGuiness and 
require further to be elaborated.380 In respect of the privacy of the person, based upon 
Scots authorities as Henderson v Chief Constable, Fife Police381 and McKie v Chief 
Constable, Strathclyde Police, 382  Reid observed that interferences with personal 
privacy in Scots law ‘are in principle recognised as a wrong’, yet ‘the basis for civil 
remedies against intrusion cannot be regarded as securely established’.383 On the basis 
of the above, and taking into account the GDPR and the Data Protection Act 2018, it 
seems unclear in Scots law in the following situations whether legal protection could 
be provided against the invasion of physical privacy: 
 
*On only one occasion,384 a person who is not a public authority385 observes, listens 
to, or even enters others’ home, without collecting any personal data,386 or without 
using automated devices or intending to place personal data into a filing system;387 
                                                                                                                
379 Reid (n 132) chs 17 and 19. 
380 ibid para 17.05. The uncertainty is left by the decision of Martin v McGuiness, in which a private 
investigator employed by the defender pretended to be a previous colleague of the pursuer, visiting his 
house, interviewing his wife, observing the house, and filming ‘events in the garden’. Despite viewing 
the wrongdoing on the part of the private investigator as capable of infringing the pursuer’s right of 
Article 8(1) ECHR, Lord Bonomy opined that the conduct in dispute could be justified by Article 8(2) 
ECHR, and the evidence produced by the investigator was admissible. See Martin v McGuiness 2003 
SLT 1424 at paras 8, 12, and 17 per Lord Bonomy. 
381 Henderson v Chief Constable, Fife Police 1988 SLT 361. 
382 McKie v Chief Constable, Strathclyde Police 2002 Rep LR 137. 
383 Reid (n 132) at para 17.09. 
384 On more than one occasion the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 may apply. 
385 If these wrongdoings are committed by a public official, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers 
(Scotland) Act 2000 and the Human Rights Act 1998 would probably apply. Also see Reid (n 132) 
paras 19.60-19.61. 
386 ‘Collecting’ personal data would constitute the ‘processing’ of personal data. See Data Protection 
Act 2018 s 3(4); GDPR Article 4(2). 
387 GDPR Article 2(1); Data Protection Act 2018 ss 4 and 21. Prior to the presence of the GDPR and 
the Data Protection Act 2018, provided automated or digital devices were used, these deeds might be 
covered by the Data Protection Act 1998. For instance, the installation of CCTV equipment for the 
purpose of covering others’ private residence without giving notice and providing information can be 
a breach of the 1998 Act. See Woolley v Akram [2017] SC EDIN 7. 
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*On only one occasion, a person who is not a public authority observes, listens to other 
persons, without collecting any personal data, or without using automated devices or 
intending to place personal data into a filing system; 
*On only one occasion, a person who is not a public authority takes photos or records 
activities or conversations in relation to others’ home or person, without using 
automated devices or intending to place personal data into a filing system. 
 
As can be observed, the circumstances listed above in respect of the Scots law 
substantially overlap with those in respect of the English law. Whether, under these 
circumstances, there is scope for this conduct pattern (under the head of the Wilkinson 
tort) to function will be analysed below. 
 
 
b)   The applicability of this tort 
 
Under the above circumstances, where there has been an invasion of physical privacy 
and statutory regulation and common law torts have reached their limits, there is scope 
for insulting/abusive conduct (under the head of the Wilkinson tort) to serve a function. 
The case of C v D, SBA may be a useful illustration as to where this tort could be 
relevant. In this case, in addition to battery or assault,388 the (first) defendant – the 
claimant’s headmaster 389  – had wronged the claimant in two different ways: (1) 
filming the claimant with a video camera when he was taking a shower together with 
his classmates;390 and (2) on an occasion exploiting his vulnerability, undressing him 
when he had been taken unwell and staring at his genitals for several minutes.391 It is 
apparent that the second incident falls beyond the remedies provided by current 
legislation and other recognised torts. Whether the first wrongdoing can be covered by 
the GDPR or the Data Protection Act 2018 is more uncertain, depending on whether 
‘automated means’ were used or whether the acquired personal data were ‘intended to 
be contained in a filing system’. However, since the conduct predated the enactment 
                                                                                                                
388 C v D, SBA (n 213) at paras 84 and 87 per Mr Justice Field. 
389 ibid at para 2 per Mr Justice Field. 
390 ibid at paras 4, 10, and 97 per Mr Justice Field. 
391 ibid at paras 4, 12, and 98 per Mr Justice Field. 
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of both the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 as well as the Data Protection Act 
1998,392 it was addressed on the footing of Wilkinson v Downton. Certainly, the limits 
of the Wilkinson tort lie in its three essential requirements, which are not so easy to 
surmount. The first wrongdoing of filming the claimant while he was taking a shower 
was held by the court as having ‘caused only emotional distress’ and ‘not actionable’, 
whereas the second wrongdoing of undressing someone and staring at his genitals was 
found to be ‘a gross invasion of his personal integrity’ and therefore recoverable.393 
Thus a claimant who has experienced an invasion of physical privacy similar to that 
reported in C v D, SBA may establish a valid claim, although only if he or she can 
satisfy the three elements indicated in Rhodes v OPO.394  
 
It is possible to take the fact pattern of Wainwright v Home Office in order to explore 
further where this tort might apply. Despite the European Court of Human Rights 
having found the manner of strip-search carried out in Wainwright as being ‘a breach 
of Art.8 of the Convention’,395 a question mark remains as to the remedy provided by 
the English law of tort in this situation.396 Moreover, if the infringement is carried out 
by a private person or entity, there is no possibility of direct action under the Human 
Rights Act 1998. For example, suppose the victim is accused of shoplifting in a 
supermarket and complies with the store detective’s request that he or she undergoes 
a strip-search before leaving the supermarket. As a result of the search, the victim 
suffers from significant emotional distress which turns into recognised psychiatric 
illness later. In this hypothetical case, there would be no recovery on the basis of 
invasion of privacy. However, there is a statable case on the basis of the Wilkinson or 
Rhodes tort, provided the required elements have been met. 
 
In the absence of a tort specific to physical privacy (which in the view of some 
commentators would be a desirable development397), providing a remedy for insulting 
                                                                                                                
392 These wrongdoings were committed during the period between 1989 and 1993. See ibid at para 2 
per Mr Justice Field. 
393 See ibid at paras 97, 98, 100 per Mr Justice Field. 
394 Rhodes v OPO (n 1) at para 88 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
395 Wainwright v United Kingdom (2007) 44 EHRR 40 at para 49. 
396 Reid (n 132) para 17.07. 
397 As to developing an ‘Intrusion into Physical Privacy Action’, see Moreham, ‘Intrusion into 
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or abusive conduct (under the head of the Wilkinson tort) has the potential to address 
wrongdoing of this nature, under limited conditions. The terminology of the court in 
C v D, SBA in branding the defendant’s conduct as a ‘a gross invasion of his personal 
integrity’,398  and thus recoverable on the basis of the Wilkinson tort, implies the 
possible role to be played by the Wilkinson tort in the realm of physical privacy. 
 
 
2.24 Conduct inflicting mental harm through injury to a third party – issues as regards 
‘secondary victims’ 
 
Inflicting mental harm upon the victim through occasioning injury to a third party is 
the most distinctive feature of the conduct pattern of this section. The wrongdoing at 
issue is directed at a third party, who is the immediate target and the primary victim of 
the wrongdoing. The mental harm is inflicted upon the claimant in an intentional but 
indirect way, through the claimant’s perception of injury caused to the third party. The 
infliction of mental harm is incidental or secondary to the causation of injury to the 
primary victim. Accordingly, the claimant should be taken as a secondary or indirect 
victim, whilst the victims of the foregoing three conduct patterns should be treated as 
primary or direct victims. As the conduct pattern of this type is closely intertwined 
with other essential requirements as regards secondary victim claims, they will be 
explored altogether in Chapter 5 – secondary victims in the field of intentional 
infliction of mental harm. 
 
 
2.25 Conclusion on conduct patterns 
 
In the light of English and Commonwealth authorities in relation to the Wilkinson tort, 
the typical types of conduct which have hitherto been held as actionable, can be 
                                                                                                                
Physical Privacy’ (n 371) at paras 10.82-10.98. Comparably, Reid also argues that in order to offer 
adequate protection to privacy or other personality interests, ‘liability cannot be restricted to malicious 
infringement’, since ‘infringement of privacy is seldom malicious in the sense of any specific 
intention or desire to harm the pursuer’. See Reid (n 132) para 17.13. 
398 C v D, SBA (n 213) at para 98 per Mr Justice Field. 
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classified under four heads: 1) playing on or interfering with victims’ emotional bonds 
with their nearest and dearest (mostly) through false statements; 2) threats or coercion; 
3) insults or other abusive conduct; 4) inflicting mental harm through injury to a third 
party. A residual category of ‘other conduct patterns’ could also be added in order to 
signify that the preceding four are not exhaustive classifications. Moreover, the review 
of the authorities above indicates the importance of taking into account the gravity of 
the disputed conduct, or aggravating factors. As analysed in section 2.12, although 
five aggravating factors are frequently observed, the falsity of the statement, exploiting 
the victim’s vulnerability and abusing power or unequal status are of most relevance 
to the conduct element of this tort.399  Falsity is particularly relevant to the first 
category of conduct. The conduct patterns of this tort can be constructed through a 
combination of the five types of conduct with the three aggravating factors, as listed 
in section 2.13. 
 
The first conduct pattern is playing on or interfering with victims’ emotional bonds 
with their nearest and dearest, (mostly) through false statements. The disputed conduct 
of this pattern requires to reach a significant level of gravity. Arguably, the falsity of 
the statement is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition of this conduct pattern, 
but it can be taken as an aggravating factor that heightens the gravity of the conduct. 
The reasonable belief of the victim in the statements is also an indispensable factor 
connecting the wrongdoer’s conduct to the emotional reaction of the victim. The abuse 
of power or status has been observed as an aggravating factor for this conduct pattern, 
since the authority enjoyed by the wrongdoer would make his/her story more credible 
and therefore more likely to injure. This tort can provide a remedy which is unavailable 
in the field of deceit/fraud, where mental harm arises as a result of the victim’s belief 
in the (false) statement rather than the victim being induced to act to his or her 
detriment. 
 
The second conduct pattern is using threats to coerce the victim into conduct which 
has negative consequences for him or her. Falsity (of the statement) is not generally a 
                                                                                                                
399 Although unlawful motive can arguably heighten the gravity of conduct, it is more related to the 
mental element of this tort. 
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characteristic of such cases. Whether or not falsity can be taken as an aggravating 
factor in relation to threats is more uncertain. The victim must have (reasonable) belief 
that the wrongdoer would carry out the threat. The authorities indicate that exploitation 
of the victim’s vulnerability and abuse of power or unequal status are aggravating 
factors in this context. Arguably, they may either heighten the existent gravity of the 
wrongdoer’s conduct, or even transform otherwise non-tortious into tortious conduct. 
In most of the cases considered where the wrongdoer abused power in conjunction 
with threats, the wrongdoer did not exercise the power or authority for a legitimate 
purpose or in an appropriate manner. Comparing this conduct pattern to the tort of 
assault, this tort may potentially provide a legal remedy where the threatened 
consequences involve no physical injury, force, or contact. In comparison to this tort, 
the potential applicability of the statutory tort of harassment is obviously much wider. 
Where wrongdoing is recurrent this tort is overshadowed by the Protection from 
Harassment Act 1997, leaving this tort with a role to play in cases where the disputed 
wrongdoing occurs merely once. 
 
The third conduct pattern is insulting or other abusive conduct. Insulting or other 
abusive conduct does not need to cause (serious) harm to one’s reputation, nor does it 
need to be false. In the cases considered, insulting or abusive conduct, standing on its 
own, has not been explicitly recognised as actionable but may be so where there are 
aggravating factors. The aggravating factors – exploiting the victim’s vulnerability or 
abusing power/unequal status – may heighten the seriousness of the insulting or 
abusive conduct, or even form an essential and inseparable part of the gravity and 
actionability of the wrongdoing. It is arguable that this tort can provide a remedy in 
the following three circumstances which are beyond the reach of the law of 
defamation: 1) where the (insulting) imputation has not surmounted the threshold of 
‘serious harm to the reputation’; 2) where the extent of publication is regarded as 
limited; and 3) where the (insulting) imputation is true. However, in most cases, insult 
is actionable only in the presence of other aggravating factors. It is further arguable 
that this tort can provide a remedy for insulting/abusive behaviour in circumstances 
where the tort of misuse of private information does not apply, namely where no 
private information is involved, or there is no misuse of information. Moreover, there 
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is scope for this tort to serve a function in situations where the statutory enactments 
and common law torts fail to provide protection against the invasion of physical 
privacy, as listed in section 2.23642 (a). 
 
The fourth conduct pattern – inflicting mental harm through injury to a third party – 
will be explored in Chapter 5. 
 
In sum, it is clear that the territory occupied by the existing English torts, and arguably 
also the law of delict in Scotland, leaves a number of significant gaps in protecting the 
rights of the person. The tort/delict under discussion here has an important role to play 


























2.3 Justification or excuse 
 
2.31 Defence or an integral part of conduct element? 
 
The judgment of the majority in the Supreme Court in Rhodes stipulated that the 
conduct element of this tort was ‘words or conduct directed at the claimant’ for which 
‘there is no justification or excuse’.400 But did the Supreme Court simply mean that, 
in respect of this tort, defendants could cite certain justifications or excuses in their 
defence? Or did the Supreme Court intend ‘the absence of justification or excuse’ to 
be an integral part of the conduct element? What is the difference between these two 
approaches? In this connection it is helpful to make reference to the analysis of tort 
law defences recently published by James Goudkamp. 
 
 
2.311 Separating definitional elements of torts from defences  
 
Goudkamp distinguishes the definitional elements of torts from defences, but notes 
that ‘any issue could be placed on either side of the equation’.401 Since definitional 
elements are what constitute the tortious wrong at issue, from Goudkamp’s point of 
view, to assert the absence of one or several definitional elements of a certain tort is a 
denial – denying that all of the requirements of the disputed tort have been satisfied,402 
and therefore denying liability. In contrast, to raise a defence is ‘not denying that he 
committed a wrong’, but explaining why the defendant committed the wrong, as well 
as why he should be released from liability.403  Goudkamp points out that many 
                                                                                                                
400 Rhodes v OPO (n 1) at para 88 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
401 J Goudkamp, Tort Law Defences (first published 2013, reprinted 2016) 34. As regards the 
interplay of torts elements and defences, also see A Dyson, J Goudkamp and F Wilmot-Smith, 
‘Central Issues in the Law of Tort Defences’ in A Dyson, J Goudkamp and F Wilmot-Smith (eds), 
Defences in Tort (2015) 3 at 11-12. 
402 Goudkamp (n 401) 46-47. 
403 ibid at 76-78. Notably, Goudkamp terms his account of defence/justification as the ‘radical view’, 
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practitioners and scholars do not consider the demarcation between the elements of 
torts and defences to be important, as it does not matter so much ‘whether liability is 
withheld on the basis that an element of the tort in which the claimant sues is absent, 
or on the ground that the defendant has a defence’. 404  Furthermore, technically 
speaking, every defence can be converted into a definitional element of torts, and vice 
versa.405 For instance, the plea of ‘consent’ serves as a justificatory defence in many 
torts. However, it is technically possible that its negative counterpart – ‘absence of 
consent’ – can be treated as a definitional element.406 Accordingly, the boundary 
between the definitional elements of torts and defences, or that between denials and 
raising defences, is obscure, even sometimes confusing.407 Nevertheless, Goudkamp 
argues that the separation between tort elements and defences is of significance, 
particularly in ‘guid[ing] defendants in their conduct by stating clearly when 
defendants are under a duty to act in a particular way and when they have a privilege 
to commit torts’.408 
 
Two salient points follow which might be of use for investigating the conduct element 
required in Rhodes. First, in practical terms, conduct elements and defences are 
effectively interchangeable. The boundary between them is unclear and 
underexplored. Secondly, it is nevertheless arguable that a separation between conduct 
elements and defences is significant in respect of guiding potential defendants how to 
behave. Adopting the presence of a justification or excuse as a defence or including 
the absence of justification or excuse in the conduct element are different approaches, 
but both can be meaningful. Did the Supreme Court in Rhodes favour one approach 
over the other? 
 
                                                                                                                
in contrast to the ‘conventional view’ that regards defences or justifications as ‘denying’ wrongdoing 
or wrongfulness. A parallel ‘radical view’ in relation to the definition of defence seems to be 
employed in Clerk & Lindsell on Torts, see Clerk and Dugdale (n 41) para 3-01. 
404 Goudkamp (n 401) 41. 
405 ibid 34. 
406 As to the controversies over whether consent/absence of consent should be treated as a defence or 
a definitional element in respect of the tort of trespass to the person, see ibid 65-67. 
407 ‘Unfortunately, the line between a failure to establish prima facie liability and a successful plea of 
a general defence is not always clear.’ See Clerk and Dugdale (n 41) para 3-01. 
408 Goudkamp (n 401) 42. 
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2.312 The stance of the Supreme Court in relation to this tort 
 
The more credible interpretation is that the Supreme Court in Rhodes treated ‘the 
absence of justification or excuse’ as an integral part of the conduct element. Various 
elements in its reasoning point in that direction. First of all, immediately after 
stipulating that the conduct element of this tort should be words or conduct directed 
towards the claimant ‘for which there is no justification or reasonable excuse’, Lady 
Hale and Lord Toulson indicated that ‘the burden of proof is on the claimant’.409 They 
did not separate the onus of proving ‘(no) justification or reasonable excuse’ from the 
burden of proving the impugned conduct. In addition, if the qualification of ‘for which 
there is no justification or reasonable excuse’ is removed, nothing is left in the conduct 
element except for ‘words or conduct directed towards the claimant’, which is too 
broad and uncertain to be treated as a stand-alone conduct element. In the 
circumstances of Rhodes, Lady Hale and Lord Toulson did not attempt to separate the 
two parts. After finding that ‘there is every justification for the publication’,410 instead 
of stating that the committed wrongdoing could be justified, they concluded that the 
publication at issue did not meet the required conduct element.411 Moreover, Lord 
Neuberger explicitly indicated that not every untruth, threat, or insult that inflicts 
distress would be ‘civilly actionable’. The criterion of ‘[without] justification or 
reasonable excuse’ applied by the majority is the ‘second and demanding requirement 
which has to be satisfied before liability can attach to an untruth, an insult or a 
threat…’.412 In contrast to the wording, ‘[without] justification or reasonable excuse’, 
Lord Neuberger chose the term ‘gratuitous’ and compared it with standards of 
‘“outrageous”, “flagrant” or “extreme”’ as employed in the American and Canadian 
courts.413 These terms clearly are adjectives qualifying the disputed conduct, and 
cannot therefore be separated from the conduct element. Accordingly, it appears very 
likely that ‘[without] justification or reasonable excuse’ was used by the Supreme 
                                                                                                                
409 Rhodes v OPO (n 1) at para 74 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
410 ibid at para 76 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
411 ibid at para 90 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
412 ibid at para 110 per Lord Neuberger. 
413 ibid. 
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Court in Rhodes as an integral part of the conduct element of this tort. 
 
 
2.313 Is the approach of the Supreme Court warranted? 
 
If the stance of the Supreme Court can be construed as treating the absence of 
justification or excuse as a part of the conduct element, is this a sound approach? 
Arguably, this stance is understandable, but not entirely satisfactory, particularly in 
regard to (distributing) the burden of proof. It is understandable because it signifies 
that not every infliction of severe emotional distress would be wrongful or tortious. 
The message – tort law only forbids ‘unjustifiable’ or ‘gratuitous’ infliction of severe 
emotional distress – is thereby conveyed to potential actors. Conversely, treating 
justifications or excuses as a defence and leaving the conduct element blank414 implies 
that every kind of conduct or words inflicting severe emotional distress is a tortious 
wrong, and any one (intentionally) inflicting severe emotional distress upon others is 
a wrongdoer. This suggestion appears unacceptable in the real world, for almost 
everyone has at some point in time (intentionally) inflicted severe emotional distress 
upon others. 
 
On the other hand, there are problems with treating absence of justification or excuse 
as part of the conduct element. The primary issue concerns the burden of proof. If this 
is part of the conduct element, the onus of proving that ‘there is no justification or 
reasonable excuse’ rests on the claimant.415 But how can a claimant prove the absence 
of something? It is difficult, if not impossible, to establish a negative proposition of 
fact or value judgment. The claimant can at best try to prove how egregious the 
defendant’s wrongdoing was.416 Secondly, as guidance for the conduct of potential 
defendants, the wording selected by the Supreme Court may not be clear enough. In 
comparison with formulations used in other jurisdictions such as ‘“outrageous”, 
                                                                                                                
414 See ibid at para 88 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
415 ibid at para 74 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
416 As analysed in the above sections, where more conduct patterns as well as aggravating factors are 
established in one case, the (one-off) wrongdoing in question could be found as more egregious, and 
more likely the case would be held as actionable. 
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“flagrant” or “extreme” (conduct)’, the content of ‘unjustifiable’, ‘gratuitous’, or 
‘without justification or excuse’ is broad and lacking in specification.417 In addition, 
analysis of previous cases suggests that gravity is required of the conduct in most cases. 
However, the terms ‘gratuitous’ or ‘without justification or excuse’ do not necessarily 
tell us anything about the gravity of the impugned conduct. In this regard the criteria 
of ‘“outrageous”, “flagrant” or “extreme” (conduct)’ give a clearer steer. 
 
Arguably it may be preferable for the future development of this tort to employ a 
conduct element which is more definite, capable of reflecting the gravity of the 
conduct, and to remove the controversial qualification of ‘without justification or 
excuse’, as can be observed in the American and Canadian approaches. As the gravity 
of conduct and justification for the conduct are conceptually different, they are better 
separated. Following this separation, the question whether there is any justification for 
the disputed conduct in Rhodes becomes less urgent, for the publication of one’s life 
story may not be serious enough to constitute the conduct element of this tort.418 Once 
the disputed conduct surmounts the threshold of gravity/seriousness, the question 
whether it can be justified would then come into play. The more egregious the disputed 
conduct, the stronger justification it may require. This kind of approach could not only 
clarify different concepts, sending the message that not every infliction of severe 
emotional distress would be tortious, but also distribute the burden of proof in a better 
way. With this approach the claimant is no longer required to establish a negative 
proposition of fact or value judgment, but merely needs to prove what has been done 
to him or her, as well as the egregious nature of the conduct. The onus of raising a 
defence – asserting and proving the existence of justification – would be placed upon 
the defendant. It was argued even before the decision in Rhodes, that instead of 
focusing on the ‘lack of justification’ for the disputed conduct, a better approach might 
be to develop an independent defence, or a ‘freestanding criterion of “justifiability”’, 
which could place policy considerations into balance.419 
                                                                                                                
417 Lord Neuberger also admitted that ‘virtually every threat, untruth or insult can be said to be 
unjustified, inexcusable and gratuitous’. See Rhodes v OPO (n 1) at para 110 per Lord Neuberger. 
418 Despite being potentially able to inflict mental harm, the nature of this conduct is not egregious at 
all. In contrast, the impugned wrongdoings in Wilkinson and Janvier are more serious even 
outrageous.  
419 For a criterion ‘to determine whether liability ought properly to be precluded’ rather than a 
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It is a pity that, despite awareness of the American and Canadian requirements for the 
conduct element, the Supreme Court chose not to follow them or to develop a parallel 
version, on the ground that these foreign approaches ‘ha[ve] not so far been advanced 
in this country’, 420  and also because they unavoidably involve a ‘subjective 
judgment’.421 Since the absence of justification or excuse has now been employed as 
a part of a definitional element of this tort, it appears unlikely that the defendant could 
be successful in raising a ‘justificatory defence’, whereas raising a ‘non-justificatory 
defence’ may still be possible.422 The reason is self-evident. If there are grounds 
which can rationalise or justify the defendant’s conduct, no wrong will be constituted 
as the elements of the tort would not be (entirely) satisfied.423 Thus there is no need 
and no likelihood for the defendant to raise a defence. However, this reason also 
reflects the importance of these justificatory grounds. Although they may not be 
adopted as a defence in relation to this tort, their existence can attack the conduct 
element and negate liability. The next question to be investigated is as the type of 




2.32 Possible justifications 
 
According to Goudkamp, tort law defences can be divided into two broad categories 
– ‘justification defences’ and ‘public policy defences’.424 When raising ‘justification 
defences’, the defendant asserts that ‘he acted reasonably’ in committing the disputed 
wrong, and that he should therefore be released from liability.425 In contrast, ‘public 
                                                                                                                
criterion serving ‘to determine liability’, see Ying Khai Liew, ‘The Rule in Wilkinson v Downton: 
Conduct, Intention, and Justifiability’ (2015) 78 MLR 349 at 359-360. (Comment on OPO v MLA 
[2014] EWCA Civ 1277, the Court of Appeal decision.) 
420 Rhodes v OPO (n 1) at para 88 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
421 See ibid at para 110 per Lord Neuberger. 
422 Dyson, Goudkamp and Wilmot-Smith (n 401) at 11. Defences that are not justificatory are 
categorised by Goudkamp as ‘public policy defences’. The distinction between ‘justification defences’ 
and ‘public policy defences’ will be explained in the next section. 
423 ibid. 
424 Goudkamp (n 401) 76. 
425 ibid. 
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policy defences’ are those pertinent to external aims of tort law other than the ‘rational 
defensibility of the defendant’s conduct’.426 It seems more likely that justificatory 
grounds which rationalise misdeeds and defeat the conduct element (of this tort) would 
be found in the former category. Some individual defences – general defences or 
defences specific to a certain tort – classified under the head of ‘justification defences’, 
appear relevant. Whether or not the justificatory grounds underpinning them could be 





‘Consent’ serves as a justification defence in several torts.427 The rationale of this 
defence is that ‘[o]ne who has invited or assented to an act being done towards him 
cannot, when he suffers from it, complain of it as a wrong.’428 When consent is 
established, delictual liability can be negated or the wrongdoing exculpated. 429 
Consent can be express or implied.430 It must be given voluntarily and freely,431 and 
its boundaries must be respected. A consent provided for particular conduct cannot be 
used as the justification for different sorts of conduct, or for conduct that exceeds the 
scope agreed by the victim.432 Consent can be raised (admittedly unusually) as a 
defence in respect of the tort of defamation – namely, by asserting that the publication 
of defamatory statements has the consent of or is authorised by the pursuer.433 
 
If consent functions as a justificatory defence for the communication of defamatory 
statements, could it also serve as a justificatory ground for this tort, based on which 
the conduct element can be defeated and liability can be negated? The first conduct 
                                                                                                                
426 Public policy defences include, for example, ‘judicial process immunities’, ‘parliamentary and 
executive privilege’, ‘limitation bars’, and so on. See ibid 76, 122-135. 
427 ibid 113. 
428 Smith v Baker [1891] AC 325 at 360 per Lord Herschell. 
429 Clerk and Dugdale (n 41) para 3-104. Also see Walker (n 140) 345. 
430 Clerk and Dugdale (n 41) para 3-111. 
431 Walker (n 140) 345; Reid (n 132) para 3.01. 
432 Goudkamp (n 401) 114; Walker (n 140) 345; Reid (n 132) paras 3.01 and 3.02. 
433 Mullis, Parkes and Gatley (n 260) para 10.2; Clerk and Dugdale (n 41) para 22-199; Walker (n 
140) 792. 
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pattern discussed above is playing on the victims’ emotional bonds with their nearest 
and dearest through false statements. Since typically the victim has to be tricked and 
believe in the false story to be injured, it appears unlikely that the wrongdoer can 
acquire consent from the victim. As to the second conduct pattern, it also seems 
contradictory that consent would have been granted to threatening conduct. 
Threatening involves intimidating the victim with certain undesired negative 
consequences, causing fear and/or distress. It is difficult to imagine that one can 
knowingly and voluntarily give consent to being threatened, and nevertheless feel 
intimidated and distressed by the threat. The third conduct pattern concerns insulting 
or other abusive conduct. It appears more likely that consent could relate to this 
conduct pattern. Despite consenting to insult, one might nonetheless experience 
significant emotional distress during insulting or abusive conduct due to the affront to 
dignity and mental integrity. Assume that students voluntarily participate in an 
insulting game/competition – primarily hurling insults and curses at each other. 
Although the participants may be deemed to have consented to each other’s 
wrongdoing in an express or implied way, it is conceivable that some of them would 
feel severely distressed or injured during or after the game/competition. In the event 
that an action was brought on the basis of this tort, ‘consent’ should be available as a 
justificatory ground to defeat the conduct element of this tort. In other words, the 
participants can assert that their conduct is not gratuitous or unjustifiable, as long as 
the conduct in question had not gone beyond the bounds of the given consent. 
 
 
2.322 Discharging duties and exercising rights – a form of privilege 
 
2.3221 In general 
 
The commentary to the American Restatement (Third) of Torts §46 indicates that 
liability for intentional infliction of emotional harm would be negated where the 
defendant was ‘exercising a legal right’.434 ‘The idea that an actor is protected by 
exercising a legal right is a narrower but comparable concept to the defense of privilege 
                                                                                                                
434 Restatement (Third) of Torts §46 (2012) (n 10) Comment e. 
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employed for other intentional torts.’435 This implies the relevance of privilege (as a 
justificatory ground) to this tort. In this regard, qualified privilege on the basis of duty 
and interest in the law of defamation may provide some useful hints. Privilege attaches 
to otherwise defamatory imputations where ‘the person who makes a communication 
has an interest or a duty, legal, social, or moral, to make it to the person to whom it is 
made, and the person to whom it is so made has a corresponding interest or duty to 
receive it’.436 Duty and interest are two pivotal aspects to be considered here,437 in 
order to facilitate the ‘common convenience and welfare of society’.438 However, 
qualified privilege is defeated if malice on the part of the defendant is established.439 
 
It is conceivable that the concepts of exercising rights and discharging duties could 
come into play as justificatory grounds for this tort. It is possible intentionally to inflict 
mental harm in the course of performing a duty or exercising a right. On these 
occasions, if we accept that the ‘common convenience and welfare of society’440 are 
more important interests to be protected than the mental integrity of the victim,441 the 
discharge of duties or the exercise of rights would be prioritised, and the intentional 
infliction of mental harm would be justified so that the conduct element of this tort 
would be defeated. 
 
It should be borne in mind that, in accordance with the commentary to the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts §46, the exercise of legal rights must be kept within necessary and 
proportional bounds. If the impugned conduct ‘goes so far beyond what is necessary 
to exercise the right’, such as ‘an employer who unnecessarily humiliates a fired 
employee’, this excessive conduct may not be justified.442 This point in a sense echoes 
                                                                                                                
435 See ibid Reporters’ Note to Comment e. 
436 Adam v Ward [1917] AC 309 at 334 per Lord Atkinson.  
437 Mullis, Parkes and Gatley (n 260) paras 14.1 and 14.9; Clerk and Dugdale (n 41) paras 22-107 
and 22-108. 
438 Toogood v Spyring (1834) 1 C M & R 181 at 193 per Parke B. 
439 Mullis, Parkes and Gatley (n 260) para 14.1; Clerk and Dugdale (n 41) para 22-96. E Reid, ‘“That 
Unhappy Expression”: Malice at the Margins’ in SGA Pitel, JW Neyers and E Chamberlain (eds), Tort 
Law: Challenging Orthodoxy (2013) 441 at 443-444. 
440 Toogood v Spyring (n 438) at 193 per Parke B. 
441 This appears to be the necessary presumption for the following justification. Admittedly, it is not 
always easy to decide which interest or right should be prioritised. 
442 Restatement (Third) of Torts §46 (2012) (n 10) Comment e. 
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the requirement of ‘absence of malice’ in respect of qualified privilege. An 
unreasonable misuse of the otherwise privileged occasion is often treated as an 




2.3222 Examples: discharging duties and exercising rights 
 
In the cases considered above, the considerations of duty and right/interest have rarely 
been raised and admitted as justificatory grounds in relation to this tort. However, for 
the purposes of argument, the contexts of some cases can be adapted to help suggest 
where this justification may arise. 
 
a)   Discharging legal, social, or moral duties 
 
It is apparent that a legal duty is ‘a duty for this purpose’.444  It would be self-
contradictory to treat conduct in compliance with the law as gratuitous or unjustifiable. 
Some professionals or officials are obliged to communicate injurious news, although 
they know with substantial certainty that their words are going to inflict severe 
emotional distress upon the recipients. In other words, these professionals or officials 
can strictly speaking be taken as intentionally 445  inflicting mental harm whilst 
performing their legal duties, but it seems warranted that their infliction of mental 
harm should be regarded as justified. In Wilkinson v Downton, an example was 
suggested where the defendant lied to a person in a position of extreme physical 
infirmity that ‘his physician has said that he has but a day to live’.446 Wright J was of 
the opinion that this wrongdoer could be criminally and tortiously liable.447 Suppose 
that this notification is not a lie, and the physician has himself or herself conveyed this 
information to the patient, knowing with substantial certainty that severe emotional 
                                                                                                                
443 Clerk and Dugdale (n 41) para 22-209. Mullis, Parkes and Gatley (n 260) para 17.9. 
444 Mullis, Parkes and Gatley (n 260) para 14.13. 
445 Their intention is an intention based upon knowledge (foresight with substantial certainty). 
Relevant analyses see Chapter 3, section 3.4. 
446 Wilkinson v Downton (n 4) at 60-61 per Wright J. 
447 ibid at 61 per Wright J. 
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distress will be caused. Since the physician is discharging his or her legal duty (without 
any purpose to injure), this injurious conduct should be regarded as justifiable and thus 
would not meet the conduct element of this tort. It should be stressed here that the 
ground on which the physician’s conduct can be justified is the discharge of legal duty 
rather than the communication of the truth. Communication of the truth may not 
necessarily justify the physician’s conduct,448  but in any event it is likely to be 
regarded as less grave than communication of a lie. 449  In other words, in this 
hypothetical situation, the physician’s words would not meet the conduct element of 
this tort because 1) they are justifiable in pursuance of the physician’s legal duty; or 2) 
speaking the truth may not be egregious/serious enough. 
 
For a further example we can adapt the facts of Boswell v Minister of Police, where 
the defendant, as a member of the police force, falsely informed the plaintiff that he 
had shot dead her nephew and asked the plaintiff to ‘go to the police station to identify 
the body’.450 Assuming that the nephew had indeed been shot dead by the defendant, 
on lawful grounds, and the defendant was telling the truth, it is nevertheless very likely 
that the plaintiff would suffer the same mental harm. Yet in this hypothetical situation, 
since the defendant would have been performing his legal duty to notify the plaintiff 
(without any purpose to injure her), his conduct would be taken as justifiable even he 
knew with substantial certainty that it would bring about severe emotional distress. 
 
Moreover, suppose that the defendant in Janvier v Sweeney451 had not lied to the 
plaintiff, so that he was indeed a ‘detective inspector from Scotland Yard’, and he 
sincerely believed on the basis of his own sources that the plaintiff was ‘corresponding 
with a German spy’. Accordingly he informed her that ‘she was the woman they 
wanted’. Under these circumstances, despite the potential for causing significant 
emotional distress to the plaintiff, the defendant’s deed should not be taken as having 
met the conduct element of this tort. The defendant’s conduct can be justified because 
                                                                                                                
448 As to whether truth can be adopted as a justificatory ground in relation to this tort, see analyses in 
section 2.3233.  
449 Issues regarding gravity and falsity in respect of the first conduct pattern of this tort, see section 
2.211. 
450 Boswell v Minister of Police (n 46) at 270-271 per Kannemeyer J. 
451 Janvier v Sweeney (n 62). 
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he did what he did in discharge of his legal duty.452 
 
Besides legal duties, it is also possible that the duty at issue might be a ‘moral or social’ 
one.453 Assuming that in Wilkinson v Downton,454 the husband of the plaintiff was 
indeed ‘smashed up in an accident’ and in desperate need of his family’s help, there 
would be a significant interest on the plaintiff’s part to be informed of this accident.455 
In this situation, ‘the interest of the person receiving the communication is of such a 
character as by its very nature to create a social duty in another under the circumstances 
to make the communication that he does in fact make’.456 Therefore, if the defendant 
saw what occurred to the plaintiff’s husband and immediately informed the plaintiff, 
despite knowing for certain that his communication would cause significant emotional 
distress to her, his conduct could be justified because he was performing his social 
duty. 
 
b)   Exercising rights or pursuing interests 
 
In addition to discharging duties, exercising rights or pursuing interests is another 
important aspect of the qualified privilege (to defamation). In relation to this tort, the 
commentary to the Restatement (Third) of Torts §46 explicitly recognises that 
exercising legal rights is a solid ground which may justify the wrongdoer’s intentional 
infliction of mental harm. The scenario of ‘an employer dismissing an at-will 
employee’ has been referred to as one of the typical instances where the defendant 
exercises his or her legal rights whilst inflicting mental harm upon others.457 It seems 
beyond doubt that termination of employment could occasion severe emotional 
distress to the dismissed employees. Nevertheless, pursuant to the agreed contract or 
relevant legislation, there exist occasions where the employers or the employees can 
terminate the employment in a legitimate way. Under these circumstances, the 
                                                                                                                
452 Also see analyses in sections 2.3233 and 2.32332. 
453 Mullis, Parkes and Gatley (n 260) para 14.13. 
454 Wilkinson v Downton (n 4). 
455 Discussions regarding ‘interest of person to whom communication addressed’, see Clerk and 
Dugdale (n 41) paras 22-109 and 22-110. 
456 Watt v Longsdon [1930] 1 KB 130 at 152 per Greer LJ. 
457 Restatement (Third) of Torts §46 (2012) (n 10) Reporters’ Note on Comment e. 
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termination of employment in compliance with the contract or relevant legislation can 
be taken as justifiable conduct. However, where ‘an employer who unnecessarily 
humiliates a fired employee goes further than is necessary to exercise the legal 
right’, 458  this justification may be lost. In Rahemtulla v Vanfed Credit Union, 
considered above, the plaintiff was embroiled in an incident of lost money and 
suspected of theft.459 Without conducting any investigation and substantiating their 
allegations, the senior supervisor of the defendant told the plaintiff that ‘[y]ou don’t 
have a job anymore’460 and dismissed her. The conduct on the part of the employer 
had been held to be wrongful and unjustified,461 even reaching the point of being 
‘flagrant and outrageous’.462 In particular, notwithstanding the defendant’s assertion 
that it possessed ‘the right to dismiss any employee pursuant to the contract’,463 
McLachlin J held that ‘[w]hile the financial institution has the right to dismiss a 
suspect employee without investigation’, it does not necessarily entail that ‘it be given 
the right to make reckless and very possibly untruthful accusations as to the 
employee’s honesty which will foreseeably inflict shock and mental suffering’.464 
This dictum explicitly indicated that legal rights require to be exercised within 
reasonable bounds. Exercising rights in an extreme and excessive manner could lead 
to the loss of its justifiability. 
 
 
2.3223 Malice and abuse of the privileged occasion 
 
As mentioned above, in the law of defamation where malice on the part of the 
defendant has been established, qualified privilege is defeated.465 If the concepts of 
discharging duties and exercising rights can be transposed to this tort as justificatory 
                                                                                                                
458 ibid Comment e. 
459 Rahemtulla v Vanfed Credit Union (n 8) at paras 1 and 3 per McLachlin J. 
460 ibid at para 4 per McLachlin J. 
461 ibid at paras 25, 30 and 31 per McLachlin J. 
462 ibid at para 55 per McLachlin J. 
463 ‘Rather, the defendant submitted that it dismissed her as it had the right to dismiss any employee 
pursuant to the contract, giving her two weeks’ pay in lieu of the notice which would otherwise have 
been required.’ See ibid at para 9 per McLachlin J. 
464 ibid at para 55 per McLachlin J. 
465 Mullis, Parkes and Gatley (n 260) para 14.1; Clerk and Dugdale (n 41) para 22-96; Reid (n 439) 
441 at 443-444. 
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grounds, what role would ‘malice’ play here? In particular, since this tort necessarily 
involves intentional conduct, would intention as established here equate with malice, 
and thus preclude justification in this context? 
 
 
2.32231 Malice in relation to defamation 
 
Traditionally in the law of defamation the issue of malice affects the burden of proof. 
Leaving aside the 2013 Act, qualified privilege in the common law was taken as a 
defence that ‘rebuts the inference [of malice] prima facie arising from a statement 
prejudicial to the character of the plaintiff’,466 and ‘throws on the plaintiff the burden 
of proving express malice’,467 and so privilege was lost where the plaintiff managed 
to establish the presence of malice. Such a framework does not readily map on to this 
tort, because the burden of proving the element of intention in relation to this tort is 
always placed on the plaintiff, which would not change even on privileged occasions. 
 
However, malice may have a different role to play here. A privileged occasion, e.g. 
where the defendant has been performing a duty or exercising rights, can be seen as a 
‘just cause or excuse’,468 where ‘the law accords immunity from suit’ on the basis of 
balancing competing interests.469 In other words, qualified privilege exists because 
there are occasions where protection should be granted to an otherwise defamatory 
communication, in order to facilitate free and frank communication 470  or the 
‘common convenience and welfare of society’.471 On these occasions, the protection 
of the individual right to reputation is regarded as outweighed by the ‘common 
convenience and welfare of society’. However, according to Lord Diplock, this 
                                                                                                                
466 Wright v Woodgate (1835) 2 C M & R 573 at 577 per Parke B. 
467 Smith v Streatfeild [1913] 3 KB 764 at 770 per Bankes J. 
468 Mullis, Parkes and Gatley (n 260) para 17.2. 
469 ‘The public interest that the law should provide an effective means whereby a man can vindicate 
his reputation against calumny has nevertheless to be accommodated to the competing public interest 
in permitting men to communicate frankly and freely with one another about matters in respect of 
which the law recognises that they have a duty to perform or an interest to protect in doing so.’ See 
Horrocks v Lowe [1975] AC 135 at 149 per Lord Diplock. 
470 ibid. 
471 Toogood v Spyring (n 438) at 193 per Parke B. 
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privilege or justification would be lost where ‘the occasion which gives rise to it is 
misused’ – namely, the defendant ‘uses the occasion for some other reason’.472 Where 
the occasion was abused, the purpose of furthering ‘common convenience and welfare 
of society’ would not be achieved, and protection should no longer be given under 
these circumstances. Whether or not the defendant ‘uses the occasion for some other 
reason’ needs to be clarified, and to this end the defendant’s motive ‘becomes 
crucial’. 473  Lord Diplock’s dicta perfectly explain why malice defeats qualified 
privilege. As malice is construed as a ‘dominant and improper motive’ or ‘a desire to 
injure the person’,474 its presence explicitly signifies misuse of the privileged occasion, 
which directly defeats the purpose of according protection on these occasions, and the 
justificatory effect brought by the privileged occasions is nullified. 
 
 
2.32232 The abuse of privileged occasions in relation to this tort 
 
In the light of analysis above, the notions of malice, misuse of the occasion, malice 
defeating privilege or justification are also relevant to this tort. Where the concepts of 
discharging duties or exercising rights are transposed as justificatory grounds for this 
tort, abuse could nullify their justificatory effect. Where the wrongdoer misuses the 
occasions of discharging duties or exercising rights, there is no reason to justify 
conduct which has intentionally occasioned mental harm.  
 
The most straightforward misuse is where the defendant ‘uses the occasion for some 
other reason’.475 This might occur where the wrongdoer has an ‘intention based upon 
purpose’. As will be discussed in Chapter 3, the mental element of this tort requires 
intention, which can be further divided into ‘intention based upon purpose (ends or 
                                                                                                                
472 Horrocks v Lowe (n 469) at 149 per Lord Diplock. 
473 ibid. 
474 ibid. Though the notion of malice can also be interpreted as including ‘disbelief in the truth (of the 
impugned publication)’ or ‘absence of honest belief’, the favoured view is that these should merely be 
taken as conclusive indicators or evidence of malice. See Reid (n 439) at 444-445; Mullis, Parkes and 
Gatley (n 260) para 17.4; Clerk and Dugdale (n 41) para 22-207. This view appears to be more 
consistent with the dicta of Lord Diplock in Horrocks, see 149-150 per Lord Diplock.  
475 Horrocks v Lowe (n 469) at 149 per Lord Diplock. 
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means)’ 476  and ‘intention based upon knowledge (foresight with substantial 
certainty)’.477  The mental state of intention based upon purpose (ends or means) 
denotes that the wrongdoer deliberately engages in the conduct (and uses the occasion) 
on purpose to inflict severe emotional distress, or through the infliction of severe 
emotional distress to achieve another (ultimate) purpose.478 In other words, where a 
wrongdoer commits this tort (and uses the occasion) with an intention based upon 
purpose (ends or means), his/her dominant purpose is not to perform duties or to 
exercise rights. Therefore, the wrongdoer can be taken as abusing the occasion. In 
contrast, where the wrongdoer only possesses an intention based upon knowledge 
(foresight with substantial certainty), ‘knowledge that it will have that effect is not 
enough if the defendant is nevertheless acting in accordance with a sense of duty or in 
bona fide protection of his own legitimate interests’.479 In these circumstances, the 
wrongdoer does not act on purpose to cause severe emotional distress to others, but 
knows with substantial certainty that severe emotional distress would be inflicted by 
his/her discharge of duties or exercise of rights. Unless the wrongdoer harbours 
another improper purpose – e.g. to obtain illegitimate advantages, he or she would not 
be taken as misusing the occasion. 
 
In sum, although intention is an essential element of this tort, the presence of the 
requisite level of intention does not necessarily entail the presence of malice. There 
are occasions where intentional infliction of mental harm can be justified on the basis 







                                                                                                                
476 See Chapter 3, section 3.3. 
477	   See Chapter 3, section 3.4.	  
478 Discussions and instances regarding intention based upon ends or means, see Chapter 3, section 
3.321. 
479 See Horrocks v Lowe (n 469) at 149 per Lord Diplock. 
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2.323 Freedom of expression and truth 
 
2.3231 Freedom of expression as a justification  
 
Freedom of expression (or speech) was recognised by the Supreme Court in Rhodes 
as a justification which could defeat the conduct element of this tort. 480  It was 
predicated upon the ‘legitimate interest of the defendant in telling his story to the world 
at large in the way in which he wishes to tell it’ and the ‘corresponding interest of the 
public in hearing his story’.481  Despite having identified a ‘corresponding public 
interest’ in the context of this case, the Supreme Court emphasised that ‘general 
interest’ is not a necessary condition for the disputed conduct (publication) to be 
justified,482 as freedom of expression does not merely protect speech in relation to 
public interest but also prevents ‘ordinary discourse’ from being hindered.483 
 
Likewise, in the United States, in accordance with the commentary to the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts §46, if the disputed conduct inflicting severe emotional distress is 
‘communicative’ and ‘protected by the First Amendment’ it is likely that liability will 
not be imposed. 484  In Snyder v Phelps, 485  a US Supreme Court decision of 
significance to this tort, the majority held that ‘[t]he Free Speech Clause of the First 
Amendment’ could be taken as a defence in tort litigation for ‘intentional infliction of 
emotional distress’. 486  The respondents were members of the ‘Westboro Baptist 
Church’ who often, through picketing at ‘military funerals’, conveyed their world view 
that ‘God hates and punishes the United States for its tolerance of homosexuality, 
particularly in America’s military’.487 In this case, they announced that they would 
picket at the funeral of Matthew Snyder, who was a Marine Lance Corporal killed on 
                                                                                                                
480 Rhodes v OPO (n 1) at paras 74 to 76 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson; at paras 104 and 110 per 
Lord Neuberger. 
481 ibid at para 75 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
482 ibid at para 76 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
483 ibid at paras 104 and 110 per Lord Neuberger. 
484 Restatement (Third) of Torts §46 (2012) (n 10) Comment f. 
485 Snyder v Phelps 562 US 443 (2011). 
486 ibid at 451 per Roberts CJ. 
487 ibid at 448 per Roberts CJ. 
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active service in Iraq. The picketers expressed their views by holding up signs488 in a 
peaceful manner, in compliance with the instructions of police.489 It was not disputed 
that the picketing at issue caused severe emotional distress to the family of the 
deceased, but whether ‘the church’s speech was insulated from liability by the First 
Amendment’ was more contentious.490 According to the majority view, the protection 
accorded by the First Amendment to a large extent depended upon ‘whether that 
speech is of public or private concern’.491 Due to the unequal importance attached to 
different kinds of speech, as well as the need to advance open and robust public debates, 
speech in relation to public issues required the highest level of protection accorded by 
the First Amendment. 492  When determining the public or private nature of the 
disputed speech, ‘content’, ‘form’, and ‘context’ were crucial factors to be 
contemplated.493 Taking all circumstances into account, the majority held that the 
picketing at issue should be ‘entitled to “special protection” under the First 
Amendment’.494  Though what was expressed in the picketing could be found as 
insulting, even outrageous, liability in relation to this tort was to be ‘set aside’.495 In 
contrast, Justice Alito dissented from the majority view. In his opinion, the picketing 
in question was an attack upon ‘private figures’, unrelated to a ‘matter of public 
concern’,496 or at least not entirely related to public concern.497 In other words, the 
conduct on the part of the respondents – ‘launching vicious verbal attacks’ on private 
persons – was of ‘slight social value’ and made ‘no contribution to public debate’.498 
His view was therefore that this intentional infliction of emotional distress was not 
justified in virtue of the First Amendment.499 
                                                                                                                
488 The demonstration signs read as ‘God Hates the USA/Thank God for 9/11’, ‘America is Doomed’, 
‘Don’t Pray for the USA’, ‘Thank God for IEDs’, ‘Thank God for Dead Soldiers’, ‘Pope in Hell’, 
‘Priests Rape Boys’, ‘God Hates Fags’, ‘You’re Going to Hell’, ‘God Hates You’. See ibid. 
489 ibid. 
490 ibid at 450 per Roberts CJ. 
491 ibid at 451 per Roberts CJ. 
492 ibid at 452 per Roberts CJ. 
493 ibid at 453-454 per Roberts CJ. 
494 ibid at 458 per Roberts CJ. 
495 ibid at 458-459 per Roberts CJ. 
496 ibid at 470 per Alito J. 
497 According to Alito J, in regard to the demonstration at issue, there was ‘actionable speech’ 
interspersed with ‘speech that is protected’. See ibid at 471 per Alito J. 
498 ibid at 464-465 per Alito J. 
499 ‘I would therefore hold that, in this setting, the First Amendment permits a private figure to 
recover for the intentional infliction of emotional distress caused by speech on a matter of private 
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Clearly if a case similar to Snyder were to be decided by the UK Supreme Court, the 
outcome might well differ. While in the US speech as regards matters of public 
concern enjoys the highest level of constitutional protection,500 in England and in 
Scotland freedom of expression must be balanced against the protected rights of others 
(notably, reputation, reasonable expectation of privacy, or mental integrity). 
Nevertheless, the reasoning in Snyder is illuminating in the sense that it offers more 
extended discussion than provided in Rhodes in regard to the potential for asserting 
freedom of expression as a justification for this tort. 
 
 
2.3232 Considerations relevant to asserting freedom of expression as a justification 
 
a)   Balancing competing interests 
 
The decision in Rhodes v OPO makes plain that in certain circumstances, freedom of 
expression (speech) can be upheld as a justification for the purposes of this tort. Yet 
under what circumstances is the next question. In England and in Scotland, the most 
important consideration is arguably the balancing of competing interests, as already 
implied in Rhodes. Whilst concluding that ‘there is every justification for the 
publication’, the majority of the Supreme Court were in fact weighing the appellant’s 
right to express himself and the ‘public interest in others being able to listen to his life 
story’501 against the ‘right to personal safety’,502 or the vulnerable child’s right to 
mental integrity. In other words, the competing interests here were freedom of 
expression (in conjunction with the recipients’ interests to receive information) against 
the right to mental integrity (or right to personal safety). And the core question after 
balancing the competing interests is whether the right to freedom of expression 
outweighs the right to mental integrity. If the answer is yes, freedom of expression 
operates as a justification and defeats the conduct element of this tort. If no, tortious 
                                                                                                                
concern.’ See ibid at 473 per Alito J. 
500 ibid at 452 per Roberts CJ. 
501 Rhodes v OPO (n 1) at para 76 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
502 ibid at para 73 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
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liability may attach to the conduct intentionally inflicting mental harm. 
 
Existing case law in respect of misuse of private information would suggest that when 
balancing countervailing interests of this kind four points are of considerable 
significance: 1) ‘neither’ the right to freedom of expression nor the right to respect for 
private life ‘has as such precedence over the other’; 2) the focus should be upon the 
‘comparative importance of the specific rights being claimed in the individual case’; 
3) the ‘justifications for interfering with or restricting each right’ should be considered; 
and 4) the balancing must be conducted in accordance with a ‘proportionality test’.503 
In this context relevant factors such as ‘contribution to a debate of general interest’, 
and the ‘content, form and consequences’ of the disputed conduct and so on504 should 
also be taken into account. 
 
 
b)   Mental integrity and freedom of expression as countervailing interests 
 
Since the balancing exercise is predicated upon an observation of the ‘comparative 
importance of the specific rights being claimed’, 505  further discussion of mental 
integrity and freedom of expression may be required here. As distinct from the ‘right 
to respect for private and family life’506 and ‘freedom of expression’,507 (the right to) 
mental integrity is not a Convention right. Nor is it a traditional right of the person, 
such as the right to reputation or the right to physical integrity. This characteristic 
might imply that mental integrity does not enjoy the same importance and protection 
as the right to freedom of expression or the right to privacy. However, it has been well 
recognised in other jurisdictions that protection can be granted to mental integrity, 
                                                                                                                
503 These four propositions can be taken as derived from the ruling of Campbell v MGN Ltd (n 336). 
In In re S (FC), Lord Steyn observed them as constituting the ‘ultimate balancing test’, see In re S 
(FC) [2004] UKHL 47; [2005] 1 AC 593 at para 17 per Lord Steyn. In Richard v BBC, these points 
have also been accepted as crucial principles to be followed when exercising the balance. See Richard 
v BBC (n 346) at para 270 per Mr Justice Mann. 
504 See Richard v BBC (n 346) at para 276 per Mr Justice Mann. 
505 In re S (FC) (n 503) at para 17 per Lord Steyn; Richard v BBC (n 346) at para 270 per Mr Justice 
Mann. 
506 See European Convention on Human Rights Article 8. 
507 See European Convention on Human Rights Article 10. 
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mental health, or even emotional tranquility, provided some limiting conditions are 
met.508 In other words, in certain circumstances,509 mental integrity is undoubtedly 
an interest worthy of protection, and can be weighed against freedom of expression, 
or at least against freedom of expression in an area not of public concern.510 
 
As context is crucial when weighing mental integrity against freedom of expression, 
factors such as the gravity of the disputed conduct (the content, the form, and the 
context of the speech; the mental state or the knowledge of the actor; whether there 
exists any aggravating factor), the extent of the effect produced by the speech upon the 
victim, the potential contribution of the publication to public/general interest, and the 
attributes of the victim511 should all be placed into consideration. For instance, when 
the gravity of the disputed conduct is weighed up a stronger justification would be 
required for more egregious conduct. In comparison with the disputed conduct in 
Rhodes v OPO (the defendant publishing his own life story), picketing at a funeral and 
insulting the dead (as in Snyder) is clearly more egregious. Thus the justificatory 
ground – e.g. the purpose of the impugned speech and the interests to be protected by 
it – for the conduct committed in the latter must be relatively more cogent. Likewise, 
a stronger justification would be needed to justify the deeds committed in Wilkinson 
and Janvier, which on the face of it are more reprehensible than the conduct in 
Rhodes.512 
                                                                                                                
508 The conditions for granting protection to mental integrity injured by intentional conduct would 
differ from those for mental integrity injured as a result of one’s negligence. For instance, in relation 
to intentional interference, Rhodes requires the satisfaction of three elements before protection can be 
given to mental integrity/health, whilst different requirements need to be met in cases where mental 
integrity is damaged by virtue of one’s negligence. Parallel conditions in relation to intentional 
interference with mental integrity required in other jurisdictions (as in Canada and Australia) can be 
observed in the foregoing case review in this chapter. 
509 Namely, where the prerequisites of this tort or those of the tort of negligently caused psychiatric 
illness have been met. 
510 This differentiation will be discussed as follows. 
511 For instance, whether the victim is a public or private figure, or whether the victim is particularly 
susceptible to mental harm. 
512 Arguably, as analysed above, the disputed conduct in Rhodes is not serious enough to meet the 
requirement of gravity of this tort. If that is the case, no justification is needed. Thus there is no need 
to conduct the exercise of balancing. Parallel to the contexts of Rhodes, if a journalist published an 
article, knowing with substantial certainty that its publication would bring about mental harm to 
certain people involved, but did everything in a responsible way and reasonably believed that the 
publication is in public interests, his or her conduct should not be taken as egregious so as to 
constitute the required gravity (of the conduct) of this tort. Notably, it should be reiterated that in 
Rhodes the Supreme Court did not separate the notion of ‘gravity of the conduct’ from that of ‘without 
   100  
 
The relative importance accorded to a potential contribution to a debate of public 
interest deserves more exploration. In this regard, different approaches have been 
employed on different sides of the Atlantic. The US Supreme Court in Snyder v Phelps 
distinguished speech of private concern from speech of public concern,513 considering 
the latter as entitled to the highest level of protection granted by the First 
Amendment.514 It is implied that speech without social value and unable to enhance 
public debates is much less likely to be adopted as justification for intentional infliction 
of emotional harm. In contrast, the UK Supreme Court in Rhodes did not address the 
issue as to whether expression in relation to public interest and that unrelated to public 
concern should be treated differently. According to the Supreme Court, public or 
general interest was not a necessary requirement in justifying the impugned conduct.515 
Apart from advancing open and robust public debate, the function of freedom of 
expression can also include ‘the need to avoid constraining ordinary (even much 
offensive) discourse’.516 Based upon this view, even ordinary discourse irrelevant to 
any public concern can be taken as speech entitled to freedom of expression and placed 
into the balance. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court did not equate the importance of 
ordinary discourse with that of speech in relation to matters of public concern. It 
appears more warranted that less value and importance should be attached to ordinary 
discourse than to speech of public concern. In other words, the latter should be taken 
as stronger justification, enjoying higher protection. In contrast, where the disputed 
speech is regarded as of low public value and importance – namely, a weak justification, 
more weight should be given to the protection of mental integrity in the balancing 
exercise. In brief, although in formal terms different approaches seem to have been 
employed as between the US and the UK Supreme Courts, it is arguable that these two 
regimes are not so different in practical terms. 
 
 
                                                                                                                
justification’. 
513 Snyder v Phelps (n 485) at 451 per Roberts CJ. 
514 ibid at 452 per Roberts CJ. 
515 Rhodes v OPO (n 1) at para 76 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
516 ibid at para 104 per Lord Neuberger. 
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2.3233 Truth as a justification 
 
2.32331 General discussion 
 
Truth is also a factor that requires further analysis. In accepting freedom of expression 
as a justification for this tort, the majority in the Supreme Court in Rhodes mentioned 
that ‘[f]reedom to report the truth is a basic right to which the law gives a very high 
level of protection’, and that ‘[t]he right to report the truth is justification in itself’.517 
Do these statements signify that truth can be taken as a justification in this tort? This 
question had been raised by Fleming long before the decision in Rhodes,518 although 
no clear answer emerged. Arguably, truth can be a factor to be considered when 
balancing countervailing interests, as it could affect the gravity of conduct, but it may 
not constitute a solid justification for this tort. This proposition is confirmed when one 
reflects upon the protected interests and conduct patterns of this tort.  
 
First of all, truth is a complete defence in the law of defamation,519 because the 
principal interest protected by defamation is reputation. If the defamatory imputation 
is (substantially) true, it is shown that ‘a claimant is not entitled to the unblemished 
reputation which he/she claims to have been damaged by the publication’.520  In 
contrast, this tort primarily protects against stand-alone harm to one’s mental integrity 
(or one’s right to personal safety). The protected interests of this tort can be harmed 
regardless of the truth or falsity of the disputed statement. There seems to be no solid 
ground why mental integrity should lose all protection where the wrongdoer is telling 
the truth. 
 
This point becomes more apparent when one looks at some hypothetical examples (as 
                                                                                                                
517 ibid at para 77 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
518 ‘It is an open question whether truth would constitute a defence to, for example, a rude 
communication of a near-one’s death which is intended to hurt the plaintiff’. See J Fleming, Fleming’s 
The Law of Torts (C Sappideen and P Vines eds, 10th edn, 2011) 43. 
519 Parkes (n 294) at paras 8.11 and 8.28; Reid (n 132) para 11.02; Gordley (n 322) 245. Also see 
Defamation Act 2013 s 2(1), ‘It is a defence to an action for defamation for the defendant to show that 
the imputation conveyed by the statement complained of is substantially true’. 
520 Chase v Newsgroup Newspapers Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 1772 at para 33 per Lord Justice Brooke. 
Also see Mullis, Parkes and Gatley (n 260) para 11.1. 
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raised in the following section). Lord Neuberger observed that ‘it will be a very rare 
case where a statement which is not untrue could give rise to a claim, save, perhaps 
where the statement was a threat or (possibly) an insult’.521 This implies that truth 
does not generally function as justification for conduct patterns constituted by 
threatening or insulting. Arguably, even for the first conduct pattern, in exceptional 
cases where false statements have not been adopted as the means to inflict mental harm, 
truth may not justify the disputed conduct under certain circumstances. Some 
hypothetical examples of different conduct patterns will be examined as follows. 
 
 
2.32332 Examples  
 
In relation to the first conduct pattern, hypothetical examples may be considered, based 
loosely on the facts of Wilkinson v Downton522 and Boswell v Minister of Police.523 
Let us suppose: 1) the defendant did in fact witness the husband of the plaintiff being 
‘smashed up in an accident’ and told the injured person’s family about what occurred; 
or 2) the defendant police factually did indeed shoot the plaintiff’s nephew, on lawful 
grounds, and informed his family of the incident. In these two examples, without doubt 
significant emotional distress would have been occasioned to the plaintiffs. Whether 
or not the defendants’ communication of truth could justify their infliction of mental 
harm depends upon what individual/societal advantages can be promoted by their 
truth-telling, and whether these outweigh the protection of individual mental integrity. 
In essence this analysis is very similar to that in relation to the justification of 
discharging duties or exercising rights, as investigated in sections 2.3221 and 2.3222. 
However, it should be acknowledged that, compared with informing others of a false 
story, communicating the truth is certainly to be viewed as less grave. Indeed it is 
highly unlikely that the communication of the truth would meet the requirement of 
gravity for this tort. In this situation, arguably no question of justification would arise. 
Only under exceptional circumstances could communicating the truth be taken as 
                                                                                                                
521 Rhodes v OPO (n 1) at para 107 per Lord Neuberger. 
522 Wilkinson v Downton (n 4). 
523 Boswell v Minister of Police (n 46). 
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sufficiently egregious. For instance, the defendants in the above examples might 
deliberately depict every searing detail of the accident or the death of the plaintiffs’ 
relative, on purpose to cause severe emotional distress to the plaintiffs. It should be 
stressed here that not every insensitive or rude communication of bad news should be 
taken as egregious. In this instance, it is the presence of an unlawful motive or purpose 
that heightens the gravity of the defendants’ conduct.524 And, since the defendants’ 
very purpose is to make use of the truth to inflict mental harm, it appears unwarranted 
that the truth of the communication can be regarded as a justification here. 
 
In relation to the second conduct pattern, the use of threatening behaviour that 
significantly invades the victims’ mental integrity, truth may not serve as an adequate 
justification. Threats need not be based on falsehood and indeed threats based upon 
true facts can be even more powerful and frightening. Whether or not a truth-based 
threat that inflicts mental harm can be justified should be decided in the context of the 
case, which encompasses the wrongdoer’s motive or purpose. For instance, suppose 
everything uttered by the defendant in Janvier v Sweeney525 had been true. He was 
actually a ‘detective inspector from Scotland Yard’ when he threatened the plaintiff 
that ‘she was the woman they wanted’ and asked for her cooperation. His threat and 
infliction of mental harm might be justified provided that he was acting in furtherance 
of his legal duties. However, it is also possible that, on the basis of true information, 
the defendant might threaten the plaintiff to achieve a goal irrelevant to his legal duty, 
inflicting severe emotional distress upon the plaintiff. In this kind of situation, without 
doubt the threat cannot be justified on the ground of discharging duties. Nor can 
(communicating the) truth serve as a justification in this instance, as true information 
is used as an essential basis of the defendant’s wrongdoing (threatening). 
 
In relation to the third conduct pattern, insults or other abusive conduct, as argued in 
section 2.23523, the truth or falsity of the disputed statement is not an absolute concern 
to the conduct pattern of insults. The focus of insult rests upon its potential to harm 
                                                                                                                
524	   Concerning	  cases where unlawful motive/purpose can be observed, and the boundary between 
motive and (intention based upon) purpose, see Chapter 3, section 3.323.	  
525 Janvier v Sweeney (n 62). 
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one’s dignity or mental integrity, and the utterance of abusive, injurious, but true 
statements can by all means achieve that goal. If a wrongdoer has made use of the truth 
to humiliate others and to inflict mental harm, there is no reason why truth should be 
invoked as a justification for the wrongdoing. 
 
 
2.32333 Truth as a factor in the balance 
 
It follows from the above that in many situations truth may not function as an adequate 
justification for this tort. However, as the truth or otherwise of the defendants’ words 
can be relevant to the gravity of conduct as well as to their potential contribution to 
discourse on a matter of public interest, it should certainly be placed into balance when 
weighing freedom of speech against mental integrity. Several scenarios can be further 
differentiated here. In ordinary situations, where an actor communicates the truth, what 
he/she says is objectively true, and he/she subjectively believes that the uttered 
statement is true. Under this circumstance, the objective truthfulness is a factor 
relevant to determining what public or private interests can be furthered by this 
statement. The subjective belief (in truth) on the part of the actor signifies that his/her 
conduct is less grave. 526  In contrast, in ordinary situations, where an actor 
communicates an objectively false statement, which he/she subjectively believes to be 
false, it is unlikely that any public interest can be furthered by it. Dissemination of 
false statements can hardly advance public debates or even ordinary discourse.527 The 
actor’s subjective belief in the statement’s falsity signifies that the conduct is more 
grave.528 
 
Under exceptional circumstances, the actor may perhaps believe a statement to be false 
where it is objectively true. In such a case the actor’s mental state and conduct indicate 
                                                                                                                
526 It is the case only when the actor does not harbour any unlawful motive/purpose. 
527 Yet, arguably, giving some latitude, in particular to journalists, for the dissemination of 
information which may be false could potentially further freedom of expression by reducing the 
chilling effect. When striking a balance between freedom of expression and reasonable expectation of 
privacy (or other protected interests), the ‘severity of the sanction imposed’ or ‘whether any sanction 
would have a chilling effect’ should be a relevant factor to be considered. See Richard v BBC (n 346) 
at paras 230, 276, 303 and 304 per Mr Justice Mann. 
528 This point is particularly relevant to the first conduct pattern of this tort. 
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an abuse of freedom of expression, which should be placed into the balance. In contrast, 
where the uttered statement is objectively false, the actor may subjectively believe it to 
be true. It should be noted here that the actor’s belief in the truth of his/her statement 
does not preclude the formation of the necessary level of intention for this tort. 
Subjective belief in the truth of the statement at issue is not inconsistent with either 
knowing with substantial certainty that this statement would inflict severe emotional 
distress upon others, or on purpose using this statement to cause severe emotional 
distress.529 However, as long as the intention of the actor is not in the form of purpose 
to use the statement to cause severe emotional distress, his/her subjective belief in the 
truth of statement can arguably lower the gravity of conduct. The reduction in the 




2.33 Conclusion on justification 
 
In Rhodes v OPO, the conduct element of this tort was stated to be ‘words or conduct 
directed at the claimant’ for which ‘there is no justification or excuse’. This raised the 
question whether claimants may raise certain justifications or excuses as a defence? 
Or does the Supreme Court intend the absence of justification or excuse to be an 
integral part of the conduct element? In this connection it is significant that the 
Supreme Court placed the onus of proof on the claimant in regard to the matter of 
absence of justification or excuse. It therefore appears probable that the absence of 
justification or excuse was regarded by the Supreme Court as an integral part of the 
conduct element. This means that a justification/justificatory ground cannot be 
adopted as a defence, but instead their existence goes to the conduct element and can 
negate liability. The potential justificatory grounds which could be used in this tort to 
defeat the conduct element may include: consent, discharging duties or exercising 
rights, and freedom of expression. 
 
With regard to consent, it appears unlikely that the wrongdoer can acquire consent 
                                                                                                                
529 Regarding different types/levels of intention, see Chapter 3, sections 3.3 and 3.4. 
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from the victim as to the first conduct pattern, since the victim has to be tricked and 
believe in the false story to be emotionally injured. Similarly with the second conduct 
pattern, it seems unreasonable that the victim can knowingly and voluntarily give 
his/her consent to being threatened, and nevertheless feel intimidated and distressed 
by the threat. It is more probable that consent could be given or obtained in respect of 
the third conduct pattern; despite the victim having given his/her consent to being 
insulted, severe emotional distress may still be caused during the process of insulting 
or abusive conduct. 
 
By reference to the commentary on the Restatement (Third) of Torts §46 as well as to 
the law of defamation, it is conceivable that the concepts of discharging duties and 
exercising rights could form the basis for justification in this tort. Mental harm may be 
intentionally inflicted while the perpetrator is performing their duties or exercising 
legitimate rights. If we regard the ‘common convenience and welfare of society’ as 
more important interests to be protected than the mental integrity of the victim, then 
the discharge of duties or the exercise of rights should be prioritised as a justification 
which defeats the conduct element of this tort. However, where the wrongdoer misuses 
such an occasion, there is no reason to sacrifice the protection of the victim’s mental 
integrity. For instance, where a wrongdoer uses the occasion with intention based upon 
purpose (ends or means) to inflict mental harm, he/she should be taken as misusing 
the occasion since his/her dominant purpose is not to perform duties or to exercise 
rights. In contrast, where the wrongdoer possesses only intention based upon 
knowledge (foresight with substantial certainty) without any improper purpose, he/she 
should not be taken as misusing the occasion. In brief, although intention is an essential 
element of this tort, intentional infliction of harm does not necessarily entail the 
presence of malice or misuse of the occasion. There are instances where the conduct 
of an intentional actor in inflicting mental harm may be justified on the basis of his/her 
discharge of duties or exercise of legitimate rights. 
 
Freedom of expression can be adopted as a justification for conduct of this tort in the 
light of the reasoning in Rhodes v OPO as well as the commentary to the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts §46. In this connection, the balancing of countervailing interests is 
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the most important consideration. Freedom of expression (and the recipients’ interests 
to receive information) would be weighed against the victim’s right to mental integrity 
(or right to personal safety). Where freedom of expression outweighs the right to 
mental integrity, the former can be adopted as justification and defeat the conduct 
element of this tort. When striking this balance, factors such as the gravity of the 
disputed conduct (the content, the form, and the context of the speech; the mental state 
or the knowledge of the actor; whether there exists any aggravating factor), the 
attributes of the victim, the extent of effect produced upon the victim, and the potential 
contribution to public interest should all be taken into account. As far as the gravity of 
conduct is concerned, a stronger justification would be required for more egregious 
conduct. As regards the contribution to public interest, less value and importance 
should be attached to ordinary discourse than to speech on matters of public concern. 
In other words, speech on matters of public concern constitutes stronger justification. 
 
Closer analysis of the protected interests of this tort and its different conduct patterns 
(in 2.32332) indicates that truth does not function as an infallible justification. 
However, when weighing freedom of expression against mental integrity, the truth of 
the defendant’s words can certainly be placed in the balance, since it relates to the 
gravity of conduct as well as to the possible contribution to discourse on a matter of 
public interest. The objective truthfulness of the statement is a factor relevant to 
determining what public or private interests can be served by the defendant’s words. 
His or her subjective belief in their truth arguably signifies that the conduct is less 
grave, provided that the actor does not harbour a purpose (intention based upon 
purpose) to use the statement to cause severe emotional distress. 
 
As a final reflection in this chapter, however, it is arguable that the approach of the 
Supreme Court is not entirely satisfactory in treating absence of justification or excuse 
as a part of the conduct element of this tort. An alternative approach would be to 
remove the controversial formulation of absence of justification or excuse, and to 
rephrase the conduct element in a way that more clearly reflects the gravity of conduct 
and fairly distributes the burden of proof. The gravity of conduct and justification for 
the conduct are conceptually different, and it would therefore make sense to 
   108  
reformulate the elements of this tort so that the conduct element and the issue of 
available defences were taken separately. This would then mean that the more 
egregious the disputed conduct, the stronger the defence (justification) it would 





Chapter 3 The Concept of Intention 
 
 
In this chapter, different interpretations of the term ‘calculated’ employed in Wilkinson 
v Downton, as well as the foundations of intention, will be explored respectively under 
the heads of ‘intention based upon purpose (ends or means)’, ‘intention based upon 
knowledge (foresight with substantial certainty)’, and ‘recklessness’. This thesis will 
argue that, in addition to ‘intention based upon purpose (ends or means)’, the mental 
element of this tort should also include ‘intention based upon knowledge (foresight 
with substantial certainty)’, whilst ‘recklessness’ should be excluded. Inferred or 
constructive foresight/intention should be accepted for these purposes, along with 
actual or subjective foresight/intention. Where the object of intention can be perceived 
as ‘(severe) mental or emotional distress’ or ‘(grave) effects’, the notion of ‘foresight 
with substantial certainty’ may arguably be regarded as the most suitable interpretation 





3.11 Historical perspective: Issues of ‘calculation’ and ‘intention’ in the Wilkinson 
authorities  
 
The case of Wilkinson v Downton1 can be seen as providing the foundation of the 
modern law as regards the tort of intentional infliction of mental harm. In this case, 
where the defendant played a practical joke and told the plaintiff that ‘her husband was 
smashed up in an accident’, ‘with both legs broken’, and waiting for her to ‘fetch him 
home’ immediately, 2  the defendant was found as having ‘wilfully done an act 
calculated to cause physical harm to the plaintiff – that is to say, to infringe her legal 
                                                                                                                          
1 Wilkinson v Downton [1897] 2 QB 57. 




right to personal safety’.3 Because the conduct on the part of the defendant was ‘so 
plainly calculated to produce some effect of the kind which was produced’, Wright J 
held that ‘an intention to produce it ought to be imputed to the defendant’. 4 
Approximately 20 years later, in Janvier v Sweeney,5 the Court of Appeal approved 
the reasoning in Wilkinson v Downton,6 considering Janvier as a ‘much stronger case’ 
than Wilkinson, since in Janvier ‘there was an intention to terrify the plaintiff for the 
purpose of attaining an unlawful object’.7 These two decisions were construed by 
Dillon LJ (with whom Rose LJ agreed) in Khorasandjian v Bush, as establishing the 
principle that ‘false words or verbal threats calculated to cause, uttered with the 
knowledge that they are likely to cause, and actually causing, physical injury to the 
person to whom they are uttered are actionable’.8 Taking Wilkinson, Janvier, and 
Khorasandjian into consideration, Hale LJ in Wong v Parkside Health NHS Trust 
stated that, for the requirements of this tort to be met, ‘it is not necessary to prove that 
the defendant actually wanted to produce such harm’;9 the defendant is ‘taken to have 
meant it to do so by the combination of the likelihood of such harm being suffered as 
the result of his behaviour and his deliberately engaging in that behaviour’.10 
 
In Wainwright v Home Office, Lord Hoffmann remarked that, in Wilkinson v Downton, 
Wright J thought that ‘the plaintiff should succeed whether the conduct of the 
defendant was intentional or negligent’, yet as Wright J was prevented by Victorian 
Railways Commissioners v Coultas11 from deciding the case on the basis of negligence, 
he ‘devised a concept of imputed intention which sailed as close to negligence as he 
                                                                                                                          
3 ibid at 58-59 per Wright J. 
4 ibid at 59 per Wright J. 
5 Janvier v Sweeney [1919] 2 KB 316. 
6 ibid at 324 per Bankes LJ. 
7 ibid at 326 per Duke LJ. 
8 Khorasandjian v Bush [1993] QB 727 at 735 per Dillon LJ. 
9 Wong v Parkside Health NHS Trust [2001] EWCA Civ 1721; [2003] 3 All ER 932 at para 10 per 
Lady Justice Hale. 
10 ibid at para 12 per Lady Justice Hale. 
11 ‘Damages arising from mere sudden terror unaccompanied by any actual physical injury, but 
occasioning a nervous or mental shock, cannot under such circumstances, their Lordships think, be 
considered a consequence which, in the ordinary course of things, would flow from the negligence of 
the gate-keeper.’ See Victorian Railways Commissioners v Coultas (1888) 13 App Cas 222 at 225 per 




felt he could go’.12 However, there was no longer a need to ‘fashion a tort of intention’ 
because the facts of Wilkinson could comfortably be accommodated ‘in the law of 
nervous shock caused by negligence’ by the time of Janvier.13 Moreover, although 
Lord Hoffmann considered Wilkinson v Downton as having provided no remedy for 
emotional distress falling short of recognised psychiatric illness,14 he suggested that, 
if the principle that ‘damages for mere distress are not recoverable’ were to be 
abandoned, then this could only be in circumstances where the defendant had actually 
‘acted in a way which he knew to be unjustifiable and intended to cause harm or at 
least acted without caring whether he caused harm or not’; ‘imputed intention will not 
do’.15 
 
Lord Hoffmann’s comments on Wright J’s judgment were considered by the Supreme 
Court in Rhodes v OPO to have misinterpreted the decision. The notion of ‘imputed 
intention’ was not ‘devised by Wright J to get around a perceived stumbling block in 
the law of negligence’.16 It was ‘in the mainstream of legal thinking at that time’, and, 
in addition, Wright J should have known that Victorian Railways Commissioners v 
Coultas was not binding upon him.17 Also, it may be incorrect that, by the time of 
Janvier, ‘the law would have comfortably accommodated the facts of Wilkinson v 
Downton within the law of nervous shock caused by negligence’.18 As ‘negligence and 
intent are very different fault elements’, they should be differentiated in respect of the 
‘bases (and possible extent) of liability for causing personal injury’.19 As regards the 
concepts of ‘calculated to cause harm’ and ‘intention’, the Supreme Court considered 
it certain that the term ‘calculated’ was employed by Wright J in the sense of ‘likely 
                                                                                                                          
12 Wainwright v Home Office [2003] UKHL 53; [2004] 2 AC 406 at para 44 per Lord Hoffmann. 
13 ibid at para 40 per Lord Hoffmann. 
14 ibid at para 47 per Lord Hoffmann. 
15 ibid at para 45 per Lord Hoffmann. 
16 Rhodes v OPO [2015] UKSC 32; [2016] AC 219 at para 62 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
17 ibid. 
18 From the perspective of the Supreme Court, during this period the decision in Dulieu v White & 
Sons had limited a claim concerning negligently caused nervous shock to cases where ‘the nervous 
shock resulted from fear for the plaintiff’s own personal safety’. However, the fear on the part of Mrs 
Wilkinson was not related to her own safety, but for the personal safety of her husband. See ibid at 
para 63 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. Also see Dulieu v White & Sons [1901] 2 KB 669 at 675-
676 per Kennedy J.  




to have an effect of the kind which was produced’.20 Accordingly it carved out the 
fundamental elements of the Wilkinson tort, requiring the mental element to be ‘an 
intention to cause at least severe mental or emotional distress’, 21  yet leaving the 
contents of intention not fully explored. 
 
In sum, this sequence of case law following on from Wilkinson, especially the Supreme 
Court decision in Rhodes v OPO, demonstrates that the Wilkinson tort is still alive22 
and differentiated from the law of negligence. Intention is the required mental element 
of this tort, which will be the main issue to be explored in this chapter. Before different 
foundations of intention are examined, several terms employed in the Wilkinson 




3.12 What does ‘calculated’ mean and what constitutes ‘intention’? 
 
As noted above, in Wilkinson v Downton, since the conduct on the part of the defendant 
was ‘so plainly calculated to produce some effect of the kind which was produced’, 
Wright J held that ‘an intention to produce it ought to be imputed to the defendant’.23 
However, the meaning of ‘calculated’, and what constitutes intention were not 
elucidated in this case. Nearly 120 years later, in Rhodes v OPO, the Supreme Court 
took it as doubtless that the term ‘calculated’ was used by Wright J in the sense of 
‘likely to have an effect of the kind which was produced’.24 Moreover, the majority 
required the mental element of the Wilkinson tort to be ‘an intention to cause at least 
severe mental or emotional distress’,25 although they did not fully clarify the contents 
of intention. Accordingly, the main task of this chapter is to investigate these terms 
further.  
 
                                                                                                                          
20 ibid at para 36 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
21 ibid at para 88 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
22 Having not been absorbed or accommodated in the law of negligence. 
23 Wilkinson v Downton (n 1) at 59 per Wright J. 
24 Rhodes v OPO (n 16) at para 36 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 




On the basis of the authorities reviewed here, the term ‘calculated’ can possibly be 
interpreted as: ‘acting with the desire or purpose (to bring about the complained 
consequence)’; ‘foreseeing (in an actual or constructive manner) with substantial 
certainty the consequence to occur’; or ‘foreseeing (in an actual or constructive manner) 
the likelihood of the consequence to occur’. The Supreme Court’s construction of 
‘calculated’ in Rhodes v OPO is close to the third interpretation. Whether or not it is 
the most appropriate interpretation requires further analysis. In section 3.4432 below 
it is argued that the second interpretation, i.e. ‘foresight with substantial certainty’, is 
the most suitable interpretation of the equivocal term ‘calculated’.26 These different 
interpretations will be explored respectively under the heads of ‘intention based upon 
purpose’, ‘intention based upon knowledge (with substantial certainty)’, and 
‘recklessness’. This chapter will then argue for interpretation(s) which can inform the 
structure of intention (or mental element) of this tort. 
 
 
3.13 The difference between ‘actual’ and ‘imputed’, ‘inferred’, or ‘constructive’ 
intention 
 
In Wilkinson v Downton, given that ‘the defendant’s act was so plainly calculated to 
produce some effect of the kind which was produced’, Wright J held that ‘an intention 
to produce it ought to be imputed to the defendant’.27 In Wong v Parkside Health NHS 
Trust, Hale LJ stated that, for the requirements of this tort to be met, ‘it is not necessary 
to prove that the defendant actually wanted to produce such harm’,28 the defendant is 
‘taken to have meant it to do so by the combination of the likelihood of such harm 
being suffered as the result of his behaviour and his deliberately engaging in that 
behaviour’.29 On the basis of these dicta, imputed intention, as contrasted with actual 
or subjective intention on the part of the actor, may be regarded as  intention in an 
objective sense, inferred or attributed on the basis of the objective facts, e.g. the actor’s 
                                                                                                                          
26 For further discussion see section 3.4432. 
27 Wilkinson v Downton (n 1) at 59 per Wright J. 
28 Wong v Parkside Health NHS Trust (n 9) at para 10 per Lady Justice Hale. 




conduct or contextual circumstances, or the knowledge shared by ordinary and 
reasonable people. 
 
Notably, in Rhodes v OPO, the Supreme Court distinguished ‘imputing the existence 
of an intention as a matter of law’ from ‘inferring the existence of an intention as a 
matter of fact’.30 The former is seen by the Supreme Court as a ‘vestige of a previous 
age’, ‘unsound in principle’, and should be abolished.31 Nevertheless, the inference of 
intention or an inferred intention appears to be acceptable. When canvassing the 
mental element of this tort, the Supreme Court did not clarify whether ‘actual’ or 
‘subjective’ intention is an absolute requirement.32 Although the usage of ‘actually 
intends’ can be discerned,33 the recognition of inferred intention can also be observed 
in several paragraphs of the Rhodes v OPO judgments.34 From the purposes of this tort, 
inferred or constructive intention should be accepted along with actual or subjective 
intention. A categorical requirement for actual or subjective intention seems 
incompatible with the reasoning of Wilkinson v Downton, of which inferred intention 
is an essential part. More importantly, a categorical requirement for actual or 
subjective intention would prove impossible in practice. Since it is never possible to 
see through the mind of another, and direct evidence about the defendant’s intention 
is almost unlikely to be present, in most cases intention has to be inferred from conduct, 
relevant contexts, or knowledge shared by ordinary and reasonable people.  
 
 
                                                                                                                          
30 Rhodes v OPO (n 16) at para 81 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
31 ‘The doctrine was created by the courts and it is high time now for this court to declare its demise.’ 
See ibid. 
32 ibid at para 88 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. In comparison, as discussed above, although Lord 
Hoffmann in Wainwright did mention that ‘[t]he defendant must actually have acted in a way which he 
knew to be unjustifiable and intended to cause harm or at least acted without caring whether he caused 
harm or not’ as well as that ‘imputed intention will not do’, he was not proposing the general 
requirement of this tort, but specifically addressing the circumstances where the rule that ‘damages for 
mere distress are not recoverable’ can possibly be abandoned. See Wainwright v Home Office (n 12) at 
para 45 per Lord Hoffmann. 
33 Rhodes v OPO (n 16) at para 87 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
34 Following the scenarios raised to elucidate intention, the Supreme Court commented that ‘[t]here 
would be no difficulty in inferring as a matter of fact that he intended to cause severe distress to the 
claimant; it was the means of trying to achieve his demand.’ See ibid at para 85 per Lady Hale and 
Lord Toulson; and ‘There are statements (and indeed actions) whose consequences or potential 
consequences are so obvious that the perpetrator cannot realistically say that those consequences were 




3.2 Intention in relation to conduct or consequence 
 
3.21 The distinction 
 
Before exploring intention, it should be borne in mind that the focus will be placed on 
intention in relation to consequence, rather than intention in relation to conduct. As 
regards this distinction, Cane made it clear that the concept of the latter is predicated 
on ‘the idea of choice’,35 whilst the account of the former is founded on the ideas of 
‘aim, purpose, and objective’.36 In other words, intention in relation to conduct, entails 
that the actor  intends to engage in a particular course of conduct when he or she 
chooses to do it. In contrast, intention in relation to consequence, entails that the actor 
‘intends to bring about (or avoid)’ certain results when he or she sets out on purpose 
to bring them about or to prevent them.37 It should be noticed that Cane employed 
notions as ‘aim, purpose, and objective’ to define intention in relation to consequence, 
as they can be taken as the conceptual core of intention,38 not because he meant to 
exclude other forms of intention.39 
 
It is a widely shared view in the modern law that the defendant must not merely ‘intend 
to commit the act’, but he also needs to ‘intend the consequence’.40 An important 
reason may be that negligence cases commonly involve deliberate acts or intentions in 
relation to these acts as well. This view can possibly explain why, in controversies 
over tortious intention, intention in relation to consequence is always the issue which 
actually matters. For example, in respect of the dicta found in Wilkinson, discussion 
                                                                                                                          
35 P Cane, ‘Mens Rea in Tort Law’ (2000) 20 OJLS 533 at 534. Also see D Priel, ‘A Public Role for 
the Intentional Torts’ (2011) 22 KLJ 183 at 188. 
36 Cane (n 35) at 534. 
37 ibid. 
38 ibid. 
39 Subsequently Cane introduced other possible constituents of a broad concept of tortious intention. 
See ibid at 535-538. 
40 S Deakin, A Johnston and B Markesinis, Markesinis and Deakin’s Tort Law (7th edn, 2013) 359. 
Please refer to E Reid, ‘Malice in the Jungle of Torts’ (2013) 87 TulLRev 901 at 902: ‘…the 
intentional torts require that the interaction between wrongdoer and victim must have been in some 
sense intended and that there must have been some level of intention as to the outcome of that 
interaction in terms of harm suffered by the victim’. Also see Restatement (Third) of Torts §1 (2010); 
C Bar and E Clive (eds), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law: Draft 
Common Frame of Reference (hereinafter DCFR) (2010) §Ⅵ-3:101. Both require that there must be 




more often revolves around the meaning of ‘calculated to cause physical harm’ rather 
than ‘(having) wilfully done an act’. The former can be observed as an expression of 
intention in relation to consequence, whereas the latter can be taken as signifying an 
intention in relation to conduct. 
 
 
3.22 The object of intention 
 
Since discussion tends to concern intention in relation to consequence, the 
consequence becomes a crucial issue. The consequence referred to here is what the 
actor intends to bring about, rather than what actually happens. In other words, it is the 
object of intention. What is the object of intention in respect of this tort? In Wilkinson 
v Downton, where the defendant desired to play a practical joke, Wright J regarded 
him as having ‘calculated to cause physical harm’.41 If ‘calculated to cause physical 
harm’ can be taken as an expression of intention in relation to consequence, without 
doubt the intended consequence, or the object of intention, should be physical harm. 
However, there are criticisms cast on this interpretation. As Lunney pointed out, on 
the basis of analysis of contemporary sources, Wright J used the words ‘calculated to 
cause physical pain’ when he delivered this decision in court,42 but he altered the 
expression into physical harm before the case was reported.43 The underlying reason 
might be, as argued by Lunney, that the law at that time was uneasy with actions based 
upon mental suffering in the absence of any physical injury.44 This argument can also 
be supported by the fact that, after expressing ‘calculated to cause physical harm’, in 
the following paragraph, rather than using the term ‘physical harm’, Wright J adopted 
expressions such as ‘calculated to produce some effect’, ‘[i]t is difficult to imagine 
that such a statement…could fail to produce grave effects…’, as well as ‘an intention 
to produce such an effect’.45 Moreover, Wright J subsequently addressed the issue of 
                                                                                                                          
41 Wilkinson v Downton (n 1) at 58-59 per Wright J. 
42 M Lunney, ‘Practical Joking and Its Penalty: Wilkinson v Downton in Context’ (2002) 10 Tort L 
Rev 168 at 181. 
43 ibid at 182. 
44 ibid. 




remoteness in his judgment. 46  If indeed he regarded the defendant’s conduct as 
‘calculated to cause physical harm’, there should have been no question of remoteness 
in relation to the factually inflicted physical harm, as ‘intended harm is never too 
remote’.47  In similar vein, Réaume has argued that, in the context of Wilkinson v 
Downton, it seems implausible to construe the object of intention (on the part of the 
defendant) as physical harm or ‘nervous shock injury’, since they were hardly 
foreseeable.48 Accordingly, Réaume has suggested that the object that the defendant 
calculated upon or intended to cause should be interpreted as either ‘distress’ or 
‘physical response’.49 The contentious question of the object of intention has also been 
raised in Rhodes v OPO,50 and the Supreme Court indicated that an intention to cause 
‘(at least) severe mental or emotional distress’ can satisfy the required mental element 
of this tort.51  In other words, the judgment in Rhodes has clarified that ‘severe mental 
or emotional distress’ suffices as the object of intention of this tort, although in some 
cases the object may be more severe harm, e.g. psychiatric illness or physical harm. 
Notably, this object of intention should be distinguished from the required 




3.3 Intention based upon purpose 
 
As mentioned above, the phrase ‘calculated to cause physical harm’ employed in 
Wilkinson v Downton has received much practical and academic attention. The 
meaning of ‘calculated’ is as problematic as the concept of intention. To elucidate the 
concept of intention has never been an easy task, especially in the sphere of intention 
in relation to consequence. Complex and equivocal judicial interpretations exacerbate 
these difficulties. According to the case law reviewed in this chapter, there are three 
                                                                                                                          
46 Wilkinson v Downton (n 1) at 59-60 per Wright J. 
47 Lunney (n 42) at 180. 
48 D Réaume, ‘The Role of Intention in the Tort in Wilkinson v Downton’ in JW Neyers, E 
Chamberlain and SGA Pitel (eds), Emerging Issues in Tort Law (2007) 533 at 540-541. 
49 ibid at 541-542. 
50 Rhodes v OPO (n 16) at para 83 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
51 ibid at paras 87 and 88 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 




possible constructions of the term ‘calculated’, namely ‘acting with the desire or 
purpose (to bring about the complained consequence)’; ‘foreseeing (in an actual or 
constructive manner) with substantial certainty the consequence to occur’; or 
‘foreseeing (in an actual or constructive manner) the likelihood of the consequence to 
occur’. 
 
The first possible construction of ‘calculated’ is having/acting with a desire or a 
purpose to bring about the disputed consequence. Likewise, it seems to be a widely 
accepted view that the quintessential character of intention lies in the actor’s purpose 
to incur some result. Many tort lawyers share the opinion that a person intends a 
consequence provided that it is his purpose, plan, or aim to bring the consequence 
about.53 If a tortfeasor directs his mind to the disputed conduct and purposes/desires 




3.31 The adoption of intention based upon purpose in law 
 
In this connection, the Restatement (Third) of Torts §1 plainly employs ‘acts with the 
purpose of producing that consequence’ as a form of intention,55 whilst the DCFR §Ⅵ
-3:101 adopts the wordings ‘meaning to cause damage of the type caused’. 56  In 
addition there is case law in relation to this tort, from England as well as from other 
jurisdictions, indicating or implying that the term ‘calculated’ or the concept of 
intention could be construed as purpose, aim, or desire. For instance, in C v D, SBA, 
three levels of bases for imputation of the necessary intention are discussed.57 The first 
                                                                                                                          
53 J Finnis, ‘Intention in Tort Law’ in D Owen (ed), Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law (1995) 
229 at 229; Cane (n 35) at 534; D Stilitz and P Sales, ‘Intentional Infliction of Harm by Unlawful 
Means’ (1999) 115 LQR 411 at 436; DM Walker, The Law of Delict in Scotland (2nd rev edn, 1981) 
43 and 165. Also see Restatement (Third) of Torts §1 (2010) (n 40) (a), which stipulates that the 
person ‘acts with the purpose’ of generating a certain consequence should be considered as acting 
‘with the intent’ to generate that consequence. 
54 Walker (n 53) 43. 
55 Restatement (Third) of Torts §1 (2010) (n 40). 
56 DCFR §Ⅵ-3:101. 




level is that ‘the acts of the defendant are calculated to cause psychiatric harm and are 
done with the knowledge that they are likely to cause such harm’; ‘[t]he second is that 
psychiatric injury is sufficiently likely to result from the conduct complained for the 
defendant not to be heard to say that he did not “mean” it’; ‘[t]he third is that the 
defendant was reckless as to whether he caused psychiatric harm’. Comparing these 
three bases, and, in particular, observing that the first separates ‘calculated to cause 
psychiatric harm’ from ‘done with the knowledge that…’, it appears obvious that the 
term ‘calculated’ here should imply something closer to ‘purpose’ or ‘aim’, rather than 
pure knowledge.  
 
In Wainwright v Home Office, Lord Hoffmann was of the opinion that ‘the necessary 
intention was not established’ in the particular circumstances of the case, and ‘the 
claimants can build nothing on Wilkinson v Downton’. 58  Notably, despite fully 
agreeing with Lord Hoffmann’s reasoning and conclusion,59 Lord Scott of Foscote 
conceded that the prison officers intended to humiliate and to incur distress, stating 
that ‘the absence of any possible justification for the handling of Alan’s penis allows 
the inference to be drawn that it was a form of bullying, done with the intention to 
humiliate’.60 Nevertheless, Lord Scott still regarded the ‘infliction of humiliation and 
distress by conduct calculated to humiliate and cause distress’ as not tortious on its 
own. 61  From the wording of ‘bullying’ and ‘intention to humiliate’, it appears 
warranted to say that the intention mentioned by Lord Scott here denotes an intention 
based upon purpose. 
 
As discussed above, if the object of intention in Wilkinson is taken as ‘physical harm’, 
it would be implausible, even impossible, to construe the mental state of the defendant 
as an intention based upon purpose. Because the defendant simply wanted to play a 
practical joke, he did not desire or have it as his purpose to bring about any physical 
harm to the plaintiff. Therefore, in Wilkinson v Downton it was held that ‘no malicious 
purpose to cause the harm which was caused nor any motive of spite is imputed to the 
                                                                                                                          
58 Wainwright v Home Office (n 12) at para 47 per Lord Hoffmann. 
59 ibid at paras 56 and 62 per Lord Scott of Foscote. 
60 ibid at para 61 per Lord Scott of Foscote. 




defendant’,62 and in Rhodes v OPO the majority of Supreme Court opined that Wright 
J was adopting the term ‘calculated’ in the sense of ‘likely’63 rather than of having 
physical harm as his ‘purpose’. However, instead of physical harm, if the object of 
intention is construed as ‘some effect of the kind which was produced’64 or (significant) 
emotional distress, it becomes more likely that the intention imputed in this case could 
connote an intention based upon purpose.65  The very aim of the person who plays a 
practical joke can be seen as to trigger some (severe) reactions, effects, even distress. 
After the decision in Rhodes v OPO, the object of intention in this tort has been 
clarified as ‘at least severe mental or emotional distress’.66 In the light of this change 
as regards the object of intention, Lord Neuberger advised that ‘the fact that a 
statement is intended to be a joke is not inconsistent with the notion that it was intended 
to upset…That was the very purpose of the so-called joke’.67 This comment indicates 
the likelihood that the intention or calculation on the part of the defendant in Wilkinson 
v Downton could be interpreted as a purpose (intention based upon purpose), as long 
as the object of intention is observed as significant emotional distress instead of 
physical harm. 
 
There is also commonwealth authority in parallel circumstances, where the intention 
or calculation on the part of the defendant can be construed as purpose, aim, or desire. 
In a Canadian case, Boothman v R, where the defendant’s employee exploited the 
plaintiff’s emotional fragility, conducting multiple acts and ‘bringing her to collapse 
mentally’68 in order to force her resign from her position, Noël J regarded him as 
harbouring ‘malicious purpose to cause the plaintiff to breakdown mentally’.69 In other 
words, while inflicting mental harm on the plaintiff, the mental state of the defendant’s 
employee could be deemed to be intention based upon purpose. In another Canadian 
                                                                                                                          
62 Wilkinson v Downton (n 1) at 59 per Wright J. 
63 Rhodes v OPO (n 16) at para 36 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. Whether or not this is the most 
appropriate interpretation of the term ‘calculated’ will be further explored in the following sections. 
64 Wilkinson v Downton (n 1) at 59 per Wright J. 
65 Certainly, it is also possible for this imputed intention to be interpreted as the foresight of the 
consequence with substantial certainty or even recklessness. These two notions will be examined in 
the following sections. 
66 Rhodes v OPO (n 16) at para 88 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
67 ibid at para 112 per Lord Neuberger. 





case, Prinzo v Baycrest Centre for Geriatric Care, Weiler JA analysed the 
prerequisites of the Wilkinson tort and held that the requirement of ‘calculated to 
produce harm’ can be satisfied where ‘the actor desires to produce the consequences 
that follow from the act’ or where ‘the consequences are known to be substantially 
certain to follow’.70 Following Prinzo, in High Parklane Consulting Inc v Royal Group 
Technologies Ltd, Perell J also set out three essential elements of the tort of ‘intentional 
infliction of mental distress or shock’, advising that the requirement of ‘calculated to 
produce harm’ can be met where ‘the actor desires to produce the consequences that 
follow from the act’ or where ‘the consequences are known to be substantially certain 
to follow’.71  These two Canadian cases indicate that the term ‘calculated’, or the 
intention element of the Wilkinson tort, is to be construed as encompassing intention 
based upon purpose. In a more recent Canadian case, Boucher v Wal-Mart Canada 
Corp, Laskin JA found that, in order to force the plaintiff (the respondent) to resign, 
the defendant (the appellant) ‘wanted to cause her so much emotional distress or 
mental anguish’ through relentlessly humiliating and belittling her.72 The expression 
of ‘wanted to cause (severe emotional distress)’ adopted here can also be read as the 
desire, aim, or purpose on the part of the defendant. 
 
Moreover, in an Australian case, Carrier v Bonham, whilst analysing the Wilkinson 
tort, McPherson JA had interpreted the term ‘calculated’ as either ‘subjectively 
contemplated and intended’ or ‘objectively likely to happen’. 73  The former 
interpretation looks similar to intention based on purpose. Following this opinion, in 
another well-known Australian case, Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Naidu, although it 
was unnecessary to decide the meaning of the expression ‘calculated’, Spigelman CJ 
observed that this notoriously ambivalent term can be construed as a ‘subjective, 
actual, conscious desire to bring about a specific result’, or ‘what is likely, perhaps 
overwhelmingly likely, to occur considered objectively’, even including ‘reckless 
                                                                                                                          
70 Prinzo v Baycrest Centre for Geriatric Care [2002] OJ No 2712 at paras 43 and 45 per Weiler JA. 
71 High Parklane Consulting Inc v Royal Group Technologies Ltd [2007] OJ No 107 at paras 31 and 
32 per Perell J. 
72 Boucher v Wal-Mart Canada Corp 2014 ONCA 419 at paras 50-51 per Laskin JA. 




indifference to a result’.74 Likewise, the first of these three constructions can be taken 





From the case law reviewed above in relation to the Wilkinson tort or the tort of 
‘intentional infliction of mental harm’, it can be observed that the notion of intention 
based upon purpose – namely the possession of a purpose or a desire75 on the part of 
the actor to bring about the disputed consequence – is widely employed in legal 
practice. In addition, with regard to the concept of intention, three elements can be 
differentiated: (a) intention based upon purpose (or desire), as mentioned; (b) intention 
based upon knowledge, knowing or foreseeing that one particular consequence is 
sufficiently likely, overwhelmingly likely, or substantially certain to result; (c) 
recklessness or reckless indifference. The second and third will be further investigated 
in subsequent sections. Furthermore, three points deriving from the above case-review 
are of considerable relevance to the notion of intention based upon purpose, and will 
be discussed below as follows: (1) the notion of intention based upon ends or means; 
(2) the means of establishing purpose, aim, or end; (3) the boundary between intention 






                                                                                                                          
74 Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Naidu [2007] NSWCA 377 at paras 77 and 80 per Spigelman CJ. 
75 Noticeably, ‘desire’ may be an equivocal term to use and define. According to Finnis, ‘desire’ can 
possibly be interpreted in two senses. In sense (a) – rational or volitional desire, a certain act or 
consequence is desired when it is ‘freely chosen’ as an ‘intelligent and rationally appealing option’. In 
contrast, desire in sense (b) – emotional desire – denotes one’s reactions to something that ‘appeals to 
one’s feeling’. Finnis regards the ‘concept of intention used in moral and legal reasoning’ as closely 
tied to ‘desire’ in sense (a), since ‘it is tightly linked to the moral significance of choice’. One’s aim or 
purpose is closely connected with one’s sense (a) desire – the rational or volitional desire, because 
‘one’s purpose is in one aspect desired, volitionally, by reason of an intelligible good’. Yet what one 
chooses, intends, or purposes to do is not necessarily what one emotionally desires (the sense [b] desire). 
See J Finnis, ‘Intention and Side Effects’, Intention and Identity: Collected Essays Volume II (2011) 




3.321 The notion of intention based upon ends or means – 
          An extended version of intention based upon purpose? 
 
Some of the cases discussed above showed that, despite the actor possessing a purpose 
or desire to bring about the consequence – e.g. to inflict mental harm – the causation 
of the consequence is not an end in itself or the ultimate end, but merely the means by 
which another more remote or ultimate end can be achieved. Nevertheless, the finding 
of intention or purpose still prevailed in these cases. For instance, in Boothman v R or 
in Boucher v Wal-Mart Canada Corp, the wrongdoers were held to have had a 
‘purpose’76 or as ‘wanted’77 to bring about severe emotional distress to the plaintiffs, 
in order to achieve another (ultimate) purpose, which was to force them to quit their 
job. In Timmermans v Buelow, the defendant Buelow was regarded as having 
‘intended’ to ‘play on the plaintiff’s fears’, in order to pressure him to ‘vacate the 
premises immediately’ and, further, to ‘put the prospective tenant into possession’.78 
 
The English case of Janvier v Sweeney may also illustrate this category. Duke LJ held 
that the defendant’s false statements had been made with ‘an intention to terrify the 
plaintiff for the purpose of attaining an unlawful object’.79 A T Lawrence J thought 
that ‘[t]he means they used were false statements made to the plaintiff calculated to 
cause terror’.80 In other words, the defendants’ calculation to cause terror and distress 
(through false statements) was merely regarded as the means to another purpose (to 
obtain an unlawful object). Nevertheless, an intention (to terrify) was still found. 
Similarly, in Rhodes v OPO, 81  the examples of the ‘hostage taker’ 82  and the 
‘blackmailer’83 raised by the Supreme Court also explicitly illustrate the notions as 
                                                                                                                          
76 Boothman v R (n 68) at para 106 per Noël J. ‘Not only was there general wilful injuria of the 
Wilkinson type, but there was also the malicious purpose to cause the plaintiff to breakdown 
mentally.’ 
77 Boucher v Wal-Mart Canada Corp (n 72) at para 51 per Laskin JA, ‘He wanted to get Boucher to 
resign. To do so, he wanted to cause her so much emotional distress or mental anguish that she would 
have no alternative but to quit her job.’ 
78 Timmermans v Buelow [1984] OJ No 2408 at para 30 per Catzman J. 
79 Janvier v Sweeney (n 5) at 326 per Duke LJ. 
80 ibid at 328 per A T Lawrence J. 
81 Rhodes v OPO (n 16) at para 85 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
82 ‘[A] hostage taker demands money from the family of the hostage (H) for his safe release’. 




regards ends or means. In these hypothetical circumstances, the majority of the 
Supreme Court observed that the wrongdoer ‘intended to cause severe distress to the 
claimant’ as ‘the means of trying to achieve his demand’.84 
 
In the light of these decisions and examples, although the purposeful or desired 
infliction of mental harm is merely an intermediary end or a means to reach a remoter 
or ultimate end, this does not affect the finding of intention or purpose in these cases. 
In other words, besides the ultimate purpose, it appears that the notion of purpose, or 
intention based upon purpose can extend to cover the intermediary purpose or the 
means to the final end. This idea is also supported by Finnis, who has argued that 
‘[m]eans, then, are purposes. But they are instrumental purposes, adopted for their 
intelligible appeal as promising to bring about the further purposes’.85 Furthermore, 
Finnis defines tortious intention as ‘what one chooses, whether as end or as 
means…everything which is part of one’s plan (proposal), whether as purpose or as 
way of effecting one’s purpose(s) – everything which is part of one’s reason for 
behaving as one does’.86 The notion of intention based upon purpose can thus be 
translated into the idea of intention based upon ends or means. Intention based upon 
ends or means can be taken as an extended version of intention based upon purpose. 
 
 
3.322 Establishing purpose, aim, or end 
 
As regards the notion of intention based upon purpose, or the intention based upon 
ends or means, the most important question is how to establish that the actor has it as 
his or her purpose, desires, or aims to bring about one particular result. Where the actor 
chooses to engage in a voluntary path of conduct, as distinct from unconscious conduct 
                                                                                                                          
84 Rhodes v OPO (n 16) at para 85 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
85 Finnis (n 75) at 180. 




such as sleepwalking,87 usually he or she has one plan or proposal in mind.88 Whether 
or not the actor has one particular result as his or her purpose can be probed by the 
following test:89 in the event that the actor’s deliberate conduct had not resulted in this 
particular consequence, would the actor have considered his or her plan as a failure.90 
The following illustrates. 
  
In the rain forest of Peru, A deliberately pulls the trigger of a gun. Due to extreme 
hunger, A very much hopes that some wild animal can be hit and killed, and he has no 
idea that any other human being is in the neighbourhood. However, B is in the vicinity 
and struck by the bullet after the discharge of the gun. A is surprised and regrets B’s 
death, and A would never agree with cannibalism.91 
 
In this example, A engages in his conduct voluntarily and deliberately, with the plan 
in his mind to hit some wild animal(s) to feed himself. The result turns out to be that 
B has been struck instead. The doctrine of ‘transferred intent’ may not apply here since 
A does not plan to kill a human at all, and he is unaware of the existence of any person 
in the vicinity.92 Moreover, A will not eat B. Whether or not B lived was incidental, 
even irrelevant, to A’s plan, which would succeed only if A had killed an animal. 
Therefore, A does not have the purpose, or an intention in this sense, of killing B.  
                                                                                                                          
87 If a sleepwalker or a person ‘in a condition of complete automation’ brings about damage to other 
people, this conduct is not voluntary or controlled by his or her free will, so that what he or she has 
done may not be actionable: see Walker (n 53) 34. The primary authority on this point is the case of 
Waugh v James K Allan Ltd 1964 SC (HL) 102 (lorry driver having heart attack at wheel incapable of 
negligence from that point). This case contrasts with Dunnage v Randall [2016] QB 639 (person in 
grip of severe mental illness who set fire to himself and severely burned the claimant still capable of 
negligence). 
88 Finnis (n 53) at 229. 
89 This is dubbed the ‘test of failure’. See RA Duff, Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability: 
Philosophy of Action and the Criminal Law (1990) 61: ‘If my action does not produce an expected 
effect, will it have been a failure? If so, that effect is one which I acted with the intention of bringing 
about; if not, it is merely a foreseen side-effect of my action….an effect whose occurrence or non-
occurrence is irrelevant to the success or failure of my action is not one which I act with the intention 
of bringing about’. 
90 ibid. Also see J Herring, Criminal Law (8th edn, 2018) 127-128; AP Simester and others, Simester 
and Sullivan’s Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine (6th edn, 2016) 136. 
91 This instance is adapted from one example provided in the Restatement, see Restatement (Third) of 
Torts §1 (2010) (n 40) Comment b Illustration 1. 
92 In contrast, in cases where the tortfeasor ‘intends to injure one person’, yet ‘another person is 
injured instead’, the doctrine of ‘transferred intent’ may be applicable, allowing the tortfeasor to be 





This test can also be applied to some of the cases reviewed earlier, to see whether or 
not there existed an intention based upon purpose (or ends or means). In Rhodes v 
OPO,93 if publishing the autobiographical material did not harm the child mentally, 
would the defendant have regarded his plan as a failure? The answer is obviously a no. 
The defendant wanted to share his story and to unveil his history to the world, without 
any desire to hurt his child; nor was emotional injury to his child the necessary and 
only means through which his ultimate end could be achieved. Therefore, whether or 
not severe emotional distress would be caused to his child was incidental to the 
defendant’s plan. He should therefore be taken as harbouring no intention based upon 
purpose (or ends or means). By contrast, in Janvier v Sweeney,94 if the plaintiff had 
not been terrified and distressed by the threat, she would probably not have cooperated 
with the defendant. Without her cooperation the ultimate goal of the defendants (to 
unlawfully obtain an object) would not have been achieved, and they would regard 
their plan as a failure. Similarly in Boothman v R,95 if the plaintiff had felt comfortable 
with the threats and humiliation without being severely distressed, she would not have 
resigned, and the wrongdoer’s plan would have been a failure. The same result applies 
to Boucher v Wal-Mart Canada Corp.96 Likewise in Timmermans v Buelow,97 if the 
plaintiff had not been frightened and significantly distressed by the defendant’s threat, 
it is unlikely that he would have submitted to the wrongdoer’s unlawful demand,98 and 
the plan in the wrongdoer’s mind (to have the apartment vacated and to bring in the 
prospective tenant) would have become a failure. In sum, except for Rhodes, it seems 
that the defendants in the other cases mentioned here did harbour an intention based 
upon purpose or an intention based upon ends or means (to inflict significant 
emotional distress). 
 
Noticeably, in circumstances where the actor is found as having no intention based 
upon purpose (or ends or means), it is nevertheless likely that he or she might possess 
                                                                                                                          
93 Rhodes v OPO (n 16). 
94 Janvier v Sweeney (n 5). 
95 Boothman v R (n 68). 
96 Boucher v Wal-Mart Canada Corp (n 72). 
97 Timmermans v Buelow (n 78). 




other relevant forms of mental state, e.g. intention based upon knowledge (with 
substantial certainty) or recklessness. Even if a certain consequence does not appear 
to have been the actor’s purpose (or means to the end), but wholly incidental to the 
actor’s principal aim, it could be deemed to be the side-effect or by-product of the 
actor’s conduct.99 The (actual or constructive) knowledge/foresight with substantial 
certainty of the side-effect’s occurrence, or the (actual or constructive) 
knowledge/foresight of likelihood of the side-effect’s occurrence will be further 




3.323 The boundary between motive and intention based upon purpose  
 
Wright J held in Wilkinson v Downton that ‘no malicious purpose to cause the harm 
which was caused nor any motive of spite is imputed to the defendant’.102 In the 
aforesaid cases where an intention based upon ends or means can be found, Noël J 
held the wrongdoer in Boothman v R to have possessed a ‘malicious purpose to cause 
the plaintiff to breakdown mentally’,103 whilst Catzman J found in Timmermans v 
Buelow that the intentional infliction of fright and distress was ‘motivated by [the 
defendant’s] desire to put the prospective tenant into possession’.104  Yet, in these 
decisions, the difference between purpose and motive was not identified. Is it really 
possible to draw a clear boundary between motive and intention based upon purpose? 
What roles do these concepts play in relation to this tort?  
 
One interpretation of motive is, like intention, that it is a state of mind, and as both can 
be regarded as a form of state of mind, motive is often entangled with intention. 
Perhaps partly for this reason, the term ‘malice’ became a troubled one. The 
                                                                                                                          
99 According to Finnis, if consequences do not lie inside one’s original plan or proposal, ‘neither 
wanted for their own sake nor needed as a means’, they are ‘side-effects’ or ‘incidental risks’ despite 
their having been foreseen and even been accepted. See Finnis (n 53) at 244. 
100 See section 3.4. 
101 See section 3.5. 
102 Wilkinson v Downton (n 1) at 59 per Wright J. 
103 Boothman v R (n 68) at para 106 per Noël J. 




complexity of malice lies in its being employed in two layers of senses: motives on the 
one hand and intention to injure on the other.105 This view is supported by Fridman’s 
observation that malice could be interpreted in four ways: ‘spite or ill-will’; ‘any 
improper motive’; ‘the intent to do a wrongful act’; and ‘the intent to inflict injury 
without just cause or excuse’. 106  Drawing together these four interpretations,  the 
essence of malice can roughly be seen as the motive to do harm, or the intention to act 
or to do harm. This mix generates considerable complexity and lack of clarity.107 
Indeed it has been advocated that the term malice should be avoided due to 
destabilising and divisive effect upon the intentional torts.108 However, even if the use 
of this term is itself discontinued, the two notions that it combines, namely intention 
and motive, as well as their interaction with each other, still require to be clarified.  
 
Cane has argued for differentiating intention and motive, on the basis that the latter is 
the reason or ground why the actor engaged in the disputed conduct or brought about 
its consequence.109 This definition is compatible with the word’s literal meaning.110 
Intention and motive might coincide with each other under some circumstances but 
diverge in others. For instance, they may coincide when the actor has the purpose of 
bringing about a certain result because he wholeheartedly wants it to occur. They may 
diverge when a person deliberately engages in his/her conduct in order to perform a 
promise but without any desire to do it.111 But although it is correct in saying that 
intention and motive might coincide in some situations but diverge in others, as 
                                                                                                                          
105 E Reid, ‘“That Unhappy Expression”: Malice at the Margins’ in SGA Pitel, JW Neyers and E 
Chamberlain (eds), Tort Law: Challenging Orthodoxy (2013) 441 at 442. Also see Reid (n 40) at 903-
904. 
106 GHL Fridman, ‘Malice in the Law of Torts’ (1958) 21 MLR 484 at 484. 
107 ibid. Also see Reid (n 40) at 903. For another brief introduction of historical liability for malice 
please refer to K Oliphant, ‘The Structure of the Intentional Torts’ in JW Neyers, E Chamberlain and 
SGA Pitel (eds), Emerging Issues in Tort Law (2007) 509 at 520-522. 
108 Reid (n 40) at 928; Reid (n 105) at 460-461. Also see Cane (n 35) at 539. 
109 Cane (n 35) at 539. Please also see Reid (n 40) at 904; Reid (n 105) at 442. 
110 The Oxford English Dictionary lists a variety of definitions for the term ‘motive’. Under the head 
of ‘Senses relating to inner impulses and mental activities’, motive can be construed as ‘an impression 
or apprehension that prompts a person to action’, ‘an inward prompting or impulse’, or ‘a 
circumstance or external factor inducing a person to act in a certain way; a desire, emotion, reason, 
argument, etc., influencing or tending to influence a person’s volition’. The more generally used 
definition is offered as ‘the reason or cause behind something’. The definition in relation to Law is 
submitted as ‘a purpose, end, or interest which motivates someone to commit an illegal, esp. criminal, 
act’.  




demonstrated in case law discussed further below, the latter instance raised by Cane 
does not properly illuminate the divergence between intention and motive, but merely 
signifies their convergence.112 
 
Admittedly in relation to this tort, the notions of intention based upon purpose and of 
motive cannot easily be differentiated. They often overlap, or, in Cane’s words, 
converge. As motive is denoted as the reason or ground why one wishes to engage in 
a particular behaviour (or to bring about the consequence of it), in many 
circumstances asking ‘why, or for what reason did one engage in this act’ is tantamount 
to questioning ‘what is one’s purpose for conducting this act’. For instance, A 
deliberately engages in a threatening or insulting conduct to inflict severe emotional 
distress upon B. Due to A’s animosity against B, A truly wishes to inflict serious hurt 
upon B. In this scenario, the purpose of A’s conduct is not different from its reason. 
Likewise, after the reformulation of the object of intention in Rhodes, Downton’s 
practical joke may be construed as demonstrating the purpose or desire to bring about 
an emotional reaction, even significant emotional distress, on the part of Mrs 
Wilkinson. Based on this construction, the purpose and the reason for the defendant’s 
conduct (in Wilkinson v Downton113) were understood in similar terms. Therefore, in 
these two examples, the intention based upon purpose and motive on the part of the 
defendant converge. 
 
On the other hand, in several instances, it is possible to distinguish motive from 
intention based on purpose. In Rhodes v OPO, the required object of intention was said 
to be ‘at least severe mental or emotional distress’.114 And, as discussed, purpose (ends 
or means) can be taken as the first basis of intention.115 Hence, to be considered as an 
intention (based upon purpose) in this context, the purpose at issue should be directed 
                                                                                                                          
112 Namely, in the latter instance where a person engages in a conduct in order to perform his promise 
without any desire to do it, the reason, ground, or purpose of his act is to perform his promise or not 
to breach his promise, which is precisely the motive of his conduct, whether he desires it or not. 
Motive is related but not limited to desire (in the sense of emotional feeling). Therefore, in his latter 
example, the actor’s motive is in fact identical with his intention (based upon purpose) – to perform or 
not to breach his promise, although the actor emotionally dislikes what he is going to do. 
113 Wilkinson v Downton (n 1). 
114 Rhodes v OPO (n 16) at para 88 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
115 The second basis of intention, intention based upon knowledge (foresight with substantial 




at ‘(at least) severe mental or emotional distress’. If the purpose directly attaches to 
any object other than ‘severe mental or emotional distress’ (or other than ‘recognised 
psychiatric illness’ or ‘physical harm’), the nature of the intention (based upon purpose) 
is not as required for this tort, and can be taken as motive as long as it meets the 
definition of motive.116 In some of the cases reviewed here concerning intention based 
on ends or means, apart from the actor’s purpose to bring about significant emotional 
distress, there exist other more remote or ultimate ends to be fulfilled. These more 
remote or ultimate purposes/ends should be taken as motive since 1) they are not the 
intention (based upon purpose) of the type required for this tort; and 2) they are the 
ultimate reason or ground of the actor engaging in the conduct. For instance, in Janvier 
v Sweeney, a mental state directed at terrifying and distressing the plaintiff should be 
taken as an intention (based upon ends or means), whilst the aim to force her to help 
them obtain a certain object is the motive.117 In Boothman v R118 or in Boucher v Wal-
Mart Canada Corp,119 the defendants’ purpose to impose severe emotional distress on 
the plaintiffs should be taken as intention, but their ultimate objective to pressure the 
plaintiffs into resigning is the motive. In Timmermans v Buelow, the desire to inflict 
fright and distress on the plaintiff is intention, while the more remote aim to press him 
to vacate the premises and to ‘put the prospective tenant into possession’120 should be 
considered as the motive. 
 
In comparison to the purpose treated as intention, less significance attaches to the 
remoter purpose, desire, or end treated as motive. However, if the motive at issue is 
connected with an unlawful act or consequence, and all other elements required in this 
tort have been met, it is likely that the finding of unlawful motive could increase the 
gravity of the wrongdoing. In other words, unlawful motive may be an aggravating or 
exacerbating factor for this tort. For instance, Duke LJ found Janvier v Sweeney as a 
stronger case than Wilkinson v Downton, because ‘there was an intention to terrify the 
                                                                                                                          
116 The reason or ground why one did engage in the disputed conduct or bring about the consequence 
of it. See Cane (n 35) at 539. See also Reid (n 40) at 904; Reid (n 105) at 442. 
117 Janvier v Sweeney (n 5). 
118 Boothman v R (n 68). 
119 Boucher v Wal-Mart Canada Corp (n 72). 




plaintiff for the purpose of attaining an unlawful object’ in the former case.121 In a 
similar vein, pursuant to the Restatement (Third) of Torts §46, when deciding the 
severity of the wrongdoing – namely, whether the disputed conduct is ‘extreme and 
outrageous’, the ‘motivation of the actor’ is also a factor to be taken into account.122 In 
jurisdictions where aggravated or punitive (exemplary) damages are applicable, the 
increased gravity of the conduct, or the outrageousness of the wrongdoing, can 
possibly trigger an award of aggravated or punitive (exemplary) damages. 123  In 
jurisdictions where aggravated or punitive (exemplary) damages are inapplicable, the 
elevated gravity of conduct may still affect the quantum of compensation or the 
justifiability of the disputed conduct. In terms of justifiability (discussed in Chapter 2), 
the more egregious the wrongdoing the stronger the defence or ground that is needed 
for it to be justified. 
 
 
3.4 Intention based upon knowledge (foresight with substantial certainty) 
 
3.41 Basic definition and background 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, after completion of the ‘test of failure’, even if 
a certain consequence does not appear to be the purpose, or the means to the actor’s 
ultimate purpose, then it could be deemed to be a mere side-effect of the actor’s 
conduct. 124  In the light of the actor’s cognition and knowledge, foreseen and 
unforeseen side-effects are to be differentiated. The essential question is: can the 
concept of intention be extended to the state of mind in which the actor has foreseen, 
with substantial certainty or high probability, certain side-effects of his deliberate 
                                                                                                                          
121 Janvier v Sweeney (n 5) at 326 per Duke LJ. 
122 Restatement (Third) of Torts §46 (2012) Comment d. 
123 For examples, in the aforementioned three Canadian cases Timmermans v Buelow, Boothman v R, 
and Boucher v Wal-Mart Canada Corp, where unlawful motives were found in addition to the 
requisite intention, either aggravated damages (in Timmermans), or punitive damages (in Boothman), 
or even both (in Boucher) were awarded for the defendants’ malicious or outrageous conduct. See 
Timmermans v Buelow (n 78) at para 38 per Catzman J; Boothman v R (n 68) at para 122(3) per Noël 
J; Boucher v Wal-Mart Canada Corp (n 72) at paras 110-111 per Laskin JA. 
124 In ‘Intention and Side Effects’, Finnis defines side effects in relevant moral or legal sense as 
‘effects which are not intended as end or means’, or effects which ‘figure neither as end nor as means 




conduct?125 It is submitted that intention can also be defined in a sense which refers 
simply to the knowledge of consequences, 126  where a harm or result is actually 
foreseen,127 not merely foreseeable.128 In addressing this issue Sidgwick contended that 
‘for purposes of exact moral or jural discussion, it is best to include under the term 
“intention” all the consequences of an act that are foreseen as certain or probable; since 
it will be admitted that we cannot evade responsibility for any foreseen bad 
consequences of our acts by the plea that we felt no desire for them, either for their 
own sake or as means to ulterior ends’.129 Certainly, there are arguments for and against 
the inclusion of the knowledge of consequence under the original concept of intention. 
These arguments will be explored after consideration of some authorities which have 
mentioned or adopted knowledge-based intention. Notably, since the notion of 
intention as analysed in this section is based on knowledge or foresight, whether actual 
knowledge (foresight) should be categorically required or whether constructive 
knowledge (foresight) can also be accepted, becomes an important question to be 
answered.   
 
 
3.42 Legal authorities and case law 
 
In accordance with the Restatement (Third) of Torts §1, ‘a person acts with the intent 
to produce a consequence’ provided that ‘(b) the person acts knowing that the 
consequence is substantially certain to result’;130 whilst the DCFR §Ⅵ–3:101 submits 
that ‘a person causes legally relevant damage intentionally when that person causes 
                                                                                                                          
125 This question will be examined below. According to Oliphant, though this is a seldom addressed 
question, generally speaking, the answer appears to be ‘yes’. However, it is not the case in ‘unlawful 
means’ economic torts, e.g. Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 3) [2006] QB 125; nor in the tort of ‘conspiracy 
to injure’. See Oliphant (n 107) at 515. 
126 Restatement (Third) of Torts §1 (2010) (n 40) (b); DCFR §Ⅵ-3:101; Oliphant (n 107) at 515; Reid 
(n 40) at 902-903; Also see WM Landes and RA Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law (1987) 
149-150. 
127 The knowledge or awareness (with substantial certainty) on the part of the actor must be 
established. See Restatement (Third) of Torts §1 (2010) (n 40) Comment c. 
128 Admittedly, the boundary between what is ‘actually foreseen’ and ‘foreseeable’ may not be so 
clear. Whether or not ‘actual foresight’, rather than ‘foreseeability’, is required in this kind of 
knowledge-based intention will be explored in section 3.4433. 
129 H Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (7th edn, 1907) 202. 




such damage either (b) by conduct which that person means to do, knowing that such 
damage, or damage of that type, will or will almost certainly be caused’.131 Obviously 
both texts have accepted the principle that knowledge of a particular consequence (or 
damage) can be deemed as a foundation for intention, but the prerequisite is that the 
known likelihood of occurrence of that consequence must be high – in their words, be 
substantially certain or almost certain. 
 
In Austen v University of Wolverhampton,132 a case involving mixed causes of action 
including defamation, breach of confidence, as well as intentional infliction of physical 
or emotional harm, Mr. Justice Gray ruled that ‘the tort of intentional infliction of harm 
requires proof that the conduct of the defendant was wilful in the sense that the 
defendant intended to do the act which caused the alleged damage. I will assume in 
favour of the claimant that it is not necessary for him to show that the defendant 
intended to cause damage but just that the damage was the likely and foreseeable 
consequence of the defendant’s intentional act’.133 In other words, in terms of the 
claimant’s burden of proof to establish the required intention in this tort, it is sufficient 
to show that the damage was the likely and foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s 
deliberate act. No actual foresight on the part of the defendant (of the damage) nor 
(foresight with) substantial certainty is required. 
 
Wong v Parkside Health NHS Trust concerned intentional harassment, predating the 
Protection from Harassment Act 1997, and was argued (partly) on the basis of 
Wilkinson v Downton.134 The decision in Wong clarified that English law has not gone 
so far as to recognise that ‘the tort is committed if there is deliberate conduct which 
will foreseeably lead to alarm or distress falling short of the recognised psychiatric 
illness…’. 135  However, if the degree of harm is not merely foreseeable, but is 
‘sufficiently likely to result’, the defendant should be deemed as ‘hav[ing] meant it to 
do so by the combination of the likelihood of such harm being suffered as the result of 
                                                                                                                          
131 DCFR §Ⅵ-3:101. 
132 Austen v University of Wolverhampton [2005] EWHC 1635 (QB). 
133 ibid at para 10 per Mr Justice Gray. 
134 Wong v Parkside Health NHS Trust (n 9) at paras 5, 7-17 per Lady Justice Hale. 




his behaviour and his deliberately engaging in that behaviour’.136 According to Lady 
Hale, what truly matters is whether the disputed conduct was ‘of a nature which was 
sufficiently likely to result in such harm that an intention to produce it could be 
imputed to her’.137 This decision thus makes clear that for an intention to be imputed 
to the actor, the likelihood or possibility of the occurrence of certain harm should be 
at a considerably high level. Notably, apart from foreseeability or constructive 
foresight, the actual foresight or knowledge on the part of the defendant is not 
emphasised in this case. 
 
In C v D, SBA, a case where Wilkinson v Downton was also employed as one of the 
causes of action, 138  three bases were identified for imputing intention: where the 
defendant’s acts are ‘calculated to cause psychiatric harm and are done with the 
knowledge that they are likely to cause such harm’; where ‘psychiatric injury is 
sufficiently likely to result from the conduct complained for the defendant not to be 
heard to say that he did not “mean” it’ (as in Wong); and where ‘the defendant was 
reckless as to whether he caused psychiatric harm’.139 The second basis can be taken 
as relevant to the notion of intention based upon knowledge analysed in this section. 
As in Wong, it should be noted that apart from the high degree of likelihood or 
foreseeability, actual foresight or knowledge on the part of the defendant was not 
stressed.  
 
The majority of Supreme Court in Rhodes v OPO construed the term ‘calculated’ as 
‘likely to have an effect of the kind which was produced’.140 More specifically, Lord 
Neuberger stated that ‘[t]here are statements (and indeed actions) whose consequences 
or potential consequences are so obvious that the perpetrator cannot realistically say 
that those consequences were unintended.’141 After the decision in Rhodes v OPO, in 
ABC v WH 2000 Ltd v William Whillock, leaving aside ‘physical sexual abuse’, the 
court analysed the requisite elements of the Wilkinson tort as reformulated by the 
                                                                                                                          
136 ibid at para 12 per Lady Justice Hale. 
137 ibid at para 13 per Lady Justice Hale.  
138 C v D, SBA (n 57) at paras 88-90 per Mr Justice Field. 
139 ibid at para 99 per Mr Justice Field. 
140 Rhodes v OPO (n 16) at para 36 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 




Supreme Court, holding that each element of this tort had been established.142 With 
regard to the mental element, the court considered it as ‘obvious’ that ‘the illicit 
relationship would in the end cause nothing but harm to the vulnerable 
Claimant…those consequences must have been entirely clear and obvious to Mr 
Whillock’.143 In the light of the dicta drawn from these two cases, it appears that the 
degree of the likelihood (of the occurrence of certain consequences) requires to be 
considerably high, rendering the disputed consequences ‘clear and obvious’. From the 
wording adopted by the court in ABC, the court seems to have assumed foresight of 
the consequences, on the basis of their ‘entirely clear and obvious’ foreseeability. 
 
In other jurisdictions, decisions relative to the Wilkinson tort indicate that intention or 
calculation on the part of the defendant can be interpreted as knowledge or foresight 
(with substantial certainty). In an important Canadian case, Rahemtulla v Vanfed 
Credit Union, the element of ‘plainly calculated to produce some effect of the kind 
which was produced’ was ‘established’, on the basis that ‘[i]t was clearly foreseeable 
that the accusations of theft which the defendant made against the plaintiff would cause 
her profound distress.’144 In other words, the term ‘calculated’ was put on a par with 
‘clearly foreseeable’. Likewise, CVC Services v IWA-Canada, Local 1-71 is a case 
involving false or uninvestigated allegations. Apart from the conduct element145 and 
the requirement of harm146 in the tort of ‘intentional infliction of mental distress’, the 
mental element (or the element of ‘calculated to produce some effect’) was translated 
into ‘foreseeability’. It was held as ‘clearly foreseeable’ that ‘a false allegation of 
promiscuity would cause the grievor “profound distress”’. 147  Furthermore, in 
Campbell v Wellfund Audio-Visual Ltd, Clancy J also interpreted the element of 
‘calculated to produce some effects’ as ‘clearly foreseeable’.148 
 
                                                                                                                          
142 ABC v WH 2000 Ltd v William Whillock [2015] EWHC 2687 (QB) at para 89 per Sir Robert 
Nelson. 
143 ibid. 
144 Rahemtulla v Vanfed Credit Union [1984] 3 WWR 296 at para 56 per McLachlin J. 
145 CVC Services v IWA-Canada, Local 1-71 38 CCEL (2d) 141 at para 79 per Lanyon. 
146 ibid at para 81 per Lanyon. 
147 ibid at para 80 per Lanyon. 




In Prinzo v Baycrest Centre for Geriatric Care, a Canadian case reviewed in the 
previous section, Weiler JA clarified the prerequisites of the Wilkinson tort, holding 
that the requirement of ‘calculated to produce harm’ can be satisfied where ‘the 
consequences are known to be substantially certain to follow’, apart from where ‘the 
actor desires to produce the consequences that follow from the act’.149 In parallel, in 
High Parklane Consulting Inc v Royal Group Technologies Ltd, after canvassing three 
requirements of the Wilkinson tort, or the tort of ‘intentional infliction of mental 
distress or shock’,150 Perell J submitted that the element of ‘calculated to produce 
harm’ can be met where ‘the consequences are known to be substantially certain to 
follow’ or where ‘the actor desires to produce the consequences that follow from the 
act’.151 According to these Canadian decisions, it is apparent that the term ‘calculated’, 
or the mental element of this tort, can be construed as knowledge or foresight (with 
substantial certainty); actual or subjective knowledge or foresight does not seem to be 




3.43 Some inferences from the case law and authorities 
 
The above authorities point to some provisional conclusions. Firstly, although the 
answer to whether the concept of intention can be extended to knowledge or foresight 
(with substantial certainty or high likelihood) may still differ between individual 
delicts or torts, at least in relation to this tort, both English and Commonwealth courts 
have employed (constructive) knowledge or foresight (with substantial certainty or 
high likelihood) as one basis of intention.  
 
Secondly, a variety of expressions are used in relation to knowledge-based intention. 
The courts may look for whether: ‘the damage was the likely and foreseeable 
consequence of the defendant’s intentional act’;152 ‘psychiatric injury is sufficiently 
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150 High Parklane Consulting Inc v Royal Group Technologies Ltd (n 71) at para 31 per Perell J. 
151 ibid at para 32 per Perell J. 




likely to result from the conduct complained for the defendant not to be heard to say 
that he did not “mean” it’;153  the ‘consequences or potential consequences are so 
obvious that the perpetrator cannot realistically say that those consequences were 
unintended’;154 or ‘those consequences [were] entirely clear and obvious’.155 They may 
interpret the term ‘calculated’ as ‘likely to have an effect of the kind which was 
produced’,156 or ‘of a nature which was sufficiently likely to result in such harm that 
an intention to produce it could be imputed to her’.157 They may construe the element 
of ‘calculated to produce some effect’ as ‘clearly foreseeable’,158 or as including the 
circumstance where ‘the consequences are known to be substantially certain to 
follow’.159 Alternatively they may direct their attention towards ‘acts knowing that the 
consequence is substantially certain to result’;160 or ‘knowing that such damage, or 
damage of that type, will or will almost certainly be caused’.161 In the light of these 
different expressions of knowledge-based intention, two points should be noted. A) 
The degree of the likelihood of occurrence of the consequence (side-effect), or the 
degree of foreseeability of the consequence is of key significance. In most of the 
authorities reviewed, a high degree of likelihood or foreseeability – e.g. ‘sufficient’ 
likelihood, ‘clear’ or ‘obvious’ foreseeability – is required. In some of them even 
‘substantial certainty’ is required. B) The Restatement (Third) of Torts §1 and DCFR 
§Ⅵ–3:101 aside, actual or subjective knowledge/foresight is not required for such a 
knowledge-based intention in any of the case law studied. 
 
On the basis of these conclusions the next question is whether, theoretically speaking, 
there is any convincing foundation for the inclusion of knowledge-based intention 
under the structure of intention. Or should we limit the concept of intention to its 
                                                                                                                          
153 C v D, SBA (n 57) at para 99 per Mr Justice Field. 
154 Rhodes v OPO (n 16) at para 112 per Lord Neuberger. 
155 ABC v WH 2000 Ltd v William Whillock (n 142) at para 89 per Sir Robert Nelson. 
156 Rhodes v OPO (n 16) at para 36 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
157 Wong v Parkside Health NHS Trust (n 9) at para 13 per Lady Justice Hale.  
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strictest sense, i.e., intention based upon purpose (ends or means)? And, if knowledge-
based intention is to be included, should foresight with substantial certainty be 
required or should a high degree of likelihood suffice? In addition, the question 




3.44 Reasoning for and against the inclusion of knowledge-based intention in the 
construct of intention 
  
3.441 Revisiting the boundary between intention based upon ends or means and 
intention based upon knowledge (foresight with substantial certainty) 
 
Before exploring whether the construct of intention can extend and include 
knowledge/foresight with substantial certainty (or sufficient likelihood), one 
preliminary issue requires to be clarified – the boundary between intention based upon 
ends or means and intention based upon knowledge (foresight with substantial 
certainty). On the face of it, the notion of ‘intention based upon ends or means’ – in 
particular when it is based on ‘means’ – in many situations could overlap with the idea 
of knowledge/foresight with substantial certainty. Where the actor deliberately harms 
someone as a means to achieve another purpose, due to the fact that the completion of 
the means is the prerequisite of the fulfilment of the ultimate end, very often the 
adopted means would be something foreseen as substantially certain.162 Under these 
overlapping circumstances, it seems possible for the ‘intention based upon means’ to 
be dealt with under the structure of intention based upon knowledge (foresight with 
substantial certainty). Nevertheless, the essence of latter is the knowledge or foresight 
of a certain ‘side-effect’ with substantial certainty. If we adhere to the interpretation 
                                                                                                                          
162 In Janvier v Sweeney, discussed above at section 3.321, the defendants’ calculation to cause terror 
and distress (via false statements and threats) was merely considered as the means to another purpose 
(to acquire an unlawful object). In that case, the intention to terrify can be taken as an intention based 
upon ends or means. However, when the defendants told the plaintiff the false story and threatened 
her to force her to cooperate, they should also have foreseen as substantially certain or at least as 
sufficiently likely, that their deliberate conduct would generate significant fright and distress on the 




that ‘side-effect’ denotes something lying outwith the actor’s plan or proposal,163 the 
necessary means to the ultimate end should not be treated as ‘side-effect’, because the 
necessary means is plainly an integral part of the chosen plan or proposal. Although it 
might be foreseen as substantially certain to occur, it appears more warranted in theory 
to be placed under the framework of intention based upon ends or means.  
 
 
3.442 Opposing and supporting views 
 
On one view, acting knowingly cannot be taken as one’s intentional doing, unlike 
bringing about something as an end in itself or as a means to an end.164 Intentional 
actions ‘involve a clear choice’ on the part of the actor.165 In forming an intention, the 
chosen proposal is integrated into the actor’s will and stance in the world.166 Provided 
the intention is to harm others, the actor is shaping his or her stance as one who 
‘exploits’ others, using others up and ‘treat[ing] them as material’, which in a sense 
reveals his or her denial of others’ dignity or right.167 On the other hand, if one effect 
is merely foreseen (even as substantially certain or sufficiently likely), but lies outside 
one’s original plan or proposal, neither wanted as an end nor required as a means, it 
will not be incorporated into the actor’s stance and will. Although in this situation the 
actor might know or even accept that the foreseen consequences/side-effects would be 
incurred by his or her deliberate conduct, the actor does not adopt or choose them. He 
or she might be culpable due to his or her ‘acceptance’ (of the occurrence of the 
foreseen consequences or side-effects), but not by virtue of his or her intention.168 
 
                                                                                                                          
163 According to Finnis, ‘side-effect’ in the relevant moral or legal sense denotes effects which ‘figure 
neither as end nor as means in the plan adopted by choice’. See Finnis (n 75) at 181. 
164 GEM Anscombe, Intention (2nd edn 1963, reprinted 2000) 42 and 44. 
165 Priel (n 35) at 188.  
166 Finnis (n 53) at 244. 
167 ibid. 
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Taking the opposite view, a foreseen consequence could be incurred ‘intentionally’ 
either in a direct sense or in an oblique sense.169 In other words, in addition to intention 
in the sense of purpose (end or means), it is possible ‘to include under the term 
“intention” all the consequences of an act that are foreseen as certain or probable’.170 
In natural language, a foreseen but unwanted result is not usually deemed as 
intended;171 but in legal terms the (actual or constructive) foresight of consequences 
(or side-effects) with substantial certainty very often suffices for intention, 
notwithstanding that the actor might sincerely hope for them not to happen.172 This 
deviation between legal and natural linguistic usage should be ‘dictated by common 
sense’.173 At least, in such cases we would not say that the actor conducted what he did 
‘unintentionally’, which implies that the side-effect might not have been foreseen, or 
might have been brought about by accident or mistake.174 
 
As to the grounds for including the oblique and direct intention under one construct of 
intention, Bentham submitted that ‘consciousness’, or ‘advisedness’, ‘with respect to 
the circumstances, if clear from the mis-supposal of any preventive circumstance, 
extends the intentionality from the act to the consequences’.175 Bentham’s words can 
be taken as suggesting that: an intention in relation to consequence(s) can be imputed 
where the actor deliberately engages in a certain conduct, being aware of all the 
circumstances and the consequence that would take place as a result of this conduct.176 
Furthermore, it has been argued that in situations where the consequences/side-effects 
have been foreseen as (substantially) certain, since they are so ‘immediately and 
invariably connected with’ the actor’s deliberate conduct, the suggestion that the 
deliberate conduct may not bring about the consequences ‘would by ordinary standards 
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be regarded as absurd’.177 Thus the actor should be held as having acted intentionally 
with respect to the inseparable or inevitable accompaniment of his or her conduct.178 
Lastly but perhaps the most importantly, both direct intention (which is based upon 
ends or means) and oblique intention (which is based on foresight with substantial 
certainty) share one feature which is of significance to ‘any system of assigning 
responsibility for conduct’.179 Namely, the actor possesses ‘control over the alternative’ 
between the occurrence or the non-occurrence of the consequence (side-effect). The 
actor’s own choice of the course determines which consequence will be realised. The 
actor may be regarded as having ‘chosen’ the disputed consequence (side-effect), as 
he or she knowingly selects the course leading to the occurrence of the consequence 
(side-effect) at issue.180 It is this feature (choosing the course that would lead to the 
occurrence of the consequence) which justifies the extension of the construct of 
intention to those situations, where there is foresight of substantially certain, 
inseparable or inevitable consequence (side-effect) of what is truly desired or required 
as a means to an end. 
 
 
3.443 Concluding analysis 
 
3.4431 ‘Foresight with substantial certainty’ should be included in the construct of 
intention in relation to this tort 
 
The argument for the inclusion of foresight with substantial certainty in the construct 
of intention is persuasive. The feature of having a ‘choice between alternative courses 
leading to different consequences’, or, more precisely, being able to choose the course 
which would inevitably lead to the occurrence of the disputed consequence, pushes the 
notion of ‘foresight with substantial certainty’ towards the concept of intention. 
Namely, where the consequence/side-effect is foreseen as substantially certain, the 
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consequence/side-effect can be taken as inseparably or inevitably linked to the actor’s 
deliberate conduct. Thus the actor can choose (or accept) the course which would 
inevitably lead to the disputed consequence, whilst he can also choose not to engage 
in this conduct and avoid the result. In contrast, in cases regarding recklessness and 
negligence,181 the disputed consequence or side-effect is (foreseen as) likely to be 
brought about by the actors’ conduct, but also likely not to be caused. In other words, 
the consequence/side-effect may not be seen as inseparably or inevitably linked to their 
conduct. Therefore, whilst the actors in these kinds of cases can still decide not to 
engage in their conduct, or decide to comply with the standard of care, in order to avoid 
the occurrence of the consequences, they cannot choose or accept the course which 
would inseparably or inevitably lead to the occurrence of the consequences. In brief, 
it seems more warranted to place the notion of ‘foresight with substantial certainty’ 
under the head of ‘intention/intentional’, rather than to categorise it as ‘unintentional’, 
‘negligent’, or ‘reckless’.  
 
Furthermore, as discussed above, these theories regarding consequences that are 
‘foreseen as (substantially) certain’, ‘inseparably or inevitably brought about by one’s 
act’, and ‘having options, choosing or accepting the course which would inevitably 
lead to the occurrence of the consequence’ are general principles in relation to conduct, 
knowledge or consciousness, and consequences. Accordingly, they should be capable 
of application in the field of tort. In other words, these theories can be taken as general 
grounds for including the idea of foresight with substantial certainty in the construct 
of intention. Yet, without doubt, in certain intentional torts what is actually required 
for the mental element still depends, to a great extent, upon the character of that 
individual delict. For example, the nature of intention in the economic torts may be 
construed rather differently as contrasted with torts concerning personal injury. With 
respect to the mental element of the tort of ‘inducing breach of contract’ and ‘causing 
loss by unlawful means’, Lord Hoffmann held in OBG Limited v Allan that the concept 
of intention in both torts requires either ‘an end in itself’ or ‘a means to an end’, 
explicitly excluding ‘a foreseeable consequence’ (of one’s deliberate act);182 whilst in 
                                                                                                                          
181 The boundary between intention and recklessness, as well as the boundary between recklessness and 
negligence, will be analysed in the next section. 




relation to this tort, as observed in the above-reviewed authorities, knowledge or 
foresight with substantial certainty (or high likelihood) has been widely accepted as 
one of the bases of intention. 
 
 
3.4432 ‘Foresight with substantial certainty’ may be regarded as the most suitable 
interpretation of the term ‘calculated’ 
 
In fact, in relation to this tort, the idea of foresight with substantial certainty may be 
regarded as the most suitable interpretation of the term ‘calculated’ employed in 
Wilkinson v Downton, as long as the object of intention in Wilkinson can be clarified 
or reformulated. The object of intention is closely tied to the concept of intention as 
well as the possible constructions of the term ‘calculated’. Based upon the authorities 
reviewed in this chapter, the term ‘calculated’ could be construed as ‘desired’, having 
the consequence as its ‘purpose’, ‘foreseeing with substantial certainty (or sufficiently 
high likelihood)’, or ‘foreseeing the likelihood’ of the consequence.183 However, as 
analysed in section 3.22, ‘The object of intention’, if we consider the object of 
intention of this tort to be ‘physical harm’, these constructions may all seem 
implausible, because physical harm or ‘nervous shock injury’ caused by a practical 
joke was hardly foreseeable.184 Lunney has argued that what Wright J actually had in 
mind was ‘calculated to cause physical pain’.185 Given that the object of intention of 
this tort can be taken as ‘severe mental or emotional distress’ (as stated in Rhodes v 
OPO), ‘physical pain’, or even ‘grave effects’ (as stated in Wilkinson v Downton), 
these above-mentioned constructions would all be acceptable. Admittedly, no one 
knows what was actually in Downton’s mind. It may have been his purpose to bring 
about (severe) emotional distress; or perhaps he did not desire to bring about any harm, 
but he could be taken to have foreseen the occurrence of (severe) emotional distress as 
substantially certain or as merely likely.   
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A closer insight can be gained, however by examining the other words used by Wright 
J. First of all, although ‘calculated’ could be interpreted as ‘desired’ or having the 
consequence as the actor’s ‘purpose’, Wright J may not have been particularly inclined 
to this view, since he explicitly expressed that ‘no malicious purpose to cause the harm 
which was caused nor any motive of spite is imputed to the defendant’.186 Furthermore, 
when Wright J imputed intention, he stated that ‘[i]t is difficult to imagine that such a 
statement, made suddenly and with apparent seriousness, could fail to produce grave 
effects under the circumstances upon any but an exceptionally indifferent person’.187 
This statement in effect reflects the ‘substantial certainty’ or the ‘foresight with 
substantial certainty’ of the disputed consequences. Because it is so sufficiently likely, 
almost certain, that grave effects would be caused, it becomes ‘difficult to imagine that 
such a statement…could fail’ to produce this effect. On the other hand, if Wright J 
merely considered the disputed consequences to be ‘likely’ to occur or ‘foreseen as 
likely’, he is unlikely to have used this formulation, because the term ‘likely’ implies 
the possibility of both the occurrence and non-occurrence of the consequences at issue. 
Moreover, in Wilkinson v Downton, Wright J imputed intention on the basis of 
‘whether the defendant’s act was so plainly calculated to produce some effect of the 
kind which was produced’.188  If ‘calculated’ is construed as ‘likely’, ‘foreseen as 
likely’, or ‘foreseeable’, the boundary between the imputed intention and negligence 
would become blurred.189  
 
In brief, where the object of intention can be taken as ‘severe mental or emotional 
distress’, ‘physical pain’, or even ‘grave effects’, the three constructions of 
‘calculated’: 1) ‘desired’ or having the consequence as the actor’s ‘purpose’; 2) 
‘foreseeing with substantial certainty’; or 3) ‘foreseeing the likelihood’ of the 
consequence should all be acceptable. However, the construction of ‘(foreseeing) with 
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substantial certainty’ is perhaps more consistent with the reasoning of Wright J’s 
judgment in Wilkinson v Downton.  
 
 
3.4433 Should ‘substantial certainty’ and ‘actual foresight’ be required? 
 
Finally, if the idea of foresight with substantial certainty can be accepted as one basis 
of intention in relation to this tort, what does this actually entail? Should the elements 
of ‘substantial certainty’ and ‘actual foresight’ be required for this notion? As regards 
the first point, in most of the authorities reviewed, a high degree of likelihood or 
foreseeability – e.g. ‘sufficient’ likelihood, ‘clear’ or ‘obvious’ foreseeability – is 
required, whilst ‘substantial certainty’ is required in some. Nevertheless, substantial 
certainty, rather than a high degree of possibility or foreseeability, should be required. 
The rationale for extending the concept of intention to the idea of foresight or 
knowledge lies in the ‘inevitability of the disputed consequence to be caused by one’s 
deliberate act’, as well as in the actor’s ‘having options, choosing or accepting the 
course which would inevitably lead to the occurrence of the consequence’. Thus the 
likelihood of the occurrence of the disputed consequence should be close to certain. 
Otherwise, there would be no inevitability and the actor would have no option in regard 
to the course which would inevitably lead to the occurrence of the consequence. 
Admittedly, in practice it may not be so easy to draw the boundary between 
‘substantially certain’ and ‘sufficiently likely’, so it can be observed that many courts 
have adopted high degree of likelihood or foreseeability instead of substantial certainty. 
Yet, noticeably, even in some cases where the court merely required a high degree of 
likelihood or foreseeability, other wordings employed there could nonetheless be 
construed as requiring the likelihood or foreseeability to be as high as to be almost 
certain. For example, in Wong v Parkside Health NHS Trust, it was held that the 
‘degree of harm is sufficiently likely to result that the defendant cannot be heard to say 
that he did not “mean” it to do so’;190 in  C v D, SBA, Mr Justice Field said that 
‘psychiatric injury is sufficiently likely to result from the conduct complained for the 
                                                                                                                          




defendant not to be heard to say that he did not “mean” it’;191 in Rhodes v OPO and 
ABC v WH 2000 Ltd v William Whillock, it was held that the ‘consequences or potential 
consequences are so obvious that the perpetrator cannot realistically say that those 
consequences were unintended’.192 Formulations such as ‘cannot be heard to say that 
he did not “mean” it’, similar to ‘difficult to imagine that such a statement…could fail’ 
as employed in Wilkinson, simply reflect the substantial certainty of the disputed 
consequence. If the consequence was not foreseen as almost certain to follow, or, in 
other words, if there was still some possibility that the consequence would not occur, 
there is no reason why the actor ‘cannot be heard to say that he did not “mean” it’. 
Notwithstanding references to a requirement for a high degree of likelihood or 
foreseeability therefore discussion elsewhere in these cases reflects a need for 
‘substantial certainty’. 
 
The second point is whether ‘actual foresight’ should be required, given that the notion 
of foresight with substantial certainty can be accepted as one basis of intention in 
relation to this tort. As discussed, if the ground for the concept of intention to extend 
to foresight with substantial certainty lies in the actor’s ‘having options, choosing or 
accepting the course which would inevitably lead to the occurrence of the 
consequence’, actual foresight should be an indispensable element in theory. However, 
the requirement of actual or subjective foresight may not work in practice. The proof 
can be found in the case law discussed above. In none of these cases was actual or 
subjective knowledge/foresight a categorical requirement (for imputing intention). The 
underlying reason may be that, in practice, the boundary between ‘actual foresight’, 
‘inferred/constructive foresight’, and ‘foreseeability’ (what can be foreseen 
objectively by ordinary and reasonable people) appears unclear. Due to the 
impossibility of looking into the defendant’s mind, in most cases the actual 
intention/foresight must be inferred from the defendant’s conduct and surrounding 
context. In addition, the inference of intention/foresight may take into account 
‘foreseeability’ (whether the disputed consequence can be foreseen objectively by 
ordinary and reasonable people). Where direct evidence (e.g. the actor’s own 
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statements) is absent, it is virtually impossible for courts to ascertain an actor’s 
knowledge or foresight without looking also at the actor’s conduct, the surrounding 
context, as well as the test of foreseeability. Therefore, it seems unavoidable that in 
practice most courts would adopt the notion of constructive knowledge/foresight, 
foreseeability, or objective likelihood, rather than categorically require actual or 
subjective knowledge/foresight. In sum, constructive knowledge or foresight should 





3.51 Basic definition 
 
The notion of recklessness denotes a frame of mind which is usually bracketed with 
intention.193 Recklessness, in its core sense, is a mental state in which people engage 
in conduct deliberately, having foreseen the possible consequences or risks of their 
actions but nonetheless going ahead, without any definite purpose or desire to bring 
the consequences about or to actualise the risks.194 As they have foreseen, in an actual 
or constructive manner, the consequences/risks of their conducts, but still opt to engage 
in them regardless, their indifference to the consequences/risks is disclosed. However, 
following a deliberate course of conduct and tolerating the risks would not in a 
straightforward way suffice for recklessness, 195  as in this modern world risks are 
inherent in almost every kind of conduct. To be taken as recklessness, the risks that 
are run require to be unreasonable and unbalanced.196 According to the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts §2, such unreasonableness or imbalance may be found when the 
magnitude of the foreseen risks are disproportionately greater compared to the burden 
of precaution. The greater the imbalance, the more likely it is that the actor’s conduct 
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would be held to be reckless.197 Recklessness (or a reckless act) has been defined in 
the Restatement (Third) of Torts §2 as applying where ‘(a) the person knows of the 
risk of harm created by the conduct or knows facts that make the risk obvious to 
another in the person’s situation, and (b) the precaution that would eliminate or reduce 
the risk involves burdens that are so slight relative to the magnitude of the risk as to 
render the person’s failure to adopt the precaution a demonstration of the person’s 
indifference to the risk’. 
 
 
3.52 Case law and analysis 
 
3.521 Case law 
 
The Court of Appeal in Wainwright v Home Office interpreted the term ‘wilfully done’, 
as  adopted in Wilkinson v Downton, as denoting an act which is either ‘done with the 
intention of causing harm’ or ‘done in circumstances where it was so likely that the 
harm would be incurred that an intention to produce harm has to be imputed’.198 It was 
emphasised that ‘[c]ertainly nothing less than recklessness would do’199 as well as that 
‘[t]he limiting factor to the “tort” is the intention to cause harm which harm is in fact 
then caused or recklessness as to whether that harm would be caused’.200 In the House 
of Lords, Lord Hoffmann agreed that the necessary intention was not established in 
this case. 201  Nevertheless, in respect of the intention needed for mere distress 
potentially to be actionable,202 he observed that the defendant must have conducted 
himself in a manner that the defendant ‘knew to be unjustifiable and intended to cause 
harm, or at least acted without caring whether he caused harm or not’. 203  These 
decisions point to recklessness playing a similar or equivalent role to that of intention, 
despite its being differentiated from intention.  
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In Austen v University of Wolverhampton, it was held that in establishing the existence 
of intention, it is sufficient for the claimant to show the damage was the ‘likely and 
foreseeable consequence’ of the defendant’s deliberate conduct.204 This appears to 
suggest that, evidentially speaking, proving the existence of the actor’s recklessness is 
sufficient for the finding of intention. 
 
In C v D, SBA, there were said to be three different ways in which intention might be 
imputed.  The first was conduct ‘calculated to cause psychiatric harm’; the second was 
conduct from which ‘psychiatric injury is sufficiently likely to result’; and the third 
was where the defendant was ‘reckless as to whether he caused psychiatric harm’.205 
And Field J held in this case that psychiatric injury to the claimant ‘was not sufficiently 
likely for the necessary intention to cause harm to be imputed on the first two bases of 
imputation. However, I am satisfied that [the defendant]…was reckless as to whether 
he caused psychiatric injury to C…’.206 Therefore, the defendant was held liable on the 
basis of the principle of Wilkinson v Downtown.207 Clearly the presence of recklessness 
was, in this decision, taken as having met the required mental element of the Wilkinson 
tort. 
 
There are also cases from Canada and from Australia in relation to this tort, where the 
intention or calculation on the part of the defendant can be construed as encompassing 
recklessness or reckless indifference. In Butler v Newfoundland (Workers’ 
Compensation Commission), a Canadian case, when analysing the claims based upon 
‘intentional infliction of mental suffering’, Russell J found (imputed) the ‘requisite 
intention’ on the basis of a ‘reckless disregard as to whether or not mental suffering 
would ensue from these acts’.208 Moreover, in an Australian case, Carrier v Bonham, 
whilst dissecting the Wilkinson tort, McPherson JA defined the term ‘calculated’ as 
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either ‘subjectively contemplated and intended’ or ‘objectively likely to happen’.209 
Following this decision, in Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Naidu, Spigelman CJ advised 
that the expression of ‘calculated’ can be construed as a ‘subjective, actual, conscious 
desire to bring about a specific result’, or ‘what is likely, perhaps overwhelmingly 
likely, to occur considered objectively’, even including ‘reckless indifference to a 
result’.210 In JMD v GJH, also an Australian case, Davis DCJ adopted the criteria 
derived from Wilkinson v Downton and held the defendant liable, on the basis of that 
either ‘the defendant wilfully committed a series of acts calculated to cause the 
plaintiff harm’, or at least demonstrated a ‘reckless indifference’ to the result, since 
the defendant’s conduct was ‘objectively likely to cause harm’. 211  Following this 
thread, when Rothman J proposed the requisite elements of the Wilkinson tort in Clavel 
v Savage, he included ‘reckless indifference’ in the element of ‘intention to cause 
physical or psychiatric harm’.212 
 
By contrast, in the two well-known Canadian cases reviewed above, Prinzo v Baycrest 
Centre for Geriatric Care and High Parklane Consulting Inc v Royal Group 
Technologies Ltd, when the court examined the prerequisites of the Wilkinson tort, the 
requirement of ‘calculated to produce harm’ was held as being met where ‘the actor 
desires to produce the consequences that follow from the act’ or where ‘the 
consequences are known to be substantially certain to follow’.213 It appears therefore 
that the notion of ‘recklessness’ or ‘reckless indifference’ is not regarded as one form 
of ‘calculation’. Noticeably, in Rhodes v OPO, although the majority interpreted the 
term ‘calculated’ as ‘likely to have an effect of the kind which was produced’,214 they 
did not take an expansive approach when reformulating the mental element of this tort. 
Namely, they expressly decided ‘not to include recklessness in the definition of the 
mental element’, because recklessness was not ‘a term used in Wilkinson v Downton 
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or Janvier v Sweeney’, and it might generate ‘problems of definition’.215 This stance 
has been followed in Brayshaw v Partners of Apsley Surgery & O’Brien, which is a 
case involving psychiatric harm (on the part of the claimant) caused by virtue of 
‘religious practices and religious doctrines imposed on her’ through a ‘locum 
doctor’.216 When considering the claim on the basis of the Wilkinson tort, or ‘the tort 
of inflicting intentional harm’, Mr Justice Spencer regarded the defendant as having 
no ‘requisite intention to cause harm’, and therefore dismissed this claim.217 Notably, 
before he struck out this claim, he reaffirmed the three elements reformulated in 
Rhodes v OPO, stating that ‘recklessness is insufficient’218 (for the mental element to 
be met).  
 
 
3.522 A brief summary of the case law 
 
These decisions indicate that many of the Wilkinson authorities, in England and 
beyond, recognised or accepted that the umbrella of intention can extend to the notion 
of recklessness, or at least that reckless conduct should be treated alongside intentional 
conduct. In contrast, there are also cases where recklessness was considered to be 
incapable of constituting the level of ‘calculation’ or ‘intention’ required in this tort; 
nor, in these cases, was recklessness deemed as equivalent to intention. On the other 
hand, the Restatement (Third) of Torts puts recklessness in a position distinct from 
intention,219 but makes both relevant to the same rule in relation to the specific tort of 
‘Infliction of Emotional Harm’.220 In the final section of this chapter, the issues of 
whether recklessness can be incorporated into the structure of intention, or whether 
reckless conduct should be attached with the same legal effect (or liability) as 
intentional, will be further discussed. Prior to that discussion, in order to clarify the 
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essence of recklessness, it is necessary to explore the boundary between intention and 
recklessness, as well as the boundary between recklessness and negligence. 
 
 
3.53 The boundary between intention and recklessness 
 
Prior to distinguishing intention from recklessness, what the two notions have in 
common should be mentioned. An intentional tort/delict always begins with a 
deliberate act. This feature is shared by reckless conduct, which denotes the actor’s 
deliberate engagement in an unreasonable/unbalanced risk-taking act. However, this 
similarity may not be so remarkable, as a deliberate act is also a shared feature in many 
negligence cases. In contrast, where the focus is placed on the mental state in relation 
to the incurred consequence, recklessness is more readily distinguished from intention. 
First of all, where intention is based upon purpose (ends or means), bringing about the 
consequence at issue should be an end in itself (the ultimate purpose of the actor’s 
original plan), or at least a necessary condition to his or her ultimate purpose.221 On the 
other hand, in the mind-set of a reckless actor, the consequence incurred is not 
something that he or she has as a purpose or plans to bring about. Rather, it is merely 
a side-effect or by-product foreseen by him while he deliberately engages in his 
original plan. 
 
As to the borderline between the mental states of intention based upon knowledge 
(foresight with substantial certainty of the consequence) and recklessness, the degree 
of likelihood of the occurrence of consequence is highly important. Foresight (in an 
actual or constructive manner) of the side-effect but still deliberately engaging in the 
original plan is a shared character of both of them. However, for intention based upon 
knowledge the perceived degree of likelihood of the occurrence of consequence should 
be ‘certainty’ or ‘close to certainty’, whilst for recklessness mere possibility or 
probability suffices. This distinction has been unequivocally adopted in the wordings 
                                                                                                                          




of Restatement (Third) of Torts §1 and §2,222 which seems to be warranted and can be 
explained as follows.  
 
As discussed in the previous section, the extension of the construct of intention to 
cover intention based upon knowledge, in the sense of foresight with substantial 
certainty of the consequence (side-effect), can be justified by the inseparable or 
inevitable link between the deliberate conduct and the foreseen consequence and the 
actor’s choosing the course which would inevitably lead to the occurrence of the 
disputed consequence. 223 The inseparability or inevitability between the deliberate 
conduct and the foreseen consequence lies in the fact that, pursuant to common sense, 
the consequence (side-effect) is foreseen as a substantially certain accompaniment of 
the deliberate conduct. There is no way that the actor can complete his conduct without 
also bringing about the consequence. And as the consequence is foreseen as 
substantially certain and inevitable in common sense terms, the actor should be taken 
as having a choice between the occurrence and the non-occurrence of the result. In 
other words, the element of substantial certainty is closely tied to ‘inevitability’, 
‘options of different courses’ and ‘choice (or acceptance)’. The feature of ‘choice’ 
displays the actor’s personality, and thus assimilates him/her to an actor with intention. 
In contrast, in cases where the consequence is merely foreseen as possible or probable 
rather than as substantially or almost certain (to happen), no one can be sure of its 
occurrence or non-occurrence. There exists no ‘inseparability’ or ‘inevitability’ 
between the deliberate conduct and the consequence that actually results. Since the 
actor does not have a choice between the occurrence and the non-occurrence of the 
consequence, he/she cannot be taken as having made a ‘choice’ (in relation to the 
resulted consequence). Therefore, despite having foreseen the risks, the actor’s 
conduct could at most be deemed as ‘risk-taking’ instead of ‘intentional’. 
 
It is thus clear that the degree of likelihood of the occurrence of consequence 
determines the nature of the conduct – either having a choice between the occurrence 
and the non-occurrence of the consequence, or mere risk-taking. And it is this 
                                                                                                                          
222 Restatement (Third) of Torts §1 (2010) (n 40); Restatement (Third) of Torts §2 (2010) (n 195). 




distinctive nature of having a ‘choice (between different results)’ or ‘risk-taking’ 
which differentiates intention from recklessness, and pushes the notion of ‘foresight 
with substantial certainty’ towards intention rather than recklessness. 
 
Although this distinction is useful, it should be reiterated that some courts have chosen 
to employ terms such as ‘sufficiently likely’, ‘clearly foreseeable’, or ‘so likely’, 
instead of ‘foreseen as substantially certain’.224 The underlying reason might be that in 
the modern industrialised world the borderline between ‘certain’ and ‘sufficiently 
likely’ (or ‘clearly foreseeable’) is difficult to draw,225 and it is increasingly rare that 
the occurrence or non-occurrence of a result can be guaranteed as absolutely ‘certain’. 
Thus the adoption of the terms (‘sufficiently likely’, ‘clearly foreseeable’, or ‘so likely’) 
could in some cases add room for manoeuvre. However, this looser approach may blur 
the boundary between foresight with substantial certainty and recklessness, obscuring 
the definitions of intention and recklessness, since it avoids the distinction between 
having a ‘choice (between the occurrence and the non-occurrence of the consequence)’ 
and ‘risk-taking’. In order to maintain the boundary between intention and recklessness, 
despite practical difficulties, the element of ‘substantial certainty’ should still be 
required when establishing an intention (based upon knowledge).226 
 
 
3.54 The boundary between recklessness and negligence 
 
Though from a legal perspective recklessness can be deemed as occupying an 
intermediate position between intention and negligence, for the non-lawyer the notion 
of recklessness may be closer to negligence, as the literal distinction between 
recklessness and negligence seems unclear. In ordinary language, the term 
recklessness appears synonymous with carelessness, and carelessness can be 
                                                                                                                          
224 See sections 3.42 and 3.4433. 
225 According to Finnis, the distinction drawn between ‘highly probable’ and ‘virtually certain’ 
consequences can be ‘tenuous and artificial’. See Finnis (n 75) at 184; also see Duff (n 89) 96. 
226 It can be observed that, although certain decisions have required only a high degree of likelihood or 
foreseeability, other wordings employed in these cases nonetheless reflect the sense of ‘substantial 




employed for (inadvertent) negligence.227 These definitional complexities are likewise 
to be discerned in Cane’s words, which depict negligence as ‘failure to take reasonable 
care to avoid causing harm to others’,228 and recklessness as ‘failure to care, as the 
normal person would, about the risk that others may suffer harm as a result of one’s 
conduct’.229 In Cane’s analysis, it appears that the non-compliance with some sort of 
standard of conduct should be the shared token of negligence and recklessness; or, in 
other words, both indicate the breach of some kind of duty, either the duty to take care 
or the duty to care. In addition, in both circumstances, exercising a balance or 
examining the element of reasonableness would be of importance.230  Usually the 
unreasonableness or imbalance in cases regarding recklessness would be greater than 
that observed in ordinary negligence cases.231 
 
Despite certain parallels between negligence and recklessness, there may exist 
important points of difference. If we take a closer look at Cane’s words and compare 
the ‘failure to take reasonable care’ with ‘failure to care’, we might gain some sense 
that the latter is indicative of the actor’s awareness of the risks but lack of care about 
them; the former implies not paying attention or not taking precautions, where the 
actor’s knowledge or unawareness is not of great significance. This view is close to 
the position adopted by the Restatement (Third) of Torts §2 and §3. According to the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts §3, negligence is defined as ‘not exercis[ing] reasonable 
                                                                                                                          
227 Williams (n 173) 55. It is also stated that ‘carelessness assumes the legal quality of negligence’ in 
Donoghue v Stevenson 1932 SC (HL) 31 at 70 per Lord Macmillan: ‘[t]he law takes no cognizance of 
carelessness in the abstract. It concerns itself with carelessness only where there is a duty to take care 
and where failure in that duty has caused damage. In such circumstances carelessness assumes the 
legal quality of negligence, and entails the consequences in law of negligence.’ 
228 Cane (n 35) at 537. 
229 ibid. 
230 As mentioned, mere risk-taking cannot directly be equated with recklessness. There must be some 
unreasonableness or imbalance in the conduct or in the relation between the conduct and the incurred 
risks or consequence. With regard to negligence, the scope of duty is determined by reference to: 
‘foreseeability’, ‘a relationship of proximity’, and the principle of ‘fair, just and reasonable’. See 
Donoghue v Stevenson (n 227); Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605. On the other side 
of the Atlantic, the American Restatement (Third) of Torts §3 defines negligence as ‘not exercis[ing] 
reasonable care’. As to what can be taken as the absence of reasonable care, three major elements should 
be considered: 1) the ‘foreseeable likelihood’ of the conduct resulting in harm, 2) ‘foreseeable severity’ 
of the ensuing harm, and 3) the ‘burden of precautions’. The fundamental theory in ascertaining 
negligence is to balance the risks against the benefits. Whilst the former represents the possible harm 
engendered by the wrongdoer’s act, the latter is the advantages obtained by the wrongdoer when the 
precautions are omitted or refrained. See Restatement (Third) of Torts §3 (2010) Comments d and e. 




care under all the circumstances’,232 and ‘it is the person’s failure to appreciate the risk 
that mainly constitutes the person’s departure from reasonable care’.233 In other words, 
in many negligence cases, the actors may not have actually known or foreseen the risks 
at issue,234 though this subjective absence of awareness of risks has not been assumed 
as a precondition of negligence.235 As the actor’s mental state is rarely the focus of 
negligence,236 the law concerns more about the (actor’s) failure to conform to a certain 
standard of conduct specified in law. Opposite to this, as ‘unreasonable risk-taking’ 
properly depicts the nature of reckless conduct, theoretically speaking the actor’s 
having actually known or foreseen the risks should be a necessary condition to be met 
prior to the finding of recklessness.237 
 
Although some differences between recklessness and negligence can be observed in 
respect of ‘actual knowledge/foresight of the risks’, the boundary between them is far 
from clear. As mentioned, there is no assumption that a negligent actor must have 
failed to advert to the risk.238 In other words, in many cases negligent actors may have 
actually known or foreseen the risks, as do reckless actors. More importantly, the 
borderline between actual knowledge/foresight and constructive knowledge/foresight 
(or even foreseeability) is significantly blurred, and the requirement of actual or 
subjective knowledge/foresight may not work in practice. As analysed in the previous 
section,239 in order to reach a judgment as regards the actual knowledge of risks on the 
part of the actor, it seems inevitable that we must resort to the actor’s conduct or the 
contextual circumstances,240 or appeal to another judgment as to whether a reasonable 
person in the position of the actor would have foreseen the risks. And this question is 
                                                                                                                          
232 Restatement (Third) of Torts §3 (2010) (n 230). 
233 Restatement (Third) of Torts §2 (2010) (n 195) Comment c. 
234 ‘In a significant number of cases, however, the actor’s alleged negligence consists of an inattentive 
failure to perceive or appreciate the risk involved in the actor’s conduct.’ See Restatement (Third) of 
Torts §3 (2010) (n 230) Comment k. 
235 ibid. 
236 See Cane (n 35) at 537, ‘[s]ince tortious negligence involves no mental state…’. 
237 Recklessness does require the actual knowledge of risks or of the relevant facts which would 
render the risks obvious to other people in the wrongdoer’s situation. See Restatement (Third) of Torts 
§2 (2010) (n 195) Comment c. 
238 Restatement (Third) of Torts §3 (2010) (n 230) Comment k. 
239 See section 3.4433. 
240 For example, it is commented in the Restatement that the ‘obviousness of the danger’ could serve 
to underpin ‘an inference of the person’s knowledge’, or ‘a finding of recklessness’. See Restatement 




not too much different from asking whether a certain occurrence ‘may reasonably and 
probably be anticipated’ to ensue provided that ‘the duty is not observed’241 – the 
formula of foreseeability in cases of negligence. In brief, the feature of ‘actual 
knowledge/foresight’ may not serve adequately to distinguish recklessness from 
negligence. Also, in cases regarding recklessness, constructive knowledge or foresight 
(of risks) should be accepted along with actual knowledge or foresight. 
 
 
3.6 The appropriate mental element for this tort  
 
3.61 Fundamental considerations 
 
From the discussion above, three possibilities are to be considered when constituting 
the appropriate mental element for this tort/delict: 1) intention based upon purpose 
(ends or means); 2) intention based on knowledge (or foresight with substantial 
certainty); 3) recklessness. In considering which should be selected, the prime 
consideration is the function that mental state serves for this specific tort/delict. To this 
end the structure and prerequisites of both intentionally and negligently inflicted 
mental harm in two different models might usefully be considered: the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts and the Scottish Law Commission Report on Damages for Psychiatric 
Injury. The judgments in Rhodes v OPO will also be taken into account, in order to 
clarify the object and the role of this mental element.  
 
 
3.62 The structure of Restatement (Third) of Torts §46 and §47 
 
The Restatement (Third) of Torts §46 provides the basis of liability for ‘non-
negligently’ incurred emotional harm, in accordance with which ‘[a]n actor who by 
extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional 
harm to another is subject to liability for that emotional harm and, if the emotional 
                                                                                                                          




harm causes bodily harm, also for the bodily harm’.242 It can be observed from the text 
that the mental state stipulated here includes intention and recklessness, and according 
to the Restatement (Third) of Torts §1, the former denotes either the intention based 
upon purpose or the intention based upon foresight with substantial certainty.243 It is 
also clear from the text that the object of the mental state should be ‘severe emotional 
harm’; namely, the conduct of the actor is seen as intentional or reckless in relation to 
the ‘severe emotional harm’. Compared to this, the Restatement (Third) of Torts §47 
provides for liability for negligently caused emotional harm arising from two situations: 
liability can only be attached in circumstances where the negligent conduct ‘(a) places 
the other in danger of immediate bodily harm and the emotional harm results from the 
danger’; or ‘(b) occurs in the course of specified categories of activities, undertakings, 
or relationships in which negligent conduct is especially likely to cause serious 




3.63 Conclusions drawn from Restatement (Third) of Torts §46 and §47 
 
What light is shed from the review of Restatement (Third) of Torts §46 and §47? 
Firstly, §46 takes an expansive position with regard to the scienter element of this 
wrong, incorporating recklessness along with intention. Secondly, in addition to the 
mental element, under §46, the wrongdoer’s conduct must be extreme and outrageous, 
which can be taken as the ‘central’ requirement of this tort246  and is difficult to 
satisfy.247 Furthermore, in terms of the threshold for severity of harm, §46 asks for 
severe emotional harm, whilst §47 requires serious emotional harm, and the threshold 
of severe emotional harm seems to be higher than that of serious emotional harm, or 
at least equivalent to it.248 Fourthly, §46 and §47 appear to be related but distinctive 
                                                                                                                          
242 Restatement (Third) of Torts §46 (2012) (n 122). 
243 Restatement (Third) of Torts §1 (2010) (n 40). 
244 Restatement (Third) of Torts §47 (2012). 
245 ibid. 
246 Restatement (Third) of Torts §46 (2012) (n 122) Reporters’ Note on Comment h. 
247 The ‘extreme and outrageous’ conduct should be an act going ‘beyond the bounds of human 
decency’ and ‘regarded as intolerable in a civilised community’. See ibid Comment d. 




wrongs, as their requirements of mental state, thresholds of harm, and other 
prerequisites are differently stated. If the plaintiff cannot establish liability under §46, 
in order to obtain compensation pursuant to §47, other independent legal obstacles 
must be surmounted apart from substantiation of elements of negligence – such as the 
two circumstantial conditions stipulated in §47.249 
 
In the light of these four points, it is arguable that  the scienter element of Restatement 
(Third) of Torts §46 does not play a significant and differentiating role in this wrong.250 
Though the culpability of the actor in terms of §46 may be graver than that in terms of 
§47, the threshold of harm in the former is higher than or identical with that in the 
latter.251 Despite there being no need for the plaintiff to substantiate (either of) the two 
circumstances required in §47, the onus of proving ‘extreme and outrageous conduct’ 
in §46 is sufficiently burdensome. In other words, the existence of these heavy legal 
burdens lessens the role that a more culpable mental state could otherwise have played, 
rendering it unimportant. This assumption in a sense justifies why the scienter element 
of §46 can be so expansive. If a certain (scienter) element serves a great function or 
bring about great changes – e.g. the ‘independent’ or ‘ancillary’ function in Cane’s 
words,252 in order to preserve stability and fairness of law, it should be precisely 
circumscribed. Namely, this (scienter) element should be clearly even strictly defined 
given that it could make alterations or grant recovery which otherwise would not have 
been admitted by law,253 as ‘more extensive recovery for loss suffered is justified by 
the more stringent criteria to be satisfied before imposing liability’254 or ‘[a] high 
degree of blameworthiness is called for, because intention serves as the factor which 
justifies imposing liability on the defendant for loss caused by a wrong otherwise not 
                                                                                                                          
249 ‘[A] person who cannot recover for intentional infliction of emotional harm usually faces 
substantial obstacles to recovering on a negligence theory’. See ibid Comment h. 
250 In fact this assumption has been expressly admitted by the Reporters of the Restatement, please see 
ibid Reporters’ Note on Comment h. 
251 Certainly, when comparing the threshold of harm, in addition to culpability, the prerequisites of 
Restatement (Third) of Torts §47 should also be taken into account. For instance, under the situation 
(a) of §47, a threat to physical safety (‘immediate bodily harm’) has been imposed upon the claimant. 
See Restatement (Third) of Torts §47 (2012) (n 244). 
252 See the analysis in section 3.65. 
253 Stilitz and Sales (n 53) at 430. 




actionable by the claimant against the defendant’.255 On the other hand, if the presence 
of the scienter element of §46 does not alleviate any other heavy onus required in §46, 
it could be more expansive. Or, at least, its being expansive would be less problematic. 
And the Restatement (Third) of Torts §46 is indeed framed in this manner, the scienter 




3.64 The proposals from the Scottish Law Commission 
 
The Scottish Law Commission’s Report on Damages for Psychiatric Injury257 will be 
briefly considered here. The draft Bill contained in the Report was not in the end taken 
up,258 but the legal framework suggested is significantly different from that contained 
in the Restatement (Third) of Torts §46 and §47, and merits analysis. The SLC Report 
advocated legislation to replace the existing legal rules pertinent to recovery of 
damages for psychiatric injury.259 The proposed Bill employed the term ‘mental harm’ 
as the ‘generic term’, covering any harm done to a person’s ‘mental state, mental 
functioning or well-being’.260 And the general restrictions contained in the statutory 
scheme precluded recovery in circumstances where ‘the mental harm results from the 
normal stresses or vicissitudes of life or the life that the victim leads’; or ‘from 
bereavements or other losses of a type which a person can reasonably expect to suffer 
in the course of his or her life’.261 In other words, only mental harm resulting from 
abnormal conditions of life or from losses not generally expected in life was potentially 
eligible for compensation.  
 
                                                                                                                          
255 OBG Ltd v Allan (n 182) at para 166 per Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead. 
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section 3.54. 
257 Scottish Law Commission, Damages for Psychiatric Injury (Scot Law Com No 196, 2004). This 
report will be referred to as SLC Report in the following discussions. 
258 The report was reviewed as part of a Scottish Government consultation in 2013, see 
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Apart from these general restrictions, where mental harm was not caused intentionally, 
the Scottish Law Commission recommended that the liability should not be imposed 
‘unless the mental harm amounts to a medically recognised mental disorder’, 262 
encompassing both ‘psychological as well as psychiatric disorders’.263 By contrast, in 
cases of intentional wrongdoing, the defender was to be held responsible for all of the 
intended mental harm, including ‘distress, anxiety, grief, anger etc’, which need not 
amount to a ‘medically recognised mental disorder’.264 The Scottish Law Commission 
was of the opinion that this differentiation between unintentional and intentional 
liability was compatible with the distinct manners in which the law of delict treated 
these two different categories of wrongful conduct.265 However, it provided no clear 
definition on what constitutes the concept of intention. 
 
In addition, in regard to foreseeability,266 the Scottish Law Commission proposed that 
‘the reasonable foreseeability test should apply in relation to unintentionally caused 
mental harm although there will be no liability unless the reasonably foreseeable 
mental harm amounts to a medically recognised mental disorder’.267 This might be 
taken to mean that, conversely, where mental harm is incurred by intentional conduct, 
the foreseeability test should not apply.268  The Scottish Law Commission did not 
clarify why the test of foreseeability was not applicable to intentionally inflicted 
mental harm. A possible reason might be that, in most of the cases, intended mental 
harm is the foreseen or foreseeable mental harm. Nevertheless, there are situations 
where the actually caused mental harm (e.g. recognised psychiatric illness) would be 
more serious than the intended or foreseen (foreseeable) mental harm (e.g. mere 
distress or significant emotional distress). In these situations, whether or not the test 
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263 ibid para 3.9. 
264 ibid para 3.7. 
265 ibid paras 3.7 and 3.31. 
266 According to the report, the foreseeability issue is whether or not ‘a person foresaw, or could 
reasonably have foreseen, at the time of the act causing the harm, that the act was likely to cause a 
person in the position of the victim to suffer such harm’. See ibid para 3.44. 
267 ibid para 3.32 (b). 
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3.65 The role and the construct of intention based on the SLC Report 
 
The SLC Report distinguished intentionally and negligently inflicted mental harm, but 
it applied the same general restriction to both.269 This approach in a sense differs from 
the models of Restatement (Third) of Torts §46 and §47, where distinct requirements 
have been set for intentionally and negligently inflicted emotional harm, as highlighted 
above. In the SLC framework, if the circumstances of the case did not come within the 
general restriction – in other words, the harm was such that ‘[a] person should 
reasonably be expected to endure [it] without seeking reparation’,270 then recovery 
might potentially be available. If the mental harm of the victim was caused by  
negligence, in addition to satisfying the preconditions to establish negligence, it was 
necessary to prove that the mental harm constituted ‘medically recognised mental 
disorder’.271 However, if intention was established that threshold did not have to be 
met,272 and lesser mental harm, including ‘distress’, ‘anxiety’, ‘grief’, or ‘anger’, might 
qualify for compensation.273 Furthermore, where intention to cause mental harm was 
established, the SLC appeared to indicate that the foreseeability test would no longer 
apply, suggesting that compensation might be payable even for unforeseeable mental 
harm.274 Therefore in contrast with the Restatement (Third) of Torts, the presence of 
intention played a significant role in the framework proposed by the SLC Report. 
 
                                                                                                                          
269 As analysed, the general restrictions in relation to recovery apply to the situations where ‘the 
mental harm results from the normal stresses or vicissitudes of life or the life that the victim leads’; or 
‘from bereavements or other losses of a type which a person can reasonably expect to suffer in the 
course of his or her life’. See ibid paras 3.22, 3.27 and 3.30. 
270 ibid para 3.30. 
271 ibid para 3.9. 
272 ibid para 3.7. 
273 Without doubt, the above-mentioned general restrictions still apply here. 




According to Cane, the functions or roles of tortious intention can be roughly divided 
into two sorts: the ‘independent’ function and the ‘ancillary’ function.275 The former 
operates ‘to justify the imposition of liability when there would be no liability in the 
absence of intention’, or to justify the imposition of ‘liability for types of harm which 
would not otherwise be actionable’.276 The latter signifies the function ‘to justify the 
awarding of remedies which would not be available in the absence of intention’,277 for 
instance to award punitive damages or to affect the rule of remoteness, making it more 
favourable to the plaintiff.278 In terms of this ‘ancillary’ function altering the rule of 
remoteness, in Wilkinson v Downton, Wright J appeared to be willing to grant recovery 
regardless of whether the plaintiff’s physical injury was foreseen/foreseeable or not.279 
It has also been commented that the concept of intention in the Wilkinson v Downton 
tort has been given a role by Canadian courts to justify compensation for unforeseeable 
psychiatric illness or physical harm incurred by intentional wrongdoing. 280  This 
‘ancillary’ function in a sense is also reflected in the Supreme Court’s dicta in Rhodes 
v OPO, where the required object of intention can be ‘severe emotional distress’ but 
the required consequence is ‘recognised psychiatric illness’. 281  As long as the 
defendant aims at causing ‘severe emotional distress’ or has foreseen it as substantially 
certain to occur, he or she should be liable for the resulted ‘recognised psychiatric 
illness’. And there appears to be no requirement that the ‘recognised psychiatric illness’ 
must be foreseeable. According to the majority of the Supreme Court, ‘[a] loose 
analogy may be drawn with the “egg shell skull” doctrine’, since ‘a person who 
actually intends to cause another to suffer severe mental or emotional distress (which 
should not be understated) bears the risk of legal liability if the deliberately inflicted 
severe distress causes the other to suffer a recognised psychiatric illness’.282 
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276 ibid at 546. 
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278 ibid at 547-548. 
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Downton (n 1) at 59. 
280 Réaume (n 48) at 542 and 549. 
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Returning to the SLC Report, it seems obvious that the framework proposed there 
envisaged that intention would exercise both an ‘independent’ and an ‘ancillary’ 
function, which could alter the legal status quo of cases completely. In the light of the 
principle that ‘more extensive recovery for loss suffered is justified by the more 
stringent criteria to be satisfied before imposing liability’,283 as well as the need to 
preserve the stability and fairness of law, the mental element at issue ought to be 
precisely circumscribed, given its potential to achieve significant change with regard 
to the existing framework. Therefore, taking into account the frameworks of both 
intentionally and negligently incurred mental harm provided in the SLC Report, the 
construct of intention should be a restricted one – at least it should not include the 
notion of recklessness.  
 
 
3.66 Conclusion – the construct of intention, after Rhodes 
 
This review of the structure and prerequisites of intentionally and negligently inflicted 
mental harm provided in both the Restatement (Third) of Torts and SLC Report shows 
that an expansive definition of the scienter element is acceptable, as long as it does not 
serve an ‘independent’ or an ‘ancillary’ function, or operate as one of the principal 
control devices within the delict/tort of intentionally inflicted mental harm. In contrast, 
a more clearly circumscribed definition is necessary if the construct of intention does 
serve such functions. For present purposes, the latter approach is more appropriate. In 
other words, intention is here required to perform an important differentiating role. 
Accordingly, the meaning of intention requires to be clearly circumscribed, as 
discussed further below. 
 
 
3.661 ‘Recklessness’ should be excluded 
 
First of all, recklessness should not be included within the construct of intention, nor 
should the same legal effect be attached to both reckless and intentional wrongdoing, 
                                                                                                                          




as submitted in the Restatement (Third) of Torts.284 The Supreme Court in Rhodes v 
OPO explicitly determined ‘not to include recklessness in the definition of the mental 
element’, since recklessness was not ‘a term used in Wilkinson v Downton or Janvier 
v Sweeney’, and it may bring about ‘problems of definition’.285 The borderline between 
recklessness and negligence in many situations is unclear even blurred. As analysed 
above, 286  the element of ‘actual knowledge/foresight of the risks’ cannot fully 
distinguish the notion of recklessness from that of negligence. Furthermore, the 
balancing of risk or examination of the element of reasonableness is significant to both 
recklessness and negligence cases, 287  which underlines the difficulties of 
distinguishing between them.288 As the notion of recklessness can often lie so close to 
negligence, it is not advisable to include recklessness into the construct of intention, 
or to assimilate in respect of legal effect intention and recklessness. Inclusion of 
recklessness would compromise the functionality of intention as one of the main 
control devices for this tort. In brief, recklessness should not be included in the 
construct of intention, and reckless infliction of mental harm is more appropriately 
addressed within the tort of negligently caused psychiatric injury.289 
 
 
3.662 ‘Foresight with substantial certainty’ should be included 
 
The remaining question, if recklessness is omitted, is what should remain within the 
restricted sense of intention? The most stringent standard would insist upon intention 
based upon purpose (ends or means), but is it more appropriate to include both the 
scienter of foresight with substantial certainty as well as purpose (ends or means)? 
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286 See section 3.54. 
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288 See ibid. A difference in essence may not exist. However, the magnitude of imbalance or 
unreasonableness found in cases regarding recklessness would generally be greater than that found in 
cases of negligence. 
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Different theoretical grounds for or against the inclusion of foresight with substantial 
certainty into the construct of intention have been investigated above,290 which should 
not be repeated here. Nonetheless, the essence of these arguments and the position of 
this thesis can be briefly summarised as follows: 
 
First of all, this thesis is inclined to agree with the view which supports the inclusion 
of foresight with substantial certainty in the construct of intention. Where an actor has 
foreseen (in an actual or constructive manner) some side-effects as substantially 
certain to happen, inseparably or inevitably linked to his or her own act, but 
nevertheless deliberately engages in this act, consciously choosing or accepting the 
course leading to the occurrence of the consequence, it seems more warranted to 
categorise this frame of mind as ‘intention/intentional’, rather than to place it under 
the head of ‘unintentional’, ‘negligent’, or ‘reckless’. 291  Because these theories 
regarding ‘foreseen as substantially certain’, ‘inseparably or inevitably brought about 
by one’s act’, and ‘having options, choosing or accepting the course which would 
inevitably lead to the occurrence of the consequence’ are general propositions in 
relation to conduct, knowledge or consciousness, consequences and the inevitability 
of consequences, there appears to be no reason why they cannot be applied in the area 
of tort.  
 
Secondly, the inclusion of the scienter of both the purpose (ends or means) and 
foresight with substantial certainty in the construct of intention would be compatible 
with judicial practice in relation to this tort. As explored above in section 3.42, 
knowledge/foresight with substantial certainty (or high likelihood) has been broadly 
recognised as a basis of intention, in both English and Commonwealth cases.292 
 
Thirdly, the notion of foresight with substantial certainty may be considered as the 
most suitable interpretation of the equivocal term ‘calculated’ employed in Wilkinson 
v Downton.293 This takes into account other comments by Wright J to the effect that 
                                                                                                                          
290 See section 3.44. 
291 See sections 3.442 and 3.443. 
292  See section 3.42.  




because grave effects were foreseen as substantially certain, it becomes ‘difficult to 
imagine that such a statement…could fail to produce grave effects’.294 
 
Fourthly, apart from the above arguments submitted previously, another reason to 
support the inclusion of ‘foresight with substantial certainty’ is that this formulation 
allows secondary victims to be dealt with on the basis of this tort. The position of 
secondary victims is investigated in Chapter 5. In this category, a third party who is 
the immediate target of the wrongdoer is always involved. The mental harm at issue 
would be inflicted upon the secondary victim, in an intentional manner, through his or 
her perception of the injury caused by the wrongdoer to the third party.295 The mental 
state on the part of the wrongdoer towards the secondary victim, in the light of the case 
law discussed in Chapter 5, can be characterised as an intention based upon knowledge 
(with substantial certainty or sufficiently high likelihood) – namely, the wrongdoer has 
known/foreseen the mental harm as ‘substantially certain’ to be inflicted upon the 
secondary victim, following from his or her primary wrongdoing.296 As a result, the 
notion of intention based upon ‘foresight with substantial certainty’ can be taken as an 
indispensable component of secondary victim claims in relation to this tort. 
 
Lastly, if ‘foresight with substantial certainty’ is to be included in the construct of 
intention, two points concerning ‘substantial certainty’ and ‘actual foresight’ should 
be reiterated. Firstly, in order to distinguish actors who ‘can choose or accept the 
course which would inevitably lead to the occurrence of the consequence’ from those 
who simply take risks, ‘substantial certainty’ should be required, despite practical 
difficulties in drawing boundaries between ‘substantial certain’ and ‘sufficiently 
likely’.297 As discussed, although some cases appear to have required merely a high 
degree of likelihood or foreseeability, other wordings featuring in those judgments – 
such as ‘cannot be heard to say that he did not “mean” it’ – still reflect the sense of 
‘substantial certainty’.298 
                                                                                                                          
294 Wilkinson v Downton (n 1) at 59 per Wright J. 
295 See Chapter 5, section 5.1. 
296 See Chapter 5, section 5.422. 
297 See section 3.4433. 
298 ibid. The cases reviewed for this point include Wong v Parkside Health NHS Trust (n 9); C v D, 





As to ‘actual knowledge or foresight’, as discussed, the categorical requirement of 
actual or subjective foresight may not be feasible in practice. Since direct evidence is 
almost invariably absent, it seems unavoidable that courts must resort to the actor’s 
conduct, contextual circumstances, and the test of what can be objectively foreseen by 
a reasonable person, to infer the actor’s actual or subjective knowledge or foresight.299 
On practical grounds it is warranted to accept the notion of constructive knowledge or 
foresight alongside that of actual knowledge or foresight.  
 
 
3.663 The current and potential function of intention in relation to this tort 
 
As explored, in Rhodes v OPO, the majority’s rephrasing of the object of intention as 
‘at least severe mental or emotional distress’, whilst maintaining ‘recognised 
psychiatric illness’ as the required threshold of consequence,300  can in a sense be 
construed as giving the mental element of this tort an ‘ancillary’ role,301 since there is 
no requirement that the resulted ‘recognised psychiatric illness’ must be foreseen or 
foreseeable.302 Yet the question as to whether, in future, a more important role is to be 
played by the mental element of this tort – namely, ‘to justify imposing tort liability 
for types of harm which would not otherwise be actionable’303 – still requires to be 
answered. This will be the core issue to be investigated in the next chapter. 
 
                                                                                                                          
299 ibid. 
300 Rhodes v OPO (n 16) at para 88 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
301 Regarding the ‘ancillary’ function of intention in tort, see Cane (n 35) at 547-548. 
302 See Rhodes v OPO (n 16) at paras 87-88 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson.  
303 The ‘independent’ function of intention in tort. See Cane (n 35) at 546. 
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Chapter 4 Issues Regarding Stand-alone Mental Harm 
 
 
The essential argument of this chapter is that, despite falling short of the traditional 
threshold of recognised psychiatric illness, the intentional and unjustifiable infliction 
of severe emotional distress, which is capable of constituting mental harm, should give 
rise to delictual liability. In this chapter, the author will firstly examine the traditional 
distinction between recognised psychiatric illness and mere emotional distress, to 
explore the legal ground for this distinction. Following the principles derived 
therefrom, the author will seek to delineate the boundary of mental harm as deviation 
from normal or trivial emotions. Arguably, this concept of mental harm can be 
differentiated from recognised psychiatric illness as well as from mere emotional 
distress. Despite functioning well in many cases, the categorical insistence on 
recognised psychiatric illness as the threshold of compensable damage may entail 
problems and inconsistencies. Whether or not this traditional threshold can to some 
extent be lowered will be explored following a review of relevant legal literature and 
case law. After this examination, if it is warranted that the traditional threshold in 
relation to this tort can be lowered to ‘mental harm’ or ‘severe/significant emotional 
distress’, the relevant criteria for finding ‘mental harm’ – namely, ‘Deviance’, 






This chapter aims to deal with one of the essential features of the tort of ‘intentionally 
inflicted mental harm’, namely mental harm suffered independently of an injury to any 
other of the pursuer’s protected rights or interests. For the sake of brevity, the term 
‘stand-alone mental harm’ is adopted here. ‘Mental harm’ has been employed by the 
Scottish Law Commission in its Report on Damages for Psychiatric Injury as a generic 
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term 1  for both intentionally inflicted cases as well as cases founded upon 
unintentional wrongdoing, though the two categories of cases are differentiated in 
respect of the threshold of liability.2 According to the Scottish Law Commission, 
mental harm can be denoted as ‘any harm to a person’s mental state, mental 
functioning or well-being whether or not the harm amounts to a medically recognised 
mental disorder.’3 Although it was adopted by the Scottish Law Commission as a 
generic term, the usage of ‘mental harm’ is rarely to be found in the case law. The 
reason lies possibly in the fact that, this area of delictual liability in the past was mostly 
identified by courts under the name of ‘nervous shock’,4 but nowadays in respect of 
‘psychiatric injury’ (or psychiatric damage/harm/illness/disorder). As regards mental 
harm suffered independently of any injury to the pursuer’s other protected rights or 
interests, the commonly used expressions in legal practice, especially in cases founded 
upon negligence, are pure psychiatric injury/damage/harm. For the sake of conceptual 
differentiation, these traditional expressions will be retained in discussions involving 
negligence cases pertinent to psychiatric injury/damage/harm. 
 
Although the term ‘nervous shock’ has been well used in the past,5  and is still 
employed to describe one of prerequisites for a successful claim for psychiatric injury 
or damage,6 the courts have come to appreciate that it is not the real subject of this 
sort of claim.7 Rather, nervous shock, defined by the House of Lords in Alcock v Chief 
Constable as ‘the sudden appreciation by sight or sound of a horrifying event, which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Scottish Law Commission, Damages for Psychiatric Injury (Scot Law Com No 196, 2004) para 3.8.  
It should be noted that the legal framework proposed in this Report was not taken up by the Scottish 
Parliament. A Scottish Government consultation (http://www.gov.scot/Publications/2013/12/7197/11) 
determined that what was proposed by the SLC would not represent an improvement on the current 
situation. However, among the responses to the consultation, Respondent 042 pointed out, in respect of 
intentional infliction of mental harm, that while the proposal allowed for recovery in respect of a 
tremendously wide range of emotional reactions, the only control mechanism was imprecise even vague, 
‘leaving much to the judicial imagination as to what a reasonable person can be expected to endure’. 
Further filters were required to rule out trivial or vexatious claims 
(http://www.gov.scot/Publications/2013/08/5509/downloads). In similar vein see D Nolan, ‘Reforming 
Liability for Psychiatric Injury in Scotland: A Recipe for Uncertainty?’ (2005) 68 MLR 983 at 985-986.  
2 Scottish Law Commission (n 1) paras 3.9-3.10. 
3 ibid para 3.8. 
4 On the history of liability for ‘nervous shock’, see H Teff, Causing Psychiatric and Emotional 
Harm: Reshaping the Boundaries of Legal Liability (2009) 43-56. 
5 McLoughlin v O’Brian [1983] 1 AC 410 at 418 per Lord Wilberforce. 
6 Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1992] 1 AC 310 at 400-401 per Lord Ackner. 
7 Page v Smith [1996] AC 155 at 189 per Lord Lloyd of Berwick. 
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violently agitates the mind’,8 is merely the means or the process, through which 
mental harm can be inflicted upon the victims or claimants. By contrast, what is at 
issue in awarding compensation is the enduring mental harm. In legal practice, mental 
harm has frequently been expressed in the form of emotional distress, or something 
more than that, a recognised (recognisable) psychiatric illness. The established rule in 
regard to pure psychiatric injury (damage or harm) is: in the law of negligence duty of 
care will not be recognised in relation solely to emotional distress, anxiety, grief, 
sorrow or any normal human bereavements. 9  Only a recognised or recognisable 




4.2 Emotional distress, mental harm, and recognised psychiatric illness 
 
4.21 The traditional distinction between emotional distress and recognised psychiatric 
illness 
 
As mentioned, in negligence cases related to pure psychiatric injury (damage or harm), 
current legal practice has drawn a well-established distinction between emotional 
distress and recognised/recognisable psychiatric illness. Whilst the former is worthy 
of sympathy, only the latter deserves compensation. This rule in principle also applies 
to cases involving intentionally inflicted mental harm, but may be less clear-cut therein. 
The following review explores the basis for this distinction both in negligently and 
intentionally inflicted mental harm cases. Several cases founded on negligence are 
worthy of review here because, apart from the fact that the traditional distinction drawn 
in them also applies to intentional cases, they in a sense shed light upon the boundary 
of mental harm, as well as upon the reasons why compensation for mere emotional 
distress should be rejected. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police (n 6) at 401 per Lord Ackner. 
9 Dulieu v White & Sons [1901] 2 KB 669 at 673 per Kennedy J; McLoughlin v O’Brian (n 5) at 431 
per Lord Bridge of Harwich; Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police (n 6) at 416-417 per 
Lord Oliver of Aylmerton. 
10 Page v Smith (n 7) at 189 per Lord Lloyd of Berwick; McLoughlin v O’Brian (n 5) at 431 per Lord 
Bridge of Harwich.  
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4.211 Negligently inflicted psychiatric injury/damage/harm: 
 
The contexts to which the negligence cases relate can broadly be divided into three 
different categories: 1) cases regarding primary victims; 2) cases regarding secondary 
victims; and 3) cases regarding stress (or mental harm) negligently caused in the work 
place. The distinction between primary and secondary victims in the realm of 
negligently caused psychiatric injury, as well as the relevant case law, is discussed 
further in Chapter 5.11 On the basis of the case law reviewed therein, it seems to be 
accepted that, despite being a fluid concept, ‘primary victim’ denotes a participant 
directly involved in the wrongdoing/accident.12 In contrast, ‘secondary victim’ can be 
taken as one who is a non-participant in a wrongdoing/accident, but merely as a 
witness, spectator or bystander.13 In addition to those who are directly involved, the 
category of primary victim is also capable of being extended to those ‘within the range 
of foreseeable physical injury (or danger)’, or, more controversially, to those who have 
found themselves the ‘unwitting cause’ of harm to another.14 In respect of the third 
category, the primary/secondary victim categorisation is plainly not relevant since the 
existence of duty on the part of the employer is uncontroversial, and guidance as to 
employers’ standard of care is found in the House of Lords decision in Barber v 
Somerset County Council.15 Issues remain, however, as to the level of harm that is 
compensable. 
 
Despite the contextual differences, the distinction between emotional distress and 
recognised psychiatric illness has been explicitly drawn in all of the three subdivisions: 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 See Chapter 5, section 5.11. 
12 See ibid. 
13 See ibid. 
14 See ibid. 
15 See Barber v Somerset County Council [2004] UKHL 13; [2004] 1 WLR 1089 at paras 5, 7, 10, 14 
and 15 per Lord Scott (dissenting); as well as at paras 65-68, and 71 per Lord Walker (agreed by the 
majority). See also the Court of Appeal decision ([2002] EWCA Civ 76; [2002] 2 All ER 1) given by 
Lady Justice Hale, in particular para 43. 
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1) Cases regarding primary victims: 
 
It was pointed out in Page v Smith, that ‘it is sometimes said that if the law were such 
as I believe it to be, the plaintiff would be able to recover damages for a fright. This is 
not so. Shock by itself is not the subject of compensation, any more than fear or grief 
or any other human emotion occasioned by the defendant’s negligent conduct. It is 
only when shock is followed by recognisable psychiatric illness that the defendant may 
be held liable’.16 
 
 
2)   Cases regarding secondary victims: 
 
Obviously the duty of care in negligence is not owed to the world as a whole. Nor 
should such duty, as regards pure psychiatric harm, be owed in respect of any 
emotional distress considered by the society as trivial or reasonable to be endured. In 
Bourhill v Young, involving a claim by a bystander of a road accident, Lord Porter 
reasoned that ‘[t]he driver of a car or vehicle, even though careless, is entitled to 
assume that the ordinary frequenter of the streets has sufficient fortitude to endure such 
incidents as may from time to time be expected to occur in them, including the noise 
of a collision and the sight of injury to others, and is not to be considered negligent 
towards one who does not possess the customary phlegm’.17 
 
In Dulieu v White & Sons, it was stated that ‘[t]he use of the epithet “mental” requires 
caution, in view of the undoubted rule that merely mental pain unaccompanied by any 
injury to the person cannot sustain an action of this kind.’18 
 
In Hinz v Berry Lord Denning MR said that ‘[i]n English law no damages are awarded 
for grief or sorrow caused by a person’s death. No damages are to be given for the 
worry about the children, or for the financial strain or stress, or the difficulties of 
adjusting to a new life. Damages are, however, recoverable for nervous shock, or, to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Page v Smith (n 7) at 189 per Lord Lloyd of Berwick. 
17 Bourhill v Young 1942 SC (HL) 78 at 98 per Lord Porter. 
18 Dulieu v White & Sons (n 9) at 673 per Kennedy J. 
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put it in medical terms, for any recognisable psychiatric illness caused by the breach 
of duty by the defendant’;19 and Lord Pearson suggested ‘that this lady is not only in 
a sad and depressed state…but something more than that: she has been and still is in a 
positively morbid state. There is a recognisable psychiatric illness’.20 
 
In McLoughlin v O’Brian Lord Bridge opined that ‘[t]he common law gives no 
damages for the emotional distress which any normal person experiences when 
someone he loves is killed or injured. Anxiety and depression are normal human 
emotions. Yet an anxiety neurosis or a reactive depression may be recognisable 
psychiatric illnesses, with or without psychosomatic symptoms. So, the first hurdle 
which a plaintiff claiming damages of the kind in question must surmount is to 
establish that he is suffering, not merely grief, distress or any other normal emotion, 
but a positive psychiatric illness. That is here not in issue.’21 
 
Lord Oliver, in Alcock v Chief Constable, stated that ‘[g]rief, sorrow, deprivation and 
the necessity for caring for loved ones who have suffered injury or misfortune must, I 
think, be considered as ordinary and inevitable incidents of life which, regardless of 
individual susceptibilities, must be sustained without compensation … to extend 
liability to cover injury in such cases would be to extend the law in a direction for 
which there is no pressing policy need and in which there is no logical stopping 
point.’22 
 
Lord Griffiths further explained in White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police 
that ‘[b]ereavement and grief are a part of the common condition of mankind which 
we will all endure at some time in our lives. It can be an appalling experience but it is 
different in kind from psychiatric illness and the law has never recognised it as a head 
of damage.’23 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Hinz v Berry [1970] 2 QB 40 at 42 per Lord Denning MR. 
20 ibid at 44 per Lord Pearson. 
21 McLoughlin v O’Brian (n 5) at 431 per Lord Bridge of Harwich. 
22 Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police (n 6) at 416 per Lord Oliver of Aylmerton. 
23 White (Frost) v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1999] 2 AC 455 at 465 per Lord 
Griffiths. 
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It seems obvious that, in the light of the dicta stated in the above cases, a distinction 
has been made between (recognised/recognisable) psychiatric illness and normal 
(ordinary/common) human emotions. 
 
 
3)   Cases regarding stress (or mental harm) negligently caused in work place: 
 
In Ward v Scotrail Railways Ltd, a Scottish Outer House case which was considered 
as founded upon negligence rather than upon intentional wrongdoing,24 Lord Reed 
reckoned that ‘[i]n the context of personal injury actions founded on negligence…it 
appears to be clear that emotional distress is not enough to found an action: the pursuer 
must have suffered physical injury. This may take the form of a recognisable 
psychiatric illness…’.25  
 
In Rorrison v West Lothian College, another Scottish Outer House case, Lord Reed 
elucidated that ‘[t]he action being based on negligence, the pursuer can recover only 
if she has sustained psychiatric injury in the form of a recognised psychiatric illness’;26 
‘Many if not all employees are liable to suffer those emotions…such as stress, anxiety, 
loss of confidence and low mood. To suffer such emotions from time to time, not least 
because of problems at work, is a normal part of human experience. It is only if they 
are liable to be suffered to such a pathological degree as to constitute a psychiatric 
disorder that a duty of care to protect against them can arise…’.27 
 
Similarly in Cunningham v Glasgow City Council, the aforesaid distinction between 
normal emotions and recognised psychiatric illness was restated: ‘[i]n support of this 
proposition, counsel referred to Angela Rorrison v West Lothian Council…Counsel 
submitted that it was well settled law that it was only in circumstances where the 
pursuer was liable to suffer stress, anxiety or other consequences to such a pathological 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Ward v Scotrail Railways Ltd 1999 SC 255 at 259 per Lord Reed. 
25 ibid at 259-260 per Lord Reed. 
26 Rorrison v West Lothian College 1999 Rep LR 102 at para 16-08 per Lord Reed. 
27 ibid at para 16-22 per Lord Reed. 
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degree as to constitute a psychiatric disorder that a duty of care could arise’.28  
 
In short, after reviewing the above cases, the established rule in the law of negligence 
is that: by contrast with recognised psychiatric illness, emotional distress (or grief, 
sorrow, stress, or anxiety) which belongs to normal human emotions without a 
pathological nature, or which is an ordinary condition of life that people usually 
experience and endure, is not regarded as recoverable where it occurs independently 
of another form of harm to the pursuer. 
 
 
4.212 Intentionally inflicted mental harm:   
 
Although the contexts of cases to be reviewed below are also different, all of them can 
be considered as authorities of relevance to this tort. 
 
In Khorasandjian v Bush, a case in effect involving harassment before the enactment 
of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, Dillon LJ advised that ‘[t]he injury for 
which damages were claimed in Wilkinson v Downton and Janvier v Sweeney was in 
both those cases described as “nervous shock”. On modern authorities in the law of 
negligence, that term is understood as referring to recognisable psychiatric illness with 
or without psychosomatic symptoms…It is distinguished from mere emotional 
distress.’29 
 
In Wong v Parkside Health NHS Trust, a case similarly involving harassment before 
1997, Lady Justice Hale explained that ‘[f]or the tort to be committed, as with any 
other action on the case, there has to be actual damage. The damage is physical harm 
or recognised psychiatric illness. The defendant must have intended to violate the 
claimant’s interest in his freedom from such harm.’30 It seems explicit that in this case 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Cunningham v Glasgow City Council [2008] CSOH 113 at para 6 per Lady Clark of Calton. 
29 Khorasandjian v Bush [1993] QB 727 at 736 per Dillon LJ. 
30 Wong v Parkside Health NHS Trust [2001] EWCA Civ 1721; [2003] 3 All ER 932 at para 12 per 
Lady Justice Hale. 
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alarm and emotional distress were differentiated from recognised psychiatric illness,31 
and only the latter was regarded actionable or recoverable. 
 
In Wainwright v Home Office, a case involving the inappropriate strip search by prison 
officers of a prisoner’s visitors, Lord Hoffmann reserved judgment as to whether 
compensation should be payable where ‘mere distress’ had been intentionally 
inflicted.32 However, the reasoning in that case appeared to leave it open, in the 
context of privacy issues, that liability might arise where a recognised psychiatric 
illness had been inflicted intentionally.33 
 
In Rhodes v OPO, the Supreme Court took the opportunity to review the prerequisites 
of the Wilkinson v Downton tort,34 and concluded that physical harm or recognised 
psychiatric illness is required for the consequence element of this tort.35 Although 
Lord Neuberger argued that ‘significant distress’ might be actionable in qualified 
circumstances,36 the majority held the line that in cases of intentionally inflicted 
mental harm, recognised psychiatric illness is an element which must be established 
before a claimant could obtain compensation. This distinction or limitation is said to 
‘have been imposed in cases of negligence as a matter of policy, and it has been 
justified in a number of cases on the ground that grief and distress are part of normal 
life, whereas psychiatric illness is not’.37 
 
The distinction between emotional distress and recognised psychiatric illness thus 
continues to be maintained in cases related to negligently inflicted (pure) psychiatric 
injury and intentionally inflicted (stand-alone) mental harm. The weight of authority 
has endorsed the recoverability of recognised psychiatric illness, whilst denying 
compensation for mere emotional distress. Nonetheless there is, certainly, also some 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 ibid at para 11 per Lady Justice Hale. 
32 Wainwright v Home Office [2003] UKHL 53; [2004] 2 AC 406 at paras 45-46 per Lord Hoffmann. 
33 ibid at para 47 per Lord Hoffmann. Also see another English case, C v D, SBA [2006] EWHC 166 
(QB) at para 94 per Justice Field: ‘[i]t is clear from what Lord Hoffmann says…the principle in 
Wilkinson v Downtown (including imputed intention) is only available if the harm suffered is a 
recognised psychiatric injury: the principle does not allow recovery for emotional distress’. 
34 Rhodes v OPO [2015] UKSC 32; [2016] AC 219 at paras 73-90 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
35 ibid at para 88 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
36 ibid at para 119 per Lord Neuberger. 
37 ibid at para 118 per Lord Neuberger. 
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contrary authority, which will be discussed in later sections. 
 
In cases pertaining to pure psychiatric injury founding upon negligence, any normal  
emotion or emotional reaction which is a common condition of daily life that we will  
all experience or have to endure at some point of time will not be compensated.38 
There was little discussion about this in Rhodes v OPO and most other cases regarding 
intentionally inflicted (stand-alone) mental harm, but they still observe the  
distinction between emotional distress and recognised psychiatric illness, which    
seems suggestive of an implied acceptance of this principle. 
 
A comparable approach has been adopted in Restatement (Third) of Torts §46 
(intentionally or recklessly caused emotional harm) 39  and the SLC Report on 
Damages for Psychiatric Injury.40 Pursuant to Restatement (Third) of Torts §46, 
‘severe’ rather than minor or transient emotional harm is required for liability because 
‘emotional harm, even significant harm, is part of the price of living in a complex and 
interactive society’,41 and consequently ‘[t]he law intervenes only where the distress 
inflicted is so severe that no reasonable [person] could be expected to endure it’.42 
The SLC Report similarly recommended that recovery for stand-alone mental harm, 
irrespective of its being caused intentionally or negligently, should be limited to 
exclude those reactions commonly or reasonably expected to be endured in life:43 ‘the 
normal stresses or vicissitudes of life or of the type of life which that person leads’;44 
or ‘bereavements or losses of a type which persons can reasonably expect to suffer in 
the course of their lives’.45 These restrictions appear to be in accordance with the 
underlying principle of the traditional distinction, which requires further investigation. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 As in the passages cited above from McLoughlin v O’Brian (n 5); Alcock v Chief Constable of 
South Yorkshire Police (n 6); White (Frost) v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police (n 23); 
Rorrison v West Lothian College (n 26).  
39 Restatement (Third) of Torts §46 (2012) Comment j. 
40 Scottish Law Commission (n 1) paras 3.18 to 3.30. 
41 Restatement (Third) of Torts §46 (2012) (n 39) Comment j. 
42 ibid. 
43 Scottish Law Commission (n 1) para 3.30. 
44 ibid. 
45 ibid. 
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4.22 The boundaries of mental harm 
 
4.221 The concept of mental harm 
 
The case law reviewed above, as well as the SLC Report, explicitly or impliedly 
supports the principle that there should be no compensation for the normal emotions 
or vicissitudes of life. But what is the legal ground for this non-recovery principle? 
There may be two possible explanations. Firstly, normal human emotions or the 
ordinary conditions of life that individuals customarily endure should not be regarded 
as ‘harm’. In cases where no harm or no mental harm has been incurred, it is 
comprehensible and reasonable that no compensation should be awarded. Secondly, 
though ‘harm’ has been incurred, in certain situations courts are inclined to deny 
recovery to pursuers based upon policy considerations, most notably the fear of the 
‘floodgates’ effect. In other words, courts might be overwhelmed by an increase in 
litigation, in the event that the normal emotions or vicissitudes of life which everyone 
experiences were to be recognised as compensable. This is what Lord Oliver of 
Aylmerton in Alcock v Chief Constable described, in warning that ‘to extend liability 
to cover injury in such cases would be to extend the law in a direction for which there 
is no pressing policy need and in which there is no logical stopping point’.46 
 
The cases reviewed above, including those founded upon negligence and those 
founded upon intentional wrongdoing, suggest that the first consideration above takes 
prominence: shock or normal human emotion is ‘not the subject of compensation’;47 
and ‘[b]ereavement and grief’ has never been ‘recognised…as a head of damage’.48 
It is said that ‘[f]or the tort to be committed…there has to be actual damage. The 
damage is physical harm or recognised psychiatric illness’.49 Thus ‘the consequence 
element’ requires ‘physical harm or recognised psychiatric illness’.50 These dicta 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police (n 6) at 416 per Lord Oliver of Aylmerton. 
47 Page v Smith (n 7) at 189 per Lord Lloyd of Berwick.	  
48 White (Frost) v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police (n 23) at 465 per Lord Griffiths. 
49 Wong v Parkside Health NHS Trust (n 30) at para 12 per Lady Justice Hale. 
50 Rhodes v OPO (n 34) at para 88 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
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allow us to identify what does not belong to the concept of mental harm, clarifying the 
boundary of mental harm in the sense of deviation from normal emotions or the 
ordinary conditions of life. 
 
Though the SLC adopted mental harm as a generic term, it merely interpreted mental 
harm as ‘any harm to a person’s mental state, mental functioning or well-being’,51 
without defining what constitutes harm or what is the substantial content of mental 
harm. Indeed, it may be a difficult or even impossible task to define mental harm 
precisely, given that this judgment in most cases needs to be made by medical experts, 
and that ‘psychiatric medicine is far from being an exact science; the opinions of its 
practitioners may differ widely’.52 A similar perspective can be derived from the fact 
that after due deliberation, the (English) Law Commission finally concluded that 
rendering a statutory definition of recognisable psychiatric illness would be an 
impracticable task.53 In contrast, the Restatement (Third) of Torts §45 does provide a 
definition of emotional harm, namely the ‘impairment or injury to a person’s emotional 
tranquility’, 54  which includes a variety of ‘detrimental’ mental conditions. 55 
However, arguably, terms such as ‘impairment’, ‘injury’, or ‘detriment’ may not 
sufficiently define ‘(emotional) harm’, since they do not provide any guidance to the 
character and degree of ‘(emotional) harm’. 
 
Admittedly, achieving an exact definition of mental harm may be difficult. Yet we 
should at least try to delineate its boundaries and determine what does not belong to 
the concept. In this respect, the above concept, deviation from normal emotions or 
ordinary conditions of life, should assist. After all, if a reaction does not remove the 
victim from his or her normal or original state, how can it be labelled as a harm? In 
such circumstances, there exists nothing to be restored or to be compensated. 
Accordingly, compensable mental harm should require some degree of deviation from 
the normal emotions or original mental status of the victim. This is a flexible rather 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Scottish Law Commission (n 1) para 3.8. 
52 McLoughlin v O’Brian (n 5) at 432 per Lord Bridge of Harwich. 
53 Law Commission, Liability for Psychiatric Illness (Law Com No 249, 1998) para 5.2. 
54 See Restatement (Third) of Torts §45 (2012). 
55 ibid Comment a. 
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than exact boundary of mental harm.   
 
This boundary, however, may need more elucidation. Though normal emotions, or the 
common or ordinary conditions of life, are widely employed terms in legal practice, 
they have not been fully clarified. What actually constitutes normal emotions? In 
addition, it may be unclear why recovery should be denied for certain emotions or 
emotional reactions due to their being commonly experienced and endured. 
  
According to Handford, the nature of being commonly experienced and endured may 
not provide solid grounds for declining recovery, as it does not similarly undermine 
the compensability of physical harm and pain which is ordinarily encountered in life.56 
Therefore, in his opinion, this logic, broadly adopted by courts in cases related to pure 
psychiatric damage/harm, is merely an attempt to address the floodgates effect and to 
prevent trivial actions.57 Based upon this understanding, it seems possible to interpret 
what is meant by normal emotions as trivial emotions. It is the triviality or 
insignificance which renders the emotional reactions at issue unrecoverable. Further, 
normal emotions can also be explicated by reference to Diagram 1 as follows: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 P Handford, Tort Liability for Mental Harm (3rd edn, 2017) para 6.50. 
57 ibid. 
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In this diagram the horizontal baseline represents emotional tranquillity (if such a 
thing actually exists). During daily life human emotions are presumed not to stay at 
the baseline. Rather, they move upwards and downwards. Moving in the upwards 
direction emotions can be considered as positive, and moving in the downwards 
direction emotions are negative. Except for exceptional cases, positive emotions are 
of less concern to the law. Thus the focus of this diagram is upon negative emotions. 
Though emotions continuously oscillate up and down, they leave the baseline merely 
within a small range and can return to it in a brief period of time. This imagined 
picture depicts the so-called normal or trivial emotions. However, there are situations 
where due to certain stimuli emotions might not act in this manner. They may depart 
markedly from the emotional baseline, becoming incapable of returning to the status 
of tranquillity or at least finding it difficult to achieve this within a short span of time. 
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These situations form the above-mentioned deviation (from normal emotions) and 
help us to delineate the contours of mental harm. The more markedly (seriously) the 
affected emotions depart from the emotional baseline, or the longer it takes for them 
to return to the original status, the more likely it is that the emotions at issue could be 
observed as deviation. 
 
This description of the boundary of mental harm is consistent with Keating’s 
interpretation of harm, under reference to the Restatement (Third) of Torts, as 
something ‘detrimental, a change of condition for the worse’,58 turning people it 
afflicts into victims. 59  In addition, Keating further explains, that emotions or 
emotional reactions can be adjusted or mediated by ourselves,60 so the crucial legal 
concern should be, in the circumstances in question, whether or not it is reasonable to 
ask people to accommodate themselves to emotions arising from the incurred incident: 
‘Tellingly, the emotional harm for which the law of NIED [negligent infliction of 
emotional distress61] allows recovery is harm that we either cannot or should not steel 
ourselves against’.62 In other words, recoverable emotional harm/distress ‘has the 
characteristic of not being something people should be expected to master or to suffer 
uncomplainingly’.63 
 
In contrast, normal or trivial emotions are what people can or should be expected to 
sustain without complaint, thus they are not regarded as mental harm. This passage 
from Keating illuminates both the boundary of mental harm as well as the importance 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 GC Keating, ‘When Is Emotional Distress Harm?’ in SGA Pitel, JW Neyers and E Chamberlain 
(eds), Tort Law: Challenging Orthodoxy (2013) 273 at 299. Pertinent to this interpretation, also see M 
Hogg, ‘Asbestos Related Conditions and the Idea of Damage in the Law of Delict’ [2008] SLT (News) 
207 at 208: ‘This fundamental principle of the law of damages makes it crucial to be able to determine 
when someone has been harmed, when they are worse off as the result of a delict.’ 
59 Keating (n 58). 
60 ibid at 300. 
61 See ibid at 274. 
62 ibid at 301. 
63 ibid at 303. 
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4.222 Mental harm and recognised psychiatric illness 
 
The approach outlined in the section above has not hitherto been adopted by the courts, 
which have instead used the terminology of ‘recognised/recognisable psychiatric 
illness’ to filter out undeserving cases. Theoretically speaking, underpinned by the 
same principle,64 the categories of recognised/recognisable psychiatric illness and 
mental harm should reflect the dichotomy between normal and abnormal (or deviating 
from normal) emotions.65 However, as depicted in the following Diagram 2, there is 
still a gap (the grey area) left between them because in practice a deviation from 
normal or trivial emotions would not necessarily be assessed as recognised psychiatric 
illness. This gap may cause problems of under-compensation in particular cases as will 
be analysed further below. Before this, a brief explanation of what is meant by 
recognised/recognisable psychiatric illness is desirable. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Namely that no compensation would be awarded for normal/trivial emotions or vicissitudes which 
people commonly experience. See section 4.221. 
65	   See the above discussion.	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4.2221 Recognised/Recognisable psychiatric illness 
 
The terms ‘recognised’ or ‘recognisable’ psychiatric illness seem often to be used 
interchangeably in judicial reasoning, without any suggestion of alteration in meaning. 
From the decisions reviewed above, ‘recognisable’ is found in Hinz v Berry, 
McLoughlin v O’Brian, Page v Smith, Ward v Scotrail Railways Ltd, Khorasandjian v 
Bush, and the (English) Law Commission Report; whilst the term ‘recognised’ is used 
in Rorrison v West Lothian College, Wong v Parkside Health NHS Trust, Wainwright 
v Home Office, C v D, SBA, Rhodes v OPO, as well as the SLC Report. In a significant 
New Zealand Court of Appeal case, van Soest v Residual Health Management Unit, 
Blanchard J considered the term ‘recognisable’ as the preferred term since 
‘“recognisable” perhaps will indicate an awareness by the Court that over time medical 
experts’ views about the nature of particular mental conditions are bound to be subject 
to some alteration, just as they are with respect to physical ailments... If the medical 
profession as a body is prepared to recognise a particular condition of the mind the 
Court should be willing to give credence to it as it does to a new virus or physical 
condition, such as occupational overuse syndrome.’ 66  It is true that medical 
knowledge can alter and develop beyond current borders. However, given that ‘the 
medical profession as a body is prepared to recognise a particular condition of the 
mind’, it seems that a new consensus of psychiatric medicine has already formed. 
Otherwise without an existent consensus how can the medical profession be ‘prepared 
to recognise’ it? In the light of the existent (already formed) consensus the mental 
condition at issue can be regarded as ‘recognised’. There is no need to insist upon 
dubbing the agreed mental condition as ‘recognisable illness’. In fact, the usage of 
either of the two expressions may not result in too much difference.67 Perhaps the 
term ‘recognisable’ indicates more flexibility, yet at the same time it imports more 
uncertainty. Given that the expression ‘recognised’ psychiatric illness was employed 
in the SLC Report,68 as well as in Wainwright v Home Office and Rhodes v OPO, this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 van Soest v Residual Health Management Unit [2000] 1 NZLR 179 at para 66 per Blanchard J. 
67 It has also been conceded that these expressions ‘seem to mean the same thing’, see ibid. 
68 The precise term adopted in the SLC Report is slightly different, namely ‘medically recognised 
mental disorder’: see Scottish Law Commission (n 1) paras 3.9-3.10. 
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usage is adopted here. 
  
It is important also to consider how recognised psychiatric illness is evaluated. Whilst 
it may be impracticable to define recognised psychiatric illness in a precise manner,69 
it can be identified by medical diagnosis and assessment. In the diagnosis of 
psychiatric illness or mental disorder, the most prevalently adopted yardsticks are the 
two classificatory guidelines: ICD-10 and DSM-V,70 but ordinarily expert medical 
evidence would still be required. 71  ICD-10 denotes the International Statistical 
Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems (10th Revision),72 of which 
mental and behavioural disorders are listed in Chapter V. DSM-V is the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th Edition), which is published by 
American Psychiatric Association. As time goes by the current versions are replaced 
by successive new editions.73 For instance, a version of ICD-11 was released in 2018, 
but has not yet been endorsed by the World Health Assembly.74 Whilst DSM-V is 
primarily adopted in North America for psychiatric diagnoses, ICD-10 is used widely 
in the UK and in Europe.75 Pursuant to ICD-10 Chapter V, mental and behavioural 
disorders are classified into 11 groups,76 whilst DSM-V categorises mental disorders 
into 21 diagnostic classifications.77  
 
Though broadly utilised by courts as crucial yardsticks in assessing psychiatric illness, 
it should be borne in mind that these two diagnostic systems are formed and developed 
for clinician and research use rather than for legal use. In its ‘Cautionary Statement for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Law Commission (n 53) para 5.2. 
70 The evolution of different versions of the DSM or the ICD have great influence upon the diagnosis. 
See KR Silk and P Tyrer, ‘Classification of Psychiatric Disorders and Their Principal Treatments’ in 
KR Silk and P Tyrer (eds), Cambridge Textbook of Effective Treatments in Psychiatry (2008) 3 at 3. 
On these two diagnostic systems see also D Marshall, J Kennedy and R Azib, Litigating Psychiatric 
Injury Claims (2012) paras 6.3-6.5. 
71 Law Commission (n 53) para 5.1. 
72 For 2016-WHO version see http://apps.who.int/classifications/icd10/browse/2016/en#/V.                                       
73 Marshall, Kennedy and Azib (n 70) para 6.4. 
74 The 72nd World Health Assembly will be held in May 2019. Information regarding ICD-11, see 
https://www.who.int/classifications/icd/en/. 
75 Marshall, Kennedy and Azib (n 70) para 6.4. 
76 World Health Organization, International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health 
Problems (10th rev edn, 2016) Chapter V. 
77 See American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th 
edn, 2013) Section II Diagnostic Criteria and Codes.  
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Forensic Use of DSM-5’, the American Psychiatric Association explicitly warns of a 
risk that, if utilised for forensic objectives, ‘diagnostic information will be misused or 
misunderstood’,78 due to the ‘imperfect fit between the questions of ultimate concern 
to the law and the information contained in a clinical diagnosis’.79 In order for the 
courts to derive useful assistance in forming their judgments, these standards should 
be used in a careful and appropriate manner, in conjunction with valid medical 
appraisals conducted by psychiatric professionals. 
 
 
4.2222 The connection between mental harm and recognised psychiatric illness 
 
In most cases recognised psychiatric illness is identified in the form of a certain mental 
illness or disorder diagnosed by psychiatric experts and admitted by the courts, with 
reference to (in rare situations, without reference to) the above-mentioned two 
classificatory systems. Therefore, a deviation from the normal emotional status or 
trivial emotions of the victim, which delineates the flexible bounds of mental harm, is 
indicated by a confirmed label of recognised psychiatric illness. But genuine mental 
harm does not in every case meet all the criteria for such a label. For instance, it is 
well-identified in the field of psychiatry that patients afflicted with ‘partial’ or 
‘subsyndromal’ PTSD (Posttraumatic Stress Disorder) suffer from great health-related 
disability, functional impairment and difficulties, even suicidal thoughts and 
attempts.80 As they may meet most, but not all, of the criteria of PTSD, a diagnosis of 
recognised psychiatric illness, namely PTSD, would not be attached to them. 81 
Nevertheless, the severity of such problems is still significantly worse than the 
difficulties which persons unaffected by PTSD may have.82 This point will be further 
elucidated in section 4.31. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 ibid 25. 
79 ibid. 
80 MJ Friedman, TM Keane and PA Resick (eds), Handbook of PTSD: Science and Practice (2nd edn, 
2014) 31-32, and 541. 
81 ibid 541. 
82 ibid 31-32. 
	   188	  
4.223 Mental harm and (mere) emotional distress 
 
As discussed above, pure or stand-alone emotional distress, grief and anxiety are 
currently deemed by courts to be normal emotions or normal conditions (which people 
are expected to endure). Because there is no deviation from the norm, they are not 
thought to constitute recoverable harm. However, what has not been fully clarified is 
that emotional distress, grief and anxiety can manifest themselves in varying degrees. 
As delineated in Diagram 2 in section 4.222, the realm of emotional distress covers 
different fields. If sufficiently severe, emotional distress could deviate from normal or 
trivial emotional status. In this circumstance, in contrast to the mainstream legal 
practice, there is an argument for categorising them as mental harm. As also shown in 
Diagram 2, provided the emotional distress in question passes through the grey zone 
and surmounts the traditional threshold – namely acquiring certain diagnoses from 
medical experts, it is capable of being categorised as recognised psychiatric illness. 
Although a demarcation can be made between emotional distress, mental harm and 
recognised psychiatric illness as presented in Diagram 2, they to some extent overlap 
with each other, and the differences between them exist in the sense of degree rather 
than kind.83 
 
Viewpoints parallel to such an approach can be found in a Scottish Inner House case, 
McLelland v Greater Glasgow Health Board. Although this case strictly speaking is 
not related to pure psychiatric harm (as the claim arose from a ‘wrongful birth’), useful 
insights were provided to the effect that between recognised psychiatric illness and 
normal emotions/(mere) emotional distress, there is still scope in theory for the concept 
of mental harm to exist. In this case, the pursuers claimed for solatium, care and 
maintenance, and loss of wages on the basis of their son’s suffering from Down’s 
syndrome due to the negligence on the part of the defenders. Lord Prosser stated that 
he was not convinced by the clear-cut distinction made by Lord Bridge in McLoughlin 
v O’Brian between ‘grief, distress or normal emotion’ and ‘positive psychiatric 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Law Commission (n 53) para 3.33, ‘Psychiatry does recognise a distinction between mere mental 
distress and psychiatric illness, although the distinction between the two is a matter of degree rather 
than kind...’ 
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illness’.84 He reasoned that ‘between normal emotions and positive psychiatric illness, 
there will be many types of suffering, and indeed consequences which are more or less 
disabling, which Lord Bridge does not mention…And while one might not wish to 
describe the impact upon Mr McLelland as psychiatric illness…Nor does Mr 
McLelland’s devastation…seem to me to be adequately described as…simply the 
“normal emotional reaction”, with no lasting effect…’.85  
 
In addition, the reasoning in Rhodes v OPO might be regarded as reinforcing the 
theoretical distinction between emotional distress, mental harm and recognised 
psychiatric illness, by means of the court’s usage of ‘severe distress’ or ‘significant 
distress’. The majority of the court adopted the term ‘severe distress’ in respect of the 
object of intention, whereas the consequence (resulting harm) has to be recognised 
psychiatric illness or physical harm.86 On the other hand, Lord Neuberger employed 
the term ‘significant distress’ for both the object of intention and the resulting harm.87 
Conceptually the terms ‘severe distress’ and ‘significant distress’ are differentiated not 
only from distress, grief and sorrow, but also from recognised psychiatric illness.88 
From the perspective of this thesis, the usage of ‘severe distress’ or ‘significant distress’ 
bears a substantial resemblance to the concept of mental harm. Lord Neuberger’s 
observations signal not only that there is scope, but also that it is practicable, for the 
concept of mental harm to be set between recognised psychiatric illness and emotional 
distress, grief and anxiety, either under this name or with a different title. 
 
In conclusion, therefore, mere emotional distress (or grief and anxiety) is an 
overarching notion which can include all sorts of emotional reactions, ranging from 
normal to abnormal, or from trivial to severe (significant), as depicted in Diagram 2. 
The argument presented here is that where the emotional distress at issue is severe 
enough to deviate from a normal emotional state or from trivial emotions, it should be 
regarded as falling within the bounds of mental harm. Where emotional distress has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 McLelland v Greater Glasgow Health Board 2001 SLT 446 at para 11 per Lord Prosser. 
85 ibid. 
86 Rhodes v OPO (n 34) at para 88 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
87 ibid at para 119 per Lord Neuberger. 
88 See ibid at paras 83-88 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson, and at paras 117-119 per Lord Neuberger. 
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crossed the grey zone in Diagram 2 and acquired a diagnosis from medical experts, it 
can be identified as recognised psychiatric illness. Despite not being different in terms 
of category, emotional distress, mental harm and recognised psychiatric illness can be 
demarcated, which is of assistance to deciding where recovery can be awarded. 
 
 
4.3 Moving away from the requirement of recognised psychiatric illness 
 
4.31 The problems arising from the categorical adoption of recognised psychiatric 
illness as the threshold of damage 
 
Although in many cases the requirement for recognised psychiatric illness can function 
well as the appropriate control device, the insistence upon the psychiatric label also 
brings about problems and inconsistencies. First of all, as mentioned above, the major 
criteria –ICD-10 or DSM-V – to which courts refer when determining the existence of 
a recognised psychiatric illness are designed for clinical use rather than for legal or 
forensic use. As a result, there may exist an ‘imperfect fit between the questions of 
ultimate concern to the law and the information contained in a clinical diagnosis’.89 
As the ultimate concern of law is the (mental) harm caused to the pursuer rather than 
a psychiatric label, the current emphasis upon the latter seems to be misplaced. 
Moreover, there are circumstances where different psychiatrists may all agree that the 
pursuer has suffered from mental harm deviating from normal or trivial emotions, but 
disagree over the precise label of the psychiatric illness that has been caused. 90 
Although this sort of contentiousness also occurs in physical harm cases, it is 
particularly acute in the field of psychiatric injury. For instance, in ABC v WH 2000 
Ltd v William Whillock, a recent decision in relation to the Wilkinson tort following 
Rhodes, despite the expert witnesses having agreed that the claimant did suffer an 
‘adjustment disorder’, they were in disagreement over ‘whether or not the Claimant 
still has symptoms referable to the abuse and its disclosure’, and whether she suffered 
from an ‘anxiety disorder’ or from a ‘lesser condition’ as ‘acute anxiety’. 91 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 American Psychiatric Association (n 77) 25. 
90 van Soest v Residual Health Management Unit (n 66) at para 106 per Thomas J. 
91 ABC v WH 2000 Ltd v William Whillock [2015] EWHC 2687 (QB) at para 80 per Sir Robert 
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Furthermore, in C v D, SBA, a case where Wilkinson v Downton was adopted as one 
of the causes of action, experts on opposite sides were in dispute over whether or not 
C suffered from ‘Anti-social Personality Disorder (“ASPD”)’ – whether all of the 
characteristics of ASPD had been met and a diagnosis of it can be given accordingly.92 
Justice Field found C as ‘not suffering from ASPD’. However, he was convinced that 
C did suffer from ‘mental abnormality as distinct from emotional distress’.93 In his 
conclusion, Justice Field held that ‘psychiatric injury’ was caused to C by one of the 
alleged incidents.94 In accordance with these cases, it appears more warranted to place 
the legal focus upon ‘the nature and extent of the mental distress actually suffered by 
the plaintiff’ instead of ‘whether a clinician would attach a particular diagnostic label 
to the plaintiff's condition’.95 
 
Secondly, the categorical employment of recognised psychiatric illness as the 
threshold of damage may result in problems with regard to foreseeability. In cases 
regarding mental harm, it is likely for a wrongdoer to foresee that his or her conduct 
would bring about some mental harm; but it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, 
for him or her to envisage that a particular type of recognised psychiatric illness will 
be caused. This problem appears in cases of both intentional and negligent infliction 
of mental harm.96 Tellingly, as analysed in Chapter 3,97 the majority of the Supreme 
Court in Rhodes in a sense solved this conundrum, but only in relation to this tort, by 
reformulating the object of intention as ‘at least severe mental or emotional distress’.98 
Whilst maintaining recognised psychiatric illness as the required consequence element, 
they drew a ‘loose analogy’ with the ‘“egg shell skull” doctrine’,99 which allowed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Nelson. 
92 C v D, SBA (n 33) at para 95 per Justice Field. 
93 ibid at para 96 per Justice Field. 
94 ibid at para 98 per Justice Field. 
95 Giller v Procopets [2008] VSCA 236 at para 31 per Maxwell P. This is an important Australian 
authority in relation to the Wilkinson tort. 
96 ‘…while it should be possible to demonstrate that mental harm was a reasonably foreseeable result 
of the intentional conduct, it would seem inordinately difficult for a plaintiff to have to establish that 
“a psychiatrically cognizable injury” was foreseeable’. See ibid at para 20 per Maxwell P. Also see 
van Soest v Residual Health Management Unit (n 66) at para 100 per Thomas J. ‘A negligent 
wrongdoer may be able to reasonably foresee mental and emotional harm to a third person; he or she 
will not contemplate a particular or any psychiatric illness.’ 
97 See Chapter 3, section 3.22. 
98 Rhodes v OPO (n 34) at para 88 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
99 ibid at para 87 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
	   192	  
them to bypass the question as to whether a certain recognised psychiatric illness could 
be foreseen. Nevertheless, this conundrum still remains in the field of negligently 
caused psychiatric injury. 
 
Thirdly, as discussed in previous sections, recognised psychiatric illness, as the 
currently adopted threshold and control device, in some situations might exclude 
pursuers who suffer from mental harm (or significant emotional distress), which not 
only deviates from normal or trivial emotions, but also brings with it debilitating and 
lasting effects. This exclusion, without solid and cogent justification, may create the 
problem of under-compensation, particularly when compared with the recoverability 
of relatively moderate physical injury under current law. The patients afflicted with 
‘partial’ or ‘subsyndromal’ PTSD (Posttraumatic Stress Disorder), as mentioned in 
section 4.2222, exemplify this problem. Psychological research probing the distinction 
between partial PTSD and full PTSD revealed that in terms of the ‘average number of 
impairment days in the 30-day period when the respondents were most upset by the 
traumatic events’100…‘the full PTSD group exceeded significantly the partial PTSD 
group on all impairment indicators’.101 Nevertheless, the results also signified that 
‘the partial PTSD group was significantly more impaired than the group with neither 
PTSD nor partial PTSD’.102 On the basis of this research, it seems evident that these 
people afflicted by partial PTSD lead a far-from-normal life, and suffer from non-
trivial distress, pain and sorrow. In other words, they can be taken as affected by mental 
harm (in the sense suggested in this chapter). However, as recognised psychiatric 
illness, rather than mental harm, is the prevalently accepted criterion in the courts, 
compensation would not be awarded to this group of people without the recognised 
‘label’. Considering that these patients with ‘partial’ PTSD may in fact suffer from 
functional impairment, difficulties and ‘decreased quality of life’, 103  significant 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 N Breslau, VC Lucia and GC Davis, ‘Partial PTSD Versus Full PTSD: An Empirical Examination 
of Associated Impairment’ (2004) 34 Psychol Med 1205 at 1208. 
101 ibid. 
102 See ibid at 1208 as well as Table 2 and Table 3 at 1209. 
103 ‘A number of studies have found more pervasive functional impairment among individuals with 
partial PTSD relative to traumatized individuals without PTSD...these studies are important because 
they show that partial PTSD is associated with increased burden and decreased quality of life’. See P 
Schnurr, ‘A Guide to the Literature on Partial PTSD’ (2014) 25 PTSD RQ 1 at 2. 
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health-related disability, and even suicidal thoughts and attempts, 104  it seems 
unjustifiable that their claim for recovery should be rejected, whilst those suffering 
from relatively moderate physical harm can be compensated.105 An inconsistency 
between the legal treatment of mental and physical harm seems to occur therefrom.106 
It is arguable therefore that a problem of under-compensation arises in respect of 
partial PTSD, due to the categorical insistence upon the label of recognised psychiatric 
illness. 
 
For these reasons, though the threshold of recognised psychiatric illness may function 
appropriately in many cases, the insistence upon it without any exception may bring 
about problems and inconsistencies. Also, it appears more sensible to place the legal 
focus upon the nature and extent of the mental harm at issue, rather than on the 
question of whether a particular recognised label can be assigned. Teff, for example, 
remarked that ‘[t]he law does not have to confine redress for mental harm to conditions 
that constitute a “recognisable psychiatric illness”’,107 suggesting that this traditional 
threshold could be replaced by ‘moderately severe mental or emotional harm’.108 In 
a similar vein, Mulheron has called the threshold of recognised psychiatric illness into 
question, and argued that it would be preferable ‘to do away with the Traditional Rule 
altogether, so as to allow the lower threshold of “grievous mental harm” for all cases 
in which the claimant is attempting to prove that he or she suffered pure mental 
harm…’. 109  Although she was writing primarily about negligence, Mulheron’s 
arguments are of considerable interest. Taking into account the problems and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 Friedman, Keane and Resick (n 80) 31-32, and 541. 
105 Notably, an actionable physical (personal) injury should at least be ‘more than negligible’. In 
Dryden v Johnson Matthey Plc, the core question considered by the Supreme Court was ‘whether the 
appellants have suffered actionable personal injury on which they can found claims for 
negligence/breach of statutory duty’. After reviewing previous authorities in this regard (in particular 
Cartledge v E Jopling & Sons Ltd [1963] AC 758 and Rothwell v Chemical & Insulating Co Ltd 
[2008] AC 281), Lady Black stated that an actionable personal (physical) injury should be ‘more than 
negligible’. The appeal by the claimants was allowed, on the ground that the claimants had suffered 
from ‘a change to their physiological make-up’, which would make them ‘los[e] part of their capacity 
to work’ and should be taken as ‘far from negligible’. See Dryden v Johnson Matthey Plc [2018] 
UKSC 18; [2018] 2 WLR 1109 at paras 1, 12, 25, 40, 47, 48, and 49 per Lady Black. 
106 ‘Under the present law, there is an inconsistency between the treatment of very minor physical and 
mental injuries.’ See Handford (n 56) para 6.40. 
107 Teff (n 4) 171. 
108 ibid 185. 
109 R Mulheron, ‘Rewriting the Requirement for a “Recognized Psychiatric Injury” in Negligence 
Claims’ (2012) 32 OJLS 77 at section 6. 
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inconsistencies arising from adopting the criterion of recognised psychiatric illness, 
these views are persuasive. The lowered thresholds which they advocate are consistent 
with the concept and boundary of mental harm canvassed in this Chapter. However, 
the question whether it is practically feasible to ‘do away with the Traditional Rule 
altogether’, to lower the threshold of compensable damage in both intentional cases 
and cases founded on negligence, will be examined after reviewing relevant English 
and Scots authority.  
 
 
4.32 Review of case law and commentary 
 
4.321 The measurability and recoverability of parasitic or concomitant emotional 
distress 
 
One often-claimed reason for the irrecoverability of stand-alone mental harm or 
emotional distress is that they cannot be valued or assessed. However, ‘difficulty of 
valuation and assessment’ should not constitute a solid ground for denial, since there 
has never been any barrier to compensating mental harm or emotional distress which 
is concomitant with other wrongs.110 In Rhodes v OPO Lord Neuberger mentioned 
that ‘as is pointed out in McGregor on Damages (19th ed) (2014), paras 5-012 and 5-
013, injury to feelings is taken into account when assessing general damages in claims, 
by way of example, for assault, invasion of privacy, malicious prosecution and 
defamation’.111 Indeed, in typical sorts of assault cases, solatium would be available 
for the concomitant emotional distress or psychiatric illness.112 It is also accepted that 
solatium for emotional distress can be taken into consideration as one of the main 
elements of damages in the law of defamation.113 In England the emotional distress 
must be derivative of or concomitant with ‘serious harm to the reputation of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 Handford (n 56) paras 6.50 and 6.70. 
111 Rhodes v OPO (n 34) at para 118 per Lord Neuberger. 
112 DM Walker, The Law of Delict in Scotland (2nd rev edn, 1981) 489. Also see E Reid, Personality, 
Confidentiality and Privacy in Scots Law (2010) para 2.19. 
113 A Mullis, R Parkes and C Gatley, Gatley on Libel and Slander (12th edn, 2013) para 9.4; as well 
as Cassell & Co Ltd v Broome [1972] AC 1027 at 1125. Also see Reid (n 112) paras 10.62-10.63. 
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claimant’.114 Thus emotional distress and mental harm are capable of being assessed 
for the purposes of compensation. It is unclear why emotional distress and mental harm 
can be assessed and compensated where they are associated with injury to other 
protected interests or rights, but become unmeasurable and unrecoverable when they 
stand on their own. 
 
 
4.322 Protection of mere distress as provided by the General Data Protection 
Regulation and the Data Protection Act 2018 
 
On the protection of mere distress falling short of recognised psychiatric illness, some 
light has been shed by the EU General Data Protection Regulation (hereinafter GDPR) 
and the Data Protection Act 2018. According to Article 82(1) of the GDPR, ‘Any 
person who has suffered material or non-material damage as a result of an infringement 
of this Regulation shall have the right to receive compensation from the controller or 
processor for the damage suffered.’115 Pursuant to its Recital 146, ‘The concept of 
damage should be broadly interpreted in the light of the case-law of the Court of Justice 
in a manner which fully reflects the objectives of this Regulation.’116 In respect of the 
right to compensation for ‘non-material damage’ (as provided in Article 82 of the 
GDPR), it has been explicitly stipulated in the Data Protection Act 2018 under section 
168(1), that ‘“non-material damage” includes distress’. 117  Moreover, in regard to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 According to the Defamation Act 2013 Section 1(1), in terms of personal defamation, ‘A 
statement is not defamatory unless its publication has caused or is likely to cause serious harm to the 
reputation of the claimant’. See Defamation Act 2013 s 1(1). With regard to serious harm to the 
‘reputation’, the Scots position, by contrast, is rather different, in that communication to a third party 
is in principle not required. See Ramsay v MacLay & Co (1890) 18 R 130 at 133 per Lord Justice-
Clerk; Mackay v M’Cankie (1883) 10 R 537 at 539 per Lord President; Thomson v Kindell 1910 2 
SLT 442 at 444 per Lord Dewar. However, in its Report on Defamation, the Scottish Law Commission 
observed this traditional rule as ‘antiquated’ and ‘being out of step with…other parts of the world’. It 
recommended that communication to ‘someone other than the person who is the subject of it’ should 
be a requisite of actionable defamation, as well as that a statutory threshold of ‘serious harm to the 
reputation’ should be introduced into the Scots law of defamation. See Scottish Law Commission, 
Defamation (Scot Law Com No 248, 2017) paras 2.4, 2.8, 2.12, and 2.14. Relevant analyses also see 
Chapter 2, section 2.2351. 
115 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement 
of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L119 
Article 82(1). 
116 See Recital 146 to ibid. 
117 Data Protection Act 2018 s 168(1). 
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‘compensation for contravention of other data protection legislation’, the concept of 
damage also includes ‘damage not involving financial loss, such as distress’.118 In the 
light of the foregoing provisions, it seems clear that compensation can be granted for 
mere distress (falling short of recognised psychiatric illness or physical injury) on the 
basis of the GDPR and the Data Protection Act 2018.119 Noticeably, it may be difficult 
to decide whether the distress stated therein is truly standing alone or not. Although 
the claimants or pursuers may suffer no other kinds of damage apart from distress, it 
is nevertheless likely to regard them as having suffered some infringements of their 
right (to data protection).120    
 
 
4.323 The impact of the Protection from Harassment Act 
 
In contrast with the general rule, the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 provides a 
possible remedy for (intentionally inflicted) mental harm, and even for mere anxiety 
or distress. In relation to Scotland, the Act provides that: ‘Every individual has a right 
to be free from harassment and, accordingly, a person must not pursue a course of 
conduct which amounts to harassment of another and (a) is intended to amount to 
harassment of that person; or (b) occurs in circumstances where it would appear to a 
reasonable person that it would amount to harassment of that person.’121 The term 
‘conduct’ includes ‘speech’, and ‘harassment’ encompasses ‘causing the person alarm 
or distress’.122 However, it should be borne in mind that ‘a course of conduct’ requires 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 ibid s 169(5). 
119 It should be noted that, even in respect of the (now superseded) Data Protection Act 1998, after 
the judgments made in Google Inc v Vidal-Hall, ‘compensation would be recoverable under section 
13(1) for any damage suffered as a result of a contravention by a data controller of any of the 
requirements of the DPA’. See Google Inc v Vidal-Hall [2015] EWCA Civ 311 at para 105 per The 
Master of the Rolls and Lady Justice Sharp. In Woolley v Akram, a Scottish case where the pursuers 
merely suffered distress by virtue of the defender’s breach of the data protection principles (as 
contained in Schedule 1 to the Data Protection Act 1998), Sheriff Ross followed the reasoning of 
Google Inc v Vidal-Hall, holding that ‘[i]t has now been settled’, that compensation is available even 
for ‘distress only’. See Woolley v Akram [2017] SC EDIN 7 at paras 110-112 per Sheriff Ross. 
120 The ‘right to the protection of personal data’ is clearly recognised in the GDPR as a ‘fundamental 
right’, but not deemed to be an ‘absolute right’. See Recitals 1 and 4 to the GDPR. 
121 Protection from Harassment Act 1997 s 8(1); see also s 1(1), in relation to England and Wales, the 
wording of which is slightly different from those of the former: ‘(1) A person must not pursue a course 
of conduct (a) which amounts to harassment of another, and (b) which he knows or ought to know 
amounts to harassment of the other’.  
122 ibid s 8(3); see also s 7(2), (4) in relation to England and Wales. 
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‘conduct on at least two occasions’,123 save exceptions provided in section 8A(3)(b) 
for Scotland124 and in section 7(3)(b) for England and Wales.125 As to the civil 
remedy in an action of harassment, besides granting an interdict or injunction, the court 
may award damages which cover ‘any anxiety caused by the harassment’ and ‘any 
financial loss resulting from it’.126 
 
As a result, although the major aim of the Act is ‘prevention and protection rather than 
compensation’,127 its provisions do make clear provision for recovery for anxiety or 
emotional distress falling short of recognised psychiatric illness. In order for the 
anxiety or emotional distress to be recovered on the basis of this Act, it has to be 
inflicted by conduct amounting to harassment on at least two occasions,128 and the 
conduct constituting harassment must be ‘genuinely offensive and unacceptable 
behaviour’ rather than ‘ordinary banter and badinage of life’.129 However, anxiety, 
alarm and distress are very broad notions, and the Act does not clarify whether they 
extend to every normal or trivial mental reaction such as unpleasantness, worry, 
uncomfortableness etc, or only to those which deviate from normal/trivial emotions 
and can be regarded as serious. In short, this Act in a sense admits the recoverability 
of anxiety, emotional distress or mental harm, but only if the restrictive conditions 
stipulated in it have been met, including, very importantly, the requirement that 
harassment should have been constituted by a course of conduct rather than a single 
incident.130 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 ibid s 8(3); see also s 7(3)(a) in relation to England and Wales. 
124 ibid s 8A(3)(b). In Scotland, where the disputed harassment constitutes ‘domestic abuse’, the 
required conduct ‘may involve behaviour on one or more than one occasion’. 
125 ibid s 7(3)(b). In England and Wales, according to section 7(3)(b), ‘in the case of conduct in 
relation to two or more persons (see section 1(1A))’, a course of conduct must involve ‘conduct on at 
least one occasion in relation to each of those persons’. 
126 ibid s 8(5), (6); see also s 3(2) in relation to England and Wales. 
127 Majrowski v Guy’s and St Thomas’s NHS Trust [2007] 1 AC 224 at paras 65 and 67 per Baroness 
Hale of Richmond. See also T Lawson-Cruttenden and N Addison, Blackstone’s Guide to the 
Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (1997) 30. It is said that the focus of the court will be put upon 
the course of conduct which might be regarded as harassment, rather than upon the effect or the harm 
inflicted on the victim. 
128 Save in exceptional circumstances as provided in section 8A(3)(b) for Scotland and in section 
7(3)(b) for England and Wales, as mentioned above. 
129 Majrowski v Guy’s and St Thomas’s NHS Trust (n 127) at para 66 per Baroness Hale of Richmond. 
130 Protection from Harassment Act 1997 s 8(3); see also s 7(3)(a) in relation to England and Wales. 
Exceptional circumstances see s 8A(3)(b) for Scotland and s 7(3)(b) for England and Wales.  
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4.324 Scottish Law Commission Report on Damages for Psychiatric Injury 
 
Harassment aside, the Scottish Law Commission proposed in its Report on Damages 
for Psychiatric Injury, that a wrongdoer who intentionally causes mental harm should 
compensate his or her victim for any harm so inflicted: ‘In the case of intentional 
wrongdoing, we now think that the defender should normally be liable for the harm he 
intended to cause: this should include distress, anxiety, grief, anger etc, whether or not 
this amounts to a medically recognised mental disorder.’131 In contrast, mental harm 
inflicted negligently would not give rise to liability unless the mental harm met the 
requirement of a ‘medically recognised mental disorder’.132 On the face of it, the 
suggested reform would have lowered the traditional threshold of harm in intentional 
cases to any (kind or level of) emotional reaction. However, due to the general 
restrictions proposed in the Report, emotional reactions which ‘persons can reasonably 
expect to suffer in the course of their lives’ were to be sustained without seeking 
recovery.133 As analysed in sections 4.212 and 4.221, these general restrictions are in 
line with the principle derived from the traditional distinction 134  – that normal 
emotions or ordinary conditions of life which people commonly experience and endure 
should not be compensated. And, arguably, the underlying ground for this principle 
could be an attempt to prevent trivial actions and to address the floodgates effect.135 
As a result, taking the scheme proposed in the Report as a whole, recovery for 
intentionally inflicted normal or trivial emotions would still have been excluded. Only 
the mental harm deviating from normal or trivial emotions would have been 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 Scottish Law Commission (n 1) para 3.7. 
132 ibid. 
133 ibid para 3.30. 
134 The traditional distinction between mere emotional distress and recognised psychiatric illness in 
both negligent and intentional fields. 
135 Handford (n 56) para 6.50. 
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4.325 Cases regarding negligently caused mental harm derivative of injury to other 
interests 
 
There are few authorities that explicitly address the recoverability of emotional distress 
or mental harm under the law of negligence. In addition, most of these authorities are 
related to mental harm/emotional distress derivative of or concomitant with injury to 
other interests. Since the focus here is upon stand-alone mental harm, these authorities 
may be of limited help. In Rhodes v OPO Lord Neuberger cited Robinson v St Helens 
Metropolitan Borough Council as having provided support for the view that ‘in some 
negligence cases, it appears that damages for distress falling short of psychiatric illness 
may be recoverable’.136 In addition to Robinson v St Helens Metropolitan Borough 
Council, two cases argued in negligence – Anderton v Clwyd County Council and 
Phelps v Hillingdon London Borough Council, both cited in Robinson by Lord Justice 
Brooke, as well as a Scottish case Holdich v Lothian Health Board – seemed to speak 
to the loosening of the traditional prerequisite of recognised psychiatric illness. 
Whether or not they can really furnish some foundation for the compensability of 
negligently inflicted pure mental harm may require further examination. 
 
In Anderton v Clwyd County Council, the appeal in which was conjoined with that in  
Phelps v Hillingdon London Borough Council,137 and which is related to a failure to 
alleviate the adverse results of a congenital defect such as dyslexia, a diagnosis of 
recognisable psychiatric illness is absent.138 Nevertheless, Lord Slynn of Hadley held 
that ‘[h]aving regard to the purpose of the provision it would in any event, in my view, 
be wrong to adopt an over-legalistic view of what are “personal injuries to a person”. 
For the reasons given in my opinion in the Phelps case, psychological damage and a 
failure to diagnose a congenital condition and to take appropriate action as a result of 
which a child’s level of achievement is reduced (which leads to loss of employment 
and wages) may constitute damage for the purpose of a claim’.139 This implied that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 Rhodes v OPO (n 34) at para 118 per Lord Neuberger. 
137 Phelps v Hillingdon London Borough Council [2001] 2 AC 619. 
138 ‘Whether the effects of such failure sound in damages where there is no recognisable psychiatric 
condition’ is one of the crucial questions raised in this case. See ibid at 662 per Lord Slynn of Hadley. 
139 ibid at 664 per Lord Slynn of Hadley. 
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psychological damage falling short of recognised psychiatric illness, resulting from 
failure to take action, and other consequential losses, can still constitute damage or 
harm. 
 
In Robinson v St Helens Metropolitan Borough Council, an English case regarding 
loss of the opportunity of academic achievement as well as loss of earnings due to the 
defendant’s failure properly to investigate and treat the claimant’s dyslexia, Lord 
Justice Brooke cited Phelps v Hillingdon London Borough Council, mentioning that 
in that case ‘the duty identified by the House was a duty to take care in relation to the 
diagnosis of a particular kind of congenital condition. A negligent failure to diagnose 
this condition could foreseeably lead to damage in the sense of economic loss… and/or 
to damage in the sense of emotional or psychological harm which would usually fall 
short of developing into a recognisable psychiatric injury. This is the kind of damage 
which the duty exists to prevent’.140 His Lordship clarified that in this context the 
House of Lords had decided that ‘emotional or psychological harm falling short of a 
positive psychiatric injury could be properly categorised as constituting “impairment 
to a person’s mental condition”’.141 Accordingly the trial judge in Robinson had been 
wrong, just as the Court of Appeal in Anderton v Clwyd County Council, ‘to hold that 
the foreseeable psychological harm caused to a dyslexic claimant following a negligent 
misdiagnosis of his condition could not amount to a “personal injury” (within the 
statutory definition) unless it developed into a recognisable psychiatric illness’.142  
 
In Holdich v Lothian Health Board, a Scottish Outer House case pertinent to damaged 
sperm samples and the pursuer’s loss of a chance of fatherhood due to the malfunction 
of defender’s storage facility, Lord Stewart raised the question as regards the threshold 
for actionable delictual mental harm, and advised that ‘[i]t has been doubted whether 
in Scots law, in spite of dicta to the contrary, there is a threshold for actionable mental 
injury in delict: but in any event I think it is reasonably clear that the judicial outlook 
is now sufficiently flexible to recognise that distress can be the precursor of more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 Robinson v St Helens Metropolitan Borough Council [2002] EWCA Civ 1099 at para 36 per Lord 
Justice Brooke. 
141 ibid at para 37 per Lord Justice Brooke. 
142 ibid at para 39 per Lord Justice Brooke. 
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serious mental symptoms. Where the line is to be drawn between distress and mental 
illness “is a matter for trial”. Distress by itself may be compensable where professional 
negligence is proved…Accordingly I must conclude that the pursuer’s averments 
about “irritability, tearfulness, negative ruminations and distress” preceding “a 
depressive disorder” are not so obviously irrelevant that they should be excluded from 
probation, even assuming the claim is one only for damages in delict’. 143  In 
accordance with this paragraph, Lord Stewart appeared to deny that recognised 
psychiatric illness is the absolute threshold, and to allow that the distinction between 
distress and recognised psychiatric illness should be a matter of degree rather than kind. 
 
These cases in a sense appeared to accept, or at least did not reject the notion, that 
emotional distress or psychological harm/damage falling short of recognised 
psychiatric illness could be compensable. In Anderton v Clwyd County Council and 
Robinson v St Helens Metropolitan Borough Council,144 rather than mere emotional 
distress, the adopted terms for compensable harm were ‘psychological damage’145 
and ‘emotional or psychological harm’. 146  In addition, this ‘emotional or 
psychological harm’ was interpreted as something constituting ‘impairment to a 
person’s mental condition’,147 which to some extent reflects the principle of deviation 
from normal mental status or trivial emotions of the victim and the concept of mental 
harm proposed by this thesis.148  Lastly, in Holdich v Lothian Health Board the 
pursuer claimed for ‘mental injury consequential on property damage in breach of 
contract’, or separately for ‘“pure” mental injury in delict’, or alternatively for 
‘damage to sperm’ sui generis with ensuing mental injury on the ground of fault at 
common law.149 In order to determine whether the averments of pursuer were relevant 
for proof, Lord Stewart doubted whether in Scots law ‘there is a threshold for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 Holdich v Lothian Health Board 2014 SLT 495 at para 98 per Lord Stewart. 
144 For discussion of cases in relation to failure of education authorities to ameliorate specific 
learning defects, see D Nolan, ‘New Forms of Damage in Negligence’ (2007) 70 MLR 59 at 80-86. 
145 Phelps v Hillingdon London Borough Council (n 137) at 664 per Lord Slynn of Hadley. 
146 Robinson v St Helens Metropolitan Borough Council (n 140) at para 37 per Lord Justice Brooke. 
147 ibid. 
148 See section 4.22 of this chapter. 
149 Holdich v Lothian Health Board (n 143) at para 4 per Lord Stewart. See also Yearworth v North 
Bristol NHS Trust [2010] QB 1. This case was discussed in Holdich and involving emotional distress 
resulting from the destruction of semen samples negligently stored by the defendants. 
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actionable mental injury in delict’ 150  and stated that ‘distress by itself may be 
compensable where professional negligence is proved’.151 
 
Admittedly, although these authorities shed some light upon the concept of mental 
harm as well as the compensability of mental harm or emotional distress, they do not 
furnish solid bases for loosening the traditional prerequisite in cases regarding 
negligently caused pure mental harm. Mental harm or emotional distress was not the 
sole concern of these cases. In the first two cases, besides the suffered emotional or 
psychological harm, loss of chances of achieving academic success, loss of 
employment and wages, or loss of earnings were also important issues. In the last case, 
though one count of claims is presented for pure mental injury, Lord Stewart did not 
seem to regard the mental injury at issue as pure.152 As regards other counts of claim, 
destruction of property and loss of reproductive autonomy were also claimed in 
addition to mental injury. Thus the mental injury claimed should be read as 
‘consequent’ or ‘consequential’ on other kinds of damage.153 In other words, in these 
cases the psychological harm or emotional distress suffered should be regarded as 
concomitant, rather than stand-alone. 
 
In sum, the cases discussed above are helpful to the discussion of recovery for mental 
harm or emotional distress falling short of recognised psychiatric illness. However, 
they do not provide cogent authority in relation to negligently inflicted pure (or stand-
alone) mental harm or emotional distress, which occurs in isolation rather than as 
concomitant with harm to any other protected rights or interests. 
 
 
4.326 Cases founding upon intentional wrongdoing 
 
There is (admittedly limited) case law indicating that recoverability of emotional 
distress should be approached differently in intentional cases as compared with those 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150 Holdich v Lothian Health Board (n 143) at para 98 per Lord Stewart. 
151 ibid. 
152 See ibid at paras 89-90 per Lord Stewart.	  
153 ibid at paras 4 and 90 per Lord Stewart. 
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founding upon negligence. In D v National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Children, it was observed in the Court of Appeal that emotional distress might be 
actionable where it was inflicted by means of a false statement made knowingly, 
intentionally and without just cause or excuse.154 In this case the appellants had been 
informed of the ill-treatment of a 14-month-girl and had sent an inspector to visit the 
parents in order to investigate. Afterwards the mother claimed damages for personal 
injury, alleging that through the manner and circumstances of the investigation she had 
suffered severe shock and depression including suicidal tendencies and continuing 
insomnia. 155  The case came before the House of Lords on the question of the 
confidentiality of the sources used by the NSPCC, and, overturning the decision of the 
Court of Appeal, their Lordships ruled that anonymity should be preserved. However, 
in the Court of Appeal Lord Denning had commented obiter: ‘I would like to say that 
if the claim against the society were to succeed, it would only be done by making a 
considerable extension of the present law. The leading case is Wilkinson v. Downton 
[1897] 2 Q.B. 57… That was followed and approved in Janvier v. Sweeney [1919] 2 
K.B. 316,… I can understand those cases. They show that where a false statement is 
made knowingly and intentionally without just cause or excuse and when it causes 
emotional distress, it may give rise to a cause of action. But it is a big step forward - 
or backward - to extend it to a statement which is made honestly in good faith’.156 
These words indicate the view that, irrespective of whether emotional distress inflicted 
through honest and truthful statements can be actionable, emotional distress caused by 
a false statement made knowingly and intentionally without just cause or excuse 
should be actionable. 
 
Two decades later in Ward v Scotrail Railways Ltd, a Scots Outer House case pled in 
negligence, there are dicta to suggest that deliberately caused fear, alarm and 
emotional distress falling short of recognisable psychiatric illness might be considered 
as recoverable, whilst those generated by negligence are not.157 In this case, Lord 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 D v National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children [1978] AC 171 at 188-189 per Lord 
Denning. 
155 ibid at 175. 
156 ibid at 188-189 per Lord Denning. 
157 Ward v Scotrail Railways Ltd (n 24) at 259-260 per Lord Reed. 
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Reed appeared to approve of the submission by the counsel for the pursuer, that 
‘damages are recoverable for conduct which deliberately causes fear and alarm, even 
in the absence of personal injury: damages are recoverable in respect of the affront’,158 
on the basis of that ‘[t]his submission appears to be supported by authorities concerned 
with assaults and threatening behaviour (see Walker, Law of Damages in Scotland, p 
555).’ 159  In contrast, Lord Reed took the view that emotional distress without 
recognisable psychiatric illness is not actionable or recoverable in cases founding upon 
negligence.160 Thus it seems that Lord Reed accepted that approaches to recovery for 
intentionally and negligently caused emotional distress could be differentiated. 
Nevertheless, this point was not taken further in the case in hand since the pleadings 
had been based upon negligence rather than upon intentional wrongdoing.161 
 
Lord Hoffmann in Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd advised that the policy considerations 
regarding a tort of intention and actions founding upon negligence are considerably 
different.162 He saw ‘no reason why a tort of intention should be subject to the rule 
which excludes compensation for mere distress, inconvenience or discomfort in 
actions based on negligence’.163 Subsequently in Wainwright v Home Office, Lord 
Hoffmann expanded this reasoning and added that ‘[i]f someone actually intends to 
cause harm by a wrongful act and does so, there is ordinarily no reason why he should 
not have to pay compensation.’164 But imputed intention would not suffice: ‘[t]he 
defendant must actually have acted in a way which he knew to be unjustifiable and 
intended to cause harm or at least acted without caring whether he caused harm or 
not.’165 However, Lord Hoffmann reserved his opinion as to whether recovery could 
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159 ibid. But see Reid (n 112) para 2.20. Reid argued that, despite Walker’s having provided some 
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towels or other affronts to dignity without the presence of some element of contact or threatened 
physical danger’…‘It is doubtful therefore whether the modern Scots authorities on assault would 
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160 Ward v Scotrail Railways Ltd (n 24) at 259-260 per Lord Reed. 
161 ibid at 259 per Lord Reed. 
162 Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd [1997] AC 655 at 707 per Lord Hoffmann. 
163 ibid. 
164 Wainwright v Home Office (n 32) at para 44 per Lord Hoffmann. 
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be granted for distress inflicted by a genuine intention,166  and in any event the 
required element of intention had not been fully established in the case in hand.167 
 
In Rhodes v OPO, Lord Neuberger suggested that under specific circumstances 
recognised psychiatric illness was not an indispensable element of the Wilkinson v 
Downton tort. 168  The specific circumstances included unjustified or gratuitous 
wrongdoing directed at the victim, and an intention to bring about severe or significant 
emotional distress.169 In contrast to Lord Neuberger’s approach, the majority of the 
Supreme Court, when restating the requirements of this tort, retained ‘recognised 
psychiatric illness’ (or ‘physical harm’) as the consequence element.170 It is possible 
that the majority persisted with the notion of ‘recognised psychiatric illness’ because 
this injects some measure of certainty in terms of the threshold of compensable damage. 
However, the claimant in this case sought only an injunction to prohibit the questioned 
publication,171 rather than compensation for harm (which had not yet been suffered). 
As a result the threshold of compensable damage (the consequence element) was not 
in serious contention. 
 
Lord Neuberger further took the view that: 
 
‘As I see it, therefore, there is plainly a powerful case for saying that, in relation 
to the instant tort, liability for distressing statements, where intent to cause 
distress is an essential ingredient, it should be enough for the claimant to 
establish that he suffered significant distress as a result of the defendant’s 
statement. It is not entirely easy to see why, if an intention to cause the claimant 
significant distress is an ingredient of the tort and is enough to establish the tort 
in principle, the claimant should have to establish that he suffered something 
more serious than significant distress before he can recover any compensation. 
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167 ibid at para 47 per Lord Hoffmann. But see ibid at para 61 per Lord Scott of Foscote: ‘And the 
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that it was a form of bullying, done with the intention to humiliate.’ 
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Further, the narrow restrictions on the tort should ensure that it is rarely invoked 
anyway.’172 
 
These remarks were obiter, and not supported by the majority. Nonetheless, they do 
admit the possibility that significant distress inflicted intentionally under specific 
circumstances could become a compensable harm. In terms of the degree of distress, 
it ‘must be significant, and not trivial, and it can amount to feelings such as despair, 
misery, terror, fear or even serious worry. But it plainly does not have to amount to a 
recognised psychiatric disease’.173 These observations may be read as an attempt to 
relax the current threshold of compensable damage. And as they differentiate 
significant distress from recognised psychiatric illness as well as from mere emotional 
distress, they lend support to the concept of mental harm proposed in this thesis as 
deserving of compensation, or at least imply the practicability of recognising it as such. 
 
 
4.33 Concluding Discussions 
 
4.331 The conundrum raised by the traditional threshold and the potential solution 
 
What light does the above review of English and Scots authorities shed on the question 
whether the threshold of compensable damage – i.e. recognised psychiatric illness – 
can be lowered in cases regarding both intentional and negligent infliction of mental 
harm? First of all, it is not credible to deny the recoverability of mental harm or 
emotional distress on the basis of the difficulty of its assessment and valuation. 
Secondly, although some of the negligence cases reviewed above appear to admit, or 
at least not to reject, the compensability of emotional distress or mental harm falling 
short of recognised labels, what was at issue in those cases was largely concomitant or 
derivative mental harm or emotional distress. As a result, these authorities cannot be 
taken as cogent authority in relation to negligently inflicted pure mental harm. Thirdly, 
some of the authorities reviewed did lend support for the practicability of 
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compensating mental harm or (severe/significant) emotional distress, where it is 
inflicted intentionally in the absence of justification or excuse. It is also clearly 
arguable that intentional and negligent wrongdoing should be differentiated in respect 
of the basis and extent of liability.174 
 
It also appears that judicial support (in England and Scotland) is lacking as regards 
lowering the traditional threshold of compensable damage in negligently caused 
mental harm cases. Among the authorities cited by Mulheron (as supporting a lowered 
threshold in negligence cases), only one English case and one Scottish case can be 
found.175 The Scottish case is McLelland v Greater Glasgow Health Board.176 Yet, 
as discussed in section 4.223 above, although this case offers helpful perspectives as 
to theoretical scope for the concept of mental harm, it involves wrongful birth and 
cannot be considered as a stand-alone mental harm case.177 As to the English case 
cited, Hussain v Chief Constable of West Mercia Constabulary, 178  it pertains to 
misfeasance in public office, which is an ‘intentional tort of considerable gravity’.179 
In this case, Kay LJ stated that ‘[w]hilst it is entirely appropriate to deny actionability 
where the non-physical consequences are trivial… it is important not to set the bar too 
high…For my part, I would not wish to shut out a claimant who has the robustness to 
avert recognized psychiatric illness but who nevertheless foreseeably suffers a 
grievous non-physical reaction as a consequence of the misfeasance’.180 He also 
explicitly acknowledged ‘[i]f my approach does not live easily with the established 
approach in cases of negligence resulting in personal injury, I would strive to treat 
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177 See discussion in section 4.223. 
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misfeasance in public office exceptionally.’ 181  In other words, these comments 
expressly envisage relaxation of the threshold of compensable damage in intentional 
cases, but not in negligence. 
 
It must certainly be recognised that the problems and inconsistencies arising from the 
insistence upon the threshold of recognised psychiatric illness, as analysed in 4.31, 
have great impact upon negligence cases as well as intentional.182 A useful illustration 
can be found in Saadati v Moorhead,183 a Canadian Supreme Court case decided in 
2017 which was pertinent to negligently caused (stand-alone) mental injury,184 the 
Canadian Supreme Court explicitly held that the compensable mental injury need not 
amount to recognised psychiatric illness. As long as the inflicted mental disturbance is 
‘serious and prolonged’ and ‘ris[ing] above the ordinary emotional disturbances’, it 
can qualify as (compensable) ‘mental injury’.185 In other words, in order to establish 
a ‘mental injury’, the claimant’s task is to prove the ‘requisite degree of disturbance’ 
instead of ‘its classification as a recognized psychiatric illness’.186 Likewise, the focus 
of the court should be placed upon the ‘level of harm that the claimant’s particular 
symptoms represent’, rather than on ‘whether a label could be attached to them’.187 
This Canadian decision convincingly pointed out the problems of (categorically) 
adopting recognised psychiatric illness as the legal threshold of damage,188 rendering 
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the relaxation of the traditional threshold in negligence cases a more likely choice. It 
remains to be seen whether the reasoning applied in this decision will be considered 
in the English or Scottish courts. Despite dealing with negligently caused (stand-alone) 
mental injury, the Canadian Supreme Court’s approach – highlighting the ‘degree’ or 
‘level’, rather than the ‘label’, of the emotional disturbance when considering its 
compensability – is plainly also relevant to this tort. 
 
Nonetheless, in England and in Scotland judicial support for lowering the traditional 
threshold has been found only in relation to intentional cases, and numerous dicta 
differentiate between intentional and negligent infliction of mental harm. Because 
intention as the foundation of delictual liability is much stronger than negligence, it 
can function as a makeweight, or a justification, for awarding compensation for sorts 
of harm which would otherwise be unrecoverable.189  There is likely to be little 
enthusiasm therefore for lowering the traditional threshold for both intentional and 
negligent infliction of mental harm. Accordingly, the question whether the traditional 
threshold should be relaxed in negligence cases, as well as whether the existing control 
devices within the law of negligence are sufficient to ring-fence trivial and 
unmeritorious suits, are not taken further here and are in any event beyond the ambit 
of this thesis. The important point to emerge from the above survey of authority is that 
there is a degree of support for the relaxation of traditional threshold in cases of 
intentional infliction of (stand-alone) mental harm.  
 
The relaxation of the threshold of recognised psychiatric illness in intentional cases 
would not necessarily trigger an unmanageable number of claims. First of all, people 
who suffer from trivial emotional distress seldom have the incentive to initiate law 
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suits, since the prospective compensation would be moderate. 190  Secondly, a 
relaxation of the traditional threshold does not mean that any slight emotional reaction 
can be recovered in the future. The question as to what constitutes the lowered 
threshold of compensable damage will be discussed in the following section. Thirdly, 
the other elements of this tort are not easily satisfied, which means that there are 
effective alternative control devices.191 As analysed in Chapter 2, after reviewing the 
line of Wilkinson authorities, although ‘extreme and outrageous’ is not a requirement 
for the conduct element employed in Rhodes v OPO,192 the previously actionable 
patterns of behaviour generally share the character of being grave instead of being 
commonplace. In other words, it is not simply any kind of infliction of mental harm 
that can constitute the necessary conduct element in this tort. Moreover, as explored 
in Chapter 3, the mental element of this tort should encompass the notion of intention 
based upon purpose (ends or means) as well as intention based upon knowledge 
(foresight with substantial certainty), with recklessness excluded. Both of these 
elements, arguably, furnish challenging hurdles for the potential claimants to surmount. 
Thus, even if the threshold of recognised psychiatric illness is relaxed, other elements 
of this tort can still serve to prevent a possible flood-gate effect. 
 
 
4.332 Simply mental harm or severe/significant emotional distress as the lowered 
threshold of compensable damage 
 
In the authorities on intentional wrongdoing reviewed above, both emotional distress 
and distress in a more serious sense have been proposed in connection with lowering 
the threshold of compensable damage. In practice, the notion of emotional distress has 
not been fully clarified. As regards stand-alone emotional distress, recovery has been 
mostly denied, whilst reparation is granted without demur for concomitant or parasitic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190 ‘Because people do not often go to the trouble of bringing actions to recover damages for trivial 
injuries…’. See Grieves v F T Everard & Sons [2007] UKHL 39; [2008] 1 AC 281 at para 8 per Lord 
Hoffmann. Although this case does not involve intentional infliction of mental harm, Lord 
Hoffmann’s reasoning is of general application. 
191 ‘Further, the narrow restrictions on the tort should ensure that it is rarely invoked anyway.’ See 
Rhodes v OPO (n 34) at para 119 per Lord Neuberger. 
192 ‘...the conduct element requiring words or conduct directed at the claimant for which there is no 
justification or excuse...’. See ibid at para 88 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson.	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emotional distress.193 In fact emotional distress is a broad and overarching notion, as 
discussed in section 4.223, encompassing all types of emotional reactions ranging from 
the slightest to the very serious. This inclusive nature may explain why it is difficult 
to regard emotional distress as universally recoverable or irrecoverable. Arguably, in 
order for emotional distress, in particular stand-alone distress, to be compensable, 
some considerable measure of severity is required. The main reason is that not every 
mental reaction, including transient and trivial upsets, slight anger or unpleasantness, 
should be deemed as harm to mental tranquility/integrity. An emotional reaction which 
does not deviate from trivial emotions or impair the victim’s normal condition cannot 
be labelled as harm and need not be compensated.194 Therefore, in comparison with 
mere (trivial) emotional distress, severe or significant distress is more capable of 
reflecting this deviation as well as mirroring the concept of mental harm. 
 
Parallel approaches or terminologies can be identified in some authorities regarding 
intentional wrongdoing, such as Rhodes v OPO,195 the above-mentioned Hussain v 
Chief Constable of West Mercia Constabulary196 and a South-African case, Boswell 
v Minister of Police.197 The adoption of severe or significant emotional distress (or 
simply mental harm) would be compatible with the consequence element as analysed 
by Lord Neuberger in Rhodes v OPO.198 In Hussain v Chief Constable of West 
Mercia Constabulary, Kay LJ observed that claimants suffering from ‘grievous non-
physical reaction’ which is not trivial should not be excluded from action or 
reparation.199 In Boswell v Minister of Police, due to the defendant’s intentional, 
unlawful and erroneous report of his having shot and killed her nephew, the plaintiff 
suffered a shock, collapsed and lost consciousness, continuing to be weak for several 
weeks.200 Kannemeyer J regarded her suffering as being a ‘substantial effect on her 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193 See section 4.321 of this chapter. 
194 With regard to normal or trivial emotions and the deviation from them, see discussion in section 
4.221. 
195 Rhodes v OPO (n 34). 
196 Hussain v Chief Constable of West Mercia Constabulary (n 178). 
197 Boswell v Minister of Police 1978 (3) SA 268 (E). 
198 See discussion in section 4.326. 
199 Hussain v Chief Constable of West Mercia Constabulary (n 178) at para 20 per Kay LJ. 
200 Boswell v Minister of Police (n 197) at 271-272 per Kannemeyer J. 
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health’, rather than something of a ‘trifling or passing’ nature,201 and accordingly 
granted her compensation.202 Despite dealing with negligent rather than intentional 
wrongdoing, in Saadati v Moorhead as discussed above, the Canadian Supreme Court 
held that the mental disturbance at issue could qualify as (compensable) ‘mental 
injury’ as long as it was ‘serious and prolonged’ and ‘ris[ing] above the ordinary 
emotional disturbances’.203 
 
Furthermore, employing severe or significant emotional distress (or simply mental 
harm) as the lowered threshold of compensable damage is consistent with the views 
expressed by many academic commentators. Keating regarded emotional harm as 
something ‘we either cannot or should not steel ourselves against’, 204  and not 
something ‘people should be expected to master or to suffer uncomplainingly’.205 
Teff explicitly put forward ‘moderately severe mental or emotional harm’ as his 
proposed threshold of liability. 206  Mulheron (admittedly writing specifically in 
relation to negligence) similarly argued that though it may be justifiable to remove the 
traditional requirement of recognised psychiatric illness, it was not her contention that 
‘all those who suffer transient or trivial mental distress should recover at law’.207 
Relaxing the more exacting threshold for actionable damage does not necessarily bring 
with it the acceptance of minor and transient upsets as an injury.208 As the lowered 
threshold she proposed ‘grievous mental injury/harm’.209 This would filter out minor 
and transient emotional reactions, as well as signifying some measure of severity of 
the mental suffering. Likewise, Belanger-Hardy, who also has written in relation to 
negligent infliction of mental harm, endorsed the threshold based upon ‘no 
compensation for mere upsets’.210  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
201 ibid at 273 per Kannemeyer J. 
202 ibid at 275 per Kannemeyer J. 
203 Saadati v Moorhead (n 183) at paras 19 and 40 per Brown J. 
204 Keating (n 58) at 301. 
205 ibid at 303. 
206	   Teff (n 4) 185.	  
207 Mulheron (n 109) at section 4 B. 
208 ibid at section 5. 
209 ibid at sections 5 and 6. 
210 Belanger-Hardy, ‘Thresholds of Actionable Mental Harm in Negligence: A Policy-Based Analysis’ 
(n 182) at 134; Belanger-Hardy, ‘Reconsidering the Recognizable Psychiatric Illness Requirement in 
Canadian Negligence Law’ (n 182) at 616. 
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With the help of professional psychiatric assessments, the courts should be able to  
distinguish mere emotional distress (normal or trivial emotions) from severe or 
significant distress constituting mental harm. 211  Mulheron has pointed out that 
medical science has made substantial progress in terms of helping the courts ‘to decide 
whether the necessary threshold of “mental injury” has been met’.212 Likewise, in van 
Soest v Residual Health Management Unit Thomas J argued that ‘[f]aced with a claim 
for mental or emotional harm today the Courts can be informed by the expert opinion 
of modern medical knowledge’213…‘The question whether the plaintiff’s mental 
illness, although not commanding a psychiatric label, is plainly outside the range of 
ordinary human experience in the sense that I have described would still be subject to 
expert medical evidence, and it is no different in kind or in difficulty than any number 
of questions which are regularly resolved in the Courts.’214 Although van Soest v 
Residual Health Management Unit was in fact a medical negligence case,215 these 
comments nevertheless hold good for mental distress/harm intentionally inflicted. 
 
In making this assessment, apart from drawing upon expert opinions, courts can also 
take into consideration the criteria prevalently employed in the field of ‘Abnormal 
Psychology’, namely the ‘four Ds’, which are of help as a basis to determine whether 
there exists mental harm, as well as to clarify the boundary between ‘normal’ and 
‘abnormal’ 216  emotions. The classic patterns of psychological abnormality are 
Deviance, Distress, Dysfunction, and Danger, which are exemplified in some of cases 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
211 See Diagram 1 in 4.221; Diagram 2 in 4.222. 
212 See Mulheron (n 109) at section 4 B. 
213 van Soest v Residual Health Management Unit (n 66) at para 103 per Thomas J. 
214 ibid at para 106 per Thomas J. In this case, Thomas J proposed a review of the existing law, 
including the relaxation of the threshold of recognisable psychiatric illness. As long as the suffered 
mental harm is ‘plainly outside the range of ordinary human experience’, the possibility of recovery 
should not be excluded. However, this proposal did not have the support of the majority. See paras 83, 
107, 120, 121. 
215 ibid at paras 2 and 8 per Blanchard J. 
216 RJ Comer and JS Comer, Abnormal Psychology (10th edn, 2018) 2. 
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1)   Deviance: 
 
Deviance denotes the obvious incompatibility of the pursuer’s emotions, thoughts and 
behaviour with social norms and culture in relation to psychological functioning.217 
In the case discussed above, C v D, SBA, Justice Field did not consider C as having 
suffered from ASPD (‘Anti-social Personality Disorder’).218 Accordingly, he did not 
attach any recognised label to the mental harm/illness complained of by C. 
Nevertheless, he held that ‘psychiatric injury’ was caused to C on the basis of C’s 
suffering from ‘mental abnormality as distinct from emotional distress’.219 Among 
C’s established symptoms/suffering which constituted this ‘mental abnormality’, one 
pivotal aspect was that he became a person who ‘behav[es] badly in a general way’ – 
e.g. ‘set[ting] off fireworks in the street to wake everyone up’, beginning to take drugs, 
drink heavily, and get involved into fights.220 Moreover, he ‘continues to have a deep 
mistrust of persons in authority’ and ‘has great difficulty in inter-personal 
relationships’, being ‘callous and uncaring to others’ and ‘isolated from his peer 
group’.221 These features of his behaviour or personality may properly be seen as 
meeting the criterion of ‘deviance’. 
 
2)   Distress: 
 
Moreover, before emotions, behaviour and ideas can be categorised as abnormal they 
have to generate distress.222 Instances of distress can be observed in almost every case 
with regard to mental harm. A Canadian (Labour Arbitration Board) case, Pacific 
Press v CEP, Local 115-M, can be taken as an example. It should be emphasised that 
in Canada the commonly accepted consequence element of this tort (the Wilkinson tort 
or the tort of intentional infliction of mental distress/harm/suffering) is ‘actual harm’ 
or ‘visible and provable illness’ instead of ‘recognised psychiatric illness’.223 In this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
217 ibid 3. 
218 C v D, SBA (n 33) at paras 96 and 95 per Justice Field. 
219 ibid at paras 98 and 96 per Justice Field. 
220 ibid at para 17 per Justice Field. 
221 ibid at para 96 per Justice Field. 
222 Comer and Comer (n 216) 4. 
223 Rahemtulla v Vanfed Credit Union [1984] 3 WWR 296 at para 57 per McLachlin J; Prinzo v 
Baycrest Centre for Geriatric Care [2002] OJ No 2712 at paras 43 and 46 per Weiler JA; Pacific 
	   215	  
case, having regard to the fact that the grievor already had a history of psychiatric 
illness, and that the intentional conduct on the part of the employer aggravated her 
depression and pain,224 it was held that the ‘severe emotional stress’ inflicted upon 
her could be taken as ‘actual harm’ or ‘provable illness’. 225  The symptoms 
constituting ‘severe emotional stress/distress’ encompassed ‘high levels of stress’ 
which exacerbated her back and neck pain,226 and for several months being ‘stressful’, 
‘constantly in tears’, ‘fretful’, ‘withdrawn’, ‘angry’, and ‘frustrated’.227 On several 
occasions her husband had to ‘console her for lengthy periods to prevent her from 
requiring hospitalization’.228 It is evident from these descriptions that, for mental 
suffering to be regarded as ‘severe emotional stress (distress)’, both the seriousness as 
well as the duration of the suffering are important factors to be considered. 
 
3)   Dysfunction: 
 
Dysfunction signifies a common feature of abnormal emotions, ideas or behaviour, 
interfering with individuals’ capacity to function, and hindering them from 
participating in ordinary activities, work or interpersonal interactions. 229  In the 
significant Canadian case in relation to this tort, Rahemtulla v Vanfed Credit Union, 
despite the fact that ‘expert medical evidence’ was absent in the proceedings – in other 
words, no label of recognised psychiatric illness had been ascribed to the plaintiff, 
McLachlin J found that the plaintiff ‘suffered depression accompanied by symptoms 
of physical illness’ which could constitute ‘visible and provable illness’.230 However, 
in the following paragraph and in her conclusion, McLachlin J clearly stated that 
damages were awarded for the ‘mental distress’ suffered by the plaintiff, which was 
‘of a serious magnitude’.231  The ‘severe emotional distress’ established included 
conditions or symptoms like ‘refus[ing] to eat to the point where she fainted and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Press v C E P, Local 115-M 52 CLAS 427 at para 100 per Bruce. 
224 Pacific Press v C E P, Local 115-M (n 223) at para 101 per Bruce. 
225 ibid at para 100 per Bruce. 
226 ibid at para 39 per Bruce. 
227 ibid at paras 45 and 46 per Bruce. 
228 ibid at para 46 per Bruce. 
229 Comer and Comer (n 216) 4. 
230 Rahemtulla v Vanfed Credit Union (n 223) at para 57 per McLachlin J. 
231 ibid at paras 59 and 60 per McLachlin J. 
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ambulances had to be called’, ‘suffer[ing] severe depression’, ‘chang[ing] from a 
happy, outgoing, affectionate person to a gloomy person subject to outbursts of 
temper’, ‘not leaving the house and doing very little’ for approximately a month.232 
Among these symptoms, locking oneself in the house and doing virtually nothing for 
a long period of time can be seen as exemplifying the criterion of ‘Dysfunction’. 
 
4)   Danger: 
 
Danger, although more contentious, is usually referred to as a feature of abnormal 
psychological functioning, in the sense that their emotions, ideas and behaviour turn 
out to be dangerous to the individuals themselves or to others.233 In a Canadian case, 
Boothman v R, where the plaintiff’s preexistent emotional vulnerability was exploited 
by her supervisor, damages was awarded for her severe emotional distress or mental 
suffering/breakdown inflicted thereby.234 Apart from other established symptoms, the 
plaintiff also presented ‘suicidal feelings’ and ‘overwhelming feelings of wanting to 
die’.235 In the English case already considered in connection with ‘Deviance’, C v D, 
SBA, C also made several attempts to commit suicide.236 These examples signify the 
presence of ‘Danger’. 
 
In addition to the above- cases, as analysed in section 4.31, patients with ‘partial’ 
PTSD can be deemed as affected by mental harm (in the sense adopted in this chapter), 
since they suffer from non-trivial distress and lead a far-from-normal life. The 
commonly identified symptoms of ‘partial’ PTSD encompass ‘decreased quality of 
life’, 237  functional impairment or great health-related disability, even suicidal 
thoughts and attempts. 238  Obviously these symptoms also reflect the criteria of 
‘Distress’, ‘Dysfunction’, and ‘Danger’. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
232 ibid at para 6 per McLachlin J.	  
233 Comer and Comer (n 216) 4. 
234 Boothman v R [1993] 3 FC 381 at paras 106 and 116 per Noël J. Particularly at para 116, ‘The 
cases of Wilkinson, Rahemtulla and Timmermans involved intentional torts and, in each case, damages 
were awarded for psychological or emotional distress similar to that from which the plaintiff suffers.’ 
235 ibid at para 81(c), 88, and 93 per Noël J. 
236 C v D, SBA (n 33) at paras 14 and 24 per Justice Field.	  
237 See Schnurr (n 103) at 2. 
238 Friedman, Keane and Resick (n 80) 31-32, and 541. 
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In sum, it is undeniable that the nature of mental harm or the boundary between 
normality and abnormality is sometimes elusive rather than absolutely precise.239 
However, the criteria of ‘Deviance’, ‘Distress’, ‘Dysfunction’, and ‘Danger’ as 
exemplified above may serve as a starting point, in combination with professional 
medical assessments, for the courts to form their decisions. Observed from the above 
cases (used as examples), the criteria of ‘Distress’ and ‘Dysfunction’ seem to be the 
fundamental components of ‘mental harm (abnormality)’ or ‘severe emotional 
distress’, since they are features shared in most of the cases. The presence of ‘Deviance’ 
and ‘Danger’ can be seen as factors which reinforce the finding of mental harm 





This chapter has argued that the boundary of actionable mental harm should be 
determined by reference to deviation from normal or trivial emotions. It is possible 
and practicable for mental harm to be recognised as setting in at a level between 
recognised psychiatric illness and mere emotional distress. The problems and 
inconsistencies arising from the categorical adoption of recognised psychiatric illness 
as the threshold of compensable damage have been explored in this chapter, drawing 
upon existing case law and academic commentary. Ultimately it would be desirable to 
address those problems in relation to both intentionally and negligently caused injury. 
The focus of this thesis is, however, intentional infliction of mental harm, and it is 
therefore left to others to address this future issue in the law of negligence. It is 
proposed here that the threshold of recognised psychiatric illness should be relaxed in 
cases regarding intentional infliction of (stand-alone) mental harm. The concepts of 
‘mental harm’ or ‘severe/significant emotional distress’ can adequately denote the 
lowered threshold of compensable damage. For a mental condition to be regarded as 
‘mental harm’ or ‘severe/significant emotional distress’, apart from its being serious 
and prolonged, the criteria of ‘Deviance’, ‘Distress’, ‘Dysfunction’, and ‘Danger’ can 
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be taken into consideration in combination with professional medical assessments.	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Chapter 5 Secondary Victims in the Field of Intentional    
         Infliction of Mental Harm 
 
 
The pivotal issues to be investigated in this chapter revolve around secondary victims 
in the realm of intentional infliction of mental harm. First it will be argued that 
secondary victims, whose mental harm is inflicted intentionally rather than negligently, 
should be entitled to a claim based upon this tort. Thereafter the prerequisites of this 
sort of claim will be explored in sections concerning, respectively, the conduct element, 
the mental element, and the consequence element of the tort. The last part of this 
chapter will argue that the prerequisites suggested, in particular in regard to the mental 
element, can adequately ring-fence liability for secondary victims in this intentional 
field. It should also be noted that the limitations or factors as regards proximity 
employed in negligent cases remain important considerations in respect of this tort, 






This chapter explores a distinctive category of intentional infliction of mental harm. 
As illustrated in the following diagram, a third party who is the immediate target of 
the wrongdoer is always involved. The circumstances can be depicted as follows. First 
of all, a third party (B) is required, who is the immediate target of the wrongdoer (A) 
and directly harmed by A’s wrongdoing. The wrongdoing at issue is intentional, 
directed at the third party (B) and occasioning physical or mental harm to him or her. 
Secondly, the wrongdoer (A), by means of the intentional infliction of harm upon the 
third party/immediate target (B), causes mental harm to (C) in an indirect but 
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intentional manner.1 The mental harm of (C) arises as a result of his or her perception 
of the physical injury or mental harm suffered by the third party (B). 
 
 
 Wrongdoer (A) 
 
  
                   
 
 Primary Victim                         Immediate Target/Third Party (B) 




    
                                 ‘Substantial Target’2 
                                 Under exceptional circumstances where,               
                                          despite not being the immediate target,  
                                          the victims are the ‘substantial target’ of 
                                          the Wrongdoer (A), they should be    
                                          treated in the same way as primary  
                                          victims instead of secondary victims. 
                                          The general requirements of this tort 
                                          apply in these cases. 
            
                            
 
                                          
                                            
                                                     
                                                                                                                                                                      
Secondary Victim (C) 
 
Mental harm is caused to (C) through his or her perception of injury inflicted on (B). This 
category of cases is the focus of this chapter. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
                                                                                                                
1 Questions as to the meaning of intention/intentional, and what follows if the mental harm were 
inflicted through an unintended manner, will be analysed later in section 5.42. 
2 Several cases regarding victims who are ‘substantial target’ of the wrongdoer will be analysed in 
section 5.41 – 5.412. 
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These circumstances appear to parallel the classification of secondary victims in the 
law of negligence, since the infliction of mental harm upon (C) could be taken as 
incidental or secondary to the causation of injury to (B) – the third party who is the 
immediate target. The distinction between secondary and primary victims plays a 
significant role in cases involving negligently caused psychiatric injury, as 
summarised below. For the sake of systematic coherence, the possibility of adopting a 
parallel distinction in the realm of intentional infliction of mental harm should be 
considered. The core questions to be answered in this chapter are: 1) Can secondary 
victims have a claim based upon (the tort of) intentional infliction of mental harm? 2) 
If the answer to the first question is yes, what are the requisite elements of this type of 
tort? 3) Can the requisite elements properly ring-fence potential claims raised by 
secondary victims?  
 
 
5.11 The distinction between secondary and primary victims in the realm of 
negligently caused psychiatric injury 
 
As is well-known, the leading case in which the House of Lords distinguished primary 
and secondary victims is Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police.3 In 
Alcock, Lord Oliver differentiated victims who are ‘involved, either mediately or 
immediately, as a participant’ from those who are ‘no more than the passive and 
unwilling witness of injury caused to others’.4 Plaintiffs who are placed in fear for 
their own safety can similarly be labeled as primary victims. In Page v Smith, Lord 
Lloyd defined secondary victim as someone ‘in the position of a spectator or 
bystander’, whilst describing primary victim as ‘participant’ who is ‘directly involved 
in the accident’ and ‘within the range of foreseeable physical injury’.5 Treating the 
                                                                                                                
3 Law Commission, Liability for Psychiatric Illness (Law Com No 249, 1998) para 2.53; Scottish 
Law Commission, Damages for Psychiatric Injury (Scot Law Com No 196, 2004) para 2.6. More in-
depth exploration of the distinction between primary and secondary victims, see R Mulheron, ‘The 
“Primary Victim” in Psychiatric Illness Claims: Reworking the “Patchwork Quilt”’ (2008) 19 KLJ 81; 
F Leverick, ‘Counting the Ways of Becoming a Primary Victim: Anderson v Christian Salvesen Plc’ 
(2007) 11 EdinLR 258. 
4 Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1992] 1 AC 310 at 407 per Lord Oliver. 
5 Page v Smith [1996] AC 155 at 184 per Lord Lloyd. 
   222  
categories reflected in Alcock and Page as ‘settled for the time being’,6 in White (Frost) 
v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police Lord Steyn considered the ‘limitation of 
actual or apprehended dangers’ as a threshold test (for primary victim), even for a 
plaintiff who seeks recovery as a rescuer. 7  Similarly, in a House of Lords case 
pertinent to pleural plagues and psychiatric illness caused by the fear for future disease, 
Rothwell v Chemical and Insulating Company Ltd, Lord Hope revisited the boundary 
between primary and secondary victims and confirmed that the former category was 
‘confined to persons who suffer psychiatric injury caused by fear or distress resulting 
from involvement in an accident caused by the defendant’s negligence or its immediate 
aftermath’.8 A further, and more controversial, subcategory of primary victims relates 
to those placed by the defendant in a position whereby they consider themselves as 
having been ‘the involuntary cause of another’s death or injury’, and as such ‘an 
unwilling participant in the event’. 9  In W v Essex County Council, Lord Slynn 
reaffirmed that people who ‘have a feeling of responsibility’ for others’ injury can 
possibly be taken as primary victims,10 despite their having not been subjected to any 
risk of physical injury.11  
 
The concept of primary victim is thus relatively fluid. A primary victim is a participant 
directly involved in the wrongdoing/accident. It may also encompass those ‘within the 
range of foreseeable physical injury (or danger)’, or, more unusually, those who found 
themselves the ‘unwitting cause’ of the accident to another. By contrast, the category 
of secondary victim relates to those who are non-participants in a 
wrongdoing/accident, but who are merely witnesses, spectators or bystanders. 
However, as Lord Slynn remarked in W v Essex County Council, the ‘categorisation 
                                                                                                                
6 White (Frost) v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1999] 2 AC 455 at 500 per Lord Steyn. 
7 ibid at 499 per Lord Steyn. 
8 Rothwell v Chemical and Insulating Company Ltd [2007] UKHL 39; [2008] 1 AC 281 at para 54 per 
Lord Hope. 
9 Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police (n 4) at 407-408 per Lord Oliver. 
10 W v Essex County Council [2001] 2 AC 592 at 601 per Lord Slynn. 
11 Parallel dicta can be seen in a Scottish case Anderson v Christian Salvesen Plc 2006 SLT 815. This 
case was classified by Lord Drummond Young, at paras 8-9, as a typical ‘instrumentality’ case, which 
‘has been recognised as giving rise to recoverable loss’ in respect of psychiatric injury. This type of 
case arises ‘where the pursuer has been instrumental in another person’s death, or possibly serious 
injury, and that has caused him psychiatric harm’. See also Salter v U B Frozen & Chilled Foods Ltd 
2004 SC 233. 
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of those claiming to be included as primary or secondary victims’ is not finally closed, 




5.12 A parallel distinction between secondary and primary victims in the field of 
intentional infliction of mental harm 
 
The distinction between secondary and primary victims has not been explored in the 
line of Wilkinson v Downton authorities. Reference may be made to analysis in 
negligence cases, but without doubt the framework found there cannot be directly 
copied by their intentional counterparts, owing to their different features. For instance, 
the requirement of ‘within the range of foreseeable physical injury (or danger)’ is 
connected to the idea of duty of care, which is inappropriate in the context of 
intentional infliction of mental harm. However, some of the dicta reflecting the 
essential relationship between primary and secondary victims are capable of 
application to both negligent and intentional infliction of mental harm – for example, 
the separation of ‘direct’ from ‘indirect’ involvement, as well as the division between 
‘participant’ and ‘bystander/witness’.  
 
The factual matrix is less challenging where the victim is the immediate target at which 
the intentional wrongdoing is directed, or is harmed directly by the intentional 
wrongdoer. However, it is more problematic where the ‘victim’ is not the target 
towards which the intentional conduct of the wrongdoer is directed, since this implies 
the existence of a different person, a third party, at whom the wrongdoing is aimed.13 
As illustrated in the foregoing diagram, the intentional wrongdoing takes place 
between the wrongdoer (A) and the third party/immediate target (B). Since ‘victim’ 
(C) is not directly involved, her mental harm, if any, should result from her perception 
of what happened in the primary process, being incidental and secondary to the injury 
                                                                                                                
12 W v Essex County Council (n 10) at 601 per Lord Slynn. 
13 In most of the cases, an intentional wrongdoing would have a (immediate) target. This target can be 
an object, an animal, a person, a group of people, or even the society or the country, which or who can 
be wronged and harmed in a direct manner by commission of the intentional wrongdoing. 
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inflicted upon the third party (B). Accordingly, (C)’s position as a victim is secondary 
to the position of the third party (B). It seems that even in the realm of intentional 
infliction of mental harm, the boundary between primary and secondary victims can 
be drawn with the help of the afore-mentioned divisions between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ 
involvement, as well as between ‘participant’ and ‘bystander/witness’. In this regard, 
the primary victim could be defined as one who is directly involved, directly harmed, 
or at whom the wrongdoing on the part of the wrongdoer is directed. In contrast, the 
secondary victim could be identified as one who is not directly involved in the (primary) 
wrongdoing, who is not a participant but merely a witness, indirectly injured as a 
result of his or her perception of the offence as well as the injury inflicted upon the 
primary victim. 
 
In the absence of English or Scots authority directly in point, the feasibility of this 
proposed distinction between primary and secondary victims in respect of intentional 
infliction of mental harm will be probed below by analysing case law from other 
jurisdictions. The three essential questions of this chapter will then be addressed. 
 
 
5.2 Review of relevant decisions 
 
The classic example of cases within this category is the infliction of mental harm upon 
the claimant or pursuer (the secondary victim), by means of intentionally causing 
serious physical harm (such as intentional murder, mutilation, sexual abuse, or assault) 
to his/her close family in his/her presence.14 Although this type of scenario has not 
hitherto figured in English or Scots case law, in Rhodes v OPO the terminology 
‘directed at’ was used, which might be taken as indicating an awareness, even approval, 
of the difference between conduct directed at the pursuer and that which is not. In 
Rhodes, Lady Hale and Lord Toulson canvassed the requisite elements of the 
Wilkinson tort, among which the conduct element requires ‘words or conduct directed 
towards/at the claimant for which there is no justification or excuse’.15 Accordingly, 
                                                                                                                
14 For parallel instances see Restatement (Third) of Torts §46 (2012) Comment m. 
15 Rhodes v OPO [2015] UKSC 32; [2016] AC 219 at paras 74 and 88 per Lady Hale and Lord 
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it seems that victims injured indirectly would have no case on the basis of Wilkinson v 
Downton. Nonetheless, given the absence of English authority directly in point, and 
the fact that the circumstances of Rhodes v OPO had no bearing on 
secondary/indirectly injured victims, this requirement should not be construed as an 
attempt to exclude recovery for secondary victims. Rather, it reflected the fact that 
during the evolutionary history of the Wilkinson tort in England, issues revolving 
around secondary victims had seldom, if ever, been taken into account. The 
requirement of conduct ‘directed at’ the victim is better interpreted as the prerequisite 
of general cases of the Wilkinson tort, in which the victims are predominantly primary 
victims. Scope may well remain for secondary victims to recover, if a deserving case 
appears at some point in the future. In a sense the employment of the wordings ‘words 
or conduct “directed at” the claimant’ suggests the relevance of differentiation between 
directly and indirectly injured victims. 
 
In the meantime, case law from other jurisdictions sheds light on the status of 
secondary victims of this tort. In an Australian case, Johnson v The Commonwealth, 
the defendants in an intentional and unjustifiable manner ‘assaulted the plaintiff’s 
husband in her presence’.16 The wrongdoing was committed in the residence where 
the plaintiff lived together with her husband. In addition to the assault, the defendants 
‘forcibly removed him therefrom, and kept him imprisoned for a long time’.17 Having 
witnessed all this at the scene, the plaintiff suffered mental harm which also developed 
into physical illness.18 Ferguson J held that mental harm (‘nervous shock’) and the 
ensuing physical illness could ‘fairly and reasonably have been anticipated’ as a result 
of ‘the assault committed upon her husband in her presence’, which gave rise to a 
‘good cause of action’.19 It should be noted that, in terms of the mental state on the 
part of the defendant, the court in this case merely required anticipation or 
foreseeability. The target/object to be foreseen appeared to encompass both mental 
harm and physical illness.  
                                                                                                                
Toulson. 
16 Johnson v The Commonwealth (1927) 27 SR (NSW) 133 at 135 per Ferguson J. 
17 ibid. 
18 ibid. 
19 ibid at 137 per Ferguson J. 
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In Purdy v Woznesensky, a Canadian case, out of personal resentment at a dance the 
defendant struck the husband (male plaintiff) ‘two severe blows on the head’, 
‘knocking him down’ and subjecting him to momentary unconsciousness in the 
presence of the wife (female plaintiff).20 The wife witnessed this scene, screaming in 
a hysterical way, and falling down ‘in a state of collapse’.21 Due to this shock she 
suffered permanent injury to her nervous system.22  Citing Wilkinson v Downton, 
Bielitski v Obadiak23 as well as other authorities,24 Mackenzie JA held that by making 
the wife view his intentional and violent attack upon her husband, the wrongdoer 
should have foreseen that he could ‘upset her nervous system in such a way as to cause 
her some physical harm’.25 Nevertheless he proceeded to perpetrate this wrongdoing 
and neglected ‘her legal right to maintain the safety and integrity of her person’. ‘An 
intention to produce such an effect’ as well as a ‘breach of duty’ was found 
accordingly.26 Though an intention (to inflict mental harm as well as physical harm) 
towards the wife was imputed here, it was not clarified whether intention rested simply 
upon the idea of foreseeability, or whether other criteria were considered relevant. 
 
These two cases share the common characteristic that the secondary victims were the 
wives of the primary victims, who were present at the scene observing the wrongdoing 
when it was being perpetrated. Yet there are situations where secondary victims might 
be absent from the scene but merely learn of what happened afterwards. An important 
case from the Supreme Court of South Australia, Battista v Cooper, is illuminating in 
this regard. Notably, this case was not founded upon the Wilkinson v Downton tort, but 
under the scheme of Criminal Injuries Compensation. However, in his arguments, Bray 
CJ took into consideration several cases in the Wilkinson category (such as Bielitzki v 
Obadisk,27 Stevenson v Basham,28 and Janvier v Sweeney), rendering this case of 
                                                                                                                
20 Purdy v Woznesensky [1937] 2 WWR 116 at para 1 per Mackenzie JA. 
21 ibid. 
22 ibid at para 2 per Mackenzie JA. 
23 Bielitski v Obadiak [1922] 65 DLR 627. The context of this case see Chapter 2, section 2.211. 
24 Purdy v Woznesensky (n 20) at paras 5-6 per Mackenzie JA. 
25 ibid at para 5 per Mackenzie JA. 
26 ibid. 
27 Bielitski v Obadiak (n 23). 
28 Stevenson v Basham [1922] NZLR 225. Relevant discussion about this case see section 5.412.	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relevance here.29 In this case, the husband of Mrs. Battista was murdered ‘in the 
course of a hold up of Mr. and Mrs. Battista in their shop and in the presence of Mrs. 
Battista’.30 Some of the children who were not at the scene later witnessed ‘their father 
being admitted to hospital’. All of them suffered significant emotional distress in 
consequence of the tragedy that befell Mr. Battista. 31  The court held that ‘an 
intentional tortfeasor is liable, not only for the injury caused directly to his victim, but 
to the injury indirectly caused to those connected with his victim or those witnessing 
the injury to the victim. I realise that the line must not be drawn too widely. Probably 
some element of foreseeability must still be present…’.32 From the perspective of 
Bray CJ, ‘all the applicants are entitled to recover under the Criminal Injuries 
Compensation Act for physical or mental injury caused to them by nervous shock or 
other emotional factors arising from their father’s murder’.33 
 
Likewise, in a more recent Australian case, from the Victoria Court of Appeal, the 
secondary victim, who was the brother and the son of the primary victims, was absent 
when the physical attacks were committed upon his family, but was informed 
afterwards. In Carter v Walker, the appellant Carter, a police officer, visited the 
residence of Donald Walker as a result of a call reporting a domestic dispute there.34 
During the investigation, at some point Marcia Walker, who was the mother of Donald 
Walker, also entered the house.35 After her arrival, an altercation took place between 
the appellant and the respondents. Without justification, Carter deliberately exerted 
excessive force, striking Donald Walker a number of times and fracturing his ribs.36 
Moreover, he pushed Marcia Walker to the effect that she fell down to the floor, 
suffering a dislocated shoulder in consequence.37  Marcus Walker, the brother of 
                                                                                                                
29 Battista v Cooper (1976) 14 SASR 225 at 229 per Bray CJ. For discussion see P Handford, Tort 
Liability for Mental Harm (3rd edn, 2017) para 30.280; J Fleming, Fleming’s The Law of Torts (C 
Sappideen and P Vines eds, 10th edn, 2011) 42-43.  
30 Battista v Cooper (n 29) at 226 per Bray CJ. 
31 ibid. 
32 ibid at 229 per Bray CJ. 
33 ibid at 230 per Bray CJ. 
34 Carter v Walker 2010 VSCA 340 at para 17 per Buchanan, Ashley and Weinberg JJA. 
35 ibid at para 21 per Buchanan, Ashley and Weinberg JJA. 
36 ibid at paras 26, 27, and 31 per Buchanan, Ashley and Weinberg JJA. 
37 ibid at para 28 per Buchanan, Ashley and Weinberg JJA. 
   228  
Donald and the son of Marcia, was informed of the situation by his mother. When he 
arrived at the scene, he saw his mother ‘being put into an ambulance’, and learned of 
what had been done to his brother later.38 As a result, Marcus suffered nervous shock. 
In addition to the claims regarding assault and battery initiated by his brother and 
mother,39 Marcus Walker brought a ‘nervous shock claim’.40 Although the specific 
cause of action had not been properly made clear, 41  the court considered the 
applicability of battery,42  negligence, 43  and the Wilkinson tort,44  as well as the 
relevance of the reasoning in Battista v Cooper.45 All of these potential grounds of 
action were in the end dismissed.46 Remarkably, the court regarded it as competent 
for the Wilkinson tort to extend to cases where the mental harm at issue is occasioned 
‘in consequence of acts done to another (as well as words spoken) where there was 
actual or imputed intention to cause that consequence’.47 Since this dictum explicitly 
required the mental state on the part of the wrongdoer towards the secondary victim to 
be an intention, anything less than that should not qualify. Although the Wilkinson tort 
may apply to cases regarding secondary victims, it cannot ‘extend to nervous shock 
suffered by a distant victim’,48 who is absent from the scene while the wrongdoing is 
being committed.49 This stance is at odds with the ruling of Battista v Cooper,50 but 
remotely echoes an earlier Australian decision, Bunyan v Jordan, where a distant 
victim’s nervous shock claim, reliant both upon Wilkinson v Downton and negligence, 
                                                                                                                
38 ibid at paras 1 and 30 per Buchanan, Ashley and Weinberg JJA. 
39 ibid at paras 7 and 9 per Buchanan, Ashley and Weinberg JJA. 
40 ibid at para 7 per Buchanan, Ashley and Weinberg JJA. 
41 ibid at paras 174 and 177 per Buchanan, Ashley and Weinberg JJA. 
42 ibid at paras 214 to 226 per Buchanan, Ashley and Weinberg JJA. 
43 ibid at paras 247 to 250 per Buchanan, Ashley and Weinberg JJA. 
44 ibid at paras 252 to 271 per Buchanan, Ashley and Weinberg JJA. 
45 ibid at paras 227 to 246 per Buchanan, Ashley and Weinberg JJA. 
46 ibid at para 319 per Buchanan, Ashley and Weinberg JJA. 
47 ibid at para 263 per Buchanan, Ashley and Weinberg JJA. 
48 ibid at para 268 per Buchanan, Ashley and Weinberg JJA. 
49 The court reviewed Stevenson v Basham as well as Bielitski v Obadiak, regarding them as cases 
related to ‘recovery by a distant victim’, as well as ‘factual exception’. More importantly, the court 
held that the distant victims in these cases were actually those ‘within a group with whom the 
defendant had intended to communicate’. See ibid at paras 262 and 264 per Buchanan, Ashley and 
Weinberg JJA. 
50 ‘If Battista should be taken as affirming the availability of a Wilkinson cause of action in those 
circumstances, we respectfully consider that it should not be followed’. See ibid at para 267 per 
Buchanan, Ashley and Weinberg JJA. For commentary on Carter v Walker, see Handford (n 29) para 
30.290; P Handford, ‘Battery, Traumatised Secondary Victims and Wilkinson v Downton’ (2012) 20 
Tort L Rev 3. 
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was also rejected.51 
 
The case law reviewed above provides important background for analysis of the 
central issues of this chapter. 
  
 
5.3 Can secondary victims in the area of intentional infliction of mental harm have a 
claim? 
 
The case law discussed above indicates that a distinction is to be drawn between 
directly injured and indirectly injured victims – between the victim at whom the 
wrongdoing is directed, and the victim in the position of witness, whose mental harm 
arises from his/her perception of the injury inflicted upon the direct victim. This 
distinction may serve to demarcate primary victims and secondary victims in the 
intentional realm. Moreover, the Commonwealth authority reviewed above seems to 
accept that compensation may be awarded to secondary victims whose mental harm is 
occasioned in an intentional manner by the wrongdoer. In the Canadian case of Purdy 
v Woznesensky the court found the existence of intention on the part of the wrongdoer 
towards the secondary victim,52 and regarded a claim to be competent in this kind of 
case. As regards the Australian cases, it was held in Johnson v The Commonwealth 
that mental harm as well as physical illness inflicted by virtue of ‘the assault 
committed upon her husband in her presence’ could provide the plaintiff with a ‘good 
cause of action’.53  In Battista v Cooper, Bray CJ plainly acknowledged that an 
intentional wrongdoer should be held responsible for ‘the injury indirectly caused to 
those connected with his victim or those witnessing the injury to the victim’.54 In 
                                                                                                                
51 Bunyan v Jordan is a case where the plaintiff (appellant) suffered mental harm due to her overhearing 
that someone was likely to be shot at some point. However, she was neither at the scene nor in any 
relationship with the potential victim. In the end no one was actually shot as the defendant did not 
attempt to realise his words. Latham CJ analysed the causes of action including both the Wilkinson v 
Downton tort and negligence, finding that ‘[n]one of the cases has gone so far as to suggest that a man 
owes a duty to persons who merely happen to overhear statements that are not addressed to them’. See 
Bunyan v Jordan 57 CLR 1 (1937) at 6-11 per Latham CJ. 
52 Purdy v Woznesensky (n 20) at para 5 per Mackenzie JA. 
53 Johnson v The Commonwealth (n 16) at 137 per Ferguson J. 
54 Battista v Cooper (n 29) at 229 per Bray CJ. 
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Carter v Walker, the possibility for the Wilkinson tort to extend to secondary victim 
cases was also recognised,55 subject to the condition that the secondary victim at issue 
should not be a ‘distant victim’.56 
 
Likewise, the American Restatement (Third) of Torts §46 has explicitly recognised 
the applicability of this tort (intentional infliction of emotional harm) to secondary 
victims. The imposition of liability necessitates one of two sorts of mental status on 
the part of the wrongdoer towards the spectator or bystander: intention in the sense of 
knowledge/foresight of his/her conduct being ‘substantially certain to cause severe 
emotional harm’; or at least recklessness as regards the risk.57 The severe emotional 
harm suffered by the secondary victims should be inflicted as a consequence of their 
perception of the ‘bodily or emotional harm to another’.58 
 
On this basis, a right to redress on the part of secondary victims in the field of 
intentional infliction of mental harm is warranted. This view is supported not only by 
case law and academic commentary from Australia and from Canada,59 but also by 
the need for systematic consistency. Although cases of this kind are lacking in England 
and in Scotland, there are many secondary victim cases in the field of negligence. It 
seems illogical and incoherent, that a pursuer, as a secondary victim, may recover for 
mental harm caused by another’s negligence, but has no remedy at all when the mental 
harm in question is inflicted by intentional wrongdoing. 
 
 
5.4 The prerequisites of this tort when claimed by secondary victims 
 
If secondary victims are permitted to claim for intentional infliction of mental harm, 
what are the prerequisites of such a claim? Although Rhodes v OPO did not actually 
                                                                                                                
55 Carter v Walker (n 34) at para 263 per Buchanan, Ashley and Weinberg JJA. 
56 ibid at para 268 per Buchanan, Ashley and Weinberg JJA . 
57 Restatement (Third) of Torts §46 (2012) (n 14) Comment m. 
58 ibid. 
59 In addition to the above-reviewed case law, see also Handford (n 29) para 30.270; Fleming (n 29) 
42.  
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touch upon the status of secondary victims, the framework60 proposed by Lady Hale 
and Lord Toulson can still be taken as a general foundation for analysis. Accordingly, 
in this section the prerequisites of this tort (when claimed by secondary victims) will 




5.41 The conduct element 
 
5.411 In general 
 
As demonstrated by the case law reviewed above, the conduct pattern of this type of 
tort is to inflict mental harm to the secondary victim through the causation of death or 
physical injury to the primary victim, who is a third party and the immediate target of 
the wrongdoer. In exceptional situations it may also be constituted by threatening the 
primary victim with serious violence61 or inflicting severe emotional distress upon the 
primary victim.62  Beyond that, the wrongdoer did nothing that was aimed at the 
secondary victim. The mental harm of the secondary victim arose in an indirect way, 
through her perception of the injury suffered by the primary victim. The mental harm 
at issue is taken as inflicted by the wrongdoer on the basis of the mental status on the 
part of the wrongdoer towards the secondary victim, 63  in combination with his 
deliberate offence done to the primary victim. 
                                                                                                                
60 Rhodes v OPO (n 15) at para 88 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
61 For instance, in the knowledge of the presence of the child’s parents, a terrorist group threatens a 
child with terrible injury. In the absence of any actual consequence, this threat on its own may 
nevertheless be capable of inflicting significant emotional distress upon the parents who witness their 
child’s fear and suffering. 
62 An illustration can be found in the commentary to the Restatement (Third) of Torts. A bridegroom-
to-be of an engaged couple has been consumed with anger and jealousy over his bride’s earlier sexual 
affairs with another person, and all of a sudden decides to call off the ceremony in revenge. Through 
the unexpected cancellation his main purpose is to humiliate and to inflict severe mental harm upon 
the bride-to-be. He knows with clarity that his conduct is substantially certain to cause considerable 
mental suffering to her parents when they perceive what has been done to their daughter, as well as 
their daughter’s suffering. The bridegroom-to-be proceeds to commit this deliberate act, and although 
the parents are not his target they are nevertheless secondary victims. See Restatement (Third) of Torts 
§46 (2012) (n 14) Comment m Illustration 13. 
63 The requisite mental state on the part of the wrongdoer towards the secondary victim will be 
explored later. 
   232  
 
5.412 A person who is a ‘substantial target’ of the wrongdoing should not be taken as 
a secondary victim 
 
Secondary victims are to be regarded as such because the infliction of mental harm 
upon them is merely a by-product, which is incidental to the causation of harm to the 
primary victim. If, on the other hand, the conduct/wrongdoing at issue can be regarded 
as substantially directed towards the individual in question, treating him or her as a 
substantial target, it would deviate from the conduct pattern depicted here. In this 
situation, that individual should not be taken as a secondary victim. The claim brought 
by him or her should be processed in accordance with the requirements submitted in 
other chapters of this thesis in regard to primary victims. 
 
For instance, in the Canadian case of Butler v Newfoundland (Workers’ Compensation 
Commission),64 the wrongdoing in question was seemingly directed at the second 
plaintiff (the wife) rather than the first plaintiff (Mr. Butler).65 Russell J reasoned that 
recovery in respect of ‘intentional infliction of mental suffering’ should be allowed to 
the plaintiff ‘in a case where the conduct is directed towards a third party’. 66 
Nonetheless, the first plaintiff (Mr. Butler) could be taken as a substantial target of 
the wrongdoing. Since the wife was in effect acting as the spokesperson for her 
husband, and the threat made by (the C.E.O. of) the defendant related to the future 
financial support for their family as a whole, the husband could be seen as directly 
affected by this wrongdoing rather than a mere bystander. Accordingly, the 
defendant’s wrongdoing in relation to Mr. Butler did not match the conduct pattern 
described above. Mr. Butler should be treated in the same way as primary victims 
instead of secondary victims. 
 
Likewise, in Stevenson v Basham,67  a New Zealand case, although the disputed 
                                                                                                                
64 The context of this case see discussion in Chapter 2, section 2.2232. 
65 See Butler v Newfoundland (Workers’ Compensation Commission) [1998] NJ No 190 at paras 
77(3), 77(6), 79, 89, 91, 100 per Russell J. 
66 ibid at para 100 per Russell J. 
67 Stevenson v Basham (n 28). The facts are outlined at 227-228 per Herdman J. Stevenson (the 
wrongdoer/appellant) visited the house occupied by Mr. and Mrs. Basham, and made the threat at 
   233  
conduct – a threat – was principally directed towards Mr. Basham, Mrs. Basham could 
be seen as a substantial target, since the wrongdoer was clearly aware of her presence 
inside the room. The wrongdoer proceeded to make the threat with the knowledge that 
his words would be heard by Mrs. Basham, and the threat (‘If I can’t get you out I’ll 
burn you out’) had the potential to inflict significant fear and emotional distress upon 
Mrs. Basham, or anyone residing in the house.68 Accordingly, in spite of Mr. Basham 
being the immediate target and primary victim of the appellant’s wrongdoing, Mrs. 
Basham can be taken as the substantial target of the wrongdoing. Moreover, the 
significant distress and fright on the part of Mrs. Basham resulted from the disputed 
threat rather than her perception of any harm inflicted upon her husband.69 She was 
not therefore to be treated as a secondary victim and the disputed wrongdoing in 
relation to her does not fit the conduct pattern depicted here (in section 5.411). 
 
In a parallel fashion, if the very purpose of the causation of harm to the primary victim 
is to inflict mental harm upon the claimant, the claimant should not be treated as a 
secondary victim. In this kind of case, the causation of harm to the primary victim is 
not the actual aim of the wrongdoing, but merely employed as a means to achieve the 
goal. The infliction of mental harm on the claimant is not a by-product but the very 
goal of the wrongdoing.70 Accordingly, the wrongdoing at issue should be regarded 
as (substantially) directed at the claimant, and this type of conduct should be 




                                                                                                                
issue in order to have the ‘possession of the premises be given to him’. 
68 Herdman J invoked the authorities of Wilkinson v Downton and Janvier v Sweeney, and held that 
Stevenson ‘intended to terrify the occupants of the house’. See ibid at 229 and 232 per Herdman J. 
69 ibid at 227 per Herdman J. 
70 For instance, ‘[t]here may be cases where the criminal intended to injure A psychologically by 
injuring B physically, e.g. assaulting a child with the intention of distressing the mother.’ See Battista 
v Cooper (n 29) at 228 per Bray CJ. Another example as suggested in Restatement (Third) of Torts 
§46 (2012) (n 14) Comment m Illustration 12, is mutilation of a son in order to cause mental harm to 
his father. 
71 The distinction can also be observed in the commentary to the Restatement (Third) of Torts §46, 
which states that the limitations related to indirect or secondary victims as expressed in Comment m 
should not apply to cases where ‘an actor harms someone for the purpose of inflicting mental distress 
on another person’. See Restatement (Third) of Torts §46 (2012) (n 14) Comment m. 
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5.42 The mental element 
 
5.421 The mental state on the part of the wrongdoer towards the primary victim 
 
The mental element plays a pivotal role in this tort when liability is asserted by 
secondary victims, since it is closely related to the conduct element and has a direct 
bearing on whether this tort can be sufficiently circumscribed. In cases involving 
secondary victims, the intentional wrongdoing on the part of the wrongdoer has an 
impact upon both the primary victim and the secondary victim. As mentioned in the 
previous section, the conduct element entails that the wrongdoer has directed his or 
her actions towards the primary victim, making the primary victim the target of the 
conduct and causing the primary victim death or physical harm. Treating the primary 
victim as a target of the conduct seems to reveal the wrongdoer’s mental status, 
suggesting that the wrongdoer committed the disputed wrongdoing on purpose. Indeed, 
in most of the cases, the infliction of death or physical harm upon the primary victim 
is intentional in the sense that it is the very aim or purpose of the wrongdoer in 
undertaking the wrongdoing, or at least the means through which the wrongdoer can 
achieve his/her ultimate purpose.72 In other words, as analysed in Chapter 3, the 
wrongdoer harbours an intention based upon purpose (or intention based on ends or 
means) towards the primary victim.73 Notably, under certain circumstances, it is also 
likely for the wrongdoer to have an intention based upon knowledge (foresight with 
substantial certainty) towards (the injury inflicted upon) the primary victim.74 
 
 
5.422 The mental state on the part of the wrongdoer towards the secondary victim 
 
In contrast, what sort of mental status is required in regard to the secondary victim 
when the wrongdoer is occasioning mental harm to the secondary victim through the 
                                                                                                                
72 E.g., physically injuring a person in order to take revenge on him/her. 
73 See Chapter 3, section 3.3. 
74 E.g., although the ultimate purpose of a sexual offender is to fulfil his/her sexual desire rather than 
to harm, he/she knows with substantial certainty that the abuse would inflict physical as well as 
mental harm on the primary victim, and he/she proceeds to perpetrate the abuse. This level of 
intention will be further examined in the following section. See also Chapter 3, section 3.4. 
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primary wrongdoing? In the case law considered in section 5.2, ‘foreseeability’ as the 
mental state towards secondary victims was mentioned in Johnson v The 
Commonwealth 75  and Battista v Cooper. 76  In other words, the court considered 
whether, when carrying out the wrongdoing directed at the primary victim, the 
wrongdoer should/could have foreseen or anticipated that the secondary victim would 
thereby suffer psychiatric illness or physical harm. However, the major drawback of 
defining the requisite mental state by reference to ‘foreseeability’ is that it is likely to 
blur the boundaries of this type of tort, since foreseeability is a notion which is 
common to the concepts of intention, recklessness, and negligence.77 Something more 
than mere foreseeability is needed, as was advised in Carter v Walker. According to 
the court in Carter v Walker, the Wilkinson tort can cover cases where the mental harm 
is inflicted ‘in consequence of acts done to another (as well as words spoken) where 
there was actual or imputed intention to cause that consequence’.78 What actually 
counts as intention was not discussed in Carter v Walker, but some assistance can be 
gained from a reading of Purdy v Woznesensky.79 In this case, Mackenzie JA imputed 
an ‘intention to produce such an effect’ to the wrongdoer, reasoning that the defendant 
should know that his attack on the husband would ‘in all likelihood’ produce ‘serious 
physical reactions’ on the wife’s part.80 This wording can be interpreted as suggesting 
that the imputed intention towards the secondary victim is an intention based upon 
actual or constructive knowledge (with substantial certainty).81 Namely, the element 
of intention requires that the wrongdoer has or ought to have known/foreseen the 
disputed consequence, through his/her primary wrongdoing, as ‘substantially certain’ 
to be inflicted upon the secondary victim. This interpretation of intention remains in 
line with the Restatement (Third) of Torts §46 Comment m, where the intention aspect 
in terms of secondary victim cases has been represented as knowing that the 
                                                                                                                
75 Johnson v The Commonwealth (n 16) at 137 per Ferguson J. 
76 Battista v Cooper (n 29) at 229 per Bray CJ. 
77 See discussion in Chapter 3, sections 3.53 and 3.54.  
78 Carter v Walker (n 34) at para 263 per Buchanan, Ashley and Weinberg JJA. 
79 Relevant discussion of this case see section 5.2. 
80 ‘But upon consideration I have come to the opposite conclusion…, for it seems to me that the 
defendant must be presumed as a reasonable man to know of the vital concern which a wife 
instinctively feels for the safety of her husband and the serious physical reactions which an attack 
upon him threatening injuries to his person would in all likelihood produce in her’. See Purdy v 
Woznesensky (n 20) at para 5 per Mackenzie JA. 
81 See further Chapter 3, section 3.4. 
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5.423 The object of intention towards secondary victims 
 
If the intention on the part of the wrongdoer towards the secondary victim can be 
construed as an intention in the sense of having known/foreseen the result as 
substantially certain to occur, what is the result that requires to have been foreseen? In 
other words, what is the object/target of intention towards secondary victims? As 
discussed in Chapter 3, the object of intention83 pursuant to Wilkinson v Downton 
accorded with the consequence that actually resulted – the physical harm.84  The 
authorities subsequent to Wilkinson further included the idea of recognised psychiatric 
illness within the category of consequences required for this tort, and therefore it also 
became relevant as an object of intention. However, as analysed in Chapter 3, section 
3.22, the adoption of physical harm as well as recognised psychiatric illness as the 
object of intention seems implausible. It is very difficult, if not impossible, for the 
wrongdoer in the Wilkinson type of cases to foresee that his/her deliberate conduct – 
in most of the cases words – would actually result in physical harm or psychiatric 
illness, not to mention to intend it.85 For this reason, the reformulation of the object 
of intention by the Supreme Court in Rhodes v OPO was sound and necessary. The 
Supreme Court reframed the object of intention to be ‘at least severe mental or 
emotional distress’, instead of ‘physical harm or recognised psychiatric illness’, whilst 
maintaining the latter as the consequence element.86 This reformulation of the object 
of intention is sensible, and should apply to secondary victim cases as well. The 
                                                                                                                
82 Restatement (Third) of Torts §46 (2012) (n 14) Comment m.  
83 See Chapter 3, section 3.22. 
84 ‘The defendant has, as I assume for the moment, wilfully done an act calculated to cause physical 
harm to the plaintiff…and has in fact thereby caused physical harm to her’. See Wilkinson v Downton 
[1897] 2 QB 57 at 58-59 per Wright J. 
85 For discussion see D Réaume, ‘The Role of Intention in the Tort in Wilkinson v Downton’ in JW 
Neyers, E Chamberlain and SGA Pitel (eds), Emerging Issues in Tort Law (2007) 533 at 540-541; see 
also Rhodes v OPO (n 15) at para 85 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. In the hypothetical example 
discussed in this paragraph, the wrongdoer ‘may not have had the intention to cause psychiatric 
illness, and he may well have given no thought to its likelihood’. 
86 See Rhodes v OPO (n 15) at para 88 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
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indirect impact of one’s deliberate conduct would be more difficult to foresee/intend 
than the direct impact. If in general Wilkinson cases – cases only related to direct 
victims – the requirement of intention to cause recognised psychiatric illness or 
physical harm can be taken as inappropriate, it is all the more so in cases involving 
indirect or secondary victims. Therefore, in secondary victim cases, the object of 
intention towards secondary victims should be reframed in a similar fashion, as 
‘mental harm’ or ‘severe emotional distress’. While committing the wrongdoing 
directed at the primary victim, the wrongdoer should have foreseen mental harm or 




5.424 Recklessness should not be included in the requisite mental element  
 
In addition to intention, ‘recklessness’ is also incorporated in the Restatement (Third) 
of Torts §46 as an eligible form of mental state, which is a different approach from that 
employed in Rhodes v OPO.87 As a result, in accordance with the Restatement (Third) 
of Torts §46, the mental state on the part of the wrongdoer towards the secondary 
victim might also take the form of recklessness. In contrast, the Supreme Court in 
Rhodes v OPO stated that ‘[r]ecklessness was not a term used in Wilkinson v Downton 
or Janvier v Sweeney’, and that it might bring about ‘problems of definition’. It 
therefore excluded recklessness from the mental element of the Wilkinson tort.88 More 
arguments have been submitted to underpin this exclusion in Chapter 3. Namely, 
recklessness appears to be a concept which stays closer to negligence than to 
intention. 89  It seems more theoretically coherent to separate recklessness from 
intention, both in primary victim cases and in secondary victim cases. As argued in 
Chapter 3,90 the boundary between this tort and negligently caused psychiatric injury 
can be drawn with more clarity provided that the notion of recklessness be kept out of 
the mental element of this tort. 
                                                                                                                
87 ibid at para 87 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
88 ibid. 
89 See Chapter 3, sections 3.53 and 3.54. 
90	   See Chapter 3, section 3.661.	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5.425 Unintended infliction of mental harm upon secondary victims could be dealt 
with by the tort of negligently caused psychiatric injury 
 
In short, in a typical secondary victim case in respect of intentional infliction of mental 
harm, the mental state of the wrongdoer towards the primary victim should be an 
intention based upon purpose (or intention based upon ends or means).91 His or her 
mental status towards the secondary victim should be an intention based upon 
knowledge (foresight with substantial certainty).92 In contrast with these two forms of 
intention, recklessness or foreseeability should not be taken as an eligible mental state 
for this tort. In cases where the wrongdoer can merely foresee the mental harm as likely, 
rather than as substantially certain, to be inflicted upon the secondary victim, he/she 
does not possess the requisite mental state towards the secondary victim. In this 
situation, since the infliction of mental harm on the secondary victim is deemed to be 
unintentional, the secondary victim cannot recover on the basis of this tort. Detailed 
consideration of the other causes of action available to the secondary victim in these 
circumstances are beyond the scope of this thesis, but the most obvious is that the 
secondary victim might have a claim based on the tort of negligently caused 
psychiatric injury. Although in this situation the wrongdoing done to the primary 
victim is an intentional one, intentional/deliberate conduct can also attract negligence 
liability.93 Following Lord Oliver’s dicta in Alcock, there is no requirement for a 
specified form of conduct vis-a-vis the primary victim before secondary victim 
liability can be imposed. The secondary victim may have a claim as long as he/she can 
satisfy the prerequisites for duty of this negligent tort, in particular reasonable 
foreseeability and the three criteria of proximity (summarised from Lord Oliver’s dicta) 
– a close tie of love and affection with the primary victim, presence at the incident or 
its immediate aftermath, and direct perception of the incident or its immediate 
aftermath through unaided senses.94 
                                                                                                                
91 See Chapter 3, section 3.3. For discussion on ‘intention based upon ends or means’, see section 3.321. 
92 See Chapter 3, section 3.4. 
93 P Cane, ‘Mens Rea in Tort Law’ (2000) 20 OJLS 533 at 537: ‘It follows that in principle, conduct 
may attract liability under more than one head. For instance, intentional conduct may attract liability 
for negligence and also under some other head of liability for which proof of intention is a condition.’ 
94 See Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police (n 4) at 411 per Lord Oliver. See also 
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5.43   The consequence element 
 
The consequence element, or the requirement for compensable damage, in this tort as 
claimed by secondary victims should be less contentious. The more contentious 
question is whether or not this requirement/threshold should be lowered. As discussed 
in Chapter 4, the traditional threshold of compensable damage – physical harm or 
recognised psychiatric illness – has been employed both in cases regarding negligently 
caused psychiatric injury and in the Wilkinson authorities.95 Systematically speaking, 
irrespective of the disputed mental harm case being intentional, negligent, direct, or 
indirect/secondary,96 the currently applicable threshold of compensable damage stays 
the same. If a case involving intentional infliction of mental harm upon a secondary 
victim were to arise at the present stage, based on logical and systematic analysis, the 
applicable consequence element would be physical harm or recognised psychiatric 
illness. 
 
However, is this requirement, in particular the threshold of ‘recognised psychiatric 
illness’, a sound one? This is the core question examined in Chapter 4. Analysis there 
revolves around whether or not the threshold of ‘recognised psychiatric illness’ should 
be relaxed or lowered to ‘mental harm’ or ‘severe/significant emotional distress’. 
Some of the salient points from that discussion can be briefly revisited in this section, 
in order to determine whether a relaxation of the threshold of compensable damage is 
justifiable where secondary victims are involved. 
 
Firstly, as explored in Chapter 4, when evaluating the existence of any ‘recognised 
psychiatric illness’, ICD-1097 and DSM-V98 are two pivotal criteria broadly adopted 
                                                                                                                
Scottish Law Commission (n 3) para 2.21; Law Commission (n 3) paras 2.25-2.33. 
95 See Chapter 4, section 4.21. 
96 Although the status of secondary victims was not considered in the Wilkinson authorities, there are 
many secondary victim cases in the area of negligently caused psychiatric injury. 
97 World Health Organization, International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health 
Problems (10th rev edn, 2016). See also Chapter 4, section 4.2221, ‘Recognised/Recognisable 
psychiatric illness’. 
98 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th 
edn, 2013). 
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by the courts. However, these two diagnostic systems are actually developed for 
diagnostic rather than for legal use. Therefore, there may exist an ‘imperfect fit 
between the questions of ultimate concern to the law and the information contained in 
a clinical diagnosis’.99 Instead of any medical label given to the inflicted mental harm, 
the court should be more concerned with its nature and extent (such as the seriousness, 
duration, and impact).100  An essential problem seems therefore to flow from the 
misplaced emphasis on the label of recognised psychiatric illness and the criteria by 
which it is assessed. This criticism is valid in both non-secondary victim cases and in 
secondary victim cases of this tort. 
 
Secondly, though the threshold of recognised psychiatric illness may function stably 
in many cases, the insistence upon it without any exception could bring about problems 
and inconsistency.101 For instance, in some situations it might exclude pursuers who 
suffer from debilitating, non-trivial, or abnormal distress falling short of recognised 
labels.102  When compared with the recoverability of relatively moderate physical 
injury, 103  this exclusion (of mental harm without recognised labels) generates 
inconsistency between the legal treatment of mental harm and that of physical injury. 
Likewise, this criticism can be made of the rigid adoption of recognised psychiatric 
illness as the threshold of damage, as applicable to secondary victim cases of this tort. 
 
In English and Scots case law, some judicial support can be observed for lowering the 
traditional threshold of damage, but mostly related to cases regarding intentional 
infliction of mental harm.104 These authorities, as discussed in Chapter 4, are not 
directly related to secondary victims, but may assist here in considering the role played 
by intention in regard to relaxing the threshold of compensable damage. In parallel 
with these cases claimed by primary victims, intention is also an indispensable element 
                                                                                                                
99 ibid 25. 
100 See further Chapter 4, section 4.31. 
101 See ibid. 
102 E.g., patients with ‘partial’ PTSD who suffer from functional impairment, great health-related 
disability, far-from-trivial distress, or even suicidal thoughts. See further Chapter 4, section 4.31. 
103 A physical (personal) injury may be actionable provided that it is ‘more than negligible’. See 
Dryden v Johnson Matthey Plc [2018] UKSC 18; [2018] 2 WLR 1109 at paras 25, 40, and 48 per 
Lady Black. 
104 See Chapter 4, sections 4.326 and 4.331. 
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of this tort as claimed by secondary victims. 
 
Lastly, it is not self-evident that a relaxation of the traditional threshold of damage 
would definitely entail a surge of (unmeritorious) suits. To start with, people who 
suffer from trivial emotional distress seldom have the incentive to embark upon 
litigation, as the expected quantum of damages would be small. Secondly, parallel to 
cases of this tort claimed by primary victims, in secondary victim cases the intention 
element can also function to prevent a likely floodgate effect after the relaxation of the 
traditional threshold. As discussed in the next section, in terms of the intention towards 
secondary victims, knowledge/foresight with substantial certainty is a demanding 
requirement, having its own control mechanisms. This in itself is likely to be sufficient 
to ring-fence potential claims. Moreover, even after such a relaxation, severe or 
significant emotional distress, namely a deviation from normal mental status or trivial 
emotional reactions, is not a low threshold which can be crossed easily.105  
 
In short, the consequence element of this tort as claimed by primary or secondary 
victims, as currently stated, is physical harm or recognised psychiatric illness. 
However, there seems to be no cogent reason why the consequence element cannot be 
lowered to severe/significant emotional distress. As analysed above, the arguments 
submitted for lowering the traditional threshold of damage in general (primary victim) 
cases of this tort can equally apply in secondary victim cases. The relevant control 
devices can function in both categories of case. It is reasonably arguable that the 
consequence element could be relaxed in both general (primary victim) cases and 








                                                                                                                
105	   For further discussion see Chapter 4, section 4.332. 
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5.5 Can the above prerequisites properly ring-fence potential claims? 
 
5.51 The stance of the Restatement and foreign authorities 
 
The possible range of secondary victim liability is extremely extensive. For instance, 
scenarios like terrorist attacks, indiscriminate killing, or the assassination of a celebrity, 
royalty, or national leader 106  can potentially bring about emotional distress to 
incalculable numbers of people. Whether or not the prerequisites canvassed above can 
properly ring-fence the potential claims is therefore a crucial question. The answer 
from the Restatement (Third) of Torts §46 appears to be negative. Besides the 
prerequisites of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional harm, the Restatement 
requires additional control devices in order to confine liability as regards secondary 
victims. Based upon the modern drift of court practice, the Restatement §46 advises 
that only secondary victims who are ‘close family members’ and who 
‘contemporaneously perceive the event’ could have a case.107 These limitations are in 
line with those required by Restatement §48 for secondary victims in cases regarding 
negligently inflicted emotional harm.108 They are also consistent with the criteria 
imposed in Alcock for the purpose of ring-fencing negligence liability for secondary 
victims. 
 
In all of the cases reviewed above in which a claim by a secondary victim was 
successful, that secondary victim was a close family member of the primary victim, 
either wife to husband or child to parent. The sibling relationship featured in Carter v 
Walker, yet in addition to being the brother of one of the primary victims (Donald 
Walker), the secondary victim was also the son of another primary victim (Marcia 
Walker). In Bunyan v Jordan, the plaintiff had no relationship with the person 
                                                                                                                
106 The assassination instance can be seen in Restatement (Third) of Torts §46 (2012) (n 14) 
Comment i. 
107	   ibid Comment m.	  
108 Restatement (Third) of Torts §48 (2012): ‘An actor who negligently causes sudden serious bodily 
injury to a third person is subject to liability for serious emotional harm caused thereby to a person 
who: (a) perceives the event contemporaneously, and (b) is a close family member of the person 
suffering the bodily injury’. 
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threatened,109 but nor was her claim successful. As to the limitation requiring the 
secondary victims’ presence at the scene, it seems to be either an existent contextual 
factor or a required condition in most of the reviewed cases, except for Battista v 
Cooper.110 In particular, in Carter v Walker, it was pointed out that the Wilkinson tort 
could not ‘extend to nervous shock suffered by a distant victim’.111 In short, there are 
elements in most of these cases that echo the negligence law limitations of ‘a close tie 
of love and affection’, ‘present at the scene’, and ‘perception through unaided senses’. 
 
However, from the opposite viewpoint, it is arguable that the degree and range of 
liability in terms of intentional wrongdoing can differ from that found in the law of 
negligence. There is no need for the tort of intentional infliction of mental harm to 
follow unconditionally the limitations imposed for the purposes of circumscribing 
negligence liability towards secondary victims. In Battista v Cooper, Bray CJ held that 
‘there is no reason for restricting the category of plaintiffs who can recover for physical 
injury from an intentional tort to those who could recover in the same circumstances 
if the tort were a negligent one, and every reason, in my opinion, for widening it. It is 
natural to expect much more lasting and serious emotional damage from the murder 
of a husband or father than from his death by being run down in the street…’; ‘…I 
think than [sic] an intentional tortfeasor, who must, ex hypothesi, be directing his mind 
to his act, ought to foresee the possibility of injury to a wider class of persons than 
those whom a court might find to have been within the reasonable foreseeability of the 
negligent driver of a car’.112 A similar view is expressed in Fleming’s The Law of 
Torts. The author considered the ‘range of foreseeability’ on the part of the intentional 
wrongdoer as ‘larger in comparison’, as a result of the wrongdoer ‘hav[ing] directed 




                                                                                                                
109 In fact no one was shot in this case. See Bunyan v Jordan (n 51). 
110 Battista v Cooper (n 29). 
111 Carter v Walker (n 34) at para 268 per Buchanan, Ashley and Weinberg JJA. 
112 Battista v Cooper (n 29) at 229 per Bray CJ. 
113 Fleming (n 29) 42. 
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5.52 The approach proposed by this thesis 
 
Given the arguments in the section above, the stance adopted by the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts §46, and in the case law applying similar restrictions, seems disputable. 
It is not self-evident why intentionally harmed secondary victims must be subjected to 
entirely the same limitations designed for negligently caused psychiatric injury cases. 
Certainly, factors concerning proximity are still important considerations in respect of 
intentional cases. Yet, as will be argued, the mental element of this tort claimed by 
secondary victims – knowledge/foresight with substantial certainty – can be seen as 
having incorporated considerations regarding proximity, which would come into play 
in determining secondary victim liability in intentional cases. It is therefore strongly 
arguable that the prerequisites of this tort as claimed by secondary victims are capable 
of ring-fencing potential claims without recourse in addition to the restrictions applied 




5.521 The range of potential secondary victims has already been narrowed after the 
decision in Rhodes v OPO  
 
The approach of the Restatement (Third) of Torts is to impose identical limitations to 
both intentional and negligent cases, in order to keep the liability for secondary victims 
within bounds. However, as previously mentioned the Restatement (Third) of Torts 
§46 imposes liability in respect of both intention and recklessness. As a result, the 
range of potential secondary victims who can invoke Restatement (Third) of Torts §46 
would be much wider, and accordingly it appears less unreasonable to implement 
control mechanisms in parallel with its negligent counterpart.114 In contrast, after the 
decision in Rhodes v OPO, the idea of recklessness has been clearly excluded from the 
mental element of the Wilkinson tort. 115  As argued above, this exclusion of 
                                                                                                                
114 As discussed in the foregoing section on the mental element, recklessness should be regarded as 
conceptually closer to negligence than to intention. 
115 Rhodes v OPO (n 15) at para 87 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
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recklessness is sensible, and it is applicable to both non-secondary victim and 
secondary victim cases. This exclusion by itself narrows the range of prospective 
secondary victims to a considerable extent, and there is consequently less need for 
control devices of the type found in the law of negligence. 
 
 
5.522 ‘Knowledge/foresight with substantial certainty’ has its own control mechanism 
 
More importantly, the prerequisites of this tort claimed by secondary victims should 
be able to circumscribe potential claims because the mental element – intention based 
upon knowledge/foresight of the mental harm as substantially certain to occur – can 
also function as a proper control device. This point will be elucidated as follows: 
 
 
5.5221 ‘Knowledge/foresight with substantial certainty’ is a high threshold to be met: 
 
First of all, it is difficult to establish that mental harm was substantially certain to occur.  
This requires the claimant to show that on the basis of objective knowledge, it was 
highly probable, close to certain or inevitable, that mental harm would be suffered. 
Furthermore, it must be established that the wrongdoer was subjectively aware of, or 
ought to have known, the near certainty or inevitability of this harm resulting from 
his/her intentional conduct. As discussed in Chapter 3,116 Wright J stated in Wilkinson 
v Downton that ‘[i]t is difficult to imagine that such a statement, made suddenly and 
with apparent seriousness, could fail to produce grave effects under the circumstances 
upon any but an exceptionally indifferent person’, as a result ‘an intention to produce 
such an effect must be imputed’. 117  This statement perfectly reflects the 
aforementioned substantial certainty or inevitability. Precisely because the foreseen 
harm is so probable, nearly certain to occur, so ‘it is difficult to imagine that…could 
fail to produce grave effects’. This requirement of actual or constructive foresight with 
substantial certainty is far removed from mere foreseeability. In the cases of Johnson 
                                                                                                                
116 See Chapter 3, section 3.4433. 
117 Wilkinson v Downton (n 84) at 59 per Wright J. 
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v The Commonwealth118 and Battista v Cooper,119 discussed above, it was required 
only that the impact upon secondary victims was foreseeable. Such a requirement is a 
long way from that entailed in ‘it is difficult to imagine that [harm] could fail to 
[occur]’. The level of intention proposed here as a prerequisite (based upon 
knowledge/foresight with substantial certainty) sets up a much higher threshold than 
foreseeability for potential secondary victims to surmount.  
 
 
5.5222 Considerations regarding proximity can be taken as incorporated in the mental 
element; indicators of ‘knowledge/foresight with substantial certainty’ specific to 
secondary victim cases 
 
Furthermore, the required level of intention (knowledge/foresight with substantial 
certainty) would ring-fence the range of prospective secondary victims because it has 
already incorporated considerations related to proximity. Thus the imposition of 
additional limitations as regards proximity may be unnecessary. After an intentional 
attack, who, as a secondary victim, can be foreseen as substantially certain to develop 
‘severe mental or emotional distress’?120 In the examples suggested above of terrorist 
attacks, indiscriminate killing, or the assassination of a celebrity, the wrongdoing 
might potentially bring distress and anxiety to a great number of people all over the 
world. Yet in most of the cases the distress suffered is not so serious, nor would it last 
for long.121 In rare cases it may be foreseen as possible that some people – e.g. a fan 
of the assassinated celebrity – could develop severe emotional distress. However, 
‘possibility’ is far from ‘certainty’ or ‘inevitability’. And it appears unwarranted to 
hold a wrongdoer as having foreseen as substantially certain or inevitable, that severe 
emotional distress would be inflicted upon (a) certain secondary victim(s), where the 
                                                                                                                
118 Johnson v The Commonwealth (n 16) at 137 per Ferguson J. 
119 Battista v Cooper (n 29) at 229 per Bray CJ. 
120 As explored in section 5.423, the object of intention towards secondary victims should be 
formulated as ‘severe mental or emotional distress’; i.e., ‘severe mental or emotional distress’ is the 
object to be foreseen as substantially certain or inevitable to happen. Normal, trivial, or transient 
emotions cannot count as ‘severe mental or emotional distress’. 
121 E.g., person learning via television or radio of a terrorist attack committed upon unknown 
individuals in a foreign country may feel distressed or uncomfortable, but that distress is likely to be 
short-lived. 
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wrongdoer can hardly identify the existence or the range of the latter.122  In the 
absence of any special ground, it would be extremely difficult for a secondary victim 
to establish that, as a result of the primary attack, the wrongdoer could have foreseen 
it as substantially certain or inevitable that this victim would suffer severe mental or 
emotional distress.  
 
The special grounds, or crucial considerations to be put in the balance when 
determining the question of knowledge/foresight with substantial certainty, include 
factors relevant, as well as irrelevant, to proximity. Considerations irrelevant to 
proximity encompass the (brutal, horrifying, and inhuman) way in which the 
wrongdoer conducted the wrongdoing, the individual predisposition on the part of the 
secondary victim and so on. Considerations relevant to proximity comprise the 
relationship between the secondary and the primary victim, and where and in what 
way the secondary victim perceived the wrongdoing and its consequences. These 
proximity factors are of major significance in the determination of 
knowledge/foresight with substantial certainty. For instance, the commonly 
anticipated levels of emotional distress suffered by the mother of the primary victim 
would differ to a great extent from those experienced by a stranger. Accordingly, the 
results of whether they could prove ‘foresight with substantial certainty’ or ‘foresight 
as a mere possibility’ in relation to the development of such severe emotional distress 
would also be different. Likewise, closeness to the scene of the primary wrongdoing, 
as well as the manner of perception, would play significant roles in this 
determination,123 since both would have a foreseeable impact upon the emotional 
reactions of secondary victims. 
 
Therefore, in secondary victim cases of this tort, considerations regarding proximity 
can be taken as being incorporated in the determination of ‘knowledge/foresight with 
                                                                                                                
122 As reinforced by the Restatement (Third) of Torts §1, which suggests that ‘[t]he applications of 
the substantial-certainty test should be limited to situations in which the defendant has knowledge to a 
substantial certainty that the conduct will bring about harm to a particular victim, or to someone 
within a small class of potential victims within a localized area. The test loses its persuasiveness when 
the identity of potential victims becomes vaguer and when, in a related way, the time frame involving 
the actor’s conduct expands and the causal sequence connecting conduct and harm becomes more 
complex’. See Restatement (Third) of Torts §1 (2010) Comment e. 
123 The determination of knowledge/foresight with substantial certainty. 
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substantial certainty’. Without the presence of any factor regarding proximity (which 
factor must be known to the wrongdoer),124 it would be almost impossible for the 
wrongdoer to foresee the severe emotional distress (of a secondary victim) as 
substantially certain or inevitable to occur. In most of the cases, factors concerning 
relational as well as spatial/temporal proximity should be required to reflect the 
knowledge/foresight with substantial certainty. In the light of the cases discussed 
above from other jurisdictions, relational proximity should be construed in a strict 
sense, as restricted to the relationship between parents and children, or between 
spouses or (legitimate) partners. As to spatial/temporal proximity, the secondary 
victim should be either present at the scene or in the immediate vicinity. The less close 
the secondary victim is to the scene, the less certain it is that his or her severe emotional 
distress can be foreseen by the wrongdoer. 
 
In short, in most of the secondary victim cases, knowledge/foresight with substantial 
certainty (of the inflicted severe emotional distress) can be established when there exist 
the factors regarding relational and spatial/temporal proximity, with or without the 
company of other factors irrelevant to proximity. Admittedly, under exceptional 
circumstances, knowledge/foresight with substantial certainty may be established 
where the secondary victim, despite being present at the scene, has no relationship 
with the primary victim. The exceptional circumstances might include those where the 
primary victim was wronged and injured in an extremely brutal, horrifying, and 
inhuman manner, which could readily traumatise any spectator of normal 
sensibilities;125 or where the personal predisposition or vulnerability of the spectator 
present at the scene is known to the wrongdoer. 
 
 
                                                                                                                
124 As to the point that factors regarding proximity must be known to the wrongdoer, see section 
5.5223. 
125 The first exceptional circumstance should not be understated. For instance, simply shooting a 
person dead in front of others could not be counted as an ‘extremely brutal, horrifying, and inhuman’ 
manner. Since, through this manner of attack upon the primary victim, a spectator unrelated to the 
primary victim can be foreseen as substantially certain to suffer severe emotional distress, the 
provocativeness and gravity of the wrongdoing should be at a very high level. Some ancient criminal 
penalties can possibly be taken as examples – e.g. skinning people alive or mutilating people in a slow 
manner within sight of the spectator. 
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5.5223 These indicators – in particular factors regarding proximity – must be known 
to the wrongdoer 
 
It should be emphasised that, since the aforesaid factors – in particular those regarding 
proximity – are considerations for the determination of ‘knowledge/foresight with 
substantial certainty’, they require to be known to the wrongdoer. For instance, in 
addition to the objective existence of a close tie of love and affection between the 
primary and the secondary victims, the knowledge of this relationship on the part of 
the wrongdoer must also be proved. This kind of knowledge can more easily be found 
if the wrongdoer is an acquaintance of the victims. Otherwise, contextual 
circumstances126 are needed to allow the wrongdoer, or any reasonable person, to 
identify the close family relationship between those present at the scene of the 
wrongdoing. The existence of the close family relationship between primary and 
secondary victims requires to be known to the wrongdoer, as the relevant level of 






The answers to the core questions raised in this Chapter can be summarised here in 
order. Firstly, systematic coherence indicates that secondary victims in the area of 
intentional infliction of mental harm should be entitled to compensation. The proposed 
prerequisites of this tort as claimed by secondary victims encompass the conduct 
element, the mental element, and the consequence element. The conduct element is 
infliction of mental harm on the secondary victim through the deliberate offence 
perpetrated upon the primary victim. The mental element, namely the intention on the 
part of the wrongdoer towards the secondary victim, requires an intention based upon 
actual or constructive knowledge with substantial certainty, in the sense of knowing 
or foreseeing the severe emotional distress of the secondary victim as substantially 
                                                                                                                
126 E.g., the interactions between the primary and the secondary victims, the conversations between 
them, or other sources of information. 
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certain to be caused. Admittedly, in the light of the current law the consequence 
element of this tort in relation to secondary victims is to be construed as physical harm 
or recognised psychiatric illness. However, it is arguable that the threshold should be 
lowered simply to mental harm or severe/significant emotional distress. These 
prerequisites, in particular the mental element, have the capability adequately to 
circumscribe liability for secondary victims in this intentional field. Intention based 
upon ‘knowledge/foresight with substantial certainty’ is a tremendously high threshold 
for secondary victims to surmount. The limitations or factors as regards proximity as 
employed in negligent cases can be taken as incorporated in the determination of 
‘knowledge/foresight with substantial certainty’. In most of the cases, the factors 
regarding relational and spatial/temporal proximity are required, with or without the 
company of other factors unrelated to proximity, to reflect knowledge/foresight with 
substantial certainty. These factors are important considerations, which must be known 
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Chapter 6 Conclusion 
  
On the basis of an in-depth analysis of existing authorities, this thesis has 
reconceptualised the essential elements of the Wilkinson tort as discussed in Rhodes v 
OPO – most notably issues of conduct and justification, intention, mental harm, and 
the status of secondary (indirectly injured) victims. The research presented in previous 
chapters permits a reconstruction of the framework of this delict or tort, which 
addresses the anomalies of earlier authorities and provides a better understanding of 
the difficulties inherent in this area of liability. 
  
  
1.   The typical conduct patterns of this tort that can be actionable 
  
According to the majority of the Supreme Court in Rhodes v OPO, the conduct element 
of the Wilkinson tort requires ‘words or conduct directed at the claimant for which 
there is no justification or excuse’.1 However, the question arises what qualifies as 
conduct for these purposes. Although the relevant wrongdoing could broadly be 
classified as ‘deceptive’, ‘threatening’, or ‘abusive’,2 its exact features have not been 
pinpointed with clarity.  
 
Study of the recurring types of conduct, which have been held as actionable in this and 
in other jurisdictions, as well as of the aggravating factors which have frequently been 
observed therein,3 indicates that the conduct patterns of this tort can be constructed 




                                                                                                                
1 Rhodes v OPO [2015] UKSC 32; [2016] AC 219 at para 88 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
2 ibid at para 77 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
3 For relevant analysis see Chapter 2, section 2.12. 
4  See Chapter 2, section 2.13. 
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A.   False Statement  
a.   In general: Playing on or interfering with the victims’ emotional bonds with 
their nearest and dearest (mostly) through false statements, which could 
significantly impact their mental well-being. 
b.   Abusing power or unequal status in conjunction with playing on or interfering 
with the victims’ emotional bonds (mostly) through false statements. 
 
B.   Threatening 
a.   In general: Threatening or coercing victims into doing something, which could 
significantly impact their mental well-being. 
b.   Exploiting the victims’ vulnerability in conjunction with threats or coercion. 
c.   Abusing power or unequal status in conjunction with threats or coercion. 
a)   In the context of employment: Abusing power and threatening employees 
with work-related negative consequences. 
b)   In other contexts: Abusing power and threatening the victims with negative 
consequences. 
 
C.   Insults or other abusive conduct 
a.   In general: Insults or other abusive conduct, which could significantly impugn 
the victims’ dignity and impact their mental well-being. 
b.   Exploiting the victims’ vulnerability in conjunction with insults or other 
abusive conduct. 
c.   Abusing power or unequal status in conjunction with insults or other abusive 
conduct. 
a)   In the context of employment. 
b)   In other contexts. 
 
D.   Inflicting mental harm through injury to a third party – cases involving 
‘secondary victims’. 
 
E.   Other conduct patterns (which can be taken as grave and capable of impacting 
the victims’ mental well-being significantly). 
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The listing above is significant in assisting a better understanding of the conduct 
patterns of this tort likely to be found actionable. The importance of the gravity (of the 
disputed conduct), mostly in the form of aggravating factors, has been reflected in 
them, particularly in the first three conduct patterns. Where more aggravating factors 
are involved the more likely it is that the wrongdoing in question would be regarded 
as egregious, and the more likely it is that the case would be held as actionable. 
 
Analysis in Chapter 2 has contrasted the conduct patterns of this tort with those of 
other related delicts/torts.5 It is clear that the territory occupied by the latter leaves a 
number of significant gaps in protecting the rights of the person, and the tort under 
discussion here plainly has an important role to play in filling these gaps. 
 
 
2.   The potential justifications/justificatory grounds (that should arguably be 
treated as defences) 
 
The conduct element of this tort is stated in Rhodes v OPO as being ‘words or conduct 
directed at the claimant’ for which ‘there is no justification or excuse’.6 After probing 
the reasoning of the Supreme Court in this connection, it appears very likely that the 
absence of justification or excuse was regarded by the Supreme Court as an integral 
part of the conduct element.7 As a result, justifications or excuses cannot be adopted 
as defences, but their existence goes to the conduct element and can negate liability. 
Arguably, the potential justifications/justificatory grounds which could be used in this 
tort to defeat the conduct element might include: consent, discharging duties or 
exercising rights, and freedom of expression.8 Although truth does not function as an 
infallible justification for this tort, when weighing freedom of expression against 
                                                                                                                
5  More detailed results of comparison between different conduct patterns of this tort and these 
recognised delicts/torts, see Chapter 2, section 2.25.  
6 Rhodes v OPO (n 1) at para 88 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
7 See Chapter 2, section 2.312. 
8 Relevant analysis see Chapter 2, section 2.32. 
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mental integrity, the truth of the defendant’s words can certainly be placed in the 
balance. 
 
An argument further developed in Chapter 2, however, is that the approach of the 
Supreme Court is not entirely satisfactory in treating the absence of justification or 
excuse as a part of the conduct element of this tort.9 An alternative approach would be 
to remove the controversial formulation of ‘for which there is no justification or 
excuse’, and to rephrase the conduct element in a way that more clearly reflects the 
gravity of conduct and fairly distributes the burden of proof. In this way the conduct 
element might usefully be presented in the form of conduct patterns as proposed above. 
On the other hand, any justification/justificatory ground – e.g. consent, discharging 
duties or exercising rights, and freedom of expression – should be treated as a defence. 
This approach would better differentiate between the notion of gravity of the conduct 
and that of justification for the conduct. More importantly, it distributes the burden of 
proof in a fairer way. The onus of establishing a defence would be placed upon the 
defendant. On the basis of this proposed approach, the more egregious the disputed 
conduct, the stronger the defence (justification) it would require. 
 
  
3.   The mental element should include two levels of intention – in the form of 
purpose (ends or means) or knowledge/foresight with substantial certainty  
  
As explored in Chapter 3, although the Supreme Court in Rhodes v OPO reformulated 
the mental element of the Wilkinson tort as ‘an intention to cause at least severe mental 
or emotional distress’, 10  the questions of what constitutes intention, and of the 
relationship between intention and the antecedent notion of ‘calculated’ (as employed 
in Wilkinson v Downton), both remain unclear. An exhaustive investigation of the 
foundations of intention and different interpretations of the term ‘calculated’ indicates 
that the appropriate meaning/basis of intention and its functionality are as follows: 
 
                                                                                                                
9  Analysis see Chapter 2, section 2.313.  
10 Rhodes v OPO (n 1) at para 88 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
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First of all, in contrast with the most stringent standard of intention that insists solely 
upon intention based upon purpose (ends or means), it is arguably more appropriate 
to include the scienter of knowledge/foresight with substantial certainty along with 
purpose (ends or means) in the construct of intention. Secondly, the decision in Rhodes 
v OPO ‘not to include recklessness in the definition of the mental element’11 is well-
supported.12  
 
The inclusion of knowledge/foresight with substantial certainty within the construct of 
intention is sensible and meaningful, for the following four reasons. A) It is more 
warranted in theory to categorise this frame of mind as ‘intention/intentional’, rather 
than to place it under the label of ‘unintentional’, ‘negligent’, or ‘reckless’.13 B) The 
inclusion of the scienter of both purpose (ends or means) and knowledge/foresight with 
substantial certainty in the construct of intention would be compatible with most of 
the existing case law in relation to this tort. C) The notion of knowledge/foresight with 
substantial certainty can be considered as the most suitable interpretation of the 
equivocal term ‘calculated’ (as employed in Wilkinson v Downton).14 D) Another 
reason to support the inclusion of knowledge/foresight with substantial certainty is that, 
as discussed in Chapter 5, the mental state on the part of the wrongdoer towards the 
secondary victim would not be an intention based upon purpose (ends or means), but 
it can be characterised as an intention based upon knowledge (foresight with 
substantial certainty).15 
 
As to the function of intention in relation to this tort, in Rhodes v OPO, the majority’s 
rephrasing of the object of intention as ‘at least severe mental or emotional distress’, 
whilst maintaining ‘recognised psychiatric illness’ as the required threshold of 
consequence,16 can in a sense be construed as giving the mental element of this tort an 
‘ancillary’ role, 17  since there is no requirement that the resulted ‘recognised 
                                                                                                                
11 ibid at para 87 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
12 See analysis in Chapter 3, section 3.661. 
13 Analysis see Chapter 3, section 3.4431. 
14 See Chapter 3, section 3.4432. 
15 See Chapter 5, section 5.422. 
16 Rhodes v OPO (n 1) at para 88 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
17 Regarding the ‘ancillary’ function of intention in tort, see P Cane, ‘Mens Rea in Tort Law’ (2000) 
20 OJLS 533 at 547-548. Relevant analyses also see Chapter 3, section 3.65. 
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psychiatric illness’ must be foreseen or foreseeable.18 Arguably, a more important role 
may be played by the mental element of this tort in future – namely to serve an 
‘independent’ function, to ‘justify imposing tort liability for types of harm which 
would not otherwise be actionable’19 (i.e. to justify granting compensation for mental 
harm falling short of recognised psychiatric illness), as explored in Chapter 4.  
 
Thus the framework of analysis outlined above, and discussed in greater depth in 
earlier chapters, provides a more nuanced definition of the meaning and functionality 
of intention. It also elucidates more clearly the relationship between the concept of 
intention and that of ‘calculated’ as employed in the case law. 
 
 
4.   Mental harm or severe/significant emotional distress as the lowered 
threshold of compensable damage 
  
The consequence element of the Wilkinson tort, as currently stated by the majority of 
the Supreme Court in Rhodes v OPO, requires ‘physical harm or recognised 
psychiatric illness’.20 However, Lord Neuberger argued that ‘it should be enough for 
the claimant to establish that he suffered significant distress as a result of the 
defendant’s statement’.21 Accordingly, questions arise as to the conceptual difference 
between recognised psychiatric illness, severe/significant emotional distress, and mere 
emotional distress, and whether there is any cogent ground for maintaining or lowering 
the threshold of recognised psychiatric illness.  
  
To answer these crucial questions, Chapter 4 has firstly argued that the boundary of 
actionable mental harm should be determined by reference to deviation from normal 
or trivial emotions.22 It is possible and practicable for mental harm to be recognised as 
setting in at a level between recognised psychiatric illness and mere emotional distress. 
                                                                                                                
18 See Rhodes v OPO (n 1) at paras 87-88 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson.  
19 See Cane (n 17) at 546. 
20 Rhodes v OPO (n 1) at para 88 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
21 ibid at para 119 per Lord Neuberger. 
22  See Chapter 4, section 4.221.  
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Secondly, having explored the problems and inconsistencies arising from the 
categorical adoption of recognised psychiatric illness as the threshold of compensable 
damage,23 it is proposed that the threshold of recognised psychiatric illness should be 
relaxed in cases regarding intentional infliction of (stand-alone) mental harm. 24 
Thirdly, the concepts of ‘mental harm’ or ‘severe/significant emotional distress’ can 
adequately denote the lowered threshold of compensable damage.25  For a mental 
condition to be regarded as ‘mental harm’ or ‘severe/significant emotional distress’, 
apart from its being serious and prolonged, the criteria of ‘Deviance’, ‘Distress’, 
‘Dysfunction’, and ‘Danger’26 can be taken into consideration in combination with 
professional medical assessments. 
 
Arguably, the lowered threshold of ‘severe/significant emotional distress’ or ‘mental 
harm’ (in the sense of deviation from normal or trivial emotions) can avoid the 
problems and inconsistencies arising from the insistence upon recognised psychiatric 
illness. It can shift the focus of courts from diagnostic labels back to the nature and 
extent of mental harm actually suffered by the claimants. This proposed framework is 
unlikely to trigger a flood-gate effect,27 and should be feasible in practice by reference 




5.   The proposed framework of this tort when claimed by secondary victims   
  
Apart from the conduct, mental, and consequence elements, a further question arises 
from the term ‘directed at’ employed in the conduct element.28 Does this term imply 
that claimants injured indirectly – i.e. the secondary victims – would have no claim on 
the basis of Wilkinson v Downton? Following investigation in Chapter 5, it is argued 
on the ground of systematic coherence that secondary victims in the area of intentional 
                                                                                                                
23  See Chapter 4, section 4.31.  
24 See Chapter 4, section 4.331. 
25 See Chapter 4, section 4.332. 
26 Relevant analysis see ibid. 
27 For arguments see Chapter 4, section 4.331. 
28 See Rhodes v OPO (n 1) at para 88 per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson. 
   258  
infliction of mental harm should be entitled to compensation. 29  The proposed 
prerequisites of this tort as claimed by secondary victims encompass the conduct 
element, the mental element, and the consequence element as presented below: 
 
The conduct element is infliction of mental harm on the secondary victim, in 
combination with the deliberate offence perpetrated upon the primary victim.30 
 
The mental element, namely the mental state on the part of the wrongdoer towards the 
secondary victim, requires an intention based upon actual or constructive 
knowledge/foresight with substantial certainty, 31  in the sense that the wrongdoer 
knows or foresees that the severe/significant emotional distress or mental harm is 
substantially certain to be caused to the secondary victim. 
 
Admittedly, in the light of the current law, the consequence element of this tort in 
relation to secondary victims is to be construed as physical harm or recognised 
psychiatric illness. However, it is arguable that the threshold should be lowered to 
mental harm or severe/significant emotional distress.32 
 
These prerequisites to liability, in particular the mental element, have the capability 
adequately to circumscribe liability for secondary victims in this intentional field. In 
particular, intention based upon ‘knowledge/foresight with substantial certainty’ is a 
tremendously high threshold for secondary victims to surmount;33 and the limitations 
or factors as regards proximity (as employed in negligence cases) can be taken as 
incorporated in the determination of ‘knowledge/foresight with substantial 
certainty’.34 These factors (regarding proximity) are important considerations, which 
must be known to the wrongdoer, although they need not be adopted as categorical 
limitations. 
 
                                                                                                                
29  See Chapter 5, section 5.3. 
30  See Chapter 5, section 5.411.  
31  See Chapter 5, section 5.422.  
32  See Chapter 5, section 5.43.  
33  See Chapter 5, section 5.5221.  
34  See Chapter 5, section 5.5222.  
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Arguably, these proposed prerequisites can pave the way for the deserving secondary 
victim cases that may appear in the future, providing a feasible framework of claim 
without triggering a flood-gate effect. 
  
In sum, this analysis and reconceptualisation of the three essential elements of this tort 
has the potential to resolve many of the complex problems to which it has given rise 
over the years and which have troubled the judiciary and academic commentators alike. 
This clarification of the current law, and the provision of feasible models with regard 
to its essential elements, point the way forward to rational development of this tort in 
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